Renault prepared for staff suicides over spying scandal

More than a year after French carmaker Renault found itself embroiled in an industrial espionage scandal, new documents show that the company had prepared statements in the event that the three employees blamed in the case committed suicide.

More than one year ago, French carmaker Renault found itself embroiled in a high-profile industrial espionage scandal. Three executives were fired, but the case turned out to be bogus, and in a desperate attempt to put the whole sordid affair behind them, the company issued a public apology to its former employees.

It appears, however, that the story is far from over. New documents have emerged showing that Renault had prepared statements in the event that the scandal drove the three employees concerned to kill themselves.

Executives Michel Balthazard, Bertrand Rochette and Mathieu Tenenbaum were dismissed from Renault in January of last year on suspicions that they had leaked information on the company’s electric cars to rivals. Although wrongly accused, the three found themselves at the heart of a very public scandal, with little recourse to defend themselves.Renault espionage scandal

AUTO INDUSTRY
Renault loses No. 2 man over industrial spying scandal

AUTO INDUSTRY
Renault apologises over spying claim

France
Renault braces for backlash in industrial spying case

Apparently aware of the possible consequences, Renault’s communications director took action. Two statements were prepared in the event of the “inevitable” – one for a botched suicide attempt, the other for a successful one.

Strain on executives

The documents, which French radio station France Info published on their website Friday, showed that Renault was not only fully aware that the strain of the situation might drive its employees to suicide, but also its apparent acceptance of what it saw as a certainty.

Written in dry, clinical terms, the two statements varied little in their content. The first, which was to be issued in the event of “option 1”, in other words a failed suicide attempt, read: “One of the three executives laid off on January 3, 2011, attempted to end his life on (date).”

The second, or “option 2”, was only slightly modified: “One of the three executives laid off on January 3, 2011, ended his life on (date).”

The statement then went on to convey the company’s regret over the tragic incident.

…

Latest update: 13/10/2012
By Luke BROWN (video)
FRANCE 24 (text)

Find this Story at 13 October 2012

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Kim Dotcom: Megaupload-Gründer darf Geheimdienste verklagen

Kim Dotcom hat vor Gericht einen Sieg erstritten: Der Mitgründer des umstrittenen und stillgelegten Datenspeicherdienstes Megaupload darf die Geheimdienste in Neuseeland verklagen.

Der Gründer der Internetplattform Megaupload, Kim Dotcom, darf die neuseeländischen Aufklärungsdienste verklagen. Das entschied eine Richterin am Donnerstag in Neuseeland.

Dotcoms Anwalt Paul Davison sagte Reportern anschließend, der gebürtige Kieler wolle wegen illegaler Abhöraktionen Schadensersatz einklagen. “Das dürfte uns teuer zu stehen kommen”, sagte Oppositionspolitiker Winston Peters. “Es geht womöglich um mehrere hundert Millionen Dollar.”

…

6. Dezember 2012, 12:49 Uhr

Find this story at 6 December 2012

© 2012 stern.de GmbH

Megaupload boss wins right to sue New Zealand

Kim Dotcom wins right to sue New Zealand’s spy agency for unlawful spying.

Kim Dotcom maintains that Megaupload should not be held responsible for stored content [Reuters]

Kim Dotcom, internet tycoon and Megaupload founder, has won the right to sue New Zealand’s foreign intelligence agency for unlawful spying by a US led probe on online piracy which led to his arrest earlier this year.

Helen Winkelmann, High Court chief judge, on Thursday ordered New Zealand’s Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) to disclose all details of any information-sharing arrangements it had with foreign agencies, including the US authorities.

“I have no doubt that the most convenient and expeditious way of enabling the court to determine all matters in dispute is to join the GCSB in the proceedings,” she stated in a written judgement.

Dotcom, who changed his name from Kim Schultz, is fighting a US attempt to extradite him from New Zealand in what has been described as the world’s largest copyright case.

His US-based lawyer, Ira Rothken hailed the court decision as a major victory.

Armed police raided Dotcom’s mansion in January at the behest of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, leading to a court ruling that the search warrants used were illegal, opening the way for him to seek damages from New Zealand Authorities.

Dotcom was released on bail and New Zealand’s Prime Minister, John Key issued an apology after it was revealed in September that the GCSB had spied on Dotcom before police raided his Auckland mansion.

Dotcom is a German national with residency in New Zealand, making it illegal for the GCSB to spy on him.

…

Last Modified: 06 Dec 2012 10:37

Find this story at 6 December 2012

DIA sending hundreds more spies overseas

The Pentagon will send hundreds of additional spies overseas as part of an ambitious plan to assemble an espionage network that rivals the CIA in size, U.S. officials said.

The project is aimed at transforming the Defense Intelligence Agency, which has been dominated for the past decade by the demands of two wars, into a spy service focused on emerging threats and more closely aligned with the CIA and elite military commando units.

When the expansion is complete, the DIA is expected to have as many as 1,600 “collectors” in positions around the world, an unprecedented total for an agency whose presence abroad numbered in the triple digits in recent years.

The total includes military attachés and others who do not work undercover. But U.S. officials said the growth will be driven over a five-year period by the deployment of a new generation of clandestine operatives. They will be trained by the CIA and often work with the U.S. Joint Special Operations Command, but they will get their spying assignments from the Department of Defense.

Among the Pentagon’s top intelligence priorities, officials said, are Islamist militant groups in Africa, weapons transfers by North Korea and Iran, and military modernization underway in China.

“This is not a marginal adjustment for DIA,” the agency’s director, Lt. Gen. Michael T. Flynn, said at a recent conference, during which he outlined the changes but did not describe them in detail. “This is a major adjustment for national security.”

The sharp increase in DIA undercover operatives is part of a far-reaching trend: a convergence of the military and intelligence agencies that has blurred their once-distinct missions, capabilities and even their leadership ranks.

Through its drone program, the CIA now accounts for a majority of lethal U.S. operations outside the Afghan war zone. At the same time, the Pentagon’s plan to create what it calls the Defense Clandestine Service, or DCS, reflects the military’s latest and largest foray into secret intelligence work.

The DIA overhaul — combined with the growth of the CIA since the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks — will create a spy network of unprecedented size. The plan reflects the Obama administration’s affinity for espionage and covert action over conventional force. It also fits in with the administration’s efforts to codify its counterterrorism policies for a sustained conflict and assemble the pieces abroad necessary to carry it out.

Unlike the CIA, the Pentagon’s spy agency is not authorized to conduct covert operations that go beyond intelligence gathering, such as drone strikes, political sabotage or arming militants.

But the DIA has long played a major role in assessing and identifying targets for the U.S. military, which in recent years has assembled a constellation of drone bases stretching from Afghanistan to East Africa.

The expansion of the agency’s clandestine role is likely to heighten concerns that it will be accompanied by an escalation in lethal strikes and other operations outside public view. Because of differences in legal authorities, the military isn’t subject to the same congressional notification requirements as the CIA, leading to potential oversight gaps.

U.S. officials said that the DIA’s realignment won’t hamper congressional scrutiny. “We have to keep congressional staffs and members in the loop,” Flynn said in October, adding that he believes the changes will help the United States anticipate threats and avoid being drawn more directly into what he predicted will be an “era of persistent conflict.”

U.S. officials said the changes for the DIA were enabled by a rare syncing of personalities and interests among top officials at the Pentagon and CIA, many of whom switched from one organization to the other to take their current jobs.

“The stars have been aligning on this for a while,” said a former senior U.S. military official involved in planning the DIA transformation. Like most others interviewed for this article, the former official spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the classified nature of the program.

The DIA project has been spearheaded by Michael G. Vickers, the top intelligence official at the Pentagon and a veteran of the CIA.

Agreements on coordination were approved by Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta, a former CIA director, and retired Army Gen. David H. Petraeus, who resigned abruptly as CIA chief last month over an extramarital affair.

The Pentagon announced the DCS plan in April but details have been kept secret. Former senior Defense Department officials said that the DIA now has about 500 “case officers,” the term for clandestine Pentagon and CIA operatives, and that the number is expected to reach between 800 and 1,000 by 2018.

Pentagon and DIA officials declined to discuss specifics. A senior U.S. defense official said the changes will affect thousands of DIA employees, as analysts, logistics specialists and others are reassigned to support additional spies.

The plan still faces some hurdles, including the challenge of creating “cover” arrangements for hundreds of additional spies. U.S. embassies typically have a set number of slots for intelligence operatives posing as diplomats, most of which are taken by the CIA.

The project has also encountered opposition from policymakers on Capitol Hill, who see the terms of the new arrangement as overly generous to the CIA.

The DIA operatives “for the most part are going to be working for CIA station chiefs,” needing their approval to enter a particular country and clearance on which informants they intend to recruit, said a senior congressional official briefed on the plan. “If CIA needs more people working for them, they should be footing the bill.”

Pentagon officials said that sending more DIA operatives overseas will shore up intelligence on subjects that the CIA is not able or willing to pursue. “We are in a position to contribute to defense priorities that frankly CIA is not,” the senior Defense Department official said.

The project was triggered by a classified study by the director of national intelligence last year that concluded that key Pentagon intelligence priorities were falling into gaps created by the DIA’s heavy focus on battlefield issues and CIA’s extensive workload. U.S. officials said the DIA needed to be repositioned as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan give way to what many expect will be a period of sporadic conflicts and simmering threats requiring close-in intelligence work.

“It’s the nature of the world we’re in,” said the senior defense official, who is involved in overseeing the changes at the DIA. “We just see a long-term era of change before things settle.”

The CIA is increasingly overstretched. Obama administration officials have said they expect the agency’s drone campaign against al-Qaeda to continue for at least a decade more, even as the agency faces pressure to stay abreast of issues including turmoil across the Middle East. Meanwhile, the CIA hasn’t met ambitious goals set by former president George W. Bush to expand its own clandestine service.

CIA officials including John D. Bennett, director of the National Clandestine Service, have backed the DIA’s plan. It “amplifies the ability of both CIA and DIA to achieve the best results,” said CIA spokesman Preston Golson.

Defense officials stressed that the DIA has not been given any new authorities or permission to expand its total payroll. Instead, the new spy slots will be created by cutting or converting other positions across the DIA workforce, which has doubled in the past decade — largely through absorption of other military intelligence entities — to about 16,500.

Vickers has given the DIA an infusion of about $100 million to kick-start the program, officials said, but the agency’s total budget is expected to remain stagnant or decline amid mounting financial pressures across the government.

The DIA’s overseas presence already includes hundreds of diplomatic posts — mainly defense attachés, who represent the military at U.S. embassies and openly gather information from foreign counterparts. Their roles won’t change, officials said. The attachés are part of the 1,600 target for the DIA, but such “overt” positions will represent a declining share amid the increase in undercover slots, officials said.

The senior Defense official said the DIA has begun filling the first of the new posts.

For decades, the DIA has employed undercover operatives to gather secrets on foreign militaries and other targets. But the Defense Humint Service, as it was previously known, was often regarded as an inferior sibling to its civilian counterpart.

Previous efforts by the Pentagon to expand its intelligence role — particularly during Donald H. Rumsfeld’s time as defense secretary — led to intense turf skirmishes with the CIA.

Those frictions have been reduced, officials said, largely because the CIA sees advantages to the new arrangement, including assurances that its station chiefs overseas will be kept apprised of DIA missions and have authority to reject any that might conflict with CIA efforts. The CIA will also be able to turn over hundreds of Pentagon-driven assignments to newly arrived DIA operatives.

“The CIA doesn’t want to be looking for surface-to-air missiles in Libya” when it’s also under pressure to assess the opposition in Syria, said a former high-ranking U.S. military intelligence officer who worked closely with both spy services. Even in cases where their assignments overlap, the DIA is likely to be more focused than the CIA on military aspects — what U.S. commanders in Africa might ask about al-Qaeda in Mali, for example, rather than the broader questions raised by the White House.

U.S. officials said DIA operatives, because of their military backgrounds, are often better equipped to recruit sources who can answer narrow military questions such as specifications of China’s fifth-generation fighter aircraft and its work on a nuclear aircraft carrier. “The CIA would like to give up that kind of work,” the former officer said.

The CIA has agreed to add new slots to its training classes at its facility in southern Virginia, known as the Farm, to make room for more military spies. The DIA has accounted for about 20 percent of each class in recent years, but that figure will grow.

The two agencies have also agreed to share resources overseas, including technical gear, logistics support, space in facilities and vehicles. The DIA has even adopted aspects of the CIA’s internal structure, creating a group called “Persia House,” for example, to pool resources on Iran.

The CIA’s influence extends across the DIA’s ranks. Flynn, who became director in July, is a three-star Army general who worked closely with the CIA in Afghanistan and Iraq. His deputy, David R. Shedd, spent the bulk of his career at the CIA, much of it overseas as a spy.

…

By Greg Miller,December 01, 2012

Find this story at 1 December 2012

© 2012 The Washington Post

Pentagon reportedly planning to double size of its worldwide spy network

More than 1,600 new Defense Department agents will collect intelligence and report findings to CIA, said to be overstretched

The news is likely to heighten concerns about the accountability of the US military amid concerns about the CIA’s drone programme. Photograph: US navy/Reuters

The US military plans to send hundreds more spies overseas as part of an ambitious plan that will more than double the size of its espionage network, it was reported Sunday.

The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Pentagon’s military intelligence unit, is aiming to recruit 1,600 intelligence “collectors” – up from the several hundred overseas agents it has employed in recent years, sources told The Washington Post.

Combined with the enormous growth in the CIA since 9/11 attacks, the recruitment drive will create an unprecedented spy network. “The stars have been aligning on this for a while,” an anonymous former senior US military official involved in planning the DIA transformation told the Post.

The news is likely to heighten concerns about the accountability of the US military’s clandestine programmes amid mounting concerns about the CIA-controlled drone programme.

The United Nations said last month that it intends to investigate civilian deaths from drone strikes. The US has refused to even acknowledge the existence of a drone programme in Pakistan. The US military is not subject to the same congressional notification requirements as the CIA, creating yet more potential controversies.

With the US pulling out of Afghanistan and operations in Iraq winding down, government officials are looking to change the focus of the DIA away from battlefield intelligence and to concentrate on gathering intelligence on issues including Islamist militant groups in Africa, weapons trades in North Korea and Iran, and the military build up in China.

“It’s the nature of the world we’re in,” said the senior defense official, who is involved in overseeing the changes at the DIA. “We just see a long-term era of change before things settle.”

The DIA’s new recruits would include military attachés and others who do not work undercover. But US officials told the Post that the growth will be driven a new generation of spies who will take their orders from the Department of Defense.

The DIA is increasingly recruiting civilians to fill out its ranks as it looks to place agents as academics and business executives in militarily sensitive positions overseas.

Officials said the sheer number of agents that the DIA is looking to recruit presents its own challenge as the agency may struggle to find enough overseas vacancies for its clandestine agents. “There are some definite challenges from a cover perspective,” a senior defense official said.

…

Dominic Rushe in New York
The Guardian, Sunday 2 December 2012 17.03 GMT

Find this story at 2 December 2012
© 2012 Guardian News and Media Limited or its affiliated companies. All rights reserved.

Deutschland Spionage: Die Verschwörung gegen Brandt

Nachdem 1969 erstmals ein SPD-Politiker Bundeskanzler wurde, bauten CDU- und CSU-Anhänger einen eigenen Nachrichtendienst auf. Ein unglaublicher Spionagefall

Dies ist die erstaunliche Geschichte einer Verschwörung. Sie begann im Herbst 1969 und endete Mitte der achtziger Jahre, sie spielt nicht irgendwo, sondern im Herzen der politischen Landschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, tief verankert in den konservativen Parteien CDU und CSU. Es geht dabei um nicht weniger als um die Gründung eines eigenen Nachrichtendienstes, abseits der Öffentlichkeit und jeder parlamentarischen Kontrolle. Verschiedene Geheimdienstfiguren spielen eine Rolle und ein internationales Netz schillernder Agenten, alles in enger Abstimmung mit christsozialen Hardlinern. Franz Josef Strauß hat den Dienst unterstützt, Helmut Kohl hat von ihm gewusst. Finanziert wurden die schwarzen Spione im Verborgenen, aus unübersichtlichen Kanälen. Nach den Unterlagen, die dem ZEITmagazin vorliegen, kostete dieser Nachrichtendienst mehrere Millionen Mark.

Im Jahr 2012 wird anlässlich der dramatischen Ermittlungspannen im Zusammenhang mit dem Zwickauer Mördertrio heftig über den Sinn der Geheimdienste diskutiert und auch über die Frage, wie schnell ein unkontrollierter Dienst zum Problem an sich werden kann. Die Geschichte, die hier erzählt wird, macht deutlich, wie Spitzenpolitiker an allen staatlichen Organen vorbei solch einen unkontrollierbaren Dienst schufen, nur um ihr eigenes trübes politisches Süppchen zu kochen.

Alles fängt damit an, dass im Herbst 1969 die Konservativen erstmals seit Bestehen der Bundesrepublik die Regierungsmacht verlieren. CDU und CSU gewinnen zwar die meisten Stimmen bei der Bundestagswahl, die FDP entscheidet sich jedoch für ein Bündnis mit den Sozialdemokraten. Nun kann Willy Brandt sein außenpolitisches Konzept »Wandel durch Annäherung« in die Tat umsetzen. Er schickt seinen Staatssekretär Egon Bahr im Januar 1970 als Unterhändler nach Moskau. Dort soll er mit dem sowjetischen Außenminister Andrej Gromyko sondieren, ob die Regierung im Kreml bereit ist, sich per Vertrag zu einem Gewaltverzicht zu verpflichten. Dafür wird die Bundesregierung dem Verhandlungspartner entgegenkommen müssen. Mitglieder der Vertriebenenverbände warnen, ihre Heimat im Osten dürfe nicht im Gegenzug preisgegeben werden. Brandt weiß, dass sich die Sowjetunion nur auf einen Vertrag einlassen wird, wenn er als deutscher Kanzler die Grenzen nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg offiziell akzeptiert. Ebenso heikel: Brandt kann und will die DDR nicht völkerrechtlich anerkennen, die Regierung in Ost-Berlin will allein unter dieser Voraussetzung verhandeln.
DIE AUTORIN

Die Politikwissenschaftlerin Stefanie Waske las für ihre Dissertation Briefe von CDU-Abgeordneten, in einigen war von einem »kleinen Dienst« die Rede. Sieben Jahre dauerte die Recherche, deren Ergebnisse sie hier erstmals veröffentlicht. Sie studierte Tausende von Dokumenten, einige wurden erst nach jahrelangen Prüfungen freigegeben. Anfang 2013 erscheint ihr Buch »Nach Lektüre vernichten! Der geheime Nachrichtendienst von CDU und CSU im Kalten Krieg« bei Hanser

Brandt wird sich nicht nur außenpolitisch geschickt verhalten müssen. Seine Koalition verfügt im Bundestag lediglich über eine Mehrheit von wenigen Stimmen. Geht der Kanzler zu weit, riskiert er das Ende seiner Regierung. Auch in der SPD- und in der FDP-Fraktion gibt es Abgeordnete, die sich in den Vertriebenenverbänden engagieren oder aus anderen Gründen skeptisch sind. Bereits im Oktober 1970 wechseln drei FDP-Parlamentarier zur CDU/CSU-Fraktion. Sie werden nicht die letzten bleiben. Ebenso könnte ein falscher Verhandlungsschritt die internationalen Partner der Bundesregierung – allen voran die USA – verärgern.

Bahr ist sich damals bewusst, dass ihn die Nachrichtendienste beobachten – ohne jedoch an einen eigenen Dienst der Opposition im Bundestag zu denken, wie er heute sagt. Henry Kissinger, dem damaligen Sicherheitsberater des US-Präsidenten, habe er als Erstem das Gesamtkonzept bei einem Besuch in völliger Offenheit dargelegt. »Natürlich war er misstrauisch. Wenn Kissinger Nein gesagt hätte, dann hätten wir es nicht gemacht. Es wäre sonst ein Abenteuer geworden.«

Was Bahr nicht wusste: Henry Kissinger empfängt in seinem Büro in Washington im März 1970 einen guten Bekannten. Der Besucher will sich über die neue Ostpolitik Willy Brandts unterhalten. Das verwundert Kissinger sicher nicht, kaum ein Thema ist in diesen Tagen wichtiger. Der deutsche Kanzler will die Regierung in Moskau zu einem Entspannungskurs bewegen. Kissinger ahnt nicht, dass sein Gast nur eines im Sinn hat: ihm vertrauliche Informationen zu entlocken, um sie Brandts Gegnern in der Bundesrepublik zu schicken. Auf seine Botschaft wartet bereits ein ehemaliger hochrangiger Mitarbeiter des Bundesnachrichtendienstes (BND). Dieser baut für die CDU und CSU einen Nachrichtendienst auf. Wer dieser Zuträger war, kann heute nicht zweifelsfrei geklärt werden. Henry Kissinger lässt sämtliche Fragen des ZEITmagazins zu diesem Komplex unbeantwortet.

Es ist die tiefe Furcht vor der neuen Politik Willy Brandts, die deutsche Konservative zum Handeln treibt. Einer von ihnen ist der CSU-Bundestagsabgeordnete Karl Theodor Freiherr zu Guttenberg, der Großvater des gleichnamigen ehemaligen Bundesverteidigungsministers im Kabinett Angela Merkels. Der damals 48-Jährige mit hoher Stirn, nach hinten gekämmten glatten Haaren und Walross-Schnauzer gilt als brillanter Redner und intellektueller Kopf der Konservativen. Die Meinungen über ihn sind gespalten. Manche bewundern und verehren ihn als Gentleman, andere sehen in ihm einen reaktionären Adeligen. Seit einiger Zeit weiß der Hoffnungsträger der CSU, dass er an der tödlichen Muskelkrankheit ALS leidet. Als außenpolitischer Experte seiner Partei kennt er die Pläne der sozialliberalen Regierung genau. Bald wird er Brandt im Bundestag vorwerfen: »Sie, Herr Bundeskanzler, sind dabei, das Deutschlandkonzept des Westens aufzugeben und in jenes der Sowjetunion einzutreten.« Für ihn steht die Freiheit auf dem Spiel.

Guttenberg trifft sich im Herbst 1969 mit dem ehemaligen Kanzler Kurt Georg Kiesinger, dem früheren Kanzleramtschef Konrad Adenauers, Hans Globke, und dem CSU-Vorsitzenden Franz Josef Strauß. Später wird in einer Aufzeichnung festgehalten: »Auf Grund der Lage nach den Wahlen zum Bundestag beschlossen Dr. H. Globke in Verbindung mit Dr. K. G. Kiesinger und Frhr. von und zu Guttenberg in Verbindung mit Dr. F. J. Strauß die Gründung eines Informationsdienstes für die Opposition.« Sie alle haben die Sorge, dass sie durch den Regierungswechsel von den Infokanälen der Geheimdienste abgeschnitten werden. Und sie wissen, dass ihre Parteien in Diplomatenkreisen noch Rückhalt haben. Deren Beobachtungen der neuen Ostpolitik könnten über abgeschirmte Kanäle zur Opposition transportiert werden, so der kühne Plan. Vier Wochen später wird die Idee noch abenteuerlicher. Guttenberg bekommt einen Brief von einem Meister der Konspiration: Wolfgang Langkau, pensionierter Vertrauter des ehemaligen BND-Präsidenten Reinhard Gehlen und langjähriger CDU-Kontaktmann. Er schreibt: »Zu diesem Ziele bietet sich die Möglichkeit an, ein seit Jahren durch eine besondere Stelle im BND geführtes Informationsbeschaffungsnetz einzusetzen, das laufende Verbindungen insbesondere zu USA, Frankreich, Österreich, Italien, Vatikan, arabische Länder, Jugoslawien, Rumänien, ČSSR, UNO unterhält.« Er ist überzeugt, dass seine ehemaligen Zubringer mit an Bord wären, würden sich die Konservativen zu einem eigenen Dienst durchringen können. Zumal in einer Situation, in der sie gemeinsam einen »Beitrag für unser europäisches Überleben« leisten könnten, notiert Langkau.

Von Langkau sind nur wenige Bilder bekannt. Sie zeigen einen kleinen, hageren Mann mit schütterem grauem Haar, ausgeprägten Geheimratsecken und riesigem dunklem Brillengestell. Seine Bekannten beschreiben ihn als beherrscht und analytisch denkend. Der BND-Präsident Gehlen schenkte dem zurückhaltenden Mann wie kaum jemandem in seinem Dienst Vertrauen. Daher gab er ihm Sonderaufträge, beispielsweise den Kontakt zum israelischen Geheimdienst Mossad aufzubauen. Langkau leitete bis 1968 den Strategischen Dienst des BND. Die Abteilung sollte die sowjetische Westpolitik und die amerikanische Sicherheitspolitik beobachten.

Das Wichtigste für ein Nachrichtennetz sind Informanten – auch hier kann Langkau viel vorweisen. Er besaß den Spitznamen Doktor der Operationen und liebte es, mit Agenten zu arbeiten. Andere Geheimdienstler bevorzugen Technik, wie Radaranlagen oder Telefonüberwachung. Langkau kümmerte sich um einige seiner Zubringer sogar persönlich. Im Geheimdienstjargon heißen sie Sonderverbindungen, es sind hochrangige Politiker, Wirtschaftslenker und Militärs. Sie verfügen über besonders gute Zugänge zu höchsten Kreisen der Gesellschaft und Politik. Erst mit der Zeit wird der Kontakt enger, das heißt, der Geheimdienst führt sie, erteilt ihnen Aufträge. An diese Sonderverbindungen denkt Langkau, als er der Opposition sein Angebot unterbreitet.

Per Brief offeriert er, diese ehemaligen BND-Verbindungen für CDU und CSU erneut in Aktion zu versetzen. Sie wollten zudem nicht für die SPD/FDP-Regierung arbeiten. Er schlägt vor, eine Kernbasis eines »echten geheimen Nachrichtendienstes im Sinne eines – zunächst winzigen – National-Security-Stabes für eine künftige CDU/CSU-Regierung« zu schaffen. Ein anspruchsvoller Plan, soll der kleine Dienst doch die gesamte Spannbreite außenpolitischer Nachrichten sammeln und auswerten.

Billig ist sein Vorschlag nicht: Die Planung sieht eine Mindestfinanzierung von 750000 Mark pro Jahr vor, dazu als Option eine weitere Million Mark. Der Kreis um Guttenberg war den Dokumenten zufolge, die dem ZEITmagazin vorliegen, vom Plan des ehemaligen Spitzenbeamten des BND trotz der hohen Kosten und Risiken überzeugt.

Die erste drängende Frage: Woher sollen CDU und CSU das Personal nehmen? Ohne Hauptamtliche kann es aus Sicht der Politiker keinen Informationsdienst geben. Sie beschließen, ihnen nahestehende BND-Mitarbeiter abzuwerben. Als Ersten nehmen sie Hans Langemann in den Blick, damals für den BND in Rom. Er leitet die dortige Residentur, das sind die »Botschaften« des Dienstes im Ausland. Doch die CDU- und CSU-Bundespolitiker kommen zu spät: Der bayerische Kultusminister Ludwig Huber bemüht sich bereits um Langemann und will ihn als auslandsnachrichtendienstlichen Berater der Olympischen Spiele 1972 gewinnen.

Die andere Option: Hans Christoph von Stauffenberg, ein weiterer ehemaliger Mitarbeiter Langkaus. Er arbeitet in einer verdeckten Münchner BND-Außenstelle. Von seinem kleinen Büro geben die Mitarbeiter Hinweise an die Zentrale in Pullach, welche Informationen die Agenten beschaffen sollen. Im Jargon des Dienstes heißt das Steuerungshinweis – die Hauptaufgabe des damals 58-Jährigen. Er wertet Meldungen und Nachrichten aus, führt somit keine Agenten. Auf Fotos wirkt der Baron eher wie ein Künstler, Schauspieler oder Intellektueller: schmal, mittelgroß, stets korrekt und geschmackvoll gekleidet mit Jackett und Krawatte.

Stauffenberg – bei diesem Namen denkt wohl jeder zuerst an Claus von Stauffenberg, den Offizier der deutschen Wehrmacht, der am 20. Juli 1944 Hitler töten wollte. Anders als der spätere Attentäter machte Hans Christoph von Stauffenberg keine militärische Karriere, eine Krankheit verhinderte den Fronteinsatz. Stattdessen befragte er Kriegsgefangene in einem Lager bei Oberursel. Als Student war er 1933 in die NSDAP eingetreten, hielt sich jedoch bald von der Partei fern. Am Tag des Attentats auf Hitler saß Stauffenberg mit seiner Frau Camilla in der Oper in Bad Homburg und sah sich die Hochzeit des Figaro an. Die Gestapo nahm das Ehepaar, wie fast alle Stauffenbergs, wenige Tage danach in Sippenhaft.

In Hans Christoph von Stauffenberg finden die Eingeweihten aus CDU und CSU einen Leiter für ihren Dienst. Es taucht nur das Problem auf, dass der nach 12 Jahren im BND nicht seine Ansprüche aus dem öffentlichen Dienst verlieren soll. Außerdem sieht der Plan vor, noch eine Übersetzerin und seine Sekretärin zu übernehmen. Es entsteht die Idee, sie gemeinsam in der bayerischen Staatskanzlei unterzubringen.

Damit das gelingt, muss Guttenberg für seinen Freund und Verwandten Stauffenberg bei seinen Kollegen im bayerischen Kabinett werben. Inzwischen bemüht sich Stauffenberg um die Unterstützung seines langjährigen Freundes Casimir Prinz zu Sayn-Wittgenstein. 1969 ist dieser noch nicht Schatzmeister der hessischen CDU, was ihn Jahrzehnte später zu einer der Schlüsselfiguren der CDU-Parteispendenaffäre werden ließ. Sayn-Wittgenstein war es, der rund 20 Millionen Mark auf ein CDU-Konto in der Schweiz gebracht hatte und deren Herkunft als »jüdische Vermächtnisse« zu deklarieren versuchte. Er wurde wegen Untreue angeklagt, das Verfahren wurde allerdings wegen seines schlechten Gesundheitszustandes 2005 eingestellt.

Die Freunde Sayn-Wittgenstein und Stauffenberg verbindet ein dramatisches Ereignis zur Zeit des Nationalsozialismus. Sayn-Wittgensteins Mutter hatte in zweiter Ehe den jüdischen Unternehmer Richard Merton geheiratet. Dem Paar war in letzter Minute die Ausreise ins britische Exil geglückt, Casimir und sein Bruder August Richard zu Sayn-Wittgenstein blieben und versuchten 1939, mit der Gestapo über das beschlagnahmte Familienvermögen zu verhandeln. Das kostete August Richard das Leben. Casimir fand ihn sterbend in einem Berliner Hotel. Stauffenberg kam noch mit einem Arzt dorthin, doch es war zu spät. Offizielle Todesursache: Selbstmord.

1969 zieht es Sayn-Wittgenstein in die Politik, auch bei ihm dient als Begründung die Ablehnung der neuen Ostpolitik. Er hat sich bisher auf seine Karriere im Familienunternehmen, der Frankfurter Metallgesellschaft AG, konzentriert. Seine Wirtschaftskontakte, so Stauffenbergs Hoffnung, könnten dem Dienst sehr helfen. Bald wird sich Sayn-Wittgenstein als Spendensammler bewähren müssen. Eine Aufzeichnung Guttenbergs, wahrscheinlich aus dem Jahr 1970, offenbart, dass fast die Hälfte der Kosten für den Nachrichtendienst durch Spenden hereinkommen soll: Darin heißt es, die Wirtschaft Nordrhein-Westfalens habe 100000 Mark zugesagt. Die CDU wolle prüfen, ob sie ebenfalls 100000 Mark zahlen könne. 50000 Mark stelle die CSU in Aussicht. Von der süddeutschen Industrie erhoffe man sich 100000 Mark.

Stauffenbergs pensionierter Chef Langkau beginnt bereits im Frühjahr 1970 mit einer kleinen privaten Gruppe in München. Er nimmt Kontakt zu seinen ehemaligen Quellen auf, bittet sie um ihre Mitarbeit. Eine von ihnen führt das oben erwähnte Gespräch mit Kissinger im März 1970 in Washington. Langkau erreicht danach die Meldung, der Sicherheitsberater des amerikanischen Präsidenten habe erwähnt, Bahr lasse dem Weißen Haus auf Umwegen Berichte über seine Gespräche in Moskau zukommen. Kissinger vermute jedoch, so der Informant, dass der Unterhändler der Bonner Regierung nicht alles sage, was sich zwischen ihm und den Sowjets abspiele.

Kissinger und Bahr hatten im Oktober 1969 verabredet, einen back channel einzurichten, einen direkten Kontakt an der Bürokratie vorbei – der sollte jedoch absolut geheim bleiben und Vertrauen herstellen. Auf US-Seite sollte nur noch Kissingers Mitarbeiter Helmut Sonnenfeldt etwas wissen, auf deutscher Willy Brandt und Kanzleramtschef Horst Ehmke. Wer die Kissinger-Meldung des Informanten noch erhielt, ist nicht überliefert. Sie trägt die Nummer 58, kommt am 10. März 1970 aus Washington und umfasst drei knappe, mit Schreibmaschine verfasste Absätze. Bahr, nach dem Dokument befragt, bemerkt: »Es erinnert an eine typische BND-Meldung aus Presseberichten und Vermutungen.«

Der Stoff hat das Zeug zum Spionageroman. Und die Konstruktion dieses Nachrichtendienstes an jeder parlamentarischen Kontrolle vorbei trägt einen politischen Skandal in sich. Was wissen CDU und CSU heute darüber? Wie beurteilen sie die Schaffung dieses Dienstes? Wie wurden die Gelder verbucht? Was für eine Rolle spielte Prinz zu Sayn-Wittgenstein, immerhin der Mann, der mitverantwortlich war für einen der größten Politikskandale der Bundesrepublik? All das haben wir die Unionsparteien gefragt. Für die Antworten ließen sich beide Parteizentralen eine Woche Zeit. Dann hieß es, der Sachverhalt sei unbekannt. Kein Kommentar.

Im Sommer 1970 übernimmt Hans Christoph von Stauffenberg die Führung der nachrichtendienstlichen Gruppe. Er hat die Zusage, mit seiner Sekretärin in die bayerische Staatskanzlei zu wechseln. In seinem Kündigungsschreiben an den BND führt Stauffenberg aus, er wolle sich nicht »zum Handlanger einer Politik machen«, die er »für das Volk für abträglich, zumindest für sehr gefährlich« halte. Seinen neuen Arbeitsplatz nennt Stauffenberg »Zuflucht«. Mit dem 1. August 1970 muss sich der ehemalige Geheimdienstler offiziell in einen Redenschreiber für Grußworte verwandeln, alles nur, damit er seine Mission des Informationsdienstes in die Tat umsetzen kann. Seinen neuen Kollegen erzählt Stauffenberg die Legende, er komme von der Bundesvermögensverwaltung. Das Synonym für Bundesnachrichtendienst kennt längst jeder. So geht bei seiner Ankunft, wie er selbst schreibt, »ein Raunen durchs Haus«. Doch Stauffenberg verschwindet schnell aus ihrem Blickfeld. Sein Dienstherr hat ihn in einem abgelegenen Nebenhaus untergebracht. Arbeit ist Mangelware. Und wenn einmal etwas anfällt, bleiben für den Neuling die Randthemen übrig, wie die Rede zum 150. Geburtstag von Pfarrer Sebastian Kneipp oder ein Grußtelegramm für das Raumausstatter-Handwerk.

Die eigentliche Arbeit beginnt nach Dienstschluss. Mit seinem ehemaligen Chef und neuen Partner Langkau stattet er eine seiner Münchner Wohnungen zu einem »bescheidenen Büro« für den Dienst um. Die Möbel stammen aus der CSU-Landesleitung. Die Lage ist – anders als die Ausstattung – exklusiv, die Ottostraße verläuft parallel zum Maximiliansplatz. Guttenberg gratuliert Stauffenberg aus der Kur in Bad Neustadt: »Ich freue mich, daß im Übrigen nun doch endlich gelungen scheint, was wir monatelang betrieben haben, und daß Du nun anscheinend vernünftig arbeiten kannst.«

Langkau und Stauffenberg beginnen sofort mit der Arbeit. Egon Bahr hat in Moskau bereits mit dem Außenminister Andrej Gromyko eine gemeinsame Linie gefunden. Am 12. August 1970 werden Brandt und Außenminister Walter Scheel sowie Gromyko und der sowjetische Ministerpräsident Alexej Kossygin feierlich den Moskauer Vertrag unterzeichnen.

Die Meldungen der Informanten gehen aus Brüssel, Paris und Washington ein, fast nie aus dem Inland. Mithilfe dieser Texte verfassen die ehemaligen BND-Mitarbeiter Berichte, nicht nur zur neuen Ostpolitik, sondern auch über die innenpolitische Entwicklung Chinas oder Spannungen im Zentralkomitee der Kommunistischen Partei der Sowjetunion. Klassische Agentenberichte sind es nicht, hier wird niemand beschattet, telefonisch abgehört oder verdeckt fotografiert. Wobei einige Informanten ihre vertraulich-privaten Unterredungen mit ihren Gesprächspartnern offensichtlich mitschneiden. Im Laufe der Jahre wird Stauffenberg laut den Berichten über einige gut platzierte Quellen verfügen. Selbst mit dem Staatspräsidenten Rumäniens, Nicolae Ceauşescu, und dem Jugoslawiens, Josip Broz Tito, kommen die Vertrauensmänner ins Gespräch. Bei Ceauşescu ist es die Quelle »Petrus«, bei Tito ist es »ein progressiver Politiker eines blockfreien Landes«.

Welche Identitäten hinter den Zuträgern stecken, lässt sich nur teilweise belegen. In den heute vorliegenden Listen und Berichten tauchen sie mit ihren Decknamen auf. Langkau und Stauffenberg waren geschulte Geheimdienst-Mitarbeiter. Sie hätten niemals die wahren Namen ihrer Vertrauensmänner aufgelistet und die Zahlungsbelege angeheftet. Bekannt sind die Einsatzgebiete der Informanten: »Dut« kümmert sich um die USA, Frankreich und Italien, »Grete« um Straßburg und »Petrus« um Osteuropa und den Nahen Osten. Die drei Informanten »Chris«, »Norbert« und »Hervier« berichten aus den USA. Österreich nimmt sich »Hiking« vor. In Fernost arbeitet »Xaver«. »Urbino« und »Kolb« decken die Kirchen ab. Im Laufe der Jahre kommen neue Zuträger hinzu. Sie berichten aus den USA ebenso wie aus Kuba oder Taiwan.

Wann immer die Berichte darauf hindeuten, wer die Information geliefert haben könnte, gehen sie nur an den engsten Verteiler. Stets schreibt der Bearbeiter, meist wohl Stauffenberg, dann hinzu: »Wegen Quellengefährdung wird um besonders vertrauliche Behandlung gebeten.« Die Empfänger sollen trotzdem ahnen, wie außerordentlich das Ganze ist: Aus den Hauptstädten der Welt berichtet daher mal »ein Vertrauensmann von Henry Kissinger«, ein »hoher rumänischer Parteifunktionär« oder »ein sehr gut unterrichteter UN-Diplomat«.

Zu Beginn erreichen die besonders exklusiven Berichte die CDU über den Fraktionsmitarbeiter Hans Neusel, der im Jahr 1979 Staatssekretär und Chef des Bundespräsidialamtes wird. Das bestätigt dieser auf Anfrage.

Friedrich Voß, Büroleiter von Franz Josef Strauß, erhält die Ausfertigungen für seinen Chef. So sind die Parteispitzen informiert. Später werden die CDU/CSU-Fraktionsvorsitzenden Karl Carstens und Helmut Kohl unterrichtet.

Der Nachrichtendienst ist teuer. Allein im ersten Jahr entstehen für die Quellen Kosten von 160.000 Mark. Eine wichtige Rolle bei der Finanzierung spielt der Verein, den Stauffenberg und seine Unterstützer im Januar 1971 ins Leben rufen: der Arbeitskreis für das Studium internationaler Fragen in München. Der Verein überweist Geld an Stauffenberg. Vorsitzender wird der Herausgeber des Rheinischen Merkurs, Otto B. Roegele, Stellvertreter wird der ehemalige Minister für die Fragen des Bundesverteidigungsrates, Heinrich Krone. Das Amt des Schatzmeisters übernimmt der Rechtsanwalt und CSU-Landtagsabgeordnete Alfred Seidl, eine höchst schillernde Figur. Seidl, ein überzeugtes NSDAP-Mitglied, verteidigte in den Nürnberger Prozessen Rudolf Heß und Hans Frank und bemühte sich lebenslang um die Freilassung von Heß. Nach dem Tod Seidls wurde bekannt, dass ihn eine enge politische Freundschaft mit dem DVU-Chef Gerhard Frey verband. Die Akten des Arbeitskreises, die Aufschluss über die Arbeit des Vereins liefern könnten, befinden sich im Nachlass von Exminister Krone. Sie sind vom Archiv der Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung mit Verweis auf Persönlichkeitsrechte gesperrt.

Fest steht: Bis Mitte der siebziger Jahre braucht Stauffenberg die finanzielle Unterstützung von CDU und CSU. Dem ZEITmagazin liegen Ausarbeitungen vor, wonach die Christdemokraten in den ersten beiden Jahren je 100000 Mark beigesteuert haben. Dazu kommen Unternehmensspenden, die nicht weiter aufgeschlüsselt werden. Überliefert ist, dass Sayn-Wittgenstein den ehemaligen Deutsche-Bank-Chef Hermann Josef Abs umwarb, der bayerische Staatsminister Franz Heubl den Unternehmer Rolf Rodenstock. Guttenberg bemühte sich um den ehemaligen Flick-Generalbevollmächtigten und CSU-Abgeordneten Wolfgang Pohle.

Ein wichtiger Helfer von Stauffenberg wird sein ehemaliger BND-Kollege Hans Langemann, der zuerst den Dienst leiten sollte. Er arbeitet seit November 1970 für die Olympischen Spiele in München und verfügt über Geld des Landes Bayern. Mit den Landesmitteln soll er geheime Zuträger finanzieren, die ihn auf Gefahren für die Sommerspiele hinweisen. Allein 1971 liegt sein Budget bei 91254 Mark, ein Jahr später sind es 108491 Mark. Ab März 1971 übernimmt Stauffenberg Langemanns Berichte mit einem Vorspann für seinen Dienst: Die Meldungen, heißt es, stammten aus einem »Bereich, dessen Koordinierung vorbereitet« werde.

Im November 1970 wird Henry Kissinger erneut von einem Informanten Stauffenbergs aufgesucht. Mittlerweile ist der deutsch-sowjetische Vertrag unterschrieben, die Unterzeichnung des Warschauer Vertrags steht kurz bevor. Dieses Mal weiß Kissinger offensichtlich, dass sein Gast der Opposition zuarbeitet. Hier wird er nicht ausgehorcht, sondern er gibt der CDU und CSU vertrauliche Ratschläge, wie sie sich gegenüber Brandt verhalten sollen. Der Zuträger zitiert Kissinger mit den Worten: »Es mag möglich sein, die gegenwärtige Regierung zu stürzen, offen bleibt aber, ob hierfür nicht Risiken eingehandelt werden, die eine CDU/CSU-Regierung in größte Schwierigkeiten bringen kann.« Der Amerikaner weist laut Bericht darauf hin, dass die sowjetische Regierung die Zustimmung beider großen Parteien im Bundestag für die Ostverträge wünsche. Auf diese Weise würde auch bei einem Mehrheitswechsel das Abkommen nicht infrage gestellt. Soll also die Opposition Verantwortung für die Verträge übernehmen, wie es auch die SPD fordert? Kissinger favorisiert demnach eine andere Taktik: »Ich würde eher dafür plädieren, die Ratifizierung zu verzögern und in dieser Zeit die Resultate der recht unterschiedlichen sowjetischen Praktiken in der Weltpolitik genauer zu beobachten, der Bundesregierung die Verantwortung für die Ratifizierung selbst zu überlassen.«

Kissinger rät jedoch der Quelle zufolge den Unionsparteien davon ab, ihre offene Konfrontation fortzusetzen. Die CDU/CSU-Fraktion lehnt es nämlich ab, einen Beobachter zu den Verhandlungen des Warschauer Vertrags in die polnische Hauptstadt zu entsenden. Im Dezember 1970 weigert sich Fraktionschef Rainer Barzel, den Kanzler zur Vertragsunterzeichnung zu begleiten. So ist er nicht dabei, als Brandt am Ghetto-Ehrenmal einen Kranz niederlegt und auf die Knie fällt. Die Bilder dieser Geste erreichen die ganze Welt und werden zum Symbol der neuen Ostpolitik.

Das kommende Jahr 1971 ist das der zähen Verhandlungen. Amerikaner, Franzosen, Briten und Sowjets beraten in endlosen Runden, wie sie das Leben in West-Berlin verbessern können. Die Alliierten haben die Hoheit über die geteilte Stadt. Die östliche Seite müsste garantieren, dass West-Berlin von der Bundesrepublik aus jederzeit ohne große Kontrolle erreichbar ist. Bisher ist die Anreise ein Abenteuer, das viele Stunden dauern kann. Am 3. September 1971 können die Botschafter der Alliierten endlich das Viermächteabkommen unterzeichnen.

Zwei Wochen später reist Kanzler Brandt überraschend auf die ukrainische Halbinsel Krim. In einem Vorort Jaltas, Oreanda, trifft er Leonid Breschnew in dessen Ferienhaus. Das bringt Brandt in die Kritik: Zum einen wird ihm vorgeworfen, habe er mit seinem Abstecher auf die Krim die westlichen Partner überrumpelt. Zum anderen wirken Breschnew und Brandt auf den Bildern wie in einem gemeinsamen Urlaub: Sie fahren mit dem Boot über das Schwarze Meer, gehen zusammen schwimmen. Offiziell sprechen die beiden unter anderem über die Folgen des Viermächteabkommens.

Stauffenbergs Informanten orakeln, was Brandt und Breschnew besprochen haben könnten. Einer der Zuträger spricht von »geheimen Konzessionen«. Wieder einmal sucht ein Vertrauensmann des Dienstes Kissinger zu einem privaten Gespräch auf. Anders als sonst entschließt sich Stauffenberg, den anschließenden Bericht komplett abzudrucken. Er mahnt jedoch die Empfänger: »Die naheliegende Enttarnung des Informanten legt eine entsprechend vorsichtige Verwendung dieser Information dringend nahe.« Der Zuträger wird mit Genugtuung die Skepsis seines Gesprächspartners notiert haben. Er fragt den amerikanischen Sicherheitsberater, was er von Brandts Besuch auf der Krim halte. Kissinger soll geantwortet haben: »Wir haben von ihm einen Bericht darüber bekommen, aber wie viel gesagt wurde und was verborgen blieb, werden erst Zeit und weitere Informationen erweisen. Natürlich haben wir all das nicht gerne gehabt, und der Präsident hat nicht gezögert, die Deutschen davon in Kenntnis zu setzen.« Dann folgt die schärfste Rüge. Der Informant schreibt, Kissinger habe ihm zum Alleingang Brandts gesagt: »Daß Deutschlands neue SPD-Führer das Gefühl haben, es sei für sie an der Zeit, wie Erwachsene zu handeln, das verstehen wir und glauben auch, daß West-Deutschland wie ein Erwachsener handeln sollte. Aber manchmal machen auch Erwachsene Fehler, törichte Fehler, und handeln dumm.«

All dies deutet an, dass die Zeiten für die sozialliberale Regierung schwieriger werden. Im Frühjahr 1972 verlassen wieder drei Abgeordnete die SPD/FDP-Fraktion. Zeitungen drucken aus dem Zusammenhang gerissene und wohl auch gefälschte Auszüge aus den Gesprächsaufzeichnungen von Bahr in Moskau. Oppositionsführer Barzel wagt ein Misstrauensvotum gegen den Kanzler und scheitert knapp.

In der folgenden Parlamentsabstimmung über den Bundeshaushalt verpasst Brandt die Mehrheit, seine Regierung hat keinen Rückhalt mehr. Der Kanzler berät sich mit seinem Herausforderer Barzel, wie es weitergehen soll. Sie beschließen, die Ostverträge passieren zu lassen und den Weg für Neuwahlen frei zu machen.

Die Lösung sieht so aus, dass die Mitglieder der Unionsparteien sich der Stimme enthalten sollen. Ein Zuträger des Stauffenberg-Dienstes schickt am 13. Mai 1972 die Kurzmeldung, der Direktor des amerikanischen Geheimdienstes CIA, Richard Helms, habe auf diese Konzessionsbereitschaft der Opposition erbost reagiert. Seine Worte sollen gewesen sein: »Die sind komplett verrückt geworden; aber das wird Barzel teuer zu stehen kommen, der wird nie Bundeskanzler werden.«

Einer, der sich nicht an die Empfehlung seiner Fraktion halten wird, ist Guttenberg. Da er schon im Februar aus gesundheitlichen Gründen nicht mehr an den Parlamentsdebatten teilnehmen konnte, warnte er den Kanzler per Brief: »Die erste deutsche Demokratie ging zugrunde, weil die Demokraten der Mitte und der Rechten die Gefahr des braunen Faschismus nicht sahen oder nicht sehen wollten. Die zweite deutsche Demokratie, unsere Bundesrepublik, ist heute in ihrem Selbstverständnis und damit in ihrer Existenz gefährdet, weil nun die Demokraten der Linken die Gefahr des roten Faschismus verharmlosen.« Er wird im Rollstuhl zur Wahlurne gefahren, auf dem Stimmzettel hat er »Nein« angekreuzt.

In seinen letzten Wochen kann er sich bei völliger geistiger Klarheit nur noch mit Handzeichen verständlich machen. Am 4. Oktober 1972 stirbt Guttenberg. Die Anhänger des Dienstes verlieren nicht nur den politischen Kampf im Parlament, sondern auch ihren wichtigsten Unterstützer.
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Stauffenberg hält jedoch an seinem Informationsdienst fest. Er erschließt neue Quellen für den Dienst, löst sich bald vom Thema der Ostpolitik. Ein Insider attestiert seinem Netzwerk Anfang der achtziger Jahre, hochprofessionell zu arbeiten.

…

Von: Stefanie Waske
02.12.2012 – 08:26 Uhr

Find this story at 2 December 2012

Quelle: ZEITmagazin, 29.11.2012 Nr. 49
© ZEIT ONLINE GmbH

Illegal spy agency operated in West Germany, new book claims

Conservative politicians in Cold-War West Germany set up an illegal domestic intelligence agency in order to spy on their political rivals, a forthcoming book claims. In Destroy After Reading: The Secret Intelligence Service of the CDU and CSU, German journalist Stefanie Waske exposes what she says was an elaborate plot to undermine West Germany’s rapprochement with Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe. The book, which is scheduled for publication in February of 2013, claims that the illegal intelligence agency, known as ‘the Little Service’, was set up by politicians from Germany’s conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and its sister organization, the Christian Social Union of Bavaria (CSU). The two parties allegedly founded ‘the Little Service’ in 1969, in response to the election of Willy Brandt as German Chancellor in 1969. Brandt, who was leader of the center-left Social Democratic Party of Germany (SDP), was elected based on a program of normalizing West Germany’s relations with Eastern Europe. Under this policy, which became known as ‘Neue Ostpolitik’ (‘new eastern policy’), Brandt radically transformed West German foreign policy on Eastern Europe. In 1970, just months after his election, he signed an extensive peace agreement with the Soviet Union, known as the Treaty of Moscow, which was followed later that year by the so-called Treaty of Warsaw. Under the latter agreement, West Germany officially recognized the existence and borders of the People’s Republic of Poland. Brandt’s Neue Ostpolitik, which continued until the end of his tenure in the Chancellery in 1974, earned him the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts to achieve reconciliation between West Germany and the countries of the Soviet bloc, primarily East Germany. But Brandt’s policy of rapprochement alarmed the CDU/CSU coalition, says Waske, which quickly set up ‘the Little Service’ by enlisting former members of Germany’s intelligence community. Intelligence operatives were allegedly tasked with infiltrating the SPD and Brandt’s administration and collecting inside intelligence, which could then be used to subvert both the party and its leader. According to Waske, ‘the Little Service’ eventually established operational links with conservative groups and individuals abroad, including Henry Kissinger, who at the time was National Security Adviser to United States President Richard Nixon.

…

December 6, 2012 by Joseph Fitsanakis Leave a comment

By JOSEPH FITSANAKIS | intelNews.org |

Find this story at 6 December 2012

Details emerge of CDU’s private spy service

West Germany’s Christian Democrats ran a intelligence service staffed by aristocrats and former Nazis during the 1970s, hoping to undermine Chancellor Willy Brandt’s policy of engagement with the communist East.
Israeli premier arrives in Berlin for tense talks (5 Dec 12)
Conservatives reject tax equality for gay couples (5 Dec 12)
Merkel: only I can steer Germany in rough seas (4 Dec 12)

The shadowy network had close ties with US President Richard Nixon’s foreign policy Svengali Henry Kissinger, who offered advice, and even discussed whether it was a good idea for the conservatives to usurp the government.

Political scientist Stefanie Waske spent seven years researching letters from politicians from the Christian Democratic Union and its Bavarian sister party the Christian Social Union – many of which concerned what they described as the “little service” – and will publish her full findings in a book early next year.

Some of those involved are still alive – but Kissinger for example, and the CDU/CSU, have refused to comment on the revelations, or even confirm what they did, Waske says.

It was the 1969 West German election which prompted the conservatives to set up their own secret service. They were kicked out of power for the first time since the establishment of the Federal Republic – and saw former allies the Free Democrats join Brandt’s centre-left Social Democrats to form a government.

Fear of Ostpolitik

The conservatives were fearful and mistrustful of his policy of talking with the Soviets and sending his secretary of state Egon Bahr to negotiate a treaty to swap West German recognition of post-war borders for a promise to not use violence against each other.

Conservative MP Karl Theodor Freiherr zu Guttenberg, (grandfather of the disgraced former defence minister) held a meeting in autumn 1969, not long after the election, with former chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger, Hans Globke who had served as chief of staff to Konrad Adenauer, and the CSU chairman Franz Josef Strauß.

They decided to form an “information service for the opposition,” a later note recorded, according to Waske’s work, which was explained in detail by the latest edition of weekly newspaper Die Zeit.

Being fresh out of office and extremely well-connected, they were able to call upon real spies to set it up for them, and contacted the former head of the foreign intelligence agency the BND for help. He offered up the BND’s own network of informants across the globe which he had established, including agents in the US, France, Austria, Italy, the Vatican, Arabic countries, Romania, the USSR and even at the United Nations.

Familiar names and aristocrats

The man they chose to head this new network was a BND staffer, Hans Christoph von Stauffenberg, cousin of Klaus, who had been killed after trying to assassinate Hitler.

Others who were brought into the scheme included Casimir Prince of Sayn-Wittgenstein, who would later play a leading role in and only narrowly miss imprisonment for the CDU’s party donation scandal. Suitably enough, he was in charge or raising hundreds of thousands of Deutsche marks to fund the spy service and he did so by tapping up his friends in industry.

One of the strongest links this service had was with Henry Kissinger, National Security Advisor under US President Richard Nixon, and later his Secretary of State. Ahead of the 1970 German-Soviet agreement, he and Brandt’s negotiator Bahr had agreed to open a back channel of informal information so the Americans could keep tabs on what the Soviets were saying.

But, Waske says, Kissinger was not confident Bahr was being candid, and it seems his office was feeding the information to the German conservatives. The Treaty of Moscow was signed, possibly confirming the fears of the CDU/CSU leaders that Brandt was doing business with the Soviets.

Stauffenberg went about his work, collecting information from sources around the world, including Brussels, London and Paris – as well as Romania and Yugoslavia, Taiwan and Cuba, and of course, the United States.

Meanwhile the position of treasurer was taken over by Alfred Seidl, formerly a Nazi party member out of conviction who not only acted as Rudolf Heß’s defence lawyer but also spend years fighting for him to be freed.

Advice from Kissinger

By the end of 1970, Kissinger was offering the conservatives’ spies advice on how to deal with the Social Democratic government. One agent who visited him quoted him saying, “It might be possible to overthrow the current government, but it remains to be seen whether this would involve risks which could put a CDU/CSU government in great difficulties.”

And he suggested the conservative opposition use delaying tactics to slow the ratification of the Treaty of Moscow in order to shift responsibility for its adoption firmly onto the government, rather than sharing it.

…

Published: 3 Dec 12 07:51 CET

The Local/hc

Find this story at 3 December 2012

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NSU-Helfer als Spitzel: “VP 562” bringt Berliner Innensenator in Erklärungsnot

Während sich Berlins Innensenator Frank Henkel im Landtag in der V-Mann-Affäre rechtfertigt, tauchen neue Fragen zu seiner Informationspolitik auf: So bat das BKA nach SPIEGEL-Informationen bereits im Dezember 2011 um Informationen über den V-Mann. Und auch das Vorstrafenregister des Spitzels birgt Zündstoff.

Berlin – In der Affäre um einen früheren Helfer der NSU-Terrorzelle, den das Berliner Landeskriminalamt (LKA) später viele Jahre als V-Mann führte, sind neue Fragen zur Informationspolitik der Berliner Behörden aufgetaucht. So wusste das LKA in Berlin laut Akten, die dem SPIEGEL vorliegen, schon seit Dezember 2011, dass sich die Ermittler des Bundeskriminalamts (BKA) bei ihren Recherchen im Umfeld des aufgeflogenen Mord-Trios auch intensiv für den früheren V-Mann Thomas S. interessierten.

Die Akten legen jedoch nahe, dass das LKA die Kollegen vom BKA damals über die langjährige Kooperation mit Thomas S. und mehrere Hinweise, die er auf den Verbleib des Trios gegeben hatte, im Dunkeln ließ. Zwar übersandte das LKA am 15. Dezember 2011 der Besonderen Aufbauorganisation “Trio” des BKA einige Erkenntnisse über S. – über die heikle Verbindung zum LKA oder den Hinweisen mit NSU-Bezug allerdings sind in den Akten keine Vermerke zu finden.

Thomas S. war vom 16. November 2000 bis zum 7. Januar 2011 “Vertrauensperson” des LKA Berlin, die Behörde führte ihn unter der Kennummer “VP 562”. Bei 38 Treffen mit seiner Vertrauten der Behörde gab er zwischen 2001 und 2005 mindestens fünf Mal Hinweise zu dem seit 1998 untergetauchten Neonazi-Trio des NSU und dessen Umfeld. Das letzte Treffen fand 2009 statt, im Januar 2011 schaltete die Behörde Thomas S. als Quelle ab.

Der ehemalige V-Mann des LKA war vor dem Abtauchen von Uwe Mundlos, Beate Zschäpe und Uwe Bönhardt im Jahr 1998 ein enger Freund und Helfer des Trios, seit Januar 2012 wird von der Generalbundesanwaltschaft im NSU-Verfahren als Beschuldigter führt.

Von ihren gewonnenen Informationen gaben die Berliner im Dezember 2011 jedoch erstmal nichts weiter. In ihrer Auskunft vom 15. Dezember teilten das LKA dem BKA lediglich mit, Thomas S. sei im Juni 2001 “als Geschädigter einer Körperverletzung und einer Nötigung” in Erscheinung getreten. Zudem verwies das LKA auf ein Verfahren gegen die inzwischen verbotene Nazi-Band “Landser”, in dem S. als Beschuldigter geführt wurde. Dass er als “VP 562” lange in Berlin als Quelle bezahlt worden war, kommt in der Mitteilung nicht vor.

Massive Kritik an Innensenator Henkel

Die neuen Details erhöhen den Druck auf Innensenator Frank Henkel (CDU), der wegen der Informationspolitik seiner Behörden in dem Fall in der Kritik steht. Bislang argumentierte Henkel, dass das BKA sich Anfang März im Auftrag der ermittelnden Generalbundesanwaltschaft in Berlin nach Thomas S. erkundigt hatte. Er selber sei zwei Tage später von seinen Leuten über den brisanten V-Mann-Vorgang informiert worden.

Erst zu diesem Zeitpunkt gab Henkels Apparat die ersten Informationen aus der V-Mann-Zeit von S. an die Fahnder der Bundesanwaltschaft weiter, einige Tage nach der ersten Anfrage der Ermittler mussten sich Berlins Vize-Polizeipräsidentin, ihr LKA-Chef und dessen Staatsschutzleiter in Karlsruhe erklären.

Im NSU-Untersuchungsausschuss sorgte das schweigsame LKA für Empörung: Das Gremium erfuhr von Henkel und seinen Behörden über Monate trotz diverser Anfragen nichts vom Fall Thomas S. Erst im Juli berichtete die Generalbundesanwaltschaft dem Ermittlungsbeauftragten des Ausschusses über die heiklen Details aus Berlin. Wegen der Sommerpause erfuhr der Ausschuss darüber erst Mitte September und zeigte sich schwer verärgert.

Henkel steht nun massiv in der Kritik, die SPD im Bundestag redete bereits von seinem Rücktritt. “Entweder der Berliner Innensenator übermittelt alle vorhandenen Akten über die Werbung und Abschöpfung des V-Manns unmittelbar dem Ausschuss oder er muss zurücktreten”, sagte Eva Högl am Dienstag, die als Obfrau der SPD im Bundestagsuntersuchungsausschuss sitzt.

Henkel sagte am Mittwoch, dass am Morgen dem Bundestags-Untersuchungsausschuss alle erforderlichen Akten zugeleitet worden seien. Auch die Mitglieder des Abgeordnetenhauses sollen Akteneinsicht bekommen.

“Ich bedauere ausdrücklich, dass es dadurch zu Irritationen gekommen ist”, sagte Henkel. Möglicherweise hätte man im Nachhinein in der Kommunikation etwas anders machen können. Aber aus damaliger Sicht sei es aus Gründen des Quellenschutzes nicht zu verantworten gewesen, die Informationen öffentlich mitzuteilen. Das Vorgehen der Berliner Behörden sei eng mit der Generalbundesanwaltschaft abgestimmt worden. “Nach rechtlicher und fachlicher Beratung habe ich mich an dieses Vorgehen gebunden gefühlt”, sagte Henkel.

V-Mann wurde wegen Volksverhetzung verurteilt

Eine Randnotiz in den Akten des BKA lässt zweifeln, ob Thomas S. als V-Mann geeignet war: Es werden vier Verurteilungen aufgelistet, darunter Beihilfe zur schweren Brandstiftung, Landfriedensbruch im besonders schweren Fall und gefährliche Körperverletzung. Drei Urteile fielen in den Jahren 1993 bis 1999, brisant ist das vierte: Im Jahr 2005 wurde er vom Landgericht Dresden wegen Volksverhetzung zu zehn Monaten auf Bewährung verurteilt. Die Berliner Behörde scheint das nicht weiter gestört zu haben, Thomas S. wurde nicht abgeschaltet.

Heute bestreitet man gar, von einer Verurteilung des V-Manns gewusst zu haben. Aktuell müssen sich Henkel und die amtierende Polizeipräsidentin Margarete Koppers in einer Sondersitzung des Innenausschusses im Berliner Abgeordnetenhaus zu dem Vorgang äußern und erklären, wieso die Dienste von Thomas S. so lange geheim blieben. Auf Nachfrage der Grünen-Abgeordneten Clara Herrmann zu Verurteilungen von Thomas S. in seiner Zeit als V-Mann sagte Koppers, nach ihrem Kenntnisstand seien “keine Straftaten und Verurteilungen bekannt”.

Überhaupt zeigten sich die Verantwortlichen keiner Schuld bewusst, räumten aber ein, dass man bei der Unterrichtung des Ausschusses möglicherweise sensibler hätte agieren müssen. Die Grünen-Politikerin Herrmann erklärt dazu: “Henkel fehlt es anscheinend weiterhin an echtem Aufklärungswillen, es bleiben viele offene Fragen. Man weiß nicht was skandalöser wäre: wenn das LKA von der Verurteilung seines V-Mannes nichts mitbekommen hätte oder wenn die Polizei-Vize-Präsidentin heute im Ausschuss nicht die Wahrheit gesagt haben sollte.”

…

18. September 2012, 16:46 Uhr
Von Matthias Gebauer, Birger Menke und Sven Röbel

Find this story at 18 September 2012

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Neonazi-Trio: NSU-Sprengstofflieferant war V-Mann der Berliner Polizei

Erneut geraten die Sicherheitsbehörden in der NSU-Affäre in Erklärungsnot: Nach SPIEGEL-Informationen war Thomas S., einer der 13 Beschuldigten im Verfahren, über zehn Jahre für das Berliner Landeskriminalamt als Informant tätig. Die brisanten Details hielt das LKA sehr lange zurück.

Hamburg/Berlin – Der Mann, der die Ermittlungspannen zum “Nationalsozialistischen Untergrund” (NSU) zur Staatsaffäre machen könnte, lebt zurückgezogen in einer Mehrfamilienhauswohnung in einer verkehrsberuhigten Seitenstraße in Sachsen. Im Garten stehen Tannen, auf dem Sportplatz gegenüber spielen Kinder Fußball. Mit Journalisten will er nicht sprechen: Als der SPIEGEL ihn im August befragen wollte, rief er nur “ich sage nichts” in die Gegensprechanlage.

Dabei hätte Thomas S. Brisantes zu berichten: Der 44-Jährige ist einer von derzeit 13 Beschuldigten, gegen die der Generalbundesanwalt im Zusammenhang mit dem NSU-Terror ermittelt. Von BKA-Ermittlern ließ sich S. inzwischen mehrfach vernehmen und gestand unter anderem, in den neunziger Jahren Sprengstoff an die Terrorzelle um Uwe Böhnhardt, Uwe Mundlos und Beate Zschäpe geliefert zu haben.

Ein zentrales Detail seiner bewegten Vergangenheit findet sich jedoch nicht in den Aussage-Protokollen: Nach SPIEGEL-Informationen wurde Thomas S. mehr als zehn Jahre lang als “Vertrauensperson” (VP) des Berliner Landeskriminalamts (LKA) geführt: Von Ende 2000 bis Anfang 2011.

Fünf Treffen mit V-Mann-Führern

Der Kontakt des LKA zur Quelle S. war offenbar intensiv. Doch erst in diesem Jahr, genauer gesagt im März 2012, informierten die Berliner den Generalbundesanwalt: Zwischen 2001 und 2005 habe S. bei insgesamt fünf Treffen mit seinen V-Mann-Führern Hinweise auf die NSU-Mitglieder geliefert.

Auch wenn die Ermittler mittlerweile recherchiert haben, dass die meisten Tipps von S. nur auf Hörensagen basierten, stellt sich die Frage, ob und warum die Berliner Behörden nicht schon viel früher die Landesbehörden in Thüringen oder auch den Bundesverfassungsschutz informierten. Schließlich wurde das Trio seit 1998 steckbrieflich gesucht.

Von den jahrelangen Verbindungen eines engen Vertrauten des Terror-Trios zu den Behörden erfuhr der Untersuchungsausschuss des Bundestags erst am Donnerstagmorgen – allerdings nicht etwa vom Land Berlin, sondern von der Bundesanwaltschaft, die den Ausschussbeauftragten im Juli abstrakt über die Causa S. in Kenntnis gesetzt hatte.

Einigen im Ausschuss platzt langsam der Kragen nach der schier endlosen Reihe von nicht bereitgestellten Akten. “Es ist unbegreiflich, dass Berlins Innensenator uns nicht über die V-Mann-Tätigkeit von Thomas S. informiert hat”, sagt Eva Högl von der SPD, “das ist ein Skandal, den Herr Henkel nun erklären muss”.

Ein eilig zusammengestelltes Geheim-Fax von Innensenator Frank Henkel beruhigte da wenig. Bis auf die zehnjährige Kooperation mit S. konnte Henkels Apparat auf die Schnelle auch noch nicht viele Details zu dem Fall nennen – zum Beispiel, was S. tatsächlich lieferte und an wen Berlin die Infos damals weitergab.

“Techtelmechtel” mit Beate Zschäpe

Ein mutmaßlicher Terrorhelfer in Staatsdiensten – die Nachricht markiert den vorläufigen Tiefpunkt in einer Affäre, die das Vertrauen in den deutschen Sicherheitsapparat in der Öffentlichkeit inzwischen gegen null sinken lässt. Immer neue Enthüllungen um verschwundene, zurückgehaltene oder eilig vernichtete Akten zum Umfeld der Neonazi-Zelle kosteten bereits den Präsidenten des Bundesamts für Verfassungsschutz, Heinz Fromm, sowie seine Länderkollegen aus Sachsen, Thüringen und Sachsen-Anhalt das Amt.

Der heute Beschuldigte und Ex-Informant Thomas S. war einst eine Größe in der sächsischen Neonazi-Szene. Er gehörte den sogenannten “88ern” an, einem gewaltbereiten Skinhead-Trupp, der in den neunziger Jahren Chemnitz terrorisierte. S. stieg in die Spitze der sächsischen Sektion des militanten Neonazi-Netzes “Blood & Honour” (B&H) auf. Er war außerdem verstrickt in Produktion und Vertrieb von Neonazi-Rock und frequentierte illegale Skin-Konzerte.

Bei einem Auftritt der Band “Oithanasie”, so erinnerte er sich in einer Vernehmung im Januar, habe er wohl auch Uwe Böhnhardt, Uwe Mundlos und Beate Zschäpe kennengelernt, bevor er wegen Körperverletzung in Haft kam. Nach seiner Entlassung sei er von Ende 1996 bis April 1997 mit Beate Zschäpe liiert gewesen, in seinen Vernehmungen sprach er von einem “Techtelmechtel”.

Erstaunlich zugänglich

Etwa in dieser Zeit, so räumte Thomas S. im Januar 2012 gegenüber dem BKA ein, habe er Mundlos auf dessen Wunsch rund ein Kilo TNT-Sprengstoff beschafft. Das “Päckchen in der Größe eines kleinen Schuhkartons” will er dem Rechtsterroristen in einem Keller übergeben haben. Wenig später flog in einer Garage in Jena die Bombenwerkstatt von Mundlos, Zschäpe und Böhnhardt auf; nach dem Fund der 1392 Gramm TNT flüchtete das Trio und ging in den Untergrund.

Dort, in Chemnitz, half Thomas S. nach eigenen Angaben den Kameraden bei der Suche nach einem Versteck. Er habe herumtelefoniert und das Trio zunächst für ein paar Wochen in der Wohnung des B&H-Sympathisanten Thomas R. untergebracht.

Danach, so S., habe er gehört, dass die drei bei Max-Florian B. wohnten, aber keinen Kontakt mehr zu ihm wünschten. Da er ein Verhältnis mit Zschäpe gehabt habe, würde die Polizei bei ihm als erstes suchen. Seit 1998, so S. in seinen Vernehmungen, habe er das Trio nicht mehr gesehen.

Dem Berliner LKA fiel Thomas S. erstmals auf, als er für die Neonazi-Band “Landser” CDs vertrieb und dabei half, die Hass-Musik konspirativ herzustellen. Als die Polizisten ihn ansprachen, war S. erstaunlich zugänglich – und willigte schließlich ein, den Beamten Informationen aus der rechten Szene zu liefern.

“Vertrauensperson” heißen solche Leute bei der Polizei. Es ist allerdings oft nicht ganz klar, wer wem dabei vertraut. Jedenfalls versprach die Behörde, S.’ Identität zu schützen. Auf dieser Zusage soll S. noch im Frühjahr 2012, bei seinen Vernehmungen beharrt haben.

Abgeschaltet im Jahr 2011

Die Berliner verpflichteten S. im November 2000 formal als VP. Zu diesem Zeitpunkt hatten die drei Rechtsterroristen zwar ihre ersten Verstecke verlassen, hielten sich offenbar aber immer noch in Chemnitz auf. Laut Akten berichtete S. das erste Mal 2001 über das Trio. Was genau, ist bislang noch unbekannt. Seine Rolle bei der Sprengstoffbeschaffung und der Organisation konspirativer Wohnungen verschwieg er dem LKA jedoch offenbar.

2002 schließlich gab er den Berliner Polizisten immerhin den Hinweis, wer Böhnhardt, Mundlos und Zschäpe suche, müsse sich auf den “Landser”-Produzenten Jan W. konzentrieren. Der war bereits von einem V-Mann des brandenburgischen Verfassungsschutzes als möglicher Waffenlieferant des Trios genannt worden. Mit den Informationen aus Berlin hätte sich der Verdacht verdichtet, die Zielfahnder hätten W. noch intensiver als ohnehin schon überwachen können. Bis heute ist unklar, was mit den Angaben, die S. in Berlin machte, geschah.

So ging es weiter. Offenbar drei weitere Male lieferte Thomas S. den Berliner LKA-Beamten Informationen über die untergetauchten Neonazis, zuletzt 2005. Für die Beamten blieb er auch danach noch eine ergiebige Quelle: Er wurde laut den Akten erst im Januar 2011 abgeschaltet – ein dreiviertel Jahr vor dem Auffliegen des “Nationalsozialistischen Untergrunds”. Es sollte aber bis zum 20. März 2012 dauern, bis die Berliner ihre Erkenntnisse aus den Jahren 2001 bis 2005 mit dem Generalbundesanwalt in Karlsruhe teilten.

…

13. September 2012, 21:43 Uhr

Von Matthias Gebauer, Sven Roebel und Holger Stark

Find this story at 13 September 2012

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Pannen bei NSU-Aufklärung: Schweigen, verschlampen, vertuschen

Panne reiht sich an Panne, bei der Aufklärung der NSU-Mordserie versagen die Behörden auf ganzer Linie. Dabei steht die Kanzlerin im Wort: Sie hat den Angehörigen der Terroropfer versprochen, alles für die Aufarbeitung zu tun. Tatsächlich ist von einem Willen zu Transparenz nichts zu spüren.

Berlin – Vielleicht muss man einfach noch mal daran erinnern, um was es hier geht: Da tauchen Ende der neunziger Jahre in Thüringen drei junge Hardcore-Neonazis unter, formieren sich zu einem Terrortrio, und ziehen mordend durch die Republik. Sie erschießen mutmaßlich zehn Menschen, verletzten etliche weitere mit einer Nagelbombe. Und bis die Bande im November 2011 durch einen Zufall auffliegt, haben die deutschen Sicherheitsbehörden keinen blassen Schimmer.

Eine Katastrophe also, eine “Schande für Deutschland”, so hat es Angela Merkel genannt. Es gäbe bei den Behörden also reichlich Grund für Demut, reichlich Grund, alles, aber auch wirklich alles dafür zu tun, die Versäumnisse aufzuklären, “damit sich das nie wieder wiederholen kann”, wie es die Kanzlerin den Angehörigen der Opfer versprochen hat. Doch davon kann keine Rede sein.

Ob beim Inlandsgeheimdienst, beim Bundeswehrgeheimdienst oder den Ermittlungsbehörden der Polizei – ständig kommen neue Pannen ans Licht, tauchen wichtige Akten und Dokumente erst nach Monaten oder überhaupt nur durch Zufall oder beharrliche Recherche Dritter auf. “Unsensibel” nennt der sonst so auf Akkuratesse bedachte Verteidigungsminister Thomas de Maizière (CDU) das. “Solche Vorgänge” würden “kein günstiges Licht auf unsere Sicherheitsbehörden” werfen, sagt Berlins Innensenator Frank Henkel (CDU). So kann man das sehen.

Man kann aber auch sagen: Die Sicherheitsbehörden haben nicht nur bei der Verfolgung der Mördernazis versagt. Sie versagen auch bei der Aufarbeitung. Es wird gemauert, geschlampt – und womöglich auch gezielt vertuscht. Aufklärungswille? Fehlanzeige.

Wut im Untersuchungsausschuss wächst

Der Ärger ist groß, quer durch die Parteien. “Das Vertrauen in den Rechtsstaat droht angesichts der fortlaufenden Pleiten- und Pannenserie langfristig beschädigt zu werden”, warnt Bundesjustizministerin Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger (FDP). Im NSU-Untersuchungsausschuss des Bundestags, der auf die Aktenzulieferungen der Geheimdienste und Ermittlungsbehörden angewiesen ist, wächst die Wut. “Hochgradig verärgert” ist der Ausschussvorsitzende Sebastian Edathy (SPD) nach den SPIEGEL-ONLINE-Enthüllungen über einen langjährigen V-Mann des Berliner Landeskriminalamts (LKA) aus dem Umfeld des Terrortrios. “Das hat eine neue Qualität”, meint Edathy. Grünen-Obmann Wolfgang Wieland empört sich: “Wir wissen buchstäblich nichts.”

Das aber ist ein Problem für die parlamentarischen Aufklärer. Inzwischen kommen die Abgeordneten kaum noch nach, mehr Kooperation und Transparenz einzufordern. Ein Überblick über die schlimmsten Pannen:

Am Donnerstag wird bekannt, dass einer der mutmaßlichen Helfer des Terrortrios mehr als zehn Jahre als V-Mann für das Berliner LKA arbeitete.Thomas S. soll den NSU-Mördern Ende der neunziger Jahre Sprengstoff besorgt haben. Von 2001 bis 2011 diente er dem LKA als Quelle, offenbar gab er auch Hinweise zum NSU. Die Bundesanwaltschaft erfuhr von der V-Mann-Tätigkeit im März – der Untersuchungsausschuss erst jetzt. Innensenator Henkel verspricht, schnell für Klarheit zu sorgen.
Zwei Tage zuvor kommt heraus, dass der Militärische Abschirmdienst (MAD) in den neunziger Jahren eine Akte über den späteren NSU-Terroristen Uwe Mundlos anlegte. Offenbar versuchte der Dienst sogar, Mundlos wegen seiner rechtsextremen Gesinnung als Quelle anzuwerben. Den Untersuchungsausschuss informierte der MAD nicht, auch das Verteidigungsministerium, das im März von der Akte erfuhr, gibt die Info nicht weiter. Verteidigungsminister de Maizière entschuldigt sich für die Panne. Der Chef des Landesverfassungsschutzes von Sachsen-Anhalt tritt zurück, weil seine Behörde zunächst erklärt, keine Kopie der MAD-Akte über Mundlos mehr zu besitzen, die sie 1995 bekommen hatte. Wenig später muss der Dienst einräumen: Die Akte liegt doch noch im Archiv.
Ende Juni räumt das Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV) ein, dass noch nach dem Auffliegen der NSU im November 2011 zahlreiche Akten mit Bezug zur Mörderbande gelöscht oder geschreddert wurden. Es geht vor allem um Dokumente zum rechtsextremen “Thüringer Heimatschutz”, dem Ende der Neunziger auch die Mitglieder der späteren Terrorzelle angehörten. Erst Anfang Juli stoppt der Dienst bis auf weiteres jede weitere Vernichtung von Akten aus dem rechtsextremen Milieu. BfV-Präsident Heinz Fromm tritt zurück, auch der Chef des Thüringer Amtes muss gehen. Sachsens Verfassungsschutzchef wirft hin, weil in seiner Behörde nur rein zufällig relevante Akten gefunden werden.

Löschaktionen, Zufallsfunde, Desinformation – mit jeder Panne wird deutlicher, wie dringend die deutschen Geheimdienste einer Reform bedürfen. Im Gestrüpp der föderalen Zuständigkeiten scheint niemand mehr den Überblick zu haben, wer sich mit wem absprechen sollte, wer welche Akten besitzt oder besitzen sollte, wo Kopien lagern oder längst vernichtet wurden.

Merkel steht im Wort

Die vergangenen Monate hätten eindrucksvoll bewiesen, “dass die deutsche Sicherheitsarchitektur grundlegend überarbeitet gehört”, sagt Justizministerin Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger und fordert “eine Straffung des föderal organisierten Verfassungsschutzes”. Wenn es nach der FDP-Politikerin ginge, würden die derzeit 16 Landesämter zumindest teilweise zusammengelegt.

Das allerdings wird nicht funktionieren. Innenminister Hans-Peter Friedrich (CSU) scheiterte vor wenigen Wochen vorerst mit dem Versuch, das Bundesamt gegenüber den Landesämtern in seinen Kompetenzen deutlich zu stärken. Statt aufrichtiger Reformbereitschaft herrscht Missgunst und Sorge vor Bedeutungsverlust. Auch die lauter werdenden Rufe nach einer Abschaffung des Bundeswehrgeheimdienstes MAD verhallen ungehört. Er soll im Zuge der Bundeswehrreform lediglich “personell verschlankt” und organisatorisch umgestellt werden. Ob der große Umbau der Sicherheitsbehörden hin zu mehr Schlagkräftigkeit und Effizienz so wirklich gelingt, ist ungewiss – auch wenn jede neue Panne zusätzlicher Ansporn sein sollte.

…

14. September 2012, 18:20 Uhr

Von Philipp Wittrock

Find this story at 14 September 2012

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Pannen bei NSU-Ermittlungen: Polizist half Thüringer Neonazis

Im Umfeld der Neonazi-Mörder Uwe Böhnhardt und Uwe Mundlos hat nach SPIEGEL-Informationen offenbar mindestens ein Polizist Geheimaktionen der Sicherheitsbehörden verraten. Konnten die untergetauchten Terroristen auch deshalb unentdeckt bleiben?

Hamburg – Bei den Ermittlungen zur Zwickauer Neonazi-Zelle gibt es neue Erkenntnisse. Akten, die die Thüringer Verfassungsschützer in ihren Panzerschränken fanden, haben es in sich: Ein Beamter namens Sven T. habe an Treffen der Neonazi-Gruppierung Thüringer Heimatschutz teilgenommen und mit den Rechtsextremisten sympathisiert, heißt es in einem geheimen Vermerk des Bundesamtes für Verfassungsschutz vom 30. Juli 1999, den die Kölner Bundesbehörde an die Landeskollegen in Erfurt geschickt hatte.

Laut einem Quellenbericht habe der Neonazi Enrico K., der wie Uwe Mundlos, Uwe Böhnhardt und Beate Zschäpe dem Thüringer Heimatschutz angehörte, von Sven T. wichtige Informationen über geplante Polizeiaktionen erhalten.

Es blieb nicht bei der einen Warnung. Am 17. September 1999 – etwa eineinhalb Jahre nach dem Abtauchen des Neonazi-Trios – meldete sich das Bundesamt ein weiteres Mal. Der Polizist, der aus der Polizeidirektion Saalfeld stamme, sei “national eingestellt” und habe Enrico K. erneut telefonisch über Polizeiaktionen gewarnt. So soll T. den Neonazi aufgefordert haben, vorsichtig zu operieren, um nicht wegen Rädelsführerschaft aufzufallen.

Vom Sympathisant zum V-Mann-Führer

Doch obwohl das Bundesamt die Landesverfassungsschützer in Thüringen auch darüber informierte, geschah offenbar nichts – im Gegenteil: vergangene Woche teilte das Thüringer Innenministerium dem Berliner Untersuchungsausschuss mit, Sven T. sei später sogar zum Verfassungsschutz versetzt worden.

…

24. August 2012, 17:21 Uhr

Von Holger Stark

Find this story at 24 August 2012

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NSU-Morde Rasterfahnder auf der falschen Spur

Warum scheiterten Ermittler im Fall der Mordserie an Migranten durch das Terrortrio NSU? Die Behörden glichen Millionen Datensätze über Kreditkarten, Hotelübernachtungen, und Mobiltelefone ab – die Täter fassten sie dennoch nicht. Der Fall zeigt, dass Rasterfahndungen oft in die Irre führen.

Berlin – Vor einem Jahr flog das Terrortrio Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund (NSU) auf. 14 Jahre zogen die Rechtsradikalen offenbar mordend durch das Land, ohne von den Ermittlern entdeckt zu werden. Grünen-Politiker Volker Beck hat den Sicherheitsbehörden nun Arroganz und “demonstrative Uneinsichtigkeit” vorgeworfen. Der Politiker verlangte eine Bundestagsdebatte, um über die Aufklärung der NSU-Straftaten sowie den Umgang mit rechtsextremistisch motivierter Gewalt in Deutschland zu diskutieren.

Am 4. November 2011 hatten sich zwei der NSU-Mitglieder, Uwe Mundlos und Uwe Böhnhardt, nach einem Banküberfall das Leben genommen. Kurz darauf stellte sich die dritte Beteiligte, Beate Zschäpe, der Polizei. Das Trio wird für bundesweit neun Morde an Migranten zwischen 2000 und 2006 sowie den Mord an einer Polizistin 2007 in Heilbronn verantwortlich gemacht. Zudem soll es zwei Bombenanschläge in Köln verübt haben.

Der Fall NSU zeigt auch, dass die von Ermittlern so gepriesenen modernen Fahndungsmethoden nicht funktioniert haben. Bei der Aufklärung der Mordserie griffen Fahnder von Landesbehörden auch zum Mittel der Rasterfahndung – und zwar gleich 80-mal. Dies teilte das Innenministerium auf Anfrage der Linksfraktion mit.

Laut Angaben des Innenministeriums umfassten die Rasterfahndungen rund 13 Millionen Transaktionsdaten von Kredit- und Geldkarten, etwa 300.000 Hotelübernachtungsdaten und eine Million Autovermietungsdaten. Bekannt war bereits, dass das Bundeskriminalamt (BKA) etwa 20,5 Millionen Funkzellendatensätze gespeichert und knapp 14.000 Anschlussinhaber ausgeforscht hatte.

Die umfangreiche Rasterfahndung brachte die Ermittler jedoch nicht auf die Spur des Terrortrios. Der NSU flog erst auf, nachdem Mundlos und Böhnhardt Selbstmord begangen hatten.

Millionen Daten, Täter unerkannt

Der Linken-Bundestagsabgeordnete Andrej Hunko glaubt, dass bei der Rasterfahndung vor allem Daten von Personen abgeglichen wurden, die mit den Getöteten in privatem oder geschäftlichem Kontakt standen. Die Ermittler hätten sich auf vermeintliche Schutzgelderpressungen und Drogengeschäften in türkischen oder kurdischen Vereinigungen fokussiert. Sie dürften damit mit den falschen Datensätzen gearbeitet haben – die Rasterfahndung brachte keinen Erfolg.

Die Methode der Rasterfahndung ist umstritten, weil eine Vielzahl unbeteiligter Personen in den Fokus der Ermittler gerät. Die Paragrafen 98a und 98b der Strafprozessordnung erlauben, bei schweren Verbrechen personenbezogene Daten auch von Privatfirmen zu nutzen und abzugleichen.

Erstmals eingesetzt wurde die Rasterfahndung 1977 durch das BKA, um den Aufenthaltsort des von der RAF entführten Arbeitgeberpräsidenten Hanns Martin Schleyer zu finden. Die Ermittler kombinierten typische Merkmale konspirativer RAF-Wohnungen wie Autobahnnähe, Tiefgarage und Barzahlungen der Miete. Der tatsächlich genutzte Unterschlupf landete tatsächlich auf die Liste verdächtiger Appartements, der Hinweis wurde jedoch nicht verfolgt, Schleyer schließlich ermordet.

1979 konnte das BKA mit der Rasterfahndung einen Erfolg vermelden. Wieder nutzte man das Kriterium der Barzahlung und kombinierte es mit der Erkenntnis, das RAF-Terroristen Wohnungen meist unter falschen Namen mieteten. Die Ermittler sortierten dann aus einer Liste mit 18.000 Frankfurtern, die ihre Stromrechnungen bar beglichen hatten, all jene aus, deren Namen als legal bekannt waren – entweder als gemeldeter Einwohner, Kfz-Halter, Rentner oder Bafög-Bezieher. Übrig blieben schließlich zwei Falschnamen. Einen nutzte ein Rauschgifthändler, den anderen das RAF-Mitglied Rolf Heißler, der schließlich festgenommen werden konnte.

Niedrige Erfolgsquote

Die Misserfolge der Rasterfahndungen im Falle Schleyer und nun auch bei der NSU überraschen Experten kaum. Laut einer Studie des Max-Planck-Instituts für Ausländisches und Internationales Strafrecht führen nur 13 Prozent der Rasterfahndungen überhaupt zur Ermittlung des Täters.

Diese Zahl stammt aus einer Analyse 31 Rasterfahndungen deutscher Behörden ab dem Jahr 1992. Max-Plack-Forscher Dirk Pehl hatte Ermittler auch zur mageren Erfolgsquote der Maßnahmen befragt. Die Beamten bewerteten trotzdem immerhin 58 Prozent der Rasterungen als “bedingt erfolgreich”, was aber nur bedeutet, dass dabei neue Ermittlungsansätze gefunden wurden. Zur Aufklärung dieser Fälle habe die Methode trotzdem nichts beigetragen, sagte Pehl.

…

03. November 2012, 14:02 Uhr

Von Holger Dambeck

Find this story at 3 November 2012 

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Verfassungsschutz ließ weitere Rechtsextremismus-Akten schreddern

Der Skandal um die rechtswidrige Vernichtung von Akten beim Berliner Verfassungsschutz weitet sich aus. Bereits 2010 wurde zahlreiche Unterlagen über die verbotene rechtsextreme Organisation “Blood & Honour” geschreddert. Die Behörde spricht von einem “bedauerlichen Versehen”.

Berlin – Beim Berliner Verfassungsschutz gibt es einen neuen Fall von unrechtmäßiger Aktenvernichtung zum Thema Rechtsextremismus. Im Juli 2010 hätten zwei Mitarbeiterinnen Unterlagen vernichtet, sagte die Verfassungsschutzchefin Claudia Schmid in einer kurzfristig anberaumten Pressekonferenz in Berlin. Die Akten seien nicht wie vorgeschrieben vorher dem Landesarchiv zur Aufbewahrung angeboten worden.

Die Papiere betrafen die seit dem Jahr 2000 verbotene Organisation “Blood & Honour”. Es handele sich um ein “bedauerliches Versehen”, so Schmid. Wann genau die Akten zerstört wurden und wer dies anordnete, konnte Schmid nicht sagen. Die Verfassungsschutzchefin sprach von einem bedauerlichen Versehen, von dem sie im Sommer dieses Jahres erfahren habe. Geprüft werde, ob die Akten rekonstruiert werden können.

Henkel kündigt Konsequenzen an

Die “Bild”-Zeitung hatte zuvor berichtet, dass 2010 zahlreiche Unterlagen geschreddert worden seien. Das Blatt hatte sich auf die Innenverwaltung von Senator Frank Henkel (CDU) berufen. Zum Zeitpunkt der Aktenvernichtung 2010 war der damalige Innensenator Ehrhart Körting (SPD) noch im Amt.

Henkel sprach von einer erneuten schweren Panne und kündigte Konsequenzen an. Es gebe ernsthafte strukturelle Probleme beim Verfassungsschutz, sagte der Senator, der seit 2011 im Amt ist. “Diese Zustände, die offenbar über Jahre ignoriert worden sind, müssen angepackt werden. Deshalb können sie nicht ohne Konsequenzen bleiben.” Am Mittwoch will Henkel im Verfassungsschutz-Ausschuss des Abgeordnetenhauses erste Überlegungen dazu vorstellen.

“Unsägliche Salamitaktik des Innensenats”

…

13. November 2012, 13:24 Uhr

Find this story at 13 November 2012

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Panne beim Verfassungsschutz Berlin ließ Rechtsextremismus-Akten schreddern

Der Berliner Verfassungsschutz hat noch im Juni 2012 mehrere Akten im Bereich Rechtsextremismus schreddern lassen – trotz der auf Hochtouren laufenden Aufarbeitung der NSU-Mordserie. Es ist nicht die erste Panne im Haus von Innensenator Henkel. Der spricht von “menschlichem Versagen”.

Berlin – Der Berliner Verfassungsschutz hat Akten geschreddert, die möglicherweise für den NSU-Untersuchungsausschuss des Bundestags von Interesse gewesen wären. Das bestätigten mehrere Berliner Abgeordnete SPIEGEL ONLINE am Dienstag. Am Nachmittag wurden die Mitglieder des Verfassungsschutzausschusses im Abgeordnetenhaus über den Vorfall informiert.

Den Angaben zufolge wurden am 29. Juni dieses Jahres mehrere Rechtsextremismus-Akten vernichtet. Es handelt sich um 25 Aktenordner, die unter anderem Informationen über den einstigen Terroristen der Rote Armee Fraktion und heutigen Rechtsextremisten Horst Mahler, die sogenannte Reichsbürgerbewegung, die Band Landser, die Heimattreue Deutsche Jugend und die Initiative für Volksaufklärung enthalten.

Generell ist die Vernichtung von Akten ein normaler Vorgang, sie unterliegen einer Löschfrist. Wenn diese als nicht mehr relevant eingeschätzt werden, müssen sie nach einer gewissen Zeit sogar vernichtet werden. Allerdings bietet man regulär dem Landesarchiv an, Altakten zu Dokumentationszwecken aufzubewahren. Das Berliner Landesarchiv hatte jene 25 Ordner mit rechtsextremistischem Bezug Ende September vergangenen Jahres als relevant erachtet und angefordert.

Doch die Dokumente wurden nie in das Archiv überführt. “Aufgrund eines Missverständnisses wurden auch die für das Landesarchiv bestimmten Akten zur Vernichtung ausgeheftet” und zum Schreddern geschickt, heißt es in einem Bericht des Berliner Verfassungschutzes.

“Unerfreulicher Vorgang”

“Es gibt keine Anhaltspunkte, dass die Akten irgendeinen NSU-Bezug hatten”, sagte eine Sprecherin der Behörde. Der Vorfall sei nach Bekanntwerden sofort hausintern aufgearbeitet worden. Doch im Zuge der Aufklärung der NSU-Morde bekommt dieser Vorgang nun eine besondere Brisanz. Auch der Zeitpunkt der Vernichtung ist pikant – Ende Juni lief die Aufarbeitung der NSU-Mordserie längst auf Hochtouren.

Nur wenige Wochen später wurde zudem in Berlin per Erlass der Verfassungsschutzleiterin Claudia Schmid angeordnet, es sollten bis auf weiteres gar keine Akten mit rechtsextremistischem Bezug mehr vernichtet werden, um die höchstmögliche Aufklärung der NSU-Mordserie zu gewährleisten. Doch da war es für besagte Akten schon zu spät.

Berlins Innensenator Frank Henkel (CDU) spricht von einem “menschlichen Versagen”. “Es war mir wichtig, dass der NSU-Untersuchungsausschuss und die Verfassungsschutzexperten aus dem Berliner Abgeordnetenhaus schnell informiert werden”, sagte er SPIEGEL ONLINE am Dienstag. “Nach jetzigem Erkenntnisstand liegt kein NSU-Bezug vor”, betonte er. “Trotzdem lässt dieser unerfreuliche Vorgang Fragen offen, die jetzt schnell aufgearbeitet werden müssen”, fügte er hinzu. Henkel versprach, den zuständigen Sonderermittler Dirk Feuerberg mit der Aufklärung der Panne zu betrauen. “Zudem ist der Verfassungsschutz in der Pflicht, alles zu versuchen, um diese Akten in Abstimmung mit anderen Behörden zu rekonstruieren.”

Empörte Opposition

In der Vergangenheit hatte die Aktenvernichtung bei Verfassungsschutzbehörden mehrfach für Schlagzeilen gesorgt. Neben dem Präsidenten des Bundesamts, Heinz Fromm, mussten auch mehrere Landesamtschefs ihren Posten räumen.

Auch Henkel selbst war wegen Ungereimtheiten in der NSU-Affäre unter Druck geraten. Mitte September war bekannt geworden, dass ein mutmaßlicher NSU-Helfer mehr als ein Jahrzehnt als Informant mit der Berliner Polizei zusammengearbeitet und ab 2002 zumindest indirekte Hinweise auf den Aufenthaltsort der Rechtsterroristen gegeben hat. Zudem hatte er eingeräumt, dem Trio Sprengstoff besorgt zu haben.

…

06. November 2012, 19:05 Uhr

Find this story at 6 November 2012

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Former spy Mark Kennedy sues police for ‘failing to stop him falling in love’

Mark Kennedy, who infiltrated environmental movement until his cover was blown, demands up to £100,000 for ‘personal injury’

Former police spy Mark Kennedy, who was known as Mark Stone, claims the undercover operation ‘destroyed his life’. Photograph: Philipp Ebeling for the Guardian

A former spy is suing the Metropolitan police for failing to “protect” him from falling in love with one of the environmental activists whose movement he infiltrated.

Mark Kennedy, who was known as Mark Stone until the activists discovered his identity in late 2010, filed a writ last month claiming damages of between £50,000 and £100,000 for personal injury and consequential loss and damage due to police “negligence”.

“I worked undercover for eight years,” he told the Mail on Sunday. “My superiors knew who I was sleeping with but chose to turn a blind eye because I was getting such valuable information They did nothing to prevent me falling in love.”

Kennedy says since he was unmasked he has been diagnosed as suffering from post-traumatic stress syndrome. His wife, Edel, has filed for divorce, and is seeking compensation for “emotional trauma”.

…

Amelia Hill
The Guardian, Sunday 25 November 2012 16.54 GMT

Find this story at 25 November 2012
© 2012 Guardian News and Media Limited or its affiliated companies. All rights reserved.

Now undercover PC to sue Scotland Yard for £100,000 ‘because they did nothing to stop HIM falling in love with an activist’

Mark Kennedy, 43, is claiming damages for ‘personal injury’ and ‘consequential loss and damage’
Ten women and one man are also suing the Met for emotional trauma
The landmark case is due to be heard at the High Court next year

A former undercover police officer is suing Scotland Yard for failing to ‘protect’ him against falling in love with a woman in the group of eco-warriors he was sent to infiltrate.

In a landmark case due to be heard at the High Court next year, Mark Kennedy says his superiors at the Metropolitan Police knew he was sleeping with women he had been sent to spy on, but turned a blind eye because of the quality of intelligence he was providing.

In a writ filed last month, Kennedy, 43, is claiming damages of between £50,000 and £100,000 for ‘personal injury’ and ‘consequential loss and damage’ due to police ‘negligence’.

Ex-undercover PC Mark Kennedy, 43, pictured, is suing Scotland Yard for failing to ‘protect’ him from falling in love with an activist he was sent to spy on

Mr Kennedy, who went undercover as an eco-warrior for eight years, is now divorcing his wife, Edel, pictured

Kennedy, who went under the alias of Mark Stone, a tattooed climber, is claiming damages for ‘personal injury’ and ‘consequential loss and damage’

He has been diagnosed as suffering from post-traumatic stress syndrome and is seeking compensation for the ‘emotional trauma’ suffered.

Last night he said: ‘I worked undercover for eight years. My superiors knew who I was sleeping with, but chose to turn a blind eye because I was getting such valuable information. The police had access to all my phone calls, texts and emails, many of which were of a sexual and intimate nature.They knew where I was spending the night and with whom. They did nothing to prevent me falling in love.

‘When my cover was blown it destroyed my life. I lost my job, my girlfriend and my reputation. I started self-harming and went to a shrink who diagnosed me with post-traumatic stress syndrome. The blame rests firmly at the feet of my superiors at the Met who had a duty to protect me.’

Ten women and one man are also suing the Met for emotional trauma saying they were duped into having sex with undercover officers. Three of the women are ex-lovers of Kennedy.

Their lawsuit states: ‘The men .  .  . used techniques they had been trained in to gain trust and thereby create the illusion they might be a “soulmate” to the women. There is no doubt that the officers obtained the consent of these women to sexual intercourse by deceit.’

Their case hit the headlines last week when police made a controversial bid to have it thrown out of the High Court and heard behind closed doors.

A legal source familiar with Kennedy’s case said: ‘He is as much a victim as the women are. The police failed to look after his psychiatric well-being and as a result he suffered post- traumatic stress for which the Met is responsible.’

Married Kennedy, who is now going through a divorce from his wife Edel, operated under the alias of Mark Stone, a long-haired heavily tattooed climber. The father of two worked for the secretive National Public Order Intelligence Unit. He says he cost the taxpayer £250,000 a year in wages and costs.

The landmark case is due to be heard at the High Court, pictured, next year. Ten women and one man are also suing the Met for emotional trauma

Kennedy was exposed when a £1 million trial against activists who allegedly planned to occupy a power plant in Nottinghamshire fell apart. Taped evidence he had made using a concealed microphone, which would have cleared the men, had not been presented in court.

All three of the women who had relationships with Kennedy have requested anonymity. He fell deeply in love with a red-haired Welsh activist he started sleeping with in 2004 and lived with from the end of 2005 until his cover was blown in 2010.

Kennedy says he had to have sex with the protesters to protect his cover. ‘The world of eco-activists is rife with promiscuity. Everyone sleeps with everyone else. If I hadn’t had sex they would have rumbled me as an informant,’ he said.

…

By Daily Mail Reporter and Caroline Graham

PUBLISHED: 22:00 GMT, 24 November 2012 | UPDATED: 15:09 GMT, 25 November 2012

Find this story at 24 November 2012

Published by Associated Newspapers Ltd

Part of the Daily Mail, The Mail on Sunday & Metro Media Group
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Statement condemning the Metropolitan Police’s attempt to have case heard in secret

“The police cannot be permitted to hide behind the cloak of secrecy, when they have been guilty of one of the most intrusive and complete invasions of privacy that can be imagined.”

The approach of the Metropolitan Police to the litigation has been obstructive from the outset, refusing to provide any substantive response to the allegations and hiding behind a ‘neither confirm nor deny’ policy about the activities of their officers. Now, to add insult to injury, following one of the most intrusive invasions of privacy imaginable, the police are attempting to strike out the women’s claim by arguing that the case should have been started in a shadowy secret court known as the Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT). [1]

The IPT exists for the sole purpose of maintaining secrecy, and under its jurisdiction the case could proceed with the women denied access to and unable to challenge police evidence, and powerless to appeal the tribunal’s decisions. This will mean that neither they, nor the public will ever find out the extent of the violations of human rights and abuses of public office perpetrated by these undercover units. Thus, the women, who have suffered a totally disproportionate, unnecessary and extremely damaging invasion of their privacy, may be denied access to justice by the very legislation which was purportedly designed to protect their rights.

The public outrage at the phone hacking scandal earlier this year focused on the cynical intrusion into lives of individuals by the press and the police. Today’s hearing relates to levels of intrusion far more invasive than phone hacking, yet so far most mainstream politicians remain silent.

What little information the women have garnered indicates that for 30 years or more these undercover units had (and still have) a rolling brief to inform on political movements and keep files on individuals (simply because they are or were politically active), without investigating any specific crime, and with no apparent intention to participate in any criminal justice process.[2] As a part of this, undercover officers lied and manipulated their way into people’s lives whilst their cover officers, back-room teams and the rest of the police command structure monitored and controlled people’s private lives and relationships. In certain cases, the false identity established by the police was able to be exploited by individual officers to continue their deceit after their deployment had officially ended, seemingly with no safeguard for the women involved, even fathering children in the process.

These massive intrusions into people’s lives are reminiscent of the activities of the Stasi in East Germany and those responsible should be brought to public account. These cases are, therefore, being brought in an attempt to expose the damage done by the Metropolitan Police and to make them publicly accountable for their actions.

This is a statement from supporters of eight women who are bringing legal against the Metropolitan Police. The eight women were deceived into long term intimate relationships with undercover police officers. The Metropolitan Police has applied to have the cases heard by the Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT). [1] The application will be heard at the High Court on Wednesday 21 and Thursday 22 November 2012. Read the Press Release here

NOTES FOR EDITORS:
[1] The IPT is a little known tribunal set up under section 65 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA, 2000) to deal with claims brought under the Human Rights Act against the police and other security services.
[2] The HMIC report states that “for most undercover deployments the most intense scrutiny occurs when the evidence they have collected is presented at court. Accountability to the court therefore provides an incentive for police to implement the system of control rigorously: but in the HMIC’s view, this incentive did not exist for the NPOIU. This is because NPOIU undercover officers were deployed to develop general intelligence…rather than gathering material for the purpose of criminal prosecutions.” Source: HMIC “A review of national police units which provide intelligence on criminality associated with protest” (February 2012) p.7

Find this story at 19 November 2012

Political activists sue Met over relationships with police spies: Women say undercover officers including Mark Kennedy tricked them into intimacy in order to foster emotional dependence

Mark Kennedy, in environmentalist mode: three of the women referred to in court had intimate relationships with him. Photograph: Guardian

Undercover police officers had long-term sexual relationships with political activists and joined them at family gatherings and on holidays to make their targets “emotionally dependent” on them, according to papers submitted to the high court.

The allegations were revealed at the start of a legal attempt by the Metropolitan police to have the claims heard in secret.

Ten women and one man have launched a legal action claiming they were conned into forming “deeply personal” relationships with the police spies.

The case is the first civil action to be brought before a court since the Guardian revealed police officers frequently slept with political campaigners as part of a spy operation over four decades.

Lawyers for the police are applying to have the cases struck out of the high court and moved to a little-known tribunal that usually deals with complaints about MI5.

The solicitor Harriet Wistrich, who is representing most of the claimants, said: “These women are suing for a gross invasion of privacy, and the Met’s response is to try and hive it off into a secret court.”

Most of the claimants had long-term and serious relationships with police spies, one lasting nearly six years. One was a man who had a close personal friendship with a police spy who ended up having a sexual relationship with his girlfriend.

The submissions also refer to the case of a woman who had a child with an undercover officer who was spying on her and who vanished from her life when the deployment came to an end.

Three of the women referred to in court had intimate relationships with Mark Kennedy, who spent seven years living as an environmental campaigner. Details of Kennedy’s deployment were made public last year after activists worked out he was a police mole.

Two other women in the case had sexual relationships with a colleague of Kennedy’s who served undercover alongside him. The police spy claimed to be a truck driver called Mark Jacobs when he infiltrated a small anarchist group in Cardiff until 2009.

As Jacobs, he had taken part in “deeply personal aspects of their lives”, even attending the funeral of one woman’s father after he died of cancer, barristers told the court in their written legal submissions.

“In doing so, he had exploited the vulnerabilities of the claimants and sought to encourage them to rely on him emotionally,” the documents added.

“Jacobs” had instigated a sexual relationship with one of the women, the court was told, while she was going out with another male activist, who is part of the legal action.

“During the course of those relationships, Jacobs purported to be a confidant, empathiser and source of close support to each of the claimants,” the barristers said.

Lawyers for the 10 women involved in the joint legal action against the Met, which had overall responsibility for the deployment of the spies, claim the deception caused their clients “serious emotional and psychiatric harm”.

They told Mr Justice Tugendhat the undercover officers had used the long-term relationships to gather intelligence on the women or for their own “personal gratification”, while pretending to support them emotionally.

They said the “grave allegations” of police misconduct raised serious questions about the “extent to which covert police powers have been and may in future be used to invade the personal, psychological and bodily integrity” of members of the public.

There is confusion over the rules governing the conduct of police spies. Senior officers have claimed it is “never acceptable” and “grossly unprofessional” for undercover officers to sleep with their targets; however, a government minister recently told parliament the tactic was permitted.

The evidence uncovered by the Guardian suggests the practice is routine. Eight of the nine undercover officers identified over the past 21 months are believed to have had intimate sexual relationships with protesters they were spying on.

Documents submitted to the court allege that Kennedy attended intimate family gatherings with all three women and joined them on holidays.

“He discouraged [them] from terminating the intimate sexual relationships,” their barristers said.

Kennedy, who was married with two children, had one relationship with an activist for two years. Another activist, who became his long-term girlfriend, was in a relationship with the police spy for six years.

…

Rob Evans and Paul Lewis
The Guardian, Wednesday 21 November 2012 13.05 GMT

Find this story at 21 November 2012

© 2012 Guardian News and Media Limited or its affiliated companies. All rights reserved.

Scotland Yard accused of ’trying to hide its secrets’ after appealing for police sex case to go to secret court

Scotland Yard has been accused of ‘trying to hide its secrets’ after appealing for a case involving female activists who were ‘conned into sexual relationships’ with undercover police officers to be heard in secret.

One man and 11 women from environmental activist groups are seeking damages from Scotland Yard for the ‘emotional trauma’ they suffered when undercover officers allegedly tricked them into having sexual relationships.

One of the women is planning to sue the Met for the financial burden of bringing up a child, now 27, fathered by an officer, it was reported.

Controversial: Scotland Yard has been accused of ’trying to hide its secrets’ after appealing for a case involving female activists who were ‘conned into sexual relationships’ with undercover police officers to be heard in secret

But it emerged last night that the Metropolitan Police are aiming to move the case against them from the High Court to a secretive tribunal.

The Met is to appeal this week that some of the cases – which were due to be heard in the High Court – should be heard in the little-known Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT) instead.

The IPT, which was established in 2000, has the power to investigate complaints about the conduct of Britain’s Intelligence Agencies, including MI5, MI6 and Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ).

But complainants who take cases to the IPT have fewer rights than in court and are not able to choose their own lawyer or cross-examine witnesses.

Most hearings are held in private, no explanation has to be given for the judgement and there is no automatic right of appeal.

The Met claims that because it’s undercover operations were authorised under the Regulation of Investigatory Power Act (Ripa), which is monitored by the IPT, the cases cannot be heard in a normal court.

Action: The cases were sparked after activists exposed Met policeman Mark Kennedy, pictured, as an undercover officer

But critics have accused the Met of covering up its ‘dirty laundry’ by trying to have the cases heard by the IPT – which has upheld fewer than 1 per cent of complaints in its history.

Jenny Jones, deputy chairwoman of City Hall’s police and crime committee, which monitors the Met, told The Times: ‘I’m very concerned about this because clearly the Met is trying to hide its dirty laundry.

‘These women deserve to have their stories told and for people to understand that what happened to them was a complete betrayal of trust.

‘There seems to be a trend of the State clearly trying to hide its secrets and that’s not acceptable.’

The cases were sparked after activists exposed Met policeman Mark Kennedy as an undercover officer, leading to the collapse of a case against people charged with planning to invade a power station.

Several women then came forward to say they had had sexual contact with him, without realising he was a policeman.

…

By Rosie Taylor and Tim Shipman

PUBLISHED: 05:26 GMT, 19 November 2012 | UPDATED: 05:29 GMT, 19 November 2012

Find this story at 19 November 2012

© Associated Newspapers Ltd

Met accused of hiding ‘dirty secrets’ in undercover cases

 

Scotland Yard has been accused of trying to “hide its dirty secrets” after it sought secret hearings for cases brought by female activists who had sexual relationships with undercover police officers.

Eleven women and one man are suing the Met for emotional trauma after claiming they were tricked into forming intimate relationships with undercover officers.

One woman claims an undercover officer fathered her child and is planning a landmark legal claim that will test whether the Met should bear some financial responsibility for the child’s upbringing.

The cases have been lodged in the High Court, but the Met argues that some cases should be heard by the Investigatory Powers Tribunal.

…

Justin Davenport, Crime Edito

Find this story at 19 November 2012

© 2012 Evening Standard Limited

Neo-Nazi murders: more questions than answers

A year ago Germany was rocked by the discovery of a group of right-wing extremists calling themselves the National Socialist Underground. Controversy and a number of investigations have since followed.

November 4, 2011: A bank robbery in Eisenach, Germany. The two robbers, who escaped on bicycles, got away with 70,000 euros ($89,800). Sharp-eyed witnesses provided the police with important clues. Two hours later, police officers approached a suspicious camper van, which went up in flames. In the wreckage they found the bodies of two men: Uwe Mundlos and Uwe Böhnhardt, known neo-Nazis who had gone underground in the late 1990s. The two had shot themselves after setting fire to the vehicle.

At this stage, nobody suspected the full extent of the case. The police recovered several weapons, one of which turned out to be the pistol used to kill the policewoman Michele Kiesewetter in Heilbronn in April 2007. Things became even more mysterious when, that same afternoon, there was a fire caused by an explosion in a house in Zwickau. It was here that the two neo-Nazis had been living, together with a woman called Beate Zschäpe.

Macabre video
Ruins of the Zwickau house, where the incriminating video was found

In the rubble the investigators discovered a macabre video, in which the group boasted of committing a series of murders since September 2000. They claimed to have killed not only Kiesewetter but also nine men of foreign origin. This video, with its utter contempt for human life, proved to be the key to a series of murders that had baffled police for years. Suddenly it seemed that the murders of eight small business owners of Turkish origin and one Greek man had apparently been committed by these three terrorists, who called themselves the National Socialist Underground (NSU).

The motive for the murders, then, was xenophobia and criminal racism. But until the discovery of the video, investigators had assumed that the strange murder series must consist of acts of revenge connected to the Turkish-dominated mafia. This suspicion was also reflected in media reports on the case.

For years, the deaths were flippantly and crudely referred to as “the döner murders,” an allusion to Turkish kebab stands. “Bosphorus,” the name of the task force charged with investigating the crimes, was in itself an indication of the line of inquiry, drawing as it did on the name of the strait that cuts through Istanbul.

Head of domestic intelligence resigns
Heinz Fromm resigned his post due to the case

Eleven years after the first NSU murder, the news was broken to a horrified public that a trio of neo-Nazis had been traveling across the country, robbing numerous banks and executing at least ten people. It was an even greater shock to discover that their crimes could probably have been prevented. The German domestic intelligence service knew about the three extremists as early as the 1990s, but lost track of them despite initially having them under close surveillance.

For months now a number of parliamentary committees have been investigating this failure by the security services. Heinz Fromm, for many years the head of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, resigned after admitting that important files his agency compiled on the group had been shredded, allegedly without his knowledge.

Chancellor Angela Merkel has promised relatives of the victims a full and rigorous investigation. Merkel said she felt sorrow and shame in the face of this extraordinary series of murders. At the memorial service in Berlin on February 23, she described as “nightmarish” the fact that for years the hunt for the murderers had focused primarily on the victims’ families and their milieu.

Merkel addressed the relatives, saying: “For that, I ask your forgiveness.” Barbara John, formerly the official responsible for the integration of foreigners in the Berlin region, has now been commissioned by the German government to look after the relatives, providing them with emotional support and assisting them with material claims, such as victims’ pensions.

Turkish community sees increase in racism

A few days ago Barbara John joined the head of the Turkish Community in Germany, Kenan Kolat, in warning that racism in Germany is on the rise. Both doubt that the revelation of the NSU terrorist cell will result in the right measures being taken. John criticized government offices as existing in a realm of their own, saying that the most important thing was for there to be a change in mentality. Kolat called for the dismantling of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution in its present form. “It is endangering the democratic constitutional state,” the community representative said.

The prosecution in the murder series cases is still gathering evidence. The only key suspect still alive, Beate Zschäpe, has been in custody for the past year. A co-founder of the NSU, Zschäpe gave herself up to police four days after the group blew its cover – but she refuses to give evidence. She is expected to be charged in the coming weeks.

NPD ban still under discussion
Semiya Simsek (r.) and Gamze Kubasik’s fathers were murdered

In the course of the investigation, Germany’s National Democratic Party (NPD) has also come under scrutiny. The openly far-right party is regarded by many of those familiar with the scene as a kind of political wing of violent right-wing extremism. Certainly there was a personal connection between members of the NPD and the NSU. Experts are divided as to whether this is sufficient evidence to prove that the NPD itself has an “aggressive, militant” attitude towards the democratic constitutional state.

…

Find this story at 4 November 2012

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Incendiary Informants: Did German Intelligence Fuel Far-Right Extremism?

A secret paper written by senior police officers paints a disastrous picture of Germany’s domestic intelligence agency. It suggests that the service may have actually strengthened the country’s far-right scene through its large network of far-right informants.

It’s a Wednesday in early summer 2012, on the terrace of a Chinese restaurant in Nuremberg’s city center. Kai D., 48, once one of the most subversive activists in the German neo-Nazi community, is sitting at a table, drinking a glass of roasted wheat tea, the house specialty, eagerly answering questions about his past in the right-wing extremist community.

The ex-Nazi seems at ease as he chats about his experiences as the head of the Covenant of the New Front (Gesinnungsgemeinschaft der Neuen Front) and the Thule Network, a neo-Nazi data-sharing group, which he helped build. He describes his role as one of the organizers of the Rudolf Hess memorial marches — annual neo-Nazi ceremonies in memory of the prominent Nazi politician that were banned by German courts in 2005. He talks about the tiresome pressure from the police with all the interrogations and raids. He also admits to having known members of a group called the Thüringer Heimatschutz (loosely translated as “Thuringian Homeland Protection”), where the terrorists who later formed the National Socialist Underground (NSU) became radicalized. According to D., they were the people who organized regular meetings in the eastern state of Thuringia. The authorities found D.’s number on a phone list used by NSU terrorist Uwe Mundlos.

On one subject, however, D. becomes tight-lipped. No, he says vehemently, “at no time, not even remotely” was he an informant for the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV), Germany’s domestic intelligence agency, and anyone who claims otherwise is lying.

Apparently, D. is still stretching the truth today. Responding to research conducted by SPIEGEL reporters, Bavarian Interior Minister Joachim Herrmann, a member of the conservative Christian Social Union (CSU), has told members of the Bavarian state parliament that D. worked with the Bavarian state intelligence service between the end of 1987 and 1998. D. was a major informant, and he was also one of the masterminds in the neo-Nazi network.

German law enforcement authorities uncovered the NSU right-wing terrorist cell almost exactly a year ago. On Nov. 4, 2011, the police found the bodies of Uwe Mundlos and Uwe Böhnhardt in a camper parked in the eastern city of Eisenach. The NSU claimed responsibility for killing at least nine men and a policewoman during a seven-year murder spree that began in 2000. The male victims, all of them shopkeepers or employeed in small businesses, belonged to ethnic minorities — eight were of Turkish origin and one was Greek.

Systematic Failure

Four parliamentary committees of inquiry are currently dissecting the work of law enforcement units, and four department heads have already resigned. The government’s failures in fighting right-wing terrorists have plunged the domestic intelligence service into the worst crisis since it was established. It was set up in postwar Germany to identify and stop the spread of precisely the kind of extremist thinking that allowed the Nazis to rise to power in the 1930s. The discovery of the NSU and its crimes, however, has shaken the system to its core.

The committees are currently examining more than 100,000 pages of classified documents. The more secrets come to light, the clearer it becomes how extensively intelligence agencies had infiltrated right-wing extremist groups. The trio of neo-Nazis that made up the NSU was surrounded by informants linked with the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, and Kai D. was only one of many. Nevertheless, the authorities had no idea what plans were being hatched in the neo-Nazi underground. The system of undercover informants had failed.

One of the big questions now being asked is whether the Office for the Protection of the Constitution and its methods are suited to protecting the German constitution — or whether it actually strengthened militant right-wing groups. “It cannot be that informants are being used who are more harmful to the community than they are beneficial,” says Thomas Oppermann, a senior lawmaker for the opposition Social Democratic Party.

Once before, during the failed effort to ban the far-right NPD party in 2003, the links between law enforcement and right-wing extremist groups led to a political fiasco. The Federal Constitutional Court rejected the motion to ban the NPD because it appeared as if the government could in fact be controlling the right-wing extremists through its informants.

Incendiary Agents

The discussion is now being fueled by a previously unknown position paper dating from 1997. It comes from an authoritative source: the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA), Germany’s version of the FBI. At the time, the police officials leveled serious charges against their counterparts with the German intelligence agencies, just a year before the NSU terrorists, who had operated in the eastern city of Jena, went into hiding. In the position paper that has now surfaced, which is still classified as “secret,” the BKA listed 10 theories that were presented to the Office for the Protection of the Constitution.

The BKA document centers around the core idea that the informants egged each other on, essentially acting as incendiary agents. Instead of decisively combatting the neo-Nazis, the BKA posits, the intelligence agency protected them, and judging by the way the Office for the Protection of the Constitution deployed its informants, they became part of the problem and not part of the solution.

The classified document, which SPIEGEL has obtained, is both an urgent warning and an indictment of the agents at the Office for the Protection of the Constitution. Did the intelligence service, intoxicated by the exclusive access it had gained, in fact protect some members of the far right? Is it indirectly responsible for the strengthening of militant neo-Nazi structures in the 1990s, from which the NSU, the most brutal and militant of all the extremist groups, emerged?

The BKA paper was written at a time, just after German reunification, when right-wing extremist groups were bursting with strength. Attacks against foreigners in the eastern cities of Hoyerswerda and Rostock in 1991 and 1992 respectively were followed by deadly arson attacks against Turkish inhabitants in Mölln, a town near Hamburg, and in Solingen in the west. Hundreds of neo-Nazi skinheads staged rallies every August to mark the anniversary of the death of Hitler’s deputy, Rudolf Hess. Entire sections of eastern Germany became practically off-limits for foreigners. Mundlos, Böhnhardt and Beate Zschäpe — the third member of the NSU group who is being held in police custody as she awaits trial — grew up in a self-confident political movement that was enjoying unchecked growth.

The BKA stepped up its investigations to find out who was responsible for what crimes. The Office for the Protection of the Constitution, for its part, infiltrated the neo-Nazi community, wanting to understand its structures and identify the masterminds and leaders, on the one hand, and their followers, on the other.

In the mid-1990s, the intelligence agencies — which operate with both a national agency as well as regional branches in the 16 German federal states — managed to recruit a large number of sources within the far-right community. For some activists, this conspiratorial cooperation with what they in fact saw as the hated “federal system” proved to be a blessing, since the intelligence agents had a vital interest in making sure that their spies would not be prosecuted.

This had to lead to conflicts between police and intelligence. According to the position paper, the tensions came to a head on Nov. 27, 1996, during a top-level meeting between the presidents of the BKA and the Office for the Protection of the Constitution to discuss the crisis. The BKA officials instructed their state security division, which works to combat politically motivated crime, to ascertain the problems at a “working level”.

BKA Warns Intelligence Services
A few months later, on Feb. 3, 1997, the BKA’s state security officers summarized their critique, as instructed, in a 14-page “position paper.” According to the document, the cause of the problems was the “increasing divergence between the operations of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution and law enforcement measures.” From the BKA’s standpoint, this was attributable to “source activities.” The authors of the position paper reached the following conclusions:

There was a “risk that sources of the intelligence service (Office for the Protection of the Constitution) could goad each other on to undertake bigger actions;” in other words, the system threatened to create an “incendiary effect.”

“For reasons of source protection,” by the time the intelligence service passed on information to the police, it was often “too late,” so that right-wing extremist actions “could no longer be prevented.”

When the intelligence service was informed about police raids, it was noted that “the sources had often been warned beforehand.” This created “the risk that evidence would be destroyed prior to the arrival of law enforcement authorities.”

Intelligence service sources that were “found to be criminals,” were often “neither indicted nor convicted.”

“The majority of the sources” were “staunch right-wing extremists” who believed “that they could act with impunity and pursue their ideology, under the protection of the intelligence service, and didn’t have to take law enforcement seriously.”

In their analysis, the police listed nine sources by name and described how the intelligence service’s informants were repeatedly found to be organizers or instigators of right-wing extremist activities.

For instance, the BKA document notes, an informant within the leadership of the neo-Nazi Free German Workers’ Party (Freiheitliche Deutsche Arbeiterpartei, or FAP) organized conspiratorial party meetings that the police tried to prevent, but to no avail. The informant was apparently warned of the impending ban of the FAP in February 1995, so that he was able to shred two garbage bags full of incriminating material. When questioned, the informant’s father said that he had long been astonished over “how well-informed his son was about police and judicial activities.”

Another informant, who was suspected of involvement in letter-bomb attacks, was tipped off and managed to evade arrest by going to Greece in March 1995. The BKA allegedly searched his apartment during a nationwide raid. When the police questioned the neo-Nazi in another matter, after he had returned to Germany, they allowed him to call his attorney. But the informant called his handler instead and asked for help. The handler told the informant what to say to the police. During the conversation, the informant complained about not having been “warned in advance” that the BKA had had him under surveillance.

According to the BKA document, the intelligence service had even recruited Andree Z., one of the leaders of the notorious neo-Nazi group Sauerland Action Front (Sauerländer Aktionsfront), as a source. Z., who used the pseudonym “Lutscher” and died in a car accident in late 1997, was viewed as someone who had whipped up neo-Nazi sentiment and radicalized the community. When the Federal Attorney’s Office launched an investigation against Z., who was suspected of having formed a criminal organization, the intelligence service apparently notified Z. immediately. After that, the BKA complained, “no relevant telephone conversations” could be recorded anymore.

A Who’s Who of the Far-Right Community

The links between the neo-Nazi community and the intelligence services seemed especially apparent to the BKA when it came to the annual memorial marches for Rudolf Hess. If the BKA is to be believed, there were no fewer than five informants among the coordinators of the “Rudolf Hess Action Week” in August 1994. The list reads like a Who’s Who of the far-right community at the time, and it includes Andree Z. and Kai D.

Not long afterwards, the BKA’s state security division noticed that the duo was once again involved in organizing the Hess rally, this time on Aug. 17, 1996. “It was determined,” the BKA document reads, that the informants’ activities “went well beyond a passive role.” For instance, Z. was apparently named press spokesman for the event, while Kai D. designed the main flyer and propaganda stickers advertising the march.

According to the BKA, informant D., who was part of the 11-member “action committee” for the banned Hess festivities, took part in preparatory meetings and sent “strictly confidential” memos to fellow neo-Nazis. The main rally was planned in a highly conspiratorial way, so that the location of the event, in the southwestern city of Worms, was only announced shortly before the demonstration.

Uwe Mundlos and Beate Zschäpe attended the march in 1996. Kai D., however, chose to watch the carefully planned rally from a safe distance.

It wasn’t until the afternoon of that Aug. 17, 1996 that the police apprehended him, after he had crossed the border into Luxembourg in a car traveling above the speed limit. D. was taken to a police station in nearby Saarbrücken, where he demanded to speak to an agent with the state security division, saying that he had “an important message.” He was unwilling to accept “ordinary officers,” the police noted, and was only willing to talk to someone with the State Criminal Police Office (LKA).

When his request was granted and two LKA officers appeared a short time later, the right-wing extremist was assertive, saying that if he wasn’t released so that he could “de-escalate” the situation, things could very well get worse. He said that he had to call a certain number at regular intervals, or else there might be “attacks.” D. was released a few hours later.

It wasn’t the first time that the informant had gotten off lightly. An investigation launched against him by authorities in the eastern state of Thuringia, who suspected him and a friend, Thuringia informant Tino Brandt, of involvement in the “formation of a criminal organization,” also came to nothing.

Divided Loyalties
Confidential informants like Kai D. can be the most valuable tool for the intelligence services, because they can go to places were the authorities cannot. But they also pose a risk to democracy. The letter “V” in “V-Mann” — “Vertrauens-Mann,” the German term for informant, which translates loosely as “Confidence Man” — doesn’t really stand for “Vertrauen,” or “confidence,” but for “Verrat” (“betrayal”), says Hans-Jürgen Förster, the former head of domestic intelligence for the eastern state of Brandenburg.

Informants often have divided loyalties. In addition to lying to and deceiving their own people, they often do the same to the authorities. Under the cover of working for the intelligence services, they can operate without interference. When that happens, they are not protecting the constitution but are in fact combatting it, both benefiting from and weakening the state at the same time. This is why the use of informants is one of the most sensitive tools available to a constitutional state.

In the ideal world of the intelligence services, agents don’t sympathize with their informants or tell them when the next raid is going to take place. This ideal world is described in the “Procurement Regulation for the Office of the Protection of the Constitution,” which remains a classified document to this day. According to the regulation, informants, who are given grades of A through F, are at best “tried and tested for a longer period of time,” report “only the truth” and have “no character defects.”

And then there is the other world, the one that’s probably more in line with the truth. It is populated by neo-Nazis who serve up their handlers a mixture of truth and lies, and are paid to do so at the expense of taxpayers. In this world, government agents and their informants have become accustomed to one another, and handlers treat any access as a treasure, which is jealously guarded, both from other state agencies and the police. Passing on information is considered a risk.

This creeping fraternization is cold and analytical, especially in the far-right community, where there are no linguistic and sometimes hardly any cultural barriers between informants and their handlers, and the dangers of too much closeness are omnipresent.

Are Informants Really Necessary?

After 20 years with the intelligence service, it became clear to him that “the (German) constitutional state cannot afford to keep using informants in the way it has in the past,” Winfried Ridder, a retired former division head of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, said last week. Ridder believes that the defect is embedded in the system, and that the government could ditch its extremist sources. Instead, he recommends that government agencies infiltrate potential terrorist groups by providing agents with false identities and sending them in to operate undercover.

So far, none of the state interior ministers has been willing to go that far. “It doesn’t work without informants,” says German Interior Minister Hans-Peter Friedrich (CSU). “If we no longer have informants, we get no information from the community.” The government, he adds, can’t operate blindly when it comes to right-wing extremist groups. Most of his counterparts at the state level agree.

In fact, informants have provided valuable information in many cases. When the Bavarian state Office for the Protection of the Constitution received a tip from a source in 2003, it was able to prevent a bombing that neo-Nazi Martin Wiese and his group had planned to commit at a groundbreaking ceremony for a Jewish community center in Munich. The BND foreign intelligence service and the Office of the Protection of the Constitution also learned of several bombings being planned by Islamists from their sources. “Without informants, we would no longer have access to key information,” warns Ulrich Mäurer, a member of the center-left Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the interior minister of the city-state of Bremen.

Mäurer has taken an unusual step. In the future, the Bremen parliament will monitor the use of informants, and no sources will be used without the approval of lawmakers. It’s a reform in which the executive is surrendering power to the legislative branch of government.

Mäurer’s initiative resembles a proposal by the former intelligence chief for the state of Brandenburg, Hans-Jürgen Förster, that informants could only be recruited after their case has been reviewed by a judge, a procedure similar to that required for telephone wiretapping. Förster hopes that this will “improve the legitimacy and standing” of the program, and that it will also enhance “internal discipline,” because intelligence agents will know that someone is looking over their shoulder.

The Office for the Protection of the Constitution has since established a task force to track and monitor the work of source managers. The supervisors will be able to keep tabs on their colleagues as they recruit, manage and follow up with informants, so that problematic cases can be detected early on and stopped if necessary. The interior ministers plan to approve new “guidelines for managing informants” soon and introduce uniform, nationwide standards. They are also discussing a central database for all informants.

“The culture of cooperation between the police and intelligence service has already changed,” says Hans-Georg Maassen, the new president of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution. Thanks to positive experiences at the Joint Counterterrorism Center (GTAZ) in Berlin — which was established in 2004 and includes the BND, Office for the Protection of the Constitution and other state and national agencies — Massen adds, “a more intensive and trusting system of exchange has become established than in the past.”

Domestic Intelligence Ignored BKA Criticism

During the late 1990s, before the NSU had committed its series of murders, officials at the Office for the Protection of the Constitution simply ignored the criticism coming from the BKA. At a conference in the central German town of Goslar in April 1997, federal and state intelligence chiefs discussed the BKA’s position paper, but they saw no reason to change anything. The Interior Ministry, which became involved in the ongoing conflict, also took no action. Various cases came to light of high-ranking informants who had enjoyed the protection of the intelligence services.

…

Translated from the German by Christopher Sultan

11/06/2012 05:49 PM

Find this story at 6 November 2012

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Panne beim Verfassungsschutz: Berlin ließ Rechtsextremismus-Akten schreddern

Der Berliner Verfassungsschutz hat noch im Juni 2012 mehrere Akten im Bereich Rechtsextremismus schreddern lassen – trotz der auf Hochtouren laufenden Aufarbeitung der NSU-Mordserie. Es ist nicht die erste Panne im Haus von Innensenator Henkel. Der spricht von “menschlichem Versagen”.

Berlin – Der Berliner Verfassungsschutz hat Akten geschreddert, die möglicherweise für den NSU-Untersuchungsausschuss des Bundestags von Interesse gewesen wären. Das bestätigten mehrere Berliner Abgeordnete SPIEGEL ONLINE am Dienstag. Am Nachmittag wurden die Mitglieder des Verfassungsschutzausschusses im Abgeordnetenhaus über den Vorfall informiert.

Den Angaben zufolge wurden am 29. Juni dieses Jahres mehrere Rechtsextremismus-Akten vernichtet. Es handelt sich um 25 Aktenordner, die unter anderem Informationen über den einstigen Terroristen der Rote Armee Fraktion und heutigen Rechtsextremisten Horst Mahler, die sogenannte Reichsbürgerbewegung, die Band Landser, die Heimattreue Deutsche Jugend und die Initiative für Volksaufklärung enthalten.

Generell ist die Vernichtung von Akten ein normaler Vorgang, sie unterliegen einer Löschfrist. Wenn diese als nicht mehr relevant eingeschätzt werden, müssen sie nach einer gewissen Zeit sogar vernichtet werden. Allerdings bietet man regulär dem Landesarchiv an, Altakten zu Dokumentationszwecken aufzubewahren. Das Berliner Landesarchiv hatte jene 25 Ordner mit rechtsextremistischem Bezug Ende September vergangenen Jahres als relevant erachtet und angefordert.

Doch die Dokumente wurden nie in das Archiv überführt. “Aufgrund eines Missverständnisses wurden auch die für das Landesarchiv bestimmten Akten zur Vernichtung ausgeheftet” und zum Schreddern geschickt, heißt es in einem Bericht des Berliner Verfassungschutzes.

“Unerfreulicher Vorgang”

“Es gibt keine Anhaltspunkte, dass die Akten irgendeinen NSU-Bezug hatten”, sagte eine Sprecherin der Behörde. Der Vorfall sei nach Bekanntwerden sofort hausintern aufgearbeitet worden. Doch im Zuge der Aufklärung der NSU-Morde bekommt dieser Vorgang nun eine besondere Brisanz. Auch der Zeitpunkt der Vernichtung ist pikant – Ende Juni lief die Aufarbeitung der NSU-Mordserie längst auf Hochtouren.

Nur wenige Wochen später wurde zudem in Berlin per Erlass der Verfassungsschutzleiterin Claudia Schmid angeordnet, es sollten bis auf weiteres gar keine Akten mit rechtsextremistischem Bezug mehr vernichtet werden, um die höchstmögliche Aufklärung der NSU-Mordserie zu gewährleisten. Doch da war es für besagte Akten schon zu spät.

Berlins Innensenator Frank Henkel (CDU) spricht von einem “menschlichen Versagen”. “Es war mir wichtig, dass der NSU-Untersuchungsausschuss und die Verfassungsschutzexperten aus dem Berliner Abgeordnetenhaus schnell informiert werden”, sagte er SPIEGEL ONLINE am Dienstag. “Nach jetzigem Erkenntnisstand liegt kein NSU-Bezug vor”, betonte er. “Trotzdem lässt dieser unerfreuliche Vorgang Fragen offen, die jetzt schnell aufgearbeitet werden müssen”, fügte er hinzu. Henkel versprach, den zuständigen Sonderermittler Dirk Feuerberg mit der Aufklärung der Panne zu betrauen. “Zudem ist der Verfassungsschutz in der Pflicht, alles zu versuchen, um diese Akten in Abstimmung mit anderen Behörden zu rekonstruieren.”

Empörte Opposition

In der Vergangenheit hatte die Aktenvernichtung bei Verfassungsschutzbehörden mehrfach für Schlagzeilen gesorgt. Neben dem Präsidenten des Bundesamts, Heinz Fromm, mussten auch mehrere Landesamtschefs ihren Posten räumen.

Auch Henkel selbst war wegen Ungereimtheiten in der NSU-Affäre unter Druck geraten. Mitte September war bekannt geworden, dass ein mutmaßlicher NSU-Helfer mehr als ein Jahrzehnt als Informant mit der Berliner Polizei zusammengearbeitet und ab 2002 zumindest indirekte Hinweise auf den Aufenthaltsort der Rechtsterroristen gegeben hat. Zudem hatte er eingeräumt, dem Trio Sprengstoff besorgt zu haben.

Nach eigenen Angaben wusste Henkel davon seit März – hatte aber nur die Bundesanwaltschaft, nicht jedoch den Untersuchungsausschuss des Bundestags und das Abgeordnetenhaus informiert. Als Grund gab er eine Absprache mit der Bundesanwaltschaft an, die das aber bestreitet.

…

06. November 2012, 19:05 Uhr

Find this story at 6 November 2012

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Die Beichte der Kapuze: Der deutsche Ku-Klux-Klan, der Verfassungsschutz und ein Mord. Ein Aussteiger packt aus

Es gab eine Zeit, da trug Achim Schmid kein graues Sakko, sondern ein weißes Gewand und eine Kapuze über dem Kopf. Der 37-Jährige war damals Chef einer deutschen Gruppierung des Ku-Klux-Klans. Ende 2002 stieg er aus. Zehn Jahre später holt ihn seine Vergangenheit ein.

„Einmalige Ku-Klux-Klan-Affäre des Verfassungsschutzes“ titelte die „TAZ“ vor ein paar Tagen. „Dienstgeheimnis verraten“ die „Süddeutsche Zeitung“. Ein Verfassungsschützer habe Schmid Informationen zukommen lassen, heißt es darin. Ist der Klan ein Sammelbecken für Staatsbedienstete, die rechtsstaatliche mit rechten Werten verwechseln?

Die BILD-am-SONNTAG-Reporter finden Schmid in Schleswig-Holstein, im Örtchen Boostedt, eine Stunde nördlich von Hamburg. Der Ex-Klan-Chef lebt in einer Wohnstraße mit Reihenhaus-Idylle. Ursprünglich stammt er aus Baden-Württemberg.

Dort wird Schmid 1975 als Sohn einer Köchin und eines Binnenschiffers geboren. Als er neun Jahre alt ist, stirbt sein Vater. Mit 13 Jahren kommt Achim Schmid erstmals in Kontakt mit der rechten Szene. „Musik war immer mein Ding“, sagt der Vater von zwei Kindern. Er hört rechte Musik von „Störkraft“ und „Endstufe“, rasiert sich später den Kopf kahl.

Der Junge macht seinen Realschulabschluss, beginnt mit 22 Jahren eine Ausbildung zum Metzger, gerät mit der Hand in den Fleischwolf, bricht die Lehre ab.

„Ich habe dann gejobbt und bin auf die NPD gestoßen“, sagt der 37-Jährige. Auf einem Dorffest bei Stuttgart spricht ihn ein Bekannter an. Ob er Interesse am Ku-Klux-Klan habe?

Der rassistische Geheimbund wurde 1865 in den USA gegründet. Spätestens seit dem Film „Mississippi Burning“ kennt man seine Bräuche: Männer in weißen Kutten treffen sich um ein brennendes Kreuz, skandieren gegen Schwarze. Amerika eben, könnte man denken. Aber Kapuzenmänner, die schwäbeln? Eine merkwürdige Vorstellung.

So wurde der Klan von Polizisten und einem Verfassungsschützer beeinflusst

„Unsere Vereinigung hieß International White Knights of the Ku-Klux-Klan“, sagt Schmid. 1998 tritt er ein, zwei Jahre später reist er in die USA, wird dort zum „Grand Dragon“, zum Anführer seines Kapuzenklubs erklärt. Heute auf den Tag genau vor zwölf Jahren war das, nachts auf einem Feld in Mississippi. Es gibt ein Video von dieser Szene. Vor einem brennenden Kreuz ruft der Chef des US-Klans Schmids Namen, schlägt ihn mit einem Schwert.

So inthronisiert kehrt Schmid zurück nach Süddeutschland, gründet die European White Knights of Ku-Klux-Klan. „Wir hatten rund 20 Mitglieder“, sagt er. Brisant: Einige davon sind Polizeibeamte. Zwei Namen nennt Schmid. „Wir haben zeitweise sogar überlegt, eine eigene Polizeiabteilung im Klan zu gründen. Interessenten gab es genug“, behauptet Schmid. Dazu kommt es nicht, aber Schmid installiert einen Geheimdienst innerhalb des Klans. Zu den Mitgliedern gehört auch einer der beiden Beamten. Gemeinsam überlegen sie, eine Bürgerwehr zu gründen. „Wir wollten Dealer überwachen, die Ergebnisse der Polizei geben“, behauptet Schmid.

Einer der Polizisten in Diensten des Klans taucht später in einem anderen Zusammenhang auf. Er ist Zugführer von Michèle Kiesewetter, als die Beamtin am 25. April 2007 von den Mitgliedern der Terrorgruppe „Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund“ (NSU) erschossen wird. Ein Zufall?

„Ich war da längst raus aus der Nummer“, sagt Schmid. Für ihn wird es Ende 2002 brenzlig. „Ich wurde von einem Verfassungsschützer gewarnt, er hat mir in einem englischsprachigen Chatroom erzählt, dass wir überwacht werden“, sagt Schmid. „Aber V-Mann, wie oft spekuliert wird, war ich nie.“ Dass Schmid im Sommer 2002 Informationen von einem Mitarbeiter des Landesamtes für Verfassungsschutz erhalten hat, bestätigt inzwischen – 10 Jahre später! – auch der baden-württembergische Innenminister.

…

Quelle: BILD.de
04.11.2012 — 00:01 Uhr
Von
JÜRGEN DAMSCH und HOLGER KARKHECK

Find this story at 4 November 2012

© Copyright BILD digital 2011

Intrigue in Lebanon: Was Murdered Intelligence Chief a Hero or Double Agent?

In mid-October, a massive car bomb killed Wissam al-Hassan in downtown Beirut. The intelligence chief was buried as a hero and praised by the West for his help in investigating the 2005 assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. Or was he a double agent, possibly also active sometimes for the Syrians?

It’s a story of personal oaths of allegiance and clan loyalties, a story of war, betrayal and deceit, a story that could only be written about the Middle East. At the story’s center stand four men and two murders.

Rafik Hariri, a business tycoon worth billions, helped rebuild Lebanon after its bloody 15-year civil war. He was an important political leader of the country’s Sunnis and Lebanon’s prime minister for roughly a decade. In October 2004, he resigned to protest the string-pulling exerted by neighboring Syria and Hezbollah, the Lebanon-based Shiite militia bankrolled by Damascus. A few months later, on Valentine’s Day 2005, Hariri would die in a massive roadside bombing attack.

Saad Hariri, Rafik’s 42-year-old son and political heir, swore that he would get to the bottom of the murder and even availed himself of foreign assistance to do so. In 2007, the United Nations decided to set up a Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL). The tribunal has been operating from its headquarters near The Hague, in the Netherlands, since the spring of 2009. The younger Hariri came to be known as one of the leaders of the Cedar Revolution, which succeeded in driving almost all Syrian troops out of the country. Saad Hariri would serve as Lebanon’s prime minister from 2009 until 2011, when his coalition government collapsed. These days, he leads his opposition movement in exile from Paris.

Hassan Nasrallah, the 52-year-old head of Hezbollah, has oscillated between suppressed and open hostility with the Hariris. In addition to overseeing a militia that is stronger than Lebanon’s army, Nasrallah commands a powerful political organization. At the moment, his party essentially controls the government in Beirut, and he views himself as the only force fighting against “Zionist occupiers.” He also sees the STL as little more than an “American-Israeli conspiracy.”

And then there is Wissam al-Hassan, who is currently the main protagonist in this great game.

An Inside Job?

Al-Hassan was born in 1965 near Tripoli, Lebanon, into a Sunni clan that has enjoyed close ties with the Hariris. He became a member of Rafik Hariri’s security detail, eventually advancing to become his head bodyguard. Al-Hassan had taken off Feb. 14, 2005, the day that a massive car bomb exploded while Rafik Hariri’s motorcade was driving by, claiming at the time that he needed to study for a university exam. But this did not harm his career, and Saad Hariri would eventually elevate al-Hassan to the rank of brigadier general and a position as the country’s intelligence chief.

On Oct. 19, al-Hassan died in a car bomb attack that bore many similarities with the one that killed his boss seven years earlier: Both were in Beirut, both were in broad daylight, and both were carried out by professionals. Both attacks involved a huge amount of explosives that claimed the lives of many more people than just the intended targets.

Al-Hassan was given a hero’s burial and interred only a few steps from the grave of Rafik Hariri in a cemetery near Martyrs’ Square in central Beirut. The circumstances surrounding his death have given rise to a number of questions. In fact, some wonder whether the 47-year-old might have even been a double agent, someone who had switched allegiances once or perhaps even several times. And if this is true, they ask, what does that say about those suspected of killing him?

Whatever the answers might be, the terrorist attack of Oct. 19 continues to grow more and more mysterious, and the STL may consider investigating it. Responding to written questions, the International Criminal Tribunal says that one first needs to determine whether the attack was related to the Hariri bombing. Moreover, it adds that launching such an investigation would also require an expansion of the STL’s mandate by the United Nations and the Lebanese government, which covers 49 percent of the tribunal’s costs.

Sources close to the tribunal say that al-Hassan originally stood at the top of the list of suspects in the Hariri attack. Indeed, investigators found it rather odd that Hariri’s head bodyguard would go missing in action on the day he died. What’s more, they established that al-Hassan spoke on the phone 24 times on the morning of Hariri’s death even though he claimed he had to study for the university exam. An internal STL document says that al-Hassan’s statements are “not very convincing” and have led to doubts about his alibi.

Friends and Enemies

Still, the fact that he was far away when the attack occurred and that Saad Hariri believed his oath of loyalty was somehow enough to get al-Hassan out of the line of fire. Likewise, before long, he became the special tribunal’s most important informant, providing investigators with details about the type of explosive used and recordings from mobile phones at the scene of the attack. The phone calls would eventually be matched to four members of Hezbollah — and spell the downfall of them all.

In June 2011, the STL brought indictments against these four men, including Mustafa Badr al-Din, Nasrallah’s chief of intelligence. An enraged Nasrallah reacted by threatening to “cut off the hand” of anyone who tried to extradite him and the other men. The four have since disappeared and are rumored to have fled to Iran.

However, such investigations weren’t enough for al-Hassan. He soon became one of the most important political players in the region, forging some astonishing alliances along the way. For example, he arranged a meeting between Saad Hariri and Syrian President Bashar Assad. After the meeting, the former refrained from making any more vehement accusations that Syria was behind his father’s murder. What’s more, in a move that was highly unusual in terms of protocol, al-Hassan himself had a private conversation with Assad in Damascus.

At the same time, al-Hassan maintained extremely close ties with top-level officials in the intelligence apparatus of Saudi Arabia, which holds a critical stance toward the Syrian regime. Likewise, some Middle East insiders have even claimed that al-Hassan had ties to the Mossad, Israel’s foreign intelligence agency. He ultimately allayed these suspicions with deeds: Under his leadership, Lebanese intelligence blew the cover of an entire network of Israeli spies operating in the country.

In recent months, the restless Lebanese intelligence chief had turned his attention to rebel forces in Syria. Just last summer, he apparently set a trap for Ali Mamlouk, who would be promoted in July from chief of Assad’s general intelligence directorate to head of his national security council. Via intermediaries, al-Hassan encouraged Mamlouk to supply Michel Samaha, a former minister of information in Lebanon and staunch ally of the Syrian regime, with explosives to be used in attacks. Samaha was arrested in early August and reportedly confessed. It was a serious loss of face for Assad — and a plausible reason for taking out the supposed turncoat al-Hassan.

Possible Hezbollah Involvement

Hezbollah might have also had a hand in the terrorist attack on al-Hassan, whose cooperation with the tribunal had made him a sworn enemy of the “Party of God.” In any case, al-Hassan had surely received warnings about an attack. Two days before the assassination, he traveled to Paris to bring his family to safety. The next day, while returning to Syria, he made a stopover in Germany. There, he met with his German counterpart, the head of the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA), for what was presumably a regularly scheduled talk.

In response to written questions, the STL confirms that the in absentia trial of the four Hezbollah members will begin on March 25, 2013, and that procedures allow “for evidence from unavailable persons to be admitted during the trial,” including that of al-Hassan. What’s more, the International Crimincal Court says that “Lebanon has an ongoing obligation to search for the accused” and the Lebanese authorities are obliged to report on a monthly basis. “We believe that justice should not be held hostage to the accused’s desire not to participate in the proceedings,” the tribunal wrote.

The FBI now has agents in Beirut to aid inthe investigation into al-Hassan’s murder. It has reportedly determined that the explosives used to kill al-Hassan bear similarities to the ones used in the Hariri assassination. The planning and execution of the attack are also thought to point to the same group of perpetrators.

Translated from the German by Josh Ward

11/05/2012 01:02 PM

By Erich Follath

Find this story at 5 November 2012

© SPIEGEL ONLINE 2012
All Rights Reserved
Reproduction only allowed with the permission of SPIEGELnet GmbH

Wissam al-Hassan: A Man Who Had Many Enemies

The fallout from the assassination of Internal Security Forces (ISF) Information Branch chief Wissam al-Hassan nearly two weeks ago was very similar to that following the series of assassinations that has rocked Lebanon since 2005.

Syria was blamed immediately, and those who expressed doubt were labeled collaborators. March 14 alluded to Hezbollah’s involvement as well. Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea even went as far as accusing Hezbollah directly.

Jumping to conclusions prevents honest dialogue. In reality, prior to his death, Hassan felt threatened by more than one party.

The intelligence chief made it clear that he feared a certain group within Hezbollah made up of “undisciplined elements who do not obey their leadership.”
People who knew Hassan heard him in recent years speak about those he thought wanted to kill him. Some of this information was based on analysis, but some of it was also based on data and facts on the ground.

Of course, Hassan had his suspicions regarding Syria’s role in Lebanon. Over the last few months, he became more apprehensive towards Syrian intelligence agencies. He would often mock their structural weaknesses, which became especially obvious following the arrest of former minister Michel Samaha [2] who was indicted for his involvement in “terror plots” in Lebanon on behalf of the Syrian regime.

Hassan also never hid his conviction that Hezbollah, along with Syria, was behind the assassination of former prime minister Rafik Hariri, but he was convinced it was the product of a conspiracy within the organization.

Hassan believed that Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah and assassinated Hezbollah military commander Imad Mughniyeh did not have prior knowledge of the killing and were not involved in it in any way.

The intelligence chief made it clear that he feared a certain group within Hezbollah made up of “undisciplined elements who do not obey their leadership.”

This apprehension did not prevent Hassan from cooperating with Hezbollah and even exchanging intelligence on several occasions.

While the Information Branch led the crackdown on Israeli spy networks over the last four years, the Resistance provided information that was crucial to their discovery.

“The are better than us in human intelligence gathering,” he would say of Hezbollah’s intelligence branch.

Hassan knew that the nature of his work made him a target. He often said that his job “left me without any friends.”

A few months ago, Hassan told people close to him about meetings he had with Jordanian officials, including the head of Jordanian intelligence, who he met in Germany, and a minister linked to Jordanian intelligence.

He said that each of them had relayed information – on separate occasions – about discussions with the Israelis regarding the situation in Lebanon.

As a result, both officials told Hassan that the Israelis do not look on him favourably and that he should be careful, even in Europe.

Hassan knew that the Israelis were after his neck. On several occasions, he reportedly said that he did not feel safe in Europe anymore.

He was aware of the damage done to Israel through the unraveling of its spy networks in Lebanon, starting in 2007 when the Intelligence Branch commenced its counter-intelligence operations.

Several US Senators explicitly informed Hassan that were facing Israeli pressure to stop their assistance to Lebanon.
Hassan also received a clear message from the US Congress, which cut back on some of the joint programs between his branch and its American counterparts. On one occasion, several US Senators explicitly informed Hassan that were facing Israeli pressure to stop their assistance to Lebanon.

But the clearest message came from the Jordanian intelligence officer he met with almost a year ago and whose warnings he took seriously.

Earlier this year, Hassan got another warning. In January 2012, he received a letter from the United Arab Emirates’ intelligence body saying they had credible information that a high ranking officer from the ISF would be targeted with a car bomb in Achrafieh on the road between the ISF headquarters and the officer’s safe house.

The information came as a surprise to Hassan, since he believed his safe house in Achrafieh was a secret. Even his closest aides were not informed of its location. He knew that the information from the UAE concerned him personally, the Achrafieh safe house being his own.

All he could do was leak the information to the press, to tell those who wanted to assassinate him that their plot had been discovered.

Urgent investigations conducted by the Information Branch did not show any suspicious activities in the area. But the precision of the information from the UAE led Hassan to treat it seriously.

The information was leaked to the press and treated, as usual, as fodder for internal Lebanese politicking. The Information Branch was accused of fabricating the information to use it to pry communications data [3] from telecom operators.

But for the security officers concerned with the investigation, the issue was critical. Hassan did not know who was behind the plot discovered by UAE intelligence.

He assumed it was related to Syrian intelligence operations. He remained convinced of this until he met a UAE intelligence official who told him that their information points to al-Qaeda, specifically one of their groups operating out of the Ain al-Helweh Palestinian refugee camp.

Wissam al-Hassan knew he had to stay a step ahead of his adversaries, some of whom remained a mystery even to him. He knew his enemies were many and that the last seven years of his life as a top intelligence chief only made him more of a target.

This article is an edited translation from the Arabic Edition.

Published on Al Akhbar English (http://english.al-akhbar.com)

By: Hassan Illeik [1]

Published Tuesday, October 30, 2012

Find this story at 30 October 2012

 

Al-Akhbar English by Al-Akhbar English is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported License.

online@al-akhbar.com

Benghazi consulate that came under attack by Al Qaeda militants was being used for CIA operations

Four Americans, including Ambassador Chris Stevens, were killed in a six-hour, commando-style attack on the US Mission on September 11
CIA Director David Petraeus did not attend the ceremony when the coffins arrived back in US to conceal the CIA operation in eastern Libya
Al Qaeda in North Africa and Islamist militia Ansar al-Sharia were implicated
Timeline of CIA involvement blows open the dramatic sequence of events, revealing that of 30 American officials there, 23 were with the CIA
CIA team had been operating out of a building known as ’the annex’, less than half a mile away from the consulate in central Benghazi
Timeline reveals heroic rescue effort by CIA team and the terrifying firefight they encountered

The CIA was operating a covert mission in the U.S. consulate in Libya when it came under attack by al Qaeda-linked militants on September 11, intelligent chiefs have admitted.

Four Americans, including Ambassador Chris Stevens, were killed in the six-hour, commando-style attack on the US Mission in the Libyan city, for which al-Qaeda and Islamist militia Ansar al-Sharia have been blamed.

The CIA made the revelation as it laid bare the heroic rescue by a handful of its agents in which they fought off wave after wave of mortar and rocket attacks with just their handguns as they sought to infiltrate the compound and shepherd its American staff to safety.

A timeline, released by the agency, has blown open the dramatic sequence of events, revealing for the first time that of the 30 American officials evacuated from the country following the deadly attack, just seven worked for the State Department.

Burning issue: Mr Stevens and three other Americans were killed in a six-hour, commando-style attack on the US Mission in Benghazi on September 11, for which Al Qaeda in North Africa and Islamist militia Ansar al-Sharia were implicated

The rest were part of a crack team of intelligence and security experts on a secret mission aimed at counterterrorism and securing heavy weapons held by the embattled regime.

They had been operating out of a building known as ’the annex’, around a mile away from the consulate in central Benghazi.

Intelligence officials told how when the annex received a call about the assault, about a half dozen members of a CIA security team tried to get heavy weapons and other assistance from the Libyans.

But with time running out, the team went ahead with the rescue attempt armed only with their standard-issue small arms.

Killed: Ambassador Christopher Stevens (left) died of smoke inhalation, while agent Sean Smith (right) died in a desperate battle with insurgents

Heroic: Former Navy SEALs Glen Doherty (left) and Tyrone Woods (right) were killed in a mortar attack

A fierce firefight ensued and the team managed to get into the consulate and shepherd its occupants back to the annex under constant attack from machine gun fire and rocket-propelled grenades.

‘The security officers in particular were genuine heroes,’ an official said. ‘They quickly tried to rally additional local support and heavier weapons, and when that could not be accomplished within minutes, they still moved in and put their own lives on the line to save their comrades.

‘At every level in the chain of command, from the senior officers in Libya to the most senior officials in Washington, everyone was fully engaged in trying to provide whatever help they could.’

The CIA revelations come after Barack Obama’s administration came under sharp attack over its handling of the incident amid claims Washington told officers on the ground to ‘stand down’ before the rescue took place.

Heroic: CIA agents engaged in a fierce firefight with heavily-armed insurgents at the consulate before shepherding its occupants to safety under constant attack from machine gun fire and rocket-propelled grenades

‘There was no second-guessing those decisions being made on the ground, by people at every U.S. organization that could play a role in assisting those in danger,’ the official added. ‘There were no orders to anybody to stand down in providing support.’

In the first days after the attack, various administration officials linked the Benghazi incident to the simultaneous protests around the Muslim world over an American-made film that ridiculed Islam’s Prophet Muhammad.

Only later did they publicly attribute it to militants, possibly linked to al-Qaeda, and acknowledged it was distinct from the film protests.

The changing explanations have led to suspicions that the administration didn’t want to acknowledge a terror attack on U.S. personnel so close to the Nov. 6 election, a charge Obama has strongly denied.

Inferno: Armed attackers dumped cans of diesel fuel and set ablaze the consulate’s exterior

Siege: The compound came under heavy mortar and gunfire during the attack, which lasted several hours

According to the timeline, around 9:40 p.m. Benghazi time, officials at the CIA’s relatively fortified and well-defended base in Benghazi got a call from State Department officials at the U.S. diplomatic mission about a mile away that the less-fortified public mission complex had come under attack from a group of militants.

Other official sources said that the initial wave of attacks on the diplomatic mission involved setting fires using diesel fuel.
TIMELINE OF EVENTS: HOW THE RESCUE OPERATION UNFOLDED

9.40pm – CIA officials in ‘The Annex’ get a distress call from the consulate saying they are under attack.

10.05pm – Armed only with handguns, team of about six CIA security officers leave their base for the public diplomatic mission compound.

10.30pm – With bullets whistling overhead, the CIA team move into the compound after unsuccessfully trying to get heavy weapons and help from local Libyan allies.

11.10pm – A Defense Department drone, which had been on an unrelated mission some distance away, arrived in Benghazi to help officials on the ground gather information.

11.30pm – U.S. personnel who had been working or staying at the mission all accounted for, except for Ambassador Stevens.

11.40pm – Driving back to the secure base, the evacuees come under further fire.

12am – The installation itself comes under fire from small arms and rocket-propelled grenades.

12am – A CIA security team based in Tripoli, which included two U.S. military officers, lands at Benghazi airport and begins plotting how to locate the missing ambassador.

1am – The patchy attacks on the base begin to die down after 90 minutes of fierce fighting.

4am – The reinforcements from Tripoli take a convoy of vehicles to the CIA base to prepare for evacuation.

4.30am – a fresh round of mortar attacks is launched on the base, killing two U.S. security officers.

5.30 – A heavily armed Libyan military unit arrive at the CIA base to help evacuate the compound of U.S. personnel to the Benghazi airport.

From 6am – Roughly 30 Americans, as well as the bodies of Stevens and the other three Americans killed during the attacks, were loaded on planes and flown out of the city, several U.S. officials said.

The dense smoke created by the fuel both made it hard for people at the compound to breathe and to organise a response to the attack.

About 25 minutes after the initial report came into the CIA base, a team of about six agency security officers left their base for the public diplomatic mission compound.

Over the succeeding 25 minutes, the CIA team approached the compound, and tried, apparently unsuccessfully, to get local Libyan allies to bring them a supply of heavier weapons, and eventually moved into the burning diplomatic compound, the intelligence official said.

At around 11:10 p.m., a Defense Department drone, which had been on an unrelated mission some distance away, arrived in Benghazi to help officials on the ground gather information.

By 11:30, U.S. personnel who had been working or staying at the mission had been rounded up except for Ambassador Stevens, who was missing, the intelligence official said.

When they tried to drive out of the diplomatic compound to return to the CIA base, however, the convoy carrying U.S. evacuees came under fire.

Once they got back to the CIA base, that installation itself came under fire from what the intelligence official described as small arms and rocket-propelled grenades.

These patchy attacks went on for roughly 90 minutes, the intelligence official said.

Around the same time, a CIA security team based in Tripoli, which included two U.S. military officers, landed at Benghazi airport. Upon its arrival, however, the team spent some time trying both to arrange local transport and to locate the missing Ambassador Stevens.

After some time trying to solve these problems, the security team that had flown in from Tripoli eventually arranged for an armed local escort and extra transportation, but decided not to go the hospital where they believed Stevens had been taken.

In part this was because they had reason to believe Stevens was likely dead, and because security at the hospital was believed, at best, to be ‘uncertain,’ the intelligence official said.

…

By Matt Blake

PUBLISHED: 12:11 GMT, 2 November 2012 | UPDATED: 17:16 GMT, 2 November 2012

Find this story at 2 November 2012

Published by Associated Newspapers Ltd

Part of the Daily Mail, The Mail on Sunday & Metro Media Group
© Associated Newspapers Ltd

Briton Killed in China Had Spy Links

BEIJING—Cruising around Beijing in a silver Jaguar with “007” in the license plate, Neil Heywood seemed to relish the air of intrigue that surrounded him.

In meetings, the British consultant hinted about his connections to Bo Xilai—the onetime Communist Party highflier—but often he would refuse to hand over a business card. He spoke Mandarin, smoked heavily and worked part time for a dealer of Aston Martin cars, the British brand driven by James Bond. Some thought him a fantasist, others a fraud.

But his contrived aura of mystery appears to have been a double bluff: He had been knowingly providing information about the Bo family to Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service, known as MI6, for more than a year when he was murdered in China last November, an investigation by The Wall Street Journal has found.

The revelation is a new twist in the saga of Mr. Bo, whose wife was convicted in August of poisoning Mr. Heywood in his hotel room in the southwestern city of Chongqing, where Mr. Bo was then party chief. The downfall of one of the party’s most powerful families threw into turmoil China’s plans for a once-a-decade leadership transition, due to start at the 18th Party Congress opening Thursday, and raised questions about corruption, abuse of power and bitter personal rivalries within China’s political elite.

The Journal investigation, based on interviews with current and former British officials and close friends of the murdered Briton, found that a person Mr. Heywood met in 2009 later acknowledged being an MI6 officer to him. Mr. Heywood subsequently met that person regularly in China and continued to provide information on Mr. Bo’s private affairs.

China regards the private lives of its leaders as state secrets, and information about them and their families is prized by foreign governments trying to understand the inner workings of an opaque political system.
China’s Leadership Change

See an interactive guide to China’s 18th Communist Party Congress, read more about the outgoing leaders and some candidates for promotion.

View Interactive

The Chongqing Drama

See key dates in the death of Neil Heywood in Chongqing and the drama surrounding Bo Xilai.

View Interactive

Players in China’s Leadership Purge

Read more about the players in the case.

View Interactive

More photos and interactive graphics

British authorities have sought to quell speculation that Mr. Heywood was a spy ever since the Journal reported in March that he had been working occasionally in China for a London-based business-intelligence company founded by a former MI6 officer and staffed by many former spies.

William Hague, the British foreign secretary who oversees MI6, broke with standard policy of not commenting on intelligence matters and issued a statement in April saying Mr. Heywood, who was 41 when he died, was “not an employee of the British government in any capacity.”

That was technically true, according to people familiar with the matter. They said Mr. Heywood wasn’t an MI6 officer, wasn’t paid and was “never in receipt of tasking”—meaning he never was given a specific mission to carry out or asked to seek a particular piece of information.
The Fall of Bo Xilai

Earlier coverage from The Wall Street Journal:
Crash Puts New Focus on China Leaders
Amid China Scandal, Spy Game Unraveled
In Elite China Circle, Briton Feared for His Life
U.K. Seeks Probe Into China Death
China in Transition: Full Coverage

But he was a willful and knowing informant, and his MI6 contact once described him as “useful” to a former colleague. “A little goes a long way,” the former colleague recalls the contact saying in relation to intelligence reports based on Mr. Heywood’s information.

Mr. Heywood’s intelligence links cast new light on the response to his death from British authorities, who initially accepted the local police’s conclusion that he died from “excessive alcohol consumption” and didn’t try to prevent his body from being quickly cremated without an autopsy. The British government didn’t ask China for an investigation until Feb. 15—a week after a former Chongqing police chief, Wang Lijun, fled to a U.S. consulate in China and told U.S. diplomats that Mr. Bo’s wife, Gu Kailai, had murdered the Briton.

There could be implications, too, for Chinese authorities, who would be guilty of a major security breach if they were unaware that MI6 had a source inside the inner family circle of a member of the Politburo—the party’s top 25 leaders—according to people familiar with the matter. If China’s security services were aware of Mr. Heywood’s contacts with MI6, they likely had him under surveillance during his final visit to Chongqing, those people said.

Until the scandal broke, Mr. Bo was a front-runner for promotion to the Politburo Standing Committee—the party’s top decision-making body—in this year’s leadership change.

Mr. Bo, sacked from the Politburo in April, is now facing criminal charges after Chinese authorities accused him in September of a series of offenses, including bribe-taking and interference in the murder investigation into his wife.

Neither Chinese nor British officials have suggested Mr. Heywood was killed because of his MI6 links. A Chinese court found Ms. Gu guilty in August of killing him because she thought he threatened her son over a business dispute, according to the state-run Xinhua news agency.

Enlarge Image

Zuma Press

Gu Kailai, wife of disgraced Chinese politician Bo Xilai, on trial in August for Mr. Heywood’s murder.

However, friends of Mr. Heywood and prominent Chinese figures have pointed out omissions, ambiguities and inconsistencies in the official account of his killing presented by state media.

And when Mr. Wang fled to the U.S. consulate in Chengdu on Feb. 6, he told U.S. diplomats there that Ms. Gu had confessed to him that she “killed a spy,” according to one person who has seen a transcript of what Mr. Wang said.

A spokesman for Britain’s Foreign Office declined to comment on what was said in the U.S. consulate, and, when asked about Mr. Heywood’s relationship with MI6, referred back to Mr. Hague’s statement in April.

Asked whether Mr. Heywood had been knowingly passing information to an MI6 officer, without being a government employee, the spokesman said: “We do not comment on intelligence matters or allegations of intelligence matters.” Mr. Heywood’s MI6 contact declined to comment.

Former intelligence officials say most informants and agents in the field aren’t considered employees because they rarely have a contract and aren’t necessarily paid, but people are usually registered as “knowing” sources and assigned a code name if they are providing information to someone who has acknowledged being an MI6 officer.

Mr. Heywood’s Chinese wife, Lulu, declined to comment. His mother and sister didn’t respond to requests for comment through an intermediary. China’s Foreign Ministry didn’t respond to a request for comment.

Mr. Heywood was a potentially risky choice as an informant, not least because of the 007 license plate on his Jaguar. He was, on the other hand, an old-fashioned patriot with a taste for adventure. He was in the rare position of having regular contact with the family of a Politburo member as well as intimate knowledge of their private affairs, according to several of his closest friends. Ms. Gu was godmother to his daughter, Olivia, according to one close friend.

He got to know the family in the 1990s while living in the northeastern city of Dalian, where Mr. Bo was mayor at the time, according to several of his friends, and had become part of an “inner circle” of friends and advisers.

Mr. Heywood kept a low profile in the expatriate community, according to people who knew him, using his connections in China to build a modest freelance consultancy business advising companies and individuals on how to navigate Chinese politics and bureaucracy.

He had dealings with several British companies and politicians, including at least two members of Britain’s House of Lords—the upper house of Parliament. One of those peers met Mr. Heywood several times in the company of his MI6 contact, according to people familiar with the matter.

In the last two years of his life, Mr. Heywood’s relationship with the Bo family deteriorated, especially after Ms. Gu became convinced she had been betrayed by a member of her “inner circle” and demanded that Mr. Heywood divorce his wife and swear an oath of allegiance to Ms. Gu, according to friends of Mr. Heywood.

Mr. Heywood informed his contact of this, according to people familiar with the matter. The contact warned him at one point that he should be careful not to become “a headline,” but continued meeting him and filing confidential reports on those meetings, according to those people.

Mr. Heywood hadn’t seen Mr. Bo for more than a year when he died and had been making plans to leave China, but he appeared to be trying to persuade the Bo family to pay him money he felt he was owed, according to close friends. They said he seemed stressed and increasingly concerned that his emails and phone calls were being monitored. He also had put on weight and begun to smoke more heavily.

“He definitely felt that he should have got more out of the relationship” with the Bo family, said one close friend. “That may explain why he agreed to go to Chongqing that last time. I think he was still hoping to get what he thought he was owed.”

Mr. Heywood flew to Chongqing on Nov. 13 after being summoned at short notice to a meeting with the Bo family, according to Xinhua. He believed he was “in trouble,” according to one friend he contacted that day.

He was murdered that night in his hotel room. According to an official account of Ms. Gu’s trial from Xinhua, she poured potassium cyanide in his mouth after he vomited from drunkenness and asked for a drink of water.

The Foreign Office said that no British officials, including MI6 officers, were in contact with him in the 48 hours before his death, but declined to comment on when and how it became aware of his relationship with the Bo family and that he had been summoned to Chongqing to meet them.

Mr. Heywood’s body was found on Nov. 15, and the British consulate was informed by local authorities the next day, according to a statement by Mr. Hague to Parliament.

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Reuters

Mr. Heywood’s body was found last Nov. 15 at the Nanshan Lijing Holiday Hotel, and Ms. Gu was subsequently convicted of fatally poisoning him.

Chongqing authorities initially told Mr. Heywood’s wife, who had traveled to Chongqing, that he had died of a heart attack, while informing the consulate that he died of “excessive alcohol consumption,” according to British officials. They said the body was cremated on Nov. 18 without an autopsy, but with the permission of Mr. Heywood’s wife.

British consular officials formally expressed to their superiors their concern and suspicion about how Chinese authorities handled Mr. Heywood’s death, but other British officials believed that asking for an investigation would be problematic, according to people with knowledge of the events.

The British officials who initially handled Mr. Heywood’s death are unlikely to have known about his MI6 links or his connection to the Bo family, these people said, but intelligence officials in Beijing and London would have been aware at the time of his death, or made aware soon after.

Britain’s Foreign Office says it had no reason to suspect foul play until members of the British community began raising suspicions on Jan. 18. But the Foreign Office didn’t raise the matter with Chinese authorities until almost a month later—after Mr. Wang’s flight to the U.S. consulate in Chengdu.

U.S. officials informed British authorities about Mr. Wang’s allegations while he was still in the consulate on Feb. 7, according to the Foreign Office. It also told the Journal that a British diplomat was sent to Chengdu to try to meet Mr. Wang, but arrived after he had left the consulate.

Mr. Hague has said that the British Embassy first asked the Chinese central government to investigate Mr. Heywood’s death on Feb. 15. But British authorities didn’t make that public until more than a month later—a delay that confused some U.S. officials following the matter.

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Getty Images

Two British diplomats outside the Hefei Intermediate People’s Court in Anhui, China, where Gu Kailai was tried for Mr. Heywood’s murder.

“We couldn’t understand what the British were waiting for,” said one U.S. official who was unaware of any links between Mr. Heywood and MI6.

…

Write to Jeremy Page at jeremy.page@wsj.com

Updated November 6, 2012, 4:47 a.m. ET

Find this story at 6 November 2011

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Murdered British businessman ‘was MI6 operative’ (we told you so)

An investigation by The Wall Street Journal has concluded that Neil Heywood, the British businessman who was murdered in China last November, was an active informant for British intelligence at the time of his death. The news appears to confirm intelNews’ assessment of April 2012 that Heywood was in fact connected with British intelligence. A highly successful financial consultant and fluent Chinese speaker who had lived in China for over a decade, Heywood was found dead on November 14, 2011, in his room at the Nanshan Lijing Holiday Hotel in Chongqing. His death led to the dramatic downfall of Bo Xilai and Gu Kailai, a husband-and-wife team of political celebrities who were found guilty in a Chinese court of killing the British businessman. Immediately after Heywood’s death, there was widespread speculation that he may have been a spy for MI6, Britain’s external intelligence service. On April 27, 2012, I argued that I was not aware of anyone “with serious knowledge of intelligence issues who was not completely certain, or did not deeply suspect, that Heywood had indeed collaborated with British intelligence at some stage during the past decade”. I wrote this in the face of an official denial by British Foreign Secretary William Hague, who had said earlier in the week that “Heywood was not an employee of the British government in any capacity”. Now an extensive investigation by The Wall Street Journal has concluded that the dead British businessman had been an MI6 operative “for more than a year” prior to his death. The paper said it concluded that based on several interviews with unnamed “current and former British officials” as well as with close friends of the murdered man. One source told The Journal that Heywood had been willingly and consciously recruited by an MI6 officer, who met with him on a regular basis in China. Heywood allegedly provided the MI6 officer with inside information on Xilai and other senior Chinese government officials. The article quotes an unnamed British official as saying that Heywood’s MI6 handler once described him as “useful” to a former colleague. According to the paper, Heywood’s MI6 work does not technically contradict the British Foreign secretary’s statement that the late businessman had not been “an employee of the British government”.

…

November 7, 2012 by Joseph Fitsanakis 8 Comments

By JOSEPH FITSANAKIS | intelNews.org |

Find this story at 7 November 2012

Taiwan unnerved by arrests over alleged spying for China

Taiwan has arrested three retired military officers on suspicion of spying for China, allegations that have unsettled lawmakers fearful that state secrets could be leaked to Beijing.

The accused include the former chief of political warfare at the Taiwanese naval meteorology and oceanography office, according a Ministry of National Defense statement sent Monday to local media. The ministry said Chang Chih-hsin had initiated contacts with Chinese officials during his service and was suspected of luring fellow officers and “making illegal gains.”

The office is seen as especially sensitive because it holds information about Taiwanese submarines and hidden ambush zones. “This has gravely endangered Taiwan’s security,” ruling party lawmaker Lin Yu-fang was quoted by the Taipei Times. “It’s a shame for the military.”

As the news spread, the ministry downplayed the risks, saying that no “confidential information” had been leaked to Beijing. The Chinese office for Taiwan affairs told the Global Times, a paper linked to the Communist Party, that it knew nothing about the alleged spying.
That failed to reassure politicians in Taiwan, which has sought to ease tensions and strengthen economic ties with a country that still sees it as a breakaway territory. Trade, investment and tourism have been liberalized between Taipei and Beijing, boosting the Taiwanese economy.

On the surface, relations between Taiwan and China seem peaceful, said Kwei-Bo Huang, director of the Center for Foreign Policy Studies at National Chengchi University. “But deep down, the intelligence warfare hasn’t stopped,” he said. Last summer, an army general was jailed for life for selling secrets to China, the most striking case of espionage yet. Opposition politicians argued episodes of alleged spying show that Taiwan has veered too far in embracing China under President Ma Ying-jeou.

The president has slipped in popularity since he first won election four years ago, when his opponents were hobbled by a corruption scandal, forcing him to defend his increased openness toward China.

“These kinds of activities undermine the confidence of the Taiwanese public towards any friendly gesture at all,” said Dean P. Chen, assistant professor of political science at Ramapo College of New Jersey. “It could easily undermine his China policy.”

The phenomenon of retired military officials heading to China has caused particular concern in Taiwan that secrets could be spilled. Without institutional channels to communicate about military issues, Chen said, officers have ended up chatting informally instead.

“In the absence of an institutionalized arrangement, they lack ideas of what is right to say and what is not right to say. Nobody really knows where to apply a brake,” he said. Creating clearer channels for discussion, Chen added, could help quash under-the-table talk.

…

October 30, 2012 | 7:37 am

Find this story at 30 October 2012

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Taiwan arrests suspected military spies for China

Taiwan has arrested three retired military officers suspected of spying for China, officials say.

One of the officers, identified by local media as Chang Chih-hsin, was the former political warfare head of the meteorology and oceanography office.

The Defence Ministry has said that Mr Chang did not leak sensitive material.

But local media warn his department handled highly classified data, including maps for submarines, hidden ambush zones and coastal defence areas.

“Chang, who initiated contacts with Chinese mainland officials while still serving in the navy, was suspected of luring his former colleagues and making illegal gains,” the Defence Ministry said in a statement.

The ministry had been investigating Mr Chang even before he retired in May and visited China in August, reports say.

While a Defence Ministry spokesman has confirmed the arrest of three former military officials, other media reports say that a total of eight officers have been arrested.

The case is raising questions about the increasing practice in recent years of Taiwan’s retired officers, including generals, visiting China, says the BBC’s Cindy Sui in Taipei.

…

 

29 October 2012 Last updated at 09:49 GMT

Find this story at 29 October 2012 

 

 

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Taiwan arrests eight military officers for spying for China

Authorities in Taiwan have announced the arrest at least eight current and former military officers on suspicion of conducting espionage on behalf of China. The eight are accused of leaking Taiwanese military secrets to Beijing, in a case that some Taiwanese legislators described yesterday as one of the most serious instances of espionage in the island’s history. According to official statements issued yesterday, the person in charge of the alleged spy ring appears to be Lieutenant Colonel Chang Chin-hsin, who until his retirement earlier this year was charge of political warfare at the Naval Meteorology and Oceanography (METOC) Office. Based outside of Taipei, METOC is in charge of producing mapping data for use by Taiwan’s naval forces, including cartographic manuals used by Taiwanese warships and submarines guarding the Taiwanese coastline. Taiwanese authorities allege that Chang “initiated contacts” with Chinese mainland officials while still serving in the Taiwanese Navy. Following his recruitment, Chang gradually enlisted several other members of the Taiwanese military by offering hefty monetary bribes in exchange for military secrets. Taipei authorities claim that they found out about Chang’s espionage activities in March of this year, and that Taiwan’s Military Prosecutors Office gathered evidence against him before he was able to seriously compromise national security. David Lo, a spokesman at Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense, told journalists yesterday that, as a result of the early tip-off and related counterintelligence precautions, Chang had “limited access to sensitive information”.

…

October 30, 2012 by Ian Allen

By IAN ALLEN | intelNews.org |

Find this story at 30 October 2012

Newly released MI5 files include early Cold War diaries

Files from the Security Service (MI5) released to The National Archives today include the personal post-war diaries of Guy Liddell, then Deputy Director General of MI5.

Liddell’s diaries cover the period 1945 to 1953 and provide a fascinating new insight into the early Cold War era. Daily entries record Liddell’s impressions of key moments including the discovery in 1949 that the Soviet Union had tested its first atomic bomb, the uncovering of the spy Klaus Fuchs and the defection of Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean.

During the Second World War, Liddell had been head of counter-espionage, and his wartime diaries were released to The National Archives in 2002 (KV 4/185-196).

This 29th release of Security Service records contains 77 files and brings the total number of Security Service records in the KV series at The National Archives to 5,003.

Liddell’s diaries are available to view online and will be free to download for one month. Professor Christopher Andrew, author of The Defence of the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5, has recorded a podcast about the new files.
Highlights

Other highlights from this release, available to view at Kew, include:
A ten-volume file on one of Britain’s leading Communist journalists, Sam Lesser, which covers his career from his time as a volunteer with the International Brigades during the Spanish Civil War to becoming the Daily Worker’s foreign correspondent and foreign editor at the height of the Cold War in the early 1960s (KV 2/3741-KV 2/3750)
Austro-German Prince Hubertus Lowenstein came to Britain after Hitler took power in Germany. An active, if eccentric, anti-Nazi he was anxious to build a Germany free from National Socialism and his personal ambition was said to be no less than the German throne (KV 2/3716)
Catholic priest Henry Borynski served in a largely Polish parish in Bradford in the early 1950s before his sudden and unexplained disappearance in 1953. There was initial speculation that he had been ‘kidnapped by Red Agents and taken behind the Iron Curtain’ but the case remains unsolved (KV 2/3722-KV 2/3724)

Find this story at 26 October 2012

Declassified spymaster’s diary reveals UK-US espionage tensions with ‘gangster’ Hoover

LONDON — Overstaffed, overconfident and all too often over here.

That’s how a top British spymaster saw his American counterparts at the FBI and CIA, according to newly declassified diaries from the years after World War II.

Friction between British spies and their American colleagues is a recurring theme in journals kept by Guy Liddell, the postwar deputy director of Britain’s domestic intelligence agency, MI5.

The diaries, published for the first time Friday by Britain’s National Archives, show Liddell was frustrated by FBI boss J. Edgar Hoover — “a cross between a political gangster and a prima donna” — and skeptical of the brand-new U.S. espionage service, the CIA.

“In the course of time … they may produce something of value,” Liddell wrote of the CIA in September 1947 after a meeting with its deputy director, Edwin Kennedy Wright.

“There is a great deal of ‘dissemination, evaluation and coordination,’ but of course the thing that really matters is whether they have anything that is worth disseminating, evaluating, or coordinating,” Liddell said.

Liddell also noted that Wright had told British intelligence officials that “in an American organization 500 people were employed to do what 50 people would do over here.”

Archives historian Stephen Twigge said the transatlantic relationship was marked by “a certain friction towards what the British might think of as the Johnny-come-latelies in the CIA.”

Britain and the U.S. were staunch wartime and Cold War allies, but the intelligence-sharing relationship was sometimes troubled. It reached a low ebb after the conviction in 1950 of Klaus Fuchs, a German-British nuclear scientist charged with passing atomic weapons secrets to the Soviet Union.

Hoover, outraged by the security lapse and angered that Britain would not let the Americans interview Fuchs in prison, threatened to cut off intelligence cooperation.

Liddell accused Hoover of “unscrupulous” behavior.

“Hoover, finding himself in something of a jam, is obviously taking British security for a ride … Hoover’s next move was to go before some other committee and say that the British made a muck of the Fuchs case,” he wrote.

Liddell called the American attitude “wholly wrong, stupid and unreasonable.”

“It merely shows how utterly incapable they are of seeing anybody’s point of view except their own, and that they are quite ready to cut off their noses to spite their faces!”

Twigge, however, said the Americans had a point — “half the British secret service turns out to have been penetrated by Soviet intelligence.”

The diaries cover a dark period for British intelligence, during which several senior agents were exposed as Soviet spies. Liddell was tainted by his friendship with Guy Burgess, one of the “Cambridge Spies” secretly working for the Russians.

The diaries show that Liddell doubted Burgess’ guilt. “My own view was that Guy Burgess was not the sort of person who would deliberately pass confidential information to unauthorized parties,” he wrote in 1950.

Liddell was shaken by the disappearance of Burgess and Donald Maclean, who defected to Moscow in 1951, and was himself questioned as a possible double agent. He retired from MI5 in 1953 and died of heart failure in 1958.

“As time has gone on it’s pretty apparent he wasn’t a Soviet agent,” Twigge said. “Just unlucky in his friends.”

A previous installment of Liddell’s diaries, covering World War II, was declassified in 2002.

The new volumes reveal the life of a postwar spymaster to be extremely varied. Liddell attended the Nuremberg trials of senior Nazis, where he saw figures including Hermann Goering — “one of the few who had much spunk left in him” — and Rudolf Hess, who “appeared to be entirely indifferent to the proceedings.”

Another entry recorded a briefing about a UFO sighting, of which Liddell was skeptical.

…

By Associated Press, Published: October 25

Find this story at 25 October 2012

Copyright 2012 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed.

© The Washington Post Company

Un agente francese dietro la morte di Gheddafi

Il merito della cattura del rais sarebbe stato dei servizi di Parigi. Il Colonnello «venduto» all’Occidente da Assad

TRIPOLI – Sarebbe stato un «agente straniero», e non le brigate rivoluzionarie libiche, a sparare il colpo di pistola alla testa che avrebbe ucciso Moammar Gheddafi il 20 ottobre dell’anno scorso alla periferia di Sirte. Non è la prima volta che in Libia viene messa in dubbio la versione ufficiale e più diffusa sulla fine del Colonnello. Ma ora è lo stesso Mahmoud Jibril, ex premier del governo transitorio e al momento in lizza per la guida del Paese dopo le elezioni parlamentari del 7 luglio, a rilanciare la versione del complotto ordito da un servizio segreto estero. «Fu un agente straniero mischiato alle brigate rivoluzionarie a uccidere Gheddafi», ha dichiarato due giorni fa durante un’intervista con l’emittente egiziana «Sogno Tv» al Cairo, dove si trova per partecipare ad un dibattito sulle Primavere arabe.

PISTA FRANCESE – Tra gli ambienti diplomatici occidentali nella capitale libica il commento ufficioso più diffuso è che, se davvero ci fu la mano di un sicario al servizio degli 007 stranieri, questa «quasi certamente era francese». Il ragionamento è noto. Fin dall’inizio del sostegno Nato alla rivoluzione, fortemente voluto dal governo di Nicolas Sarkozy, Gheddafi minacciò apertamente di rivelare i dettagli dei suoi rapporti con l’ex presidente francese, compresi i milioni di dollari versati per finanziare la sua candidatura e la campagna alle elezioni del 2007. «Sarkozy aveva tutti i motivi per cercare di far tacere il Colonnello e il più rapidamente possibile», ci hanno ripetuto ieri fonti diplomatiche europee a Tripoli.

RIVELAZIONI – Questa tesi è rafforzata dalle rivelazioni raccolte dal «Corriere» tre giorni fa a Bengasi. Qui Rami El Obeidi, ex responsabile per i rapporti con le agenzie di informazioni straniere per conto del Consiglio Nazionale Transitorio (l’ex organismo di autogoverno dei rivoluzionari libici) sino alle metà del 2011, ci ha raccontato le sue conoscenze sulle modalità che permisero alla Nato di individuare il luogo dove si era nascosto il Colonnello dopo la liberazione di Tripoli per mano dei rivoluzionari tra il 20 e 23 agosto 2011. «Allora si riteneva che Gheddafi fosse fuggito nel deserto e verso il confine meridionale della Libia assieme ad un manipolo di seguaci con l’intenzione di riorganizzare la resistenza», spiega El Obeidi. La notizia era ripetuta di continuo dagli stessi rivoluzionari, che avevano intensificato gli attacchi sulla regione a sud di Bani Walid e verso le oasi meridionali. In realtà Gheddafi aveva trovato rifugio nella città lealista di Sirte. Aggiunge El Obeidi: «Qui il rais cercò di comunicare tramite il suo satellitare Iridium con una serie di fedelissimi fuggiti in Siria sotto la protezione di Bashar Assad. Tra loro c’era anche il suo delfino per la propaganda televisiva, Yusuf Shakir (oggi sarebbe sano e salvo in incognito a Praga).

…

Dal nostro inviato LORENZO CREMONESI

Dal nostro inviato LORENZO CREMONESI

Find this story at 1 October 2012

Copyright 2012 © RCS Mediagroup S.p.a. Tutti i diritti sono riservati

US General: American Military Spies ‘Across Africa’

A U-28A plane, painted in a civilian paint scheme, is seen about to touch down on a landing strip, in this file photo. (US Airforce)

America’s top commander in Africa revealed that the U.S. military has conducted spy operations all over the continent as part of the fight against international adversaries from al Qaeda-allied terror groups that target the homeland to suspected war criminals like Joseph Kony.

“Do we collect information across Africa? Yes, we do,” U.S. Gen. Carter Ham, commander of U.S. Africa Command, said in a leadership conference at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies Monday.

In an attempt to clarify recent press reports that the U.S. military had set up “spy locations” throughout Africa, Ham said that U.S. troops do at times go on “short-term deployments of capabilities” in various African nations, but always with the permission of the host country.

Ham did not explain what exactly those capabilities are, but gave as an example the hunt for Joseph Kony, the notorious leader of the brutal Lord’s Resistance Army — a hunt the U.S. military has supported with the permission of four local governments. Last October, President Obama announced that 100 American special operations troops had been sent to central Africa to help track Kony.

“To have some intelligence collection capability that has the ability to monitor the areas in which we believe the Lord’s Resistance Army is operating, to be able to see, to be able to listen, to be able to collect information which we then pass to the four nations, four African nations, which are participating, I think is a good way ahead,” Ham said.

Ham’s admission comes two weeks after The Washington Post reported that the U.S. military had secretly expanded its presence in Africa to include a network of small air bases used to spy on terrorist organizations there. According to the Post, the military uses small, unarmed turbo-prop planes disguised as private charters to carry out sensitive intelligence collection.

Part of that program appeared to have been revealed in February when the Department of Defense announced the deaths of four special operations servicemen near Djibouti. The four men died after their U-28 plane — a “non-standard” surveillance aircraft similar in appearance to a private plane — was involved in an accident.

Gen.: Future Role for US Military in Libya, ‘Ideal’ Position in Somalia

Ham echoed fears previously voiced by U.S. officials to ABC News about a possible foothold extremist groups like al Qaeda may be trying to make in Libya and elsewhere in Africa. AQIM, an al Qaeda offshoot based in northwestern Africa, has publicly said it has “benefitted” from the chaos in Libya already.

…

By LEE FERRAN
June 26, 2012

Find this story at 26 June 2012

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White House widens covert ops presence in North Africa

WASHINGTON – Small teams of special operations forces arrived at American embassies throughout North Africa in the months before militants launched the fiery attack that killed the U.S. ambassador in Libya. The soldiers’ mission: Set up a network that could quickly strike a terrorist target or rescue a hostage.

But the teams had yet to do much counterterrorism work in Libya, though the White House signed off a year ago on the plan to build the new military task force in the region and the advance teams had been there for six months, according to three U.S. counterterror officials and a former intelligence official.

The counterterror effort indicates that the administration has been worried for some time about a growing threat posed by al-Qaida and its offshoots in North Africa. But officials say the military organization was too new to respond to the attack in Benghazi, where the administration now believes armed al-Qaida-linked militants surrounded the lightly guarded U.S. compound, set it on fire and killed Ambassador Chris Stevens and three other Americans.

Republicans have questioned whether the Obama administration has been hiding key information or hasn’t known what happened in the immediate aftermath of the attack.

As of early September, the special operations teams still consisted only of liaison officers who were assigned to establish relationships with local governments and U.S. officials in the region. Only limited counterterrorism operations have been conducted in Africa so far.

“There are no plans at this stage for unilateral U.S. military operations” in the region, Pentagon spokesman George Little said Tuesday, adding that the focus was on helping African countries build their own forces.

For the Special Operations Command, spokesman Col. Tim Nye would not discuss “the missions and or locations of its counterterrorist forces” except to say that special operations troops are in 75 countries daily conducting missions.

The go-slow approach being taken by the Army’s top clandestine counterterrorist unit – known as Delta Force – is an effort by the White House to counter criticism from some U.S. lawmakers, human rights activists and others that the anti-terror fight is shifting largely to a secret war using special operations raids and drone strikes, with little public accountability. The administration has been taking its time when setting up the new unit to get buy-in from all players who might be affected, such as the U.S. ambassadors, CIA station chiefs, regional U.S. military commanders and local leaders.

Eventually, the Delta Force group will form the backbone of a military task force responsible for combating al-Qaida and other terrorist groups across the region with an arsenal that includes drones. But first, it will work to win acceptance by helping North African nations build their own special operations and counterterror units.

The Obama administration has been concerned about the growing power and influence of al-Qaida offshoots in Yemen, Somalia, Iraq and North Africa. Only the Yemeni branch has tried to attack American territory directly so far, with a series of thwarted bomb plots aimed at U.S.-bound aircraft. A Navy SEAL task force set up in 2009 has used a combination of raids and drone strikes to fight militants in Yemen and Somalia, working together with the CIA and local forces.

The new task force would work in much the same way to combat al-Qaida’s North African affiliates, which are growing in numbers and are awash in weapons from post-revolutionary Libya’s looted stockpiles. They are well-funded by a criminal network trafficking in drugs and hostages.

…

Published: 07:12 PM, Tue Oct 02, 2012

By Kimberly Dozier

The Associated Press

Find this story at 2 October 2012

Copyright 2012 – The Fayetteville Observer, Fayetteville, N.C.

Spy chiefs used fake info to raid fund

SENIOR crime intelligence officials planted paid informers to make fake right-wing-related threats against the government.

This was allegedly part of a wider strategy to loot the unit’s Secret Service Account for personal benefit.

Law enforcement agency sources allege that spy bosses worked their way into the R600 million-a-year slush fund by fabricating information to create a false impression of imminent, unprecedented attacks on black people and ANC members.

It is understood that in the run-up to the ANC’s centenary celebrations in the Free State in January, spy masters in North West used one of their informers to threaten chaos and violence against the ruling party, unless it stemmed farm attacks.

Claiming to have detected a threat, they allegedly asked for and got additional money – believed to be millions – from the slush fund on the pretext that they wanted to remunerate “sources” who tipped them off.

In one incident, a masked man made chilling threats against black people and the ANC in a recorded video last year alongside right-winger Andre Visagie, a former secretary-general of the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging who formed the Geloftevolk Republikeine (Covenant People Republicans).

The video was posted on YouTube, sparking fear and costly investigations by law enforcement agencies.

Visagie said he would comment after viewing the video.

Three security cluster sources said the threats were behind the police’s decision to deploy an Nyala permanently outside the ANC’s headquarters in the Joburg CBD.

A confidential document penned by one of the investigators, a copy of which is in the possession of Independent Newspapers, points to the staged events.

These entail crime intelligence officials planting informers to make false threats, meant to justify the looting of the fund by intelligence operatives.

The five-page document outlined the methods used and gave the names of those involved – informers and their police handlers – as well as their backgrounds.

A senior national police official said he was “aware” of the scam, adding that some of those implicated had offered evidence in exchange for immunity from prosecution.

He confirmed that spy bosses cited the need to pay sources as a reason for wanting more resources. “You can say, ‘There is a group I want to impress – I need a Gucci bag’, and you will get it. At times there isn’t a follow-up on whether there was any infiltration.”

It is understood the money was shared among those who masterminded the scam.

Brigadier Thulani Ngubane, North West police spokesman, said they were “not aware” of any abuse of the slush fund. The provincial commissioner would investigate and charge those implicated as he viewed the allegations “seriously”.

While a report by other investigators has noted abuses of the fund under crime intelligence boss Richard Mdluli, who has been suspended, it is understood it has been abused for decades. Mdluli has denied any wrongdoing.

…

June 14 2012 at 03:49pm

PIET RAMPEDI

Find this story at 14 June 2012 

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Gaddafi was killed by French secret serviceman on orders of Nicolas Sarkozy, sources claim

A French secret serviceman acting on the express orders of Nicolas Sarkozy is suspected of murdering Colonel Gaddafi, it was sensationally claimed today.

He is said to have infiltrated a violent mob mutilating the captured Libyan dictator last year and shot him in the head.

The motive, according to well-placed sources in the North African country, was to stop Gaddafi being interrogated about his highly suspicious links with Sarkozy, who was President of France at the time.

Nicolas Sarkozy, France’s former president, allegedly ordered the murder of former Libyan dictator Colonel Gaddafi

Other former western leaders, including ex British Prime Minister Tony Blair, were also extremely close to Gaddafi, visiting him regularly and helping to facilitate multi-million pounds business deals.

Sarkozy, who once welcomed Gaddafi as a ‘brother leader’ during a state visit to Paris, was said to have received millions from the Libyan despot to fund his election campaign in 2007.

The conspiracy theory will be of huge concern to Britain which sent RAF jet to bomb Libya last year with the sole intention of ‘saving civilian lives’.

A United Nations mandate which sanctioned the attack expressly stated that the western allies could not interfere in the internal politics of the country.

Instead the almost daily bombing runs ended with Gaddafi’s overthrow, while both French and British military ‘advisors’ were said to have assisted on the ground.

Now Mahmoud Jibril, who served as interim Prime Minister following Gaddafi’s overthrow, told Egyptian TV: ‘It was a foreign agent who mixed with the revolutionary brigades to kill Gaddafi.’

Gaddafi was killed on October 20 in a final assault on his hometown Sirte by fighters of the new regime, who said they had cornered the ousted despot in a sewage pipe waving a golden gun. The moment was captured on video

Former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, covered in blood, is pulled from a truck by NTC fighters in Sirte before he was killed

Revolutionary Libyan fighters inspect a storm drain where Muammar Gaddafi was found wounded in Sirte, Libya, last year

Diplomatic sources in Tripoli, the Libyan capital, meanwhile suggested to the Italian newspaper Corriere della Serra that a foreign assassin was likely to have been French.

The paper writes: ‘Since the beginning of NATO support for the revolution, strongly backed by the government of Nicolas Sarkozy, Gaddafi openly threatened to reveal details of his relationship with the former president of France, including the millions of dollars paid to finance his candidacy at the 2007 elections.’

One Tripoli source said: ‘Sarkozy had every reason to try to silence the Colonel and as quickly as possible.’

The view is supported by information gathered by investigaters in Benghazi, Libya’s second city and the place where the ‘Arab Spring’ revolution against Gaddafi started in early 2011.

Rami El Obeidi, the former head of foreign relations for the Libyan transitional council, said he knew that Gaddafi had been tracked through his satellite telecommunications system as he talked to Bashar Al-Assad, the Syrian dictator.

…

By Peter Allen

PUBLISHED: 11:43 GMT, 30 September 2012 | UPDATED: 06:56 GMT, 1 October 2012

Find this story at 30 September 2012

Published by Associated Newspapers Ltd

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