Canadian spy’s guilty plea closes lid on serious breach24 januari 2013
A CANADIAN spy who compromised Australian intelligence information has pleaded guilty to espionage, having reportedly sold secrets to Russia for $3000 a month.
Canadian naval officer Jeffrey Paul Delisle’s guilty plea in Nova Scotia’s supreme court on Wednesday has ensured that the Canadian, United States and Australian governments will not be embarrassed by a jury trial that would have revealed details of one of the worst Western security breaches since the end of the Cold War.
Delisle’s sale of top-secret intelligence to Russian agents was the subject of high-level consultation between the Australian and Canadian governments last January and was discussed at a secret international conference of Western security agencies at Queenstown, New Zealand, in February.
Fairfax Media reported in July that Australian security sources had privately acknowledged the massive security breach compromised Western intelligence information and capabilities.
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The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation was also briefed on the case through liaison with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service.
Sub-Lieutenant Delisle worked at the Royal Canadian Navy’s Trinity intelligence and communications centre at Halifax, Nova Scotia. A naval intelligence and security analyst, he had access to a top-secret computer network code-named Stone Ghost that connects the defence intelligence agencies of the US, Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.
Australian security sources say much of the information Delisle sold was top-secret signals intelligence collected by the five agencies.
Delisle’s guilty plea means that few details of the espionage case have or will be made public.
However, newly released information from Delisle’s bail hearing in January has revealed that facing chronic financial difficulties, he began a four-year espionage career by walking into the Russian Embassy in Ottawa in 2007. Wearing civilian clothes, Delisle displayed his Canadian military identification badge and asked to meet someone from GRU, the Russian military intelligence service.
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October 12, 2012
Philip Dorling
Find this story at 12 October 2012
Copyright © 2013 Fairfax Media
Royal Navy submariner admits meeting ‘Russian spies’24 januari 2013
Petty officer gathered secret coding programs and met two people he thought were Russian agents, court hears
Edward Devenney admitted discussing information relating to the movement of nuclear submarines. Photograph: Gaz Armes/ MoD Crown Copyright/PA
A Royal Navy submariner was caught trying to sell secrets to Russia in a sting operation led by the security services, the Guardian understands.
Edward Devenney, 30, pleaded guilty on Tuesday to collecting secret coding programs used by the British and attempting to pass the classified information on to Moscow.
Devenney, who is formerly from Northern Ireland, was a submariner on HMS Vigilant, a Trident nuclear submarine, when he decided to pass on secrets to the “enemy”, it is understood. The submarine – one of four that make up the UK’s nuclear deterrent – is normally based at Faslane in Scotland but had been refuelling at Devonport dock in Plymouth when Devenney’s activities raised the suspicions of his senior officers.
Devenney’s motivation, it is believed, was unhappiness with his situation and a degree of anger towards his employers after being passed over for promotion, rather than an issue of ideology or money.
A prolific tweeter, his behaviour raised the suspicions of his senior officers and over a period of months an undercover operation was carried out.
This led to Devenney contacting two people he believed were from the Russian secret service and discussing information relating to the movement of nuclear submarines with them. However, he was in fact talking to British agents.
Devenney was arrested and charged under the Official Secrets Act. He appeared at the Old Bailey in London and pleaded guilty to gathering details of encryption programs in breach of the act.
The charge related to collecting information for a purpose prejudicial to the safety of the state between 18 November 2011 and 7 March 2012. The information was described in court as “crypto material” – or codes used to encrypt secret information – which could be useful to an enemy.
Devenney also admitted a charge of misconduct in a public office in relation to a meeting with two people he believed were from the Russian secret service. He admitted meeting the two individuals and discussing the movement of nuclear submarines with them. He denied a further count of communicating information to another person. The Crown Prosecution Service would not pursue this charge, the court heard.
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Sandra Laville, crime correspondent
guardian.co.uk, Tuesday 13 November 2012 13.15 GMT
Find this story at 13 November 2012
© 2013 Guardian News and Media Limited or its affiliated companies. All rights reserved.
Eight years for submariner who took secret photos in ‘disgusting’ betrayal24 januari 2013
Threat: Edward Devanney took photographs on board HMS Vigilant
A Royal Navy petty officer was jailed for eight years today after taking mobile phone pictures in the top-secret communications room of a nuclear submarine and planning to pass information to the Russians.
Edward Devanney secretly photographed canisters holding code systems used throughout Britain’s armed forces, which are normally locked in a safe.
Such a security breach could have jeopardised any chance of British submarines operating undetected by the enemy, the Old Bailey heard. Navy chiefs still do not know how he was able to open the safe and take the photos undetected.
Mr Justice Saunders told him: “You were prepared to betray your country and your colleagues. It needs to be understood by those who may be tempted to pass on secrets that long sentences will follow even unsuccessful attempts.”
Devanney rang the Russian embassy 11 times and later made contact with two men called Dimitri and Vladimir he believed to be enemy agents. He told them he was disillusioned with the Navy saying: “I’m just a bit p***** off with them. I know it’s petty but I just want to hurt them.”
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Paul Cheston
12 December 2012
Find this story at 12 December 2012
© 2012 Evening Standard Limited
Nuclear submariner tried to pass secrets to Russians to ‘hurt’ Royal Navy24 januari 2013
A disillusioned Royal Navy submariner betrayed his country by trying to pass nuclear sub secrets to Russian agents because he wanted to “hurt” the Navy.
Petty Officer Edward Devenney was jailed for eight years yesterday for breaching the official secrets act after being caught in an elaborate MI5 sting operation.
He spent three months in contact with men who he thought were two Russian spies but were actually British agents, the Old Bailey heard.
He continued with his plan, done in revenge for not being promoted, despite having suspicions and even told one: “Your accent sounds remarkably fake, like British intelligence”.
A communications engineer, he offered highly sensitive details of the movements of nuclear submarines and of a previous secret operation.
He also photographed top secret code information that could have caused “substantial damage to the security of the UK”.
The case last night also raised questions over Royal Navy security because Devenney had been able to access the code material from a locked safe.
He was also allowed to remain in his sensitive post despite having problems with drink and depression after being charged with rape, for which he was later acquitted, and had been warned he would be sacked after showing signs of erratic behaviour such as going absent without leave.
Passing sentence, Mr Justice Saunders said: “This is a very serious case. The defendant was prepared to betray his country and his colleagues.”
Devenney, 30, from County Tyrone, had been a “blue-eyed boy” with a promising future in the Royal Navy, which he had served loyally for more than ten years, the court heard.
Lord Carlile QC, defending, said his career went “awry” in 2010 after he was charged with alleged rape, for which he was acquitted.
He began drinking excessively and became depressed and the following year asked to be removed from a promotion training course for 12 months.
However, he later decided he had been treated badly by the Navy and wanted to “hurt” them, Mark Dennis, prosecuting, said.
In November last year he began calling the Russian embassy in London, including 11 calls on one day shortly after a 12 hour binge drinking session.
At the time he was stationed on the nuclear submarine HMS Vigilant, which was in Plymouth undergoing a refit.
The following month he was contacted by a man called “Dima” who claimed to be from the Russian embassy.
A week later another man called Vladimir called claiming to be a colleague of Dima.
A series of phone calls and text messages were exchanged in which Devenney said he was “****** off” with the Royal Navy and that they could “help each other”.
In January, it was arranged he would meet Vladimir at the British Museum in London and the pair then met Dima in a nearby hotel room.
During the secretly filmed meeting, Devenney offered details of a previous secret operation by HMS Trafalgar, a hunter killer submarine, and various movement dates of two nuclear submarines.
Such advance notice could allow an enemy state time to set up equipment to record the sub’s unique signature information which would have meant it could have been tracked anywhere in the world, the court heard.
Two days after first contacting the Russian embassy, Devenney also managed to get into a locked safe on board HMS Vigilant and take three photographs of part of a secret code for encrypted information.
The pictures were placed on his laptop but he never passed them on or even mentioned them during his later meeting with the “Russians”.
Devenney pleaded guilty to breaching the Official Secrets Act by gathering classified information and misconduct by meeting the supposed spies.
The judge said he was passing a deterrent sentence because “those who serve their country loyally must know that those who don’t will receive proper punishment.”
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By Tom Whitehead, Security Editor
5:15PM GMT 12 Dec 2012
Find this story at 12 December 2012
© Copyright of Telegraph Media Group Limited 2013
MI5 arrests Royal Navy petty officer for trying to spy for Russia24 januari 2013
An member of the British Royal Navy has been arrested in a counterintelligence sting operation, after trying to sell top-secret government documents to people he believed were Russian operatives. Petty Officer Edward Devenney, who has been in the Royal Navy for over a decade, was arrested earlier this week while meeting with two MI5 officers posing as Russian spies. Originally from Northern Ireland, Devenney, 29, appears to have been motivated by disgruntlement against the Navy, after his planned promotion to commissioned officer was halted due to financial austerity measures imposed on the military by the British government. According to the court indictment, Devenney contacted an unnamed “embassy of a foreign country” in London, offering to provide classified information in exchange for money. It is unknown at this point how exactly MI5, the British government’s foremost counterintelligence organization, became privy to the content of Devenney’s communication with officials at the unidentified embassy. What is known is that, after several messages were exchanged between the parties, Devenney arranged to meet two people he believed were Russian government employees. In reality, the two individuals were MI5 officers, who were able to film the clandestine meeting. Devenney was apparently arrested on the spot, having first announced that he wished to “hurt the Navy” because his promotion to a commissioned officer had been “binned” by the British government. He also shared with them classified information, which British government prosecutors say he collected meticulously between November 19, 2011, and March 7 of this year. The information consisted of cryptological material, including encryption codes for British naval communications, operational details about the now decommissioned submarine HMS Trafalgar, as well as “the comings and goings of two nuclear submarines”.
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November 15, 2012 by Joseph Fitsanakis 5 Comments
By JOSEPH FITSANAKIS | intelNews.org |
Find this story at 15 December 2012
Defensie probeerde ex-spion af te kopen24 januari 2013
Vijfhonderdduizend euro zwijggeld heeft het ministerie van Defensie geboden aan ex-agent I.A. (42) van de militaire inlichtingendienst MIVD. Op geheime bandopnamen – in bezit van De Telegraaf – biedt mr. Marc Gazenbeek, directeur juridische zaken bij het ministerie van Defensie, duidelijk hoorbaar het ’ongelooflijk mooie’ geldbedrag aan, zoals hij zelf zegt.
In ruil moet de ex-agent alle juridische procedures staken tegen de ministeries van Defensie en van Buitenlandse Zaken. Bij de onderhandelingen tussen de ex-agent en Defensie waren ook landsadvocaat Eric Daalder aanwezig en I.A.’s advocaat Michael Ruperti.
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door Bart Olmer en Charles Sanders
vr 18 jan 2013, 05:30
Find this story at 18 Januar 2013
© 1996-2013 TMG Online Media B.V., Amsterdam.
One Man, Three Lives The Munich Olympics and the CIA’s New Informant14 januari 2013
Willi Voss started as a petty criminal in Germany’s industrial Ruhr Valley. Before long, though, he found himself helping the PLO, even playing a minor role in the 1972 Munich Olympics attack. He went on to become a valuable CIA informant, and has now written a book about his life in the shadows. By SPIEGEL Staff
In the summer of 1975, Willi Voss was left with few alternatives: prison, suicide or betrayal. He chose betrayal. After all, he had just been betrayed by the two men whom he had trusted, and whose struggle had forced him to lead a clandestine existence.
It was Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat’s closest advisers who had used him and jeopardized his life: Abu Daoud, the mastermind behind the terror attack on Israeli athletes at the 1972 Summer Olympics in Munich, and Abu Iyad, head of the PLO intelligence service Razd.
Voss, a petty criminal from West Germany’s industrial Ruhr region, in cahoots with Palestinian leaders who were feared around the world? It took a number of coincidences and twists of fate in Voss’ life before he found himself in such a position, but here he was on a mission for the Palestinians — in a Mercedes-Benz, traveling from Beirut to Belgrade, together with his girlfriend Ellen, so it would all look like a vacation trip.
His job was to deliver the car, Iyad and Daoud had said. But they had neglected to mention that the Mercedes contained automatic weapons, a sniper rifle and explosives, which were hidden in a secret compartment and consisted of a number of packages, each weighing 20 kilos (44 pounds) — complete with fully assembled detonators made of mercury fulminate, a highly unstable substance. If Voss had gotten into an accident or hit a deep pothole, he, the car and his girlfriend would have been blown to pieces.
Voss only found out about his dangerous cargo when Romanian customs officials tore the vehicle apart. The only thing that saved the 31-year-old and his companion from ending up behind bars was the fact that the PLO maintained excellent ties with the Romanian regime. Romanian officials placed the two Germans in a car driven by a couple of pensioners from the Rhineland region, who were on their way back home to Germany after a vacation. Voss and his girlfriend hopped out in Belgrade. This was the end of the road for them — and, as Voss recalls today, the day when they had to make a fateful decision: prison, suicide or betrayal?
Becoming a Defector
Prison: In Germany there was a warrant for Voss’ arrest. A few years earlier, he had been taken into custody during a raid at the Munich home of a former SS officer who was in league with neo-Nazis. Investigators had secured weapons and explosives from the PLO along with plans for terror attacks and hostage-taking missions in Cologne and Vienna.
Suicide: Voss and his companion spent three days and nights in a tawdry hotel in Belgrade, where they continuously debated whether they should put an end to their lives. But they decided against this option as well.
That left only betrayal. Voss and his girlfriend went to the American embassy, demanded to speak to a diplomat and made the statements that would add yet another twist to his already eventful life: “I am an officer of Fatah. This is my wife. I’m in a position to make an interesting offer to your intelligence agency.”
Voss became a defector. He went from being an accomplice of Palestinian terrorists to a member of the US intelligence agency — from a handmaiden of terror to a CIA spy. As if his first life were not eventful enough, Voss opted for a second life: as a CIA spook with the codename “Ganymede,” named after the kidnapped lover of Zeus, the father of the gods in Greek mythology.
His career as an undercover agent took him from Milan and Madrid back to Beirut and the headquarters of the PLO intelligence service. “Ganymede” provided information and documents that helped thwart attacks in the Middle East and Europe. Duane Clarridge, the legendary and infamous founder of the CIA Counterterrorist Center, even gave him the mission of catching top terrorist Carlos, “The Jackal.”
Today, as he sits in a Berlin café and talks about his life, the gray-haired man clad in a black leather jacket appears at times bitingly ironic, at times shy and prone to depression — making it all the more difficult to reconcile him with the daredevil who lived through this lunacy.
‘Naked Fury’
Voss, who was called Pohl until he adopted the name of his first wife, often says: “That’s exactly how it was, but nobody believes it anyway” — as if he himself had trouble tying together all the loose ends of his life to create a coherent biography. He is 68 years old and wants to get one thing straight: He has never been a neo-Nazi, he insists. “I was a stray dog — one that had been kicked so often that it wanted to bite back, no matter how,” says Voss. “If I had met Andreas Baader at the time,” he contends, “I would have presumably ended up with the Red Army Faction.”
It’s a statement that only becomes plausible when one considers the other formative experiences of his life. He recounts that his childhood was marred by violence, sexual abuse and other humiliations. “As a child, I constantly faced situations in which I was completely powerless,” says Voss, “and that triggered a naked fury, utter shame and the feeling that I was the most worthless thing in the world.”
As a teenager, he sought to escape this world by joining a clique of young rowdies whose dares including stealing mopeds for joy rides. That got him a year in juvenile detention.
This could have led to a small, or even substantial, career as a criminal in the industrial Ruhr region. But in 1960, Voss met Udo Albrecht in prison, who later became a major figurehead in the German neo-Nazi scene. Albrecht fascinated his fellow prisoners with his dream of using mini submarines to smuggle in diamonds from the beaches of southwest Africa.
Yes, he actually believed this nonsense at the time, admits Voss. Politics didn’t come into the picture until later on, he says, when the two jailbirds met in another prison in 1968. This time Voss was doing time for breaking and entering. “Albrecht talked and acted then like an unabashed Nazi,” says Voss. But he says that this did nothing to diminish his friendship with the self-proclaimed leader of the “People’s Liberation Front of Germany.”
Hooking Up with the Palestinians
Voss’ connection with the PLO began when he helped smuggle his buddy Albrecht out of prison in a container. The neo-Nazi slipped away to Jordan, where he hooked up with the Palestinians. When Daoud, the architect of the Munich massacre, asked him if he knew a reliable man in Germany, Albrecht recommended his prison pal from the Ruhr region.
Voss made himself useful. In Dortmund he purchased a number of Mercedes sedans for Daoud — and he established contact to a passport forger in his circle of acquaintances. Today, Voss believes that he was even involved in the preparations for the Munich attack. For a number of weeks, he says, he drove the leader of Black September, a terrorist group with ties to the PLO, “all across Germany, where he met with Palestinians in various cities.”
The Palestinians used him to handle other jobs, as well: “I was to hold a press conference in Vienna, in which I would comment on a mission that I would only find out about once it was successfully completed,” as the PLO chief of intelligence Iyad had told him. When Voss saw the images on TV, he realized that the “mission” was the massacre at the 1972 Summer Olympics. Instead of securing the release of hundreds of Palestinian prisoners, as the hostage-takers had demanded, it ended in a bloodbath: Nine Israeli hostages, five Palestinian terrorists and one German policeman died.
Six weeks later, Voss was arrested in Germany. He had machine guns and hand grenades that stemmed from the same source as the weapons used by the Palestinian hostage-takers in Munich. This marked the beginning of wild negotiations initiated by Voss’ lawyer Wilhelm Schöttler, who sent a letter with a “classified” offer to Federal Minister for Special Affairs Egon Bahr.
The offer was simple: Release Voss to allow for negotiations with Black September. The objective was to prevent further attacks on German soil. Today, it is known that high-ranking officials at the Foreign Ministry met with the lawyer, who was considered a right-wing radical, and discussed an ongoing series of demands until March 1974, when then-Interior Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher decided to end the negotiations.
Looking for Carlos
Six days later, a court in Munich handed Voss a relatively mild prison sentence of 26 months for contravening the War Weapons Control Act.
In December of 1974, his sentence was suspended despite the fact that he was still under investigation on suspicion of being a member of Black September. In Feb. 1975, he slipped out of Germany and headed back to Beirut, where he was soon serving the Palestinian cause again — right up until that big turning point in his life when he drove a car packed with weapons and explosives to the Romanian border in the summer of 1975.
Even today, one can sense the enormous respect that CIA veterans still have for their former German agent. “I’ve often wondered if he made it,” says Terrence Douglas, “although we are trained to keep our distance and to forget everything after the job is done and move on.”
Douglas, codename “Gordon,” was Voss’ commanding officer at the CIA. He has a very high opinion of his operative “Ganymede”: “Willi was a very cool guy. He was creative and a bit crazy — we spent a very, very intense time together.”
It takes a healthy dose of courage to secretly photograph documents at the PLO intelligence service headquarters. “Ganymede” foiled attacks in Sweden and Israel, identified terror cells in diverse countries and supplied information on collaborations between the neo-Nazi Albrecht and his accomplices with Arafat’s Fatah. And, as if all that were not enough, Voss lived next door to top terrorist Abu Nidal.
Surprisingly, though, the CIA agents stationed in Belgrade and Zagreb who Voss first met were not particularly thrilled with the young German. “They thought he was too boring,” says Douglas with a laugh. “But they had no clue. They didn’t know about the Black September list of people to be released with the hostage-taking at the Saudi Arabian embassy in Sudan in March 1973.”
Refusing to Tell the Truth
Members of the terror organization had also sought the release of a German during their operation in Sudan: Willi Voss. “That was his reference,” says Douglas. “That’s the reason why we were excited by him.”
The CIA made sure that Voss no longer had to fear being arrested in Germany. “It was clear to him that he couldn’t continue with his previous lifestyle,” says Douglas. “He wanted to survive and someday be able to settle again undisturbed in Germany,” he recalls. “After all, he had a wife, and she had a 10-year-old kid. It was a package deal, I took care of them.”
“As always in such situations, we informed the CIA office in Bonn, and they arranged everything with the BND or the BKA, depending on the situation,” says spymaster Clarridge, referring to Germany’s foreign intelligence agency and domestic criminal investigation agency respectively. Only a few weeks after the first meeting, the German arrest warrant had been rescinded.
Today, German authorities still refuse to tell the truth about these events. In the wake of revelations published in a June 2012 SPIEGEL article on the Munich massacre, Bavarian state parliamentarians Susanna Tausendfreund and Sepp Dürr of the Green Party demanded that the state government reveal “what documents from what Bavarian government agencies responsible at the time (exist) … on Willi Voss.”
In late August 2012, the Bavarian Interior Ministry responded — and it had a surprise. Ministry officials said that Voss had submitted a plea for clemency, which had received a positive response. “The content of this plea for clemency,” they noted, however, was “classified.” This is demonstrably false. Voss has never submitted a plea for clemency.
On the Terrace of an Athens Hotel
In any case, the deal certainly paid off for the Americans: Voss didn’t disappoint them, even at risk of life and limb. In the fall of 1975, the Christian Phalange militia in Lebanon held him captive because they thought he was what he pretended to be — a German member of Black September.
For weeks, Voss endured torture and mock executions without blowing his cover. For the CIA, this was a recommendation for an even riskier job. When Voss was released, he was told to hunt down Carlos, “The Jackal,” who, as a terror mercenary employed by Libyan revolutionary leader Moammar Gadhafi, had stormed OPEC headquarters in Vienna, and was committing murders for Palestinian terror groups.
Voss traveled to Athens. On the terrace of a hotel with a view of the Acropolis, not only Douglas, but also Clarridge — who had specially flown in from Washington — were waiting to meet the daring German operative. In his memoirs, Clarridge described the meeting as follows: “Just hours before I had left headquarters at Langley on this trip, a very senior clandestine service officer asked to see me alone in his office on the seventh floor. He could be excruciatingly elliptical when he desired — and this was such an occasion. Referring to my meeting with this agent in Athens, he hinted that if the agent could set up Carlos to be taken by a security service, it would be a boon for mankind and worth a bonus. I recall ten thousand dollars being mentioned. If Carlos were killed in the process, so be it. I acknowledged that I understood and left for Athens.”
Voss’ job was to find out where the Jackal was staying. But “Ganymede” lost his nerve this time. “Abu Daoud had told me that Carlos had a place in Damascus, not far from his own apartment,” Voss recalls today. “If something had happened to him, the people at the PLO intelligence service would have automatically suspected me. I found that too risky.”
‘CIA Beats Nazi’
In retrospect, his CIA contact Douglas was extremely happy about this decision. On December 6, 2012, after meeting with SPIEGEL, he sent an e-mail to his former agent: “I was delighted to hear that you are ageing gracefully — the alternative would have been unthinkable for me. … Let me say, I hold you in deep respect for your courage, quickness, wry humor, dedication and trustworthiness.” Douglas had written a book before he found out that Voss had survived his adventurous life. It’s a novel about a “plot in the Middle East” entitled: “Ganymede”.
Voss is also writing books; his third life. He specializes in crime thrillers and screenplays, having completed some 30 works since the late 1970s. But the author has never dared to tackle the most thrilling material of all — his complete life story.
Now, he’s telling the story for the first time. The German title of his book is “UnterGrund” (“Under Ground”) and, according to the preface, readers should not expect “a written confession seeking forgiveness.” Instead, he notes that “this is an account of events that, for security reasons, I thought I would have to keep secret forever.” Voss intends to save his honor and provide an explanation for his actions. In order to report on the 1972 Munich massacre, last spring SPIEGEL had applied for the release of classified files and written two articles mentioning Voss’ role in the attack. Afterwards, at least in the author’s eyes, his reputation was in tatters.
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BY KARIN ASSMANN, FELIX BOHR, GUNTHER LATSCH and KLAUS WIEGREFE
01/02/2013 06:07 PM
Find this story at 2 January 2013
© SPIEGEL ONLINE 2013
Revealed: German neo-Nazi who helped Palestinians was CIA agent14 januari 2013
A German far-right militant, whose animosity against Jews led him to aid Palestinians kill Israeli athletes in the 1972 Munich massacre, says he was later recruited by the United States Central Intelligence Agency. Willi Pohl, also known as Willi Voss, 68, was arrested by German authorities a few weeks after Palestinian terrorist group Black September stormed the Olympic village in Munich and took hostage 11 Israeli athletes. All of them were eventually killed by their captors during a botched escape attempt at the nearby Fürstenfeldbruck airport. Voss, who was a known neo-Nazi activist at the time, was charged with possession of weapons and providing logistical support to the Black September militants. However, after his sentence was suspended, Voss managed to secretly emigrate to Beirut, Lebanon, where he was recruited as an agent of Jihaz el-Razd, the intelligence service of the Fatah, the main group in the Palestine Liberation Organization. But in 1975, while on a PLO mission in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, he decided to switch sides. He made the decision after discovering that the car he and his girlfriend were transporting on behalf of the PLO from Beirut to Belgrade contained weapons and highly unstable explosives. He says that the PLO had apparently failed to mention the existence of the hidden items when they asked him to transport the car to Europe. According to Voss’ new book, which has just been published in Germany under the title UnterGrund (Underground), the guns and explosives were discovered by customs officers in Romania (then Rumania); but because at that time the communist country was an ally of the PLO, Voss and his girlfriend were allowed to travel to Belgrade, minus the car and the weapons. Once in the Yugoslav capital, they made the decision to walk in the US embassy, identify themselves as agents of the Jihaz el-Razd and offer their services to Washington. In an interview with German newsmagazine Der Spiegel, published this week, Voss claims he was recruited by the CIA and given the operational codename GANYMEDE. The interview in Der Spiegel includes confirmation of Voss’ CIA role by his intelligence handler CIA officer Terrence Douglas. Douglas says he instructed Voss to return to the service of the PLO and Black September, which was a separate group, and provide the US with information about the activities of leading Palestinian militants from various factions, including Abu Daoud, Abu Nidal, and Abu Jihad, who led the Jihaz el-Razd.
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January 4, 2013 by intelNews 5 Comments
By JOSEPH FITSANAKIS | intelNews.org |
Find this story at 4 January 2013
Munich Olympics Massacre Officials Ignored Warnings of Terrorist Attack14 januari 2013
Explicit warnings that a terrorist attack might take place at the 1972 Munich Olympics were ignored by German officials, according to previously classified documents seen by SPIEGEL. The new details also reveal efforts to cover up the extent of their failure to stop the brutal murders of Israeli athletes.
It is no secret that the German authorities’ handling of the massacre of Israeli athletes during the 1972 Munich Olympics was characterized by bumbling and cover-ups. But new documents seen by SPIEGEL reveal that officials concealed even more — and more blatant — errors than previously thought. Indeed, there were even several warnings prior to the Games that an attack was imminent.
ANZEIGE
Previously classified documents from investigative officials, embassy dispatches, and cabinet protocols released to SPIEGEL by the Chancellery, Foreign Office and state and federal intelligence agencies have revealed the lengths to which officials went to hide their mistakes.
In the attack on Sept. 5, 1972, Palestinian terrorists killed 11 members of Israel’s Olympic delegation, along with one German police officer. Five of the eight terrorists from the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) terrorist group called “Black September” were also killed during the botched rescue attempt by German police at the Fürstenfeldbruck military airport, where the hostages were being held in two helicopters.
‘No Self-Criticism’
Already on Sept. 7, just one day after the memorial ceremony for the victims took place in Munich’s Olympic Stadium, a Foreign Ministry official told a special sitting of the federal cabinet what would ultimately become the maxim for both Bavarian and West German officials. “Mutual incriminations must be avoided,” a protocol for the meeting reads. “Also, no self-criticism.”
Just how closely this advice was followed can be seen in documentation from both the federal government and the Bavarian state government, which falsely described the “precision” with which the terrorists carried out their attack. In reality, officials knew that the “Black September” members were actually so poorly prepared that they even had trouble finding hotel rooms in Munich before their attack.
On the day of the attack, the Palestinians were even known to have gone right past the Israelis’ apartments in the Olympic village, encountering athletes from Hong Kong on an upper level of the building instead. An “analytic evaluation” of the attack by the Munich criminal police later explicitly determined that the terrorists had “conducted no precise reconnaissance” ahead of time.
But none of these details were revealed to the public. The fact that Bavarian state prosecutors in Munich were pursuing an investigation against police president Manfred Schreiber and his chief of operation on suspicion of negligent manslaughter also wasn’t mentioned in the document.
Clear Warnings
Concrete warnings of a potential attack also went unmentioned, despite the fact that they were so clear that their dismissal remains difficult to comprehend. On Aug. 14, 1972, a German embassy officer in Beirut heard that “an incident would be staged by from the Palestinian side during the Olympic Games in Munich.” Four days later, the Foreign Office forwarded the warning to the state intelligence agency in Bavaria, along with the recommendation to “take all possible available security measures” against such an attack.
Security agencies didn’t even register warnings that appeared in the press. On Sept. 2, three days ahead of the deadly hostage-taking, the Italian publication Gente wrote that terrorists from Black September were planning a “sensational act during the Olympic Games.” Only later — two days after the bloodbath in Munich — was the warning put on record through a tip-off from the Hamburg criminal police.
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Released: July 23, 2012 | 12:20 PM
Find this story at 23 July 2012
© SPIEGEL ONLINE 2012
The FBI’s secret file on Marilyn Monroe: Document that shows agency kept track of intimate details about actress14 januari 2013
A classified file released by the FBI shows how the agency tracked Marilyn Monroe’s suspected ties to communism in 1956.
The agency documented an anonymous phone call to the New York Daily News that year warning that playwright Arthur Miller was a communist and Monroe had ‘drifted into the communist orbit’ after her marriage to him earlier that year.
The file is just one piece of the puzzle about what the FBI knew about the actress when she died in August 1962.
The Associated Press waging an ongoing campaign to have more of the FBI documents released by the agency, coinciding with the 50th anniversary Monroe’s death.
Being watched: Marilyn Monroe and her husband, playwright Arthur Miller were both suspected of communist activities by the FBI
The redacted document reveals that on July 11, 1956, the agency got a tip that an anonymous male caller phoned the Daily News to report that the actress’s company, Marilyn Monroe Productions, was ‘filled with communists’ and that money from the company was being used to finance communist activities.
The caller said Miller’s marriage to Monroe during a Jewish ceremony less than a months earlier was a ‘coverup.’
Miller, the man said, ‘was still a member of the CP (communist party) and was their cultural front man.’
The FBI has long made portions of its documents about Monroe public, but most of them are heavily redacted.
Surveillance: This FBI file documented an anonymous call to the New York Daily News. It’s unknown how the agency found out about it
However, the FBI claims it has lost its files on the actress and cannot release them.
Finding out precisely when the records were moved – as the FBI says has happened – required the filing of yet another, still-pending Freedom of Information Act request.
The most recent version of the files is publicly available on the bureau’s website, The Vault, which periodically posts FBI records on celebrities, government officials, spies and criminals.
The AP appealed the FBI’s continued censorship of its Monroe files, noting the agency has not given ‘any legal or factual analysis of the foreseeable harm that might result from the release of the full records.’
Marilyn Monroe is seen here with Jean Pierre Piquet, manager of Continental Hilton Hotel. The FBI has released a new version of files it kept on Monroe that reveal the names of some of her acquaintances who had drawn concern from the FBI
The star’s death was ruled likely drug overdose, but questions still remain about the FBI’s role in her life
Monroe’s star power and fears she might be recruited by the Communist Party during the tenure of longtime FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover led to reports being taken on her activities and relationships, including her marriage to playwright Arthur Miller.
Monroe’s file begins in 1955 and mostly focuses on her travels and associations, searching for signs of leftist views and possible ties to communism. The file continues up until the months before her death, and also includes several news stories and references to Norman Mailer’s biography of the actress, which focused on questions about whether Monroe was killed by the government.
…
By Daily Mail Reporter and Associated Press
PUBLISHED: 06:03 GMT, 28 December 2012 | UPDATED: 11:08 GMT, 28 December 2012
Find this story at 28 December 2012
© Associated Newspapers Ltd
Wegen Nähe zu Kommunisten unter Beobachtung FBI-Akten über Marilyn Monroe aufgetaucht14 januari 2013
Erst 50 Jahre nach ihrem Tod gibt es unzensierte Einblicke darüber, wie sehr die US-Bundespolizei Marilyn Monroe († 36) im Visier hatte. Aufgetauchte FBI-Akten beweisen, dass sie damals wegen ihrer angeblichen Kontakte zu Kommunisten unter Beobachtung stand. Wider Erwarten bringen die Dokumente keine neuen Erkenntnisse über die Todesumstände des Filmstars.
Bereits im Sommer hatte die Nachrichtenagentur AP versucht, sich Einblick in die FBI-Akten über Marilyn Monroe zu verschaffen. Anlass war ihr 50. Todestag am 5. August 2012. Die Unterlagen über die Ermittlungen waren in den Monaten vor dem Tod des Filmstars verschwunden. Das FBI erklärte, die über Monroe angelegten Akten seien nicht mehr in ihrem Besitz. Ebenso wenig waren sie im Nationalarchiv der USA auffindbar. Erst jetzt gelang es, an die Akten zu kommen.
Ihre Akte beginnt 1955, in dem Jahr, als sie mit der berühmten U-Bahn-Szene aus „Das verflixte 7. Jahr“ für Wirbel sorgte. Das FBI beobachtete Marilyn Monroe mehrere Jahre lang. Grund: Ihre Verbindungen zu Sympathisanten der kommunistischen Ideologie. Die meisten Dokumente der Bundespolizei betreffen eine Reise von Monroe nach Mexiko im Jahr 1962.
Sie besuchte dort den Links-Aktivisten Frederick Vanderbilt Field († 94), der von seiner wohlhabenden Familie wegen seiner linken Ansichten enterbt wurde. Laut den Informanten des FBI’s seien die beiden geradezu ineinander vernarrt gewesen.
Das Treffen zwischen Vanderbilt Field und Monroe habe Sorge in ihrem engsten Umfeld ausgelöst. „Die Situation hat für Bestürzung bei Monroes Entourage gesorgt und ebenso unter der Gruppe von amerikanischen Kommunisten in Mexiko,“ heißt es in den Akten.
…
29.12.2012 – 13:15 Uhr
Find this story at 29 December 2012
© Copyright BILD digital 2011
A la caza del espía marroquí14 januari 2013
El servicio secreto de Mohamed VI es, tras el ruso, el que más agentes pierde en el Viejo Continente
Yassin Mansouri, compañero de estudios del rey, dirige lo dirige desde 2005
Bagdad A., marroquí, de 59 años, se movía con soltura en el seno de la inmigración magrebí en Alemania. Recopilaba “informaciones sobre manifestaciones organizadas por grupos de oposición”, según la fiscalía federal germana. En 2007 se ofreció a los servicios secretos de su país alegando que poseía “una amplia red de contactos” en el seno de la comunidad marroquí. Le contrataron. Cinco años después, el 7 de diciembre, la fiscalía de Karlsruhe le imputó por “actividades por cuenta de servicios secretos extranjeros”.
Bagdad A. es el cuarto marroquí detenido por espionaje en Alemania desde 2011. Todos se consagraban a informar sobre las actividades de sus 230.000 compatriotas allí residentes, excepto Mohamed B., de 56 años, apresado en febrero en Berlín, y que se dedicaba a vigilar a los miembros del Frente Polisario. Cobró por ello 22.800 euros, según la fiscalía.
De todos los agentes marroquíes caídos estos últimos años en Europa, el que hizo más ruido fue, en 2008, Redouane Lemhaouli, de 42 años, un policía de origen marroquí que tenía acceso a las bases de datos del Ministerio del Interior de los Países Bajos. De ahí sacó información sobre “actuaciones contra el rey de Marruecos”, “terrorismo” y “tráfico de armas”, para comunicársela a los espías que, con cobertura diplomática, le habían reclutado.
El caso de Re, el apodo que habían puesto sus compañeros al policía, ha sido el que más repercusión tuvo porque el agente llegó a codearse con la princesa Máxima, esposa del príncipe Orange, y con un miembro del Gobierno holandés. Se sentó a su lado, en primera fila, durante una ceremonia en la que 57 chavales inmigrantes, muchos de ellos de origen marroquí, recibieron diplomas que les habilitaban para trabajar como personal de tierra en el aeropuerto de Rotterdam. Re les había formado.
Meses después, el policía fue expulsado del cuerpo y condenado a 240 horas de trabajos sociales. El que era entonces ministro de Exteriores holandés, Maxime Verhagen, envió una carta a los diputados lamentando “la intervención de sectores o servicios para influir a los ciudadanos de origen marroquí”.
Los agentes marroquíes sufren traspiés en la Europa del norte, pero se mueven con más libertad en la del sur
En total, desde 2008 han trascendido 10 detenciones y procesamientos de agentes o expulsiones de diplomáticos de Marruecos en Europa —Mauritania echó también a un undécimo confidente el año pasado—, un número solo superado por Rusia, que en los últimos cinco años perdió a 31 espías en el Viejo Continente.
Los 11 agentes marroquíes trabajaban para la Dirección General de Estudios y Documentación (DGED), el servicio de espionaje exterior de Yassin Mansouri, de 50 años, el primer civil que lo dirige. Es el único servicio de inteligencia que formalmente depende del palacio real de Marruecos y se ha convertido en algo más que un servicio secreto. Es un instrumento de la diplomacia marroquí. La personalidad de su jefe lo explica.
Mansouri forma parte del círculo de estrechos colaboradores del rey Mohamed VI, con el que estudió en el colegio real. Es además el único entre los íntimos del monarca que no ha sido salpicado por un escándalo económico o político.
Su travesía del desierto
acabó poco después
de la entronización
de Mohamed VI
Su lealtad al futuro rey le provocó incluso, en 1997, ser apartado del puesto que desempeñaba en el Ministerio del Interior por su titular, Driss Basri. Sospechaba que le espiaba por cuenta del príncipe heredero, al que él sí vigilaba por encargo de su padre, Hassan II. Mansouri fue, sin embargo, el único de los amigos de juventud del príncipe que cayó bien a Basri. Ensalzó ante Hassan II su capacidad de trabajo y el rey le envió en 1992 a EE UU para que le formase el FBI.
Nacido en Beejad, en el centro del país, hijo de un alem (sabio del islam), Mansouri recibió una educación religiosa, algo trastornada por las amistades izquierdistas de su hermano, hasta que se le ofreció plaza en el colegio real. Aún hoy día sigue siendo un hombre piadoso que intenta rezar con frecuencia, que no bebe alcohol, ni fuma, ni hace ostentación.
Su travesía del desierto acabó tras la entronización de Mohamed VI, que en 1999 le nombró director de la MAP, la agencia de prensa oficial, desde donde regresó en 2003, esta vez por la puerta grande, a Interior. Durante dos años estuvo al frente de la más importante dirección general del ministerio del que Basri ya había sido expulsado. De ahí dio el salto al espionaje y a la diplomacia discreta.
Mansouri formó, por ejemplo, parte de la delegación marroquí que acudió a Nueva York en 2007 a presentar al secretario general de la ONU la oferta de autonomía para el Sáhara; se sentó varias veces a negociar con el Polisario y se entrevistó en secreto en París, en 2007, con la ministra israelí de Exteriores, Tzipi Livn. En 2008 recibió en Rabat al secretario de Estado adjunto norteamericano, David Welsh, al que expresó su preocupación por la fragilidad del régimen tunecino y la “codicia” de su dictador Ben Ali, según revelaron posteriormente los cables de Wikileaks. Tres años después, Ben Ali fue derrocado. Mansouri fue de los pocos que acertaron en su pronóstico sobre Túnez..
La DGED se ha dedicado, desde su creación en 1973, a vigilar a los exiliados enemigos de la monarquía alauí, antes izquierdistas y ahora más bien islamistas y a los independentistas saharauis. Pero a medida que la emigración marroquí ha ido creciendo también se esfuerza en supervisarla para que no germine en ella el extremismo, para que sea leal al trono.
En España, Marruecos ha elaborado “una estrategia de gran magnitud”, señalaba en mayo de 2011 un informe del Centro Nacional de Inteligencia (CNI) enviado por su director, el general Félix Sanz, a tres ministros. “Su objetivo es extender su influencia e incrementar el control sobre las colonias marroquíes utilizando la excusa de la religión”, añadía. Esta supervisión la ejerce, según el CNI, “a través de su embajada y consulados (…), personal afín”, es decir, agentes de la DGED con cobertura diplomática y confidentes reclutados sobre el terreno. También colabora la Fundación Hassan II, que preside la princesa Lalla Meryem, hermana de Mohamed VI, cuyo presupuesto no está sometido al control del Parlamento.
Prueba del interés de la DGED por la religión fue la intervención de Mansouri, en noviembre de 2008, ante un nutrido grupo de imanes, procedentes de España e Italia, e invitados a Marraquech por el Ministerio de Asuntos Islámicos. Un año antes, Mansouri viajó a Mallorca para reunirse con el que era entonces su homólogo español, Alberto Saiz, y advertirle de que estaba “jugando con fuego” al fomentar en Ceuta el auge de los tablig, una corriente islámica de origen indio, en detrimento del islam malekita que impera en Marruecos.
…
Ignacio Cembrero Madrid 14 DIC 2012 – 20:47 CET
Find this story at 14 December 2012
© EDICIONES EL PAÍS, S.L.
Anklage wegen mutmaßlicher Spionage14 januari 2013
Die Bundesanwaltschaft hat am 8. November 2012 vor dem Staatsschutzsenat des Kammergerichts in Berlin gegen
den 59-jährigen deutschen und marokkanischen Staatsangehörigen Bagdad A.
Anklage wegen geheimdienstlicher Agententätigkeit (§ 99 Abs. 1 Nr. 1 StGB) erhoben.
Dem Angeschuldigten wird in der nunmehr zugestellten Anklageschrift vorgeworfen, von Mai 2007 bis Ende Februar 2012 für den marokkanischen Nachrichtendienst Informationen über in Deutschland lebende Oppositionelle beschafft zu haben.
In der Anklageschrift ist im Wesentlichen folgender Sachverhalt dargelegt:
Der Angeschuldigte verfügt über ein weit verzweigtes Netz von Kontakten zu den in Deutschland lebenden Marokkanern. Im Jahr 2007 erklärte er sich gegenüber dem marokkanischen Auslandsgeheimdienst bereit, seine Kontakte zu nutzen, um Informationen über marokkanische Oppositionelle in Deutschland zu beschaffen. Bis Ende Februar 2012 stand er ununterbrochen in Kontakt zu seinen nachrichtendienstlichen Auftraggebern und unterrichtete sie über seine Erkenntnisse aus der marokkanischen Gemeinschaft. Insbesondere berichtete er seinen Führungsfunktionären von Demonstrationen oppositioneller Gruppierungen.
07.12.2012 – 34/2012
Find this story at 7 December 2012
GBA: Anklage wegen mutmaßlicher Spionage14 januari 2013
Karlsruhe (ots) – Nr. 16
Die Bundesanwaltschaft hat am 9. Mai 2012 vor dem Staatsschutzsenat des Kammergerichts in Berlin gegen
den 47-jährigen deutschen und marokkanischen Staatsangehörigen Mohammed B.
Anklage wegen geheimdienstlicher Agententätigkeit (§ 99 Abs. 1 Nr. 1, 2 StGB) und Urkundenfälschung (§ 267 StGB) erhoben.
Dem Angeschuldigten wird in der nunmehr zugestellten Anklageschrift vorgeworfen, ab Januar 2011 Informationen über in Deutschland lebende Marokkaner an den marokkanischen Nachrichtendienst weitergegeben zu haben.
Im Einzelnen wird in der Anklageschrift von folgendem Sachverhalt ausgegangen:
Der Angeschuldigte hat für seine nachrichtendienstlichen Auftraggeber vor allem marokkanische Oppositionelle und Anhänger der “Frente Polisario”, einer Befreiungsbewegung für die Westsahara, ausgespäht. So berichtete er seinen Führungsoffizieren etwa über eine Veranstaltung mit einem Repräsentanten der “Frente Polisario” in Berlin. Zudem veranlasste er, dass Informationen über die in Berlin ansässige “Projektgruppe Westsahara” zusammengetragen und an seine Auftraggeber weitergeleitet wurden. Außerdem berichtete er seinen Auftraggebern über die Haltung eines Gelehrten und eines Botschaftsangehörigen zur marokkanischen Staatsführung.
Für seine Dienste erhielt der Angeschuldigte im Jahr 2011 einen Agentenlohn von 22.800 Euro. Um die Herkunft des Geldes zu verschleiern, stellte der Angeschuldigte Rechnungen über angebliche Werbeveranstaltungen für die staatliche marokkanische Fluggesellschaft aus.
Der Angeschuldigte wurde am 15. Februar 2012 aufgrund eines Haftbefehls des Ermittlungsrichters des Bundesgerichtshof vom 14. Februar 2012 festgenommen (vgl. Pressemitteilung Nr. 5/2012 vom 15. Februar 2012) und befand sich bis 5. Juni 2012 in Untersuchungshaft. Der Haftbefehl war am 4. Juni 2012 außer Vollzug gesetzt worden, nachdem der Angeschuldigte den Tatvorwurf der geheimdienstlichen Agententätigkeit eingeräumt hatte.
Der Generalbundesanwalt beim Bundesgerichtshof (GBA)
Frauke Köhler
Staatsanwältin
Brauerstr. 30
76137 Karlsruhe
Telefon: +49 (0)721 8191-410
E-Mail: pressestelle@gba.bund.de
http://www.generalbundesanwalt.de/
12.06.2012 | 14:25 Uhr
Find this story at 12 June 2012
Mutmaßlicher marokkanischer Spion in Berlin festgenommen14 januari 2013
Die Bundesanwaltschaft hat einen mutmaßlichen Spion Marokkos festnehmen lassen. Der Mann soll marokkanische Aktivisten an den Geheimdienst seines Landes verraten haben.
Eine Truppe der Westsahara-Rebellenbewegung Frente Polisario, deren Anhänger der mutmaßliche Spion verraten haben soll.
Die Bundesanwaltschaft hat in Berlin einen 56-jährigen Marokkaner wegen mutmaßlicher Spionage festnehmen lassen. Er sei dringend verdächtig, Informationen über in Deutschland lebende Landsleute an den marokkanischen Geheimdienst weitergegeben zu haben. Ein Ermittlungsrichter des Bundesgerichtshofs ordnete Untersuchungshaft an.
Dem Festgenommenen wird geheimdienstliche Agententätigkeit vorgeworfen. Insbesondere soll er Informationen über Anhänger der Widerstandsbewegung für die Westsahara, Frente Polisario, beschafft haben. Die Rebellenbewegung kämpft mit Unterstützung Algeriens für die vollständige Unabhängigkeit der Westsahara. Die Region war früher eine spanische Kolonie, die nach ihrer Unabhängigkeit im Jahr 1975 von Marokko annektiert wurde.
…
15.02.2012 – 18:30 Uhr
Find this story at 15 February 2012
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informatieverzoek Occupy beweging in Nederland28 december 2012
Onderwerp: informatie verzoek inlichtingen- en opsporingshandelingen, databanken, situatierapportages, programma’s, informatieoverdracht, informatie uitwisseling, dataverzameling, optreden, projecten en beleid met betrekking tot mensen/burgers/ingezetenen die actief zijn betrokken bij de Occupy beweging en de Occupy beweging zelf in de plaatsen Amsterdam, Utrecht, Rotterdam en Den Haag.
Geachte Mw./Dhr.,
Met een beroep op de Wet Openbaarheid van Bestuur, WIV, BUPO, EVRM en andere burger- en mensenrechtelijke wetten en verdragen richt ik mij tot u met een verzoek om informatie.
openbaarheid verzoek van 20 december 2012
Het betreft informatie inzake inlichtingen- en opsporingshandelingen, databanken, situatierapportages, programma’s, informatieoverdracht, informatie uitwisseling, dataverzameling, optreden, projecten en beleid met betrekking tot mensen/burgers/ingezetenen die actief zijn betrokken bij de Occupy beweging en de Occupy beweging zelf in de plaatsen Amsterdam, Utrecht, Rotterdam, Den Haag en eventuele andere gemeenten.
Ik zou graag alle documenten met betrekking tot mensen/burgers/ingezetenen die actief zijn betrokken bij de Occupy beweging en de Occupy beweging zelf in de plaatsen Amsterdam, Utrecht, Rotterdam en Den Haag van u ontvangen. U kunt hierbij denken aan:
Onderzoeken, evaluaties, rapportages, overzichten, lijsten, check-lijsten, puntenlijsten, formulieren, eventuele processen verbaal, statistieken, beleidsdocumenten, richtlijnen, aanwijzingen, overwegingen, notulen, verslagen, draaiboeken, plannen van aanpak, planningen, concepten, briefings, digitale communicaties, interne communicatie (waaronder e-mail), meldingen, mutaties, databestanden, registraties en andere documenten met betrekking tot inlichtingenhandelingen, databanken, situatierapportages, programma’s, informatieoverdracht, informatie uitwisseling, dataverzameling, projecten en beleid met betrekking tot mensen/burgers/ingezetenen die actief zijn betrokken bij de Occupy beweging en de Occupy beweging zelf in de plaatsen Amsterdam, Utrecht, Rotterdam, Den Haag en eventuele andere gemeenten.
Binnen het kader van de Wob (art. 10 lid 2 sub e) en de Aanwijzing voorlichting opsporing en vervolging kunt u deze stukken gemotiveerd anonimiseren.
Conform de Wet Openbaarheid van Bestuur verwacht ik binnen wettelijke termijnen antwoord op mijn verzoek.
U weet dat er met mij over termijnen en afwikkeling overlegd kan worden.
Gaarne ontvang ik een bewijs van ontvangst.
Een vriendelijke groet
Postbus 10591
1001 EN Amsterdam
www.burojansen.nl
e-mail info@burojansen.nl
tel 0206123202
mob 0634339533
nieuwsblog.burojansen.nl
www.identificatieplicht.nl
www.preventieffouilleren.nl
www.openheid.nl
www.openbaarheid.nl
www.justitievrijheidenveiligheid.nl
FBI Documents Reveal Secret Nationwide Occupy Monitoring28 december 2012
FBI documents just obtained by the Partnership for Civil Justice Fund (PCJF) pursuant to the PCJF’s Freedom of Information Act demands reveal that from its inception, the FBI treated the Occupy movement as a potential criminal and terrorist threat even though the agency acknowledges in documents that organizers explicitly called for peaceful protest and did “not condone the use of violence” at occupy protests.
The PCJF has obtained heavily redacted documents showing that FBI offices and agents around the country were in high gear conducting surveillance against the movement even as early as August 2011, a month prior to the establishment of the OWS encampment in Zuccotti Park and other Occupy actions around the country.
“This production, which we believe is just the tip of the iceberg, is a window into the nationwide scope of the FBI’s surveillance, monitoring, and reporting on peaceful protestors organizing with the Occupy movement,” stated Mara Verheyden-Hilliard, Executive Director of the Partnership for Civil Justice Fund (PCJF). “These documents show that the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security are treating protests against the corporate and banking structure of America as potential criminal and terrorist activity. These documents also show these federal agencies functioning as a de facto intelligence arm of Wall Street and Corporate America.”
“The documents are heavily redacted, and it is clear from the production that the FBI is withholding far more material. We are filing an appeal challenging this response and demanding full disclosure to the public of the records of this operation,” stated Heather Benno, staff attorney with the PCJF.
As early as August 19, 2011, the FBI in New York was meeting with the New York Stock Exchange to discuss the Occupy Wall Street protests that wouldn’t start for another month. By September, prior to the start of the OWS, the FBI was notifying businesses that they might be the focus of an OWS protest.
The FBI’s Indianapolis division released a “Potential Criminal Activity Alert” on September 15, 2011, even though they acknowledged that no specific protest date had been scheduled in Indiana. The documents show that the Indianapolis division of the FBI was coordinating with “All Indiana State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies,” as well as the “Indiana Intelligence Fusion Center,” the FBI “Directorate of Intelligence” and other national FBI coordinating mechanisms.
Documents show the spying abuses of the FBI’s “Campus Liaison Program” in which the FBI in Albany and the Syracuse Joint Terrorism Task Force disseminated information to “sixteen (16) different campus police officials,” and then “six (6) additional campus police officials.” Campus officials were in contact with the FBI for information on OWS. A representative of the State University of New York at Oswego contacted the FBI for information on the OWS protests and reported to the FBI on the SUNY-Oswego Occupy encampment made up of students and professors.
Documents released show coordination between the FBI, Department of Homeland Security and corporate America. They include a report by the Domestic Security Alliance Council (DSAC), described by the federal government as “a strategic partnership between the FBI, the Department of Homeland Security and the private sector,” discussing the OWS protests at the West Coast ports to “raise awareness concerning this type of criminal activity.” The DSAC report shows the nature of secret collaboration between American intelligence agencies and their corporate clients – the document contains a “handling notice” that the information is “meant for use primarily within the corporate security community. Such messages shall not be released in either written or oral form to the media, the general public or other personnel…” (The DSAC document was also obtained by the Northern California ACLU which has sought local FBI surveillance files.)
Naval Criminal Investigative Services (NCIS) reported to the DSAC on the relationship between OWS and organized labor for the port actions. The NCIS describes itself as “an elite worldwide federal law enforcement organization” whose “mission is to investigate and defeat criminal, terrorist, and foreign intelligence threats to the United States Navy and Marine Corps ashore, afloat and in cyberspace.” The NCIS also assists with the transport of Guantanamo prisoners.
DSAC issued several tips to its corporate clients on “civil unrest” which it defines as ranging from “small, organized rallies to large-scale demonstrations and rioting.” It advised to dress conservatively, avoid political discussions and “avoid all large gatherings related to civil issues. Even seemingly peaceful rallies can spur violent activity or be met with resistance by security forces. Bystanders may be arrested or harmed by security forces using water cannons, tear gas or other measures to control crowds.”
The FBI in Anchorage reported from a Joint Terrorism Task Force meeting of November 3, 2011, about Occupy activities in Anchorage.
A port Facility Security Officer in Anchorage coordinated with the FBI to attend the meeting of protestors and gain intelligence on the planning of the port actions. He was advised to request the presence of an Anchorage Police Department official to also attend the event. The FBI Special Agent told the undercover private operative that he would notify the Joint Terrorism Task Force and that he would provide a point of contact at the Anchorage Police Department.
The Jacksonville, Florida FBI prepared a Domestic Terrorism briefing on the “spread of the Occupy Wall Street Movement” in October 2011. The intelligence meeting discussed Occupy venues identifying “Daytona, Gainesville and Ocala Resident Agency territories as portions …where some of the highest unemployment rates in Florida continue to exist.”
The Tampa, Florida FBI “Domestic Terrorism” liaison participated with the Tampa Police Department’s monthly intelligence meeting in which Occupy Lakeland, Occupy Polk County and Occupy St. Petersburg were discussed. They reported on an individual “leading the Occupy Tampa” and plans for travel to Gainesville for a protest planning meeting, as well as on Veterans for Peace plans to protest at MacDill Air Force Base.
The Federal Reserve in Richmond appears to have had personnel surveilling OWS planning. They were in contact with the FBI in Richmond to “pass on information regarding the movement known as occupy Wall Street.” There were repeated communications “to pass on updates of the events and decisions made during the small rallies and the following information received from the Capital Police Intelligence Unit through JTTF (Joint Terrorism Task Force).”
The Virginia FBI was collecting intelligence on the OWS movement for dissemination to the Virginia Fusion Center and other Intelligence divisions.
The Milwaukee division of the FBI was coordinating with the Ashwaubenon Public Safety division in Green Bay Wisconsin regarding Occupy.
The Memphis FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force met to discuss “domestic terrorism” threats, including, “Aryan Nations, Occupy Wall Street, and Anonymous.”
The Birmingham, AL division of the FBI sent communications to HAZMAT teams regarding the Occupy Wall Street movement.
The Jackson, Mississippi division of the FBI attended a meeting of the Bank Security Group in Biloxi, MS with multiple private banks and the Biloxi Police Department, in which they discussed an announced protest for “National Bad Bank Sit-In-Day” on December 7, 2011.
The Denver, CO FBI and its Bank Fraud Working Group met and were briefed on Occupy Wall Street in November 2011. Members of the Working Group include private financial institutions and local area law enforcement.
Jackson, MS Joint Terrorism Task Force issued a “Counterterrorism Preparedness” alert. This heavily redacted document includes the description, “To document…the Occupy Wall Street Movement.”
You can read the FBI – OWS documents below where we have uploaded them in searchable format for public viewing.
The PCJF filed Freedom of Information Act demands with multiple federal law enforcement agencies in the fall of 2011 as the Occupy crackdown began. The FBI initially attempted to limit its search to only one limited record keeping index. Recognizing this as a common tactic used by the FBI to conduct an inadequate search, the PCJF pressed forward demanding searches be performed of the FBI headquarters as well as FBI field offices nationwide.
The PCJF will continue to push for public disclosure of the government’s spy files and will release documents as they are obtained.
December 22, 2012
Find this story at 22 December 2012
Find the documents at 22 December 2012
The FBI vs. Occupy: Secret Docs Reveal “Counterterrorism” Monitoring of OWS from Its Earliest Days28 december 2012
Once-secret documents reveal the FBI monitored Occupy Wall Street from its earliest days and treated the nonviolent movement as a potential terrorist threat. Internal government records show Occupy was treated as a potential threat when organizing first began in August of 2011. Counterterrorism agents were used to track Occupy activities, despite the internal acknowledgment that the movement opposed violent tactics. The monitoring expanded across the country as Occupy grew into a national movement, with FBI agents sharing information with businesses, local police agencies and universities. We’re joined by Mara Verheyden-Hilliard of the Partnership for Civil Justice Fund, which obtained the FBI documents through the Freedom of Information Act. “We can see, decade after decade, with each social justice movement, that the FBI conducts itself in the same role over and over again, which is to act really as the secret police of the establishment against the people,” Verheyden-Hilliard says. [includes rush transcript]
Thursday, December 27, 2012 Full Show
Find this story at 27 December 2012
The Jonathan Pollard Spy Case: The CIA’s 1987 Damage Assessment Declassified27 december 2012
Washington, DC, December 14, 2012 – When Naval Investigative Service analyst Jonathan Pollard spied for Israel in 1984 and 1985, his Israeli handlers asked primarily for nuclear, military and technical information on the Arab states, Pakistan, and the Soviet Union – not on the United States – according to the newly-declassified CIA 1987 damage assessment of the Pollard case, published today by the National Security Archive at George Washington University (www.nsarchive.org).
The damage assessment includes new details on the specific subjects and documents sought by Pollard’s Israeli handlers (pages 36-43), such as Syrian drones and central communications, Egyptian missile programs, and Soviet air defenses. The Israelis specifically asked for a signals intelligence manual that they needed to listen in on Soviet advisers in Syria. The document describes how Pollard’s handler, Joseph Yagur, told him to ignore a request, from Yagur’s boss, for U.S. “dirt” on senior Israeli officials and told Pollard that gathering such information would terminate the operation (page 38).
Under the heading “What the Israelis Did Not Ask For,” the assessment remarks (page 43) that they “never expressed interest in US military activities, plans, capabilities, or equipment.”
The assessment also notes that Pollard volunteered delivery of three daily intelligence summaries that had not been requested by his handlers, but which proved useful to them, and ultimately handed over roughly 1,500 such messages from the Middle East and North Africa Summary (MENAS), the Mediterranean Littoral Intelligence Summary (MELOS), and the Indian Ocean Littoral Intelligence Summary, in addition to the more than 800 compromised documents on other subjects that Pollard delivered to the Israelis in suitcases.
The damage assessment also features a detailed 21-page chronology of Pollard’s personal life and professional career, including his work for the Israelis, highlighting more than a dozen examples of unusual behavior by Pollard that the CIA suggests should have, in retrospect, alerted his supervisors that he was a security risk. Prominent on the list were false statements by Pollard during a 1980 assignment with Task Force 168, the naval intelligence element responsible for HUMINT collection. Pollard is now serving a life sentence in prison for espionage.
The CIA denied release of most of the Pollard damage assessment in 2006, claiming for example that pages 18 through 165 were classified in their entirety and not a line of those pages could be released. The Archive appealed the CIA’s decision to the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel, established by President Clinton in 1995 and continued by Presidents Bush and Obama. The ISCAP showed its value yet again as a check on systemic overclassification by ordering release of scores of pages from the Pollard damage assessment that were previously withheld by CIA, and published today for the first time.
Today’s posting, edited by Archive senior fellow Jeffrey T. Richelson, includes more than a dozen other declassified documents on the Pollard case, such as the Defense Intelligence Agency biographic sketch of Pollard’s initial Israeli handler, Col. Aviam Sella. Among many other books and articles, Richelson is the author of The U.S. Intelligence Community (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2011, 6th edition), which the Washington Post called “the authoritative survey of the American cloak-and-dagger establishment.”
Jonathan Pollard: Fantasist and Spy
By Jeffrey T. Richelson
Nineteen-eighty-five became known as the “Year of the Spy” in the United States after a series of arrests and one defection revealed several serious penetrations of the U.S. intelligence and defense establishments by foreign intelligence services. On November 22, Larry Wu-Tai Chin, a long-time CIA employee, was taken into custody by the FBI and accused of spying for the People’s Republic of China. Two days later, former National Security Agency employee Ronald Pelton was arrested and charged with having provided the Soviet Union with details of five signals intelligence operations. Those arrests followed the apprehension, in May, of a former member of the U.S. Navy, John A. Walker, Jr., who had started turning over highly-secret documents to the KGB in 1968. And in September, before he could be arrested, former CIA officer Edward Lee Howard absconded to Moscow.1
But no arrest was more stunning than that of Jonathan J. Pollard, a thirty-one year old analyst for the Navy’s Anti-Terrorist Alert Center (ATAC). Pollard was detained on November 21, after a futile attempt to gain access to the Washington, D.C. embassy of Israel – to one of whose intelligence services, the Scientific Liaison Bureau (LAKAM), he had been delivering a vast assortment of documents. News of Pollard’s arrest was not the first time that the issue of Israeli intelligence activities directed against U.S. targets had been in the press. That subject had been the subject of press coverage several years earlier after the CIA’s study of the organization and operations of Israel’s intelligence and security services (Document 1) had become public, after it had been recovered from the U.S. embassy in Tehran during the November 4, 1979 takeover.2
The outlines of Pollard’s personal and professional life, as well as details of the nature of the material he turned over to Israel became the subject of both newspaper and magazine reports, books, and official, sometimes heavily redacted, internal documents (Document 3, Document 11) as well as declarations prepared for the court by both the government and defense in aid of sentencing (Document 6, Document 7, Document 8). Both official and media reports indicated that Pollard had first expressed his willingness to provide Israel with highly-classified documents during a late May 1984 meeting with Israeli Air Force officer Aviam Sella (Document 2a, Document 2b, Document 9). Until his arrest, Pollard delivered approximately 800 documents, many of which were classified top secret or codeword. In addition, he stole an estimated 1,500 current intelligence summary messages.3
The documents provided information on PLO headquarters in Tunisia; specific capabilities of Tunisian and Libyan air defense systems; Iraqi and Syrian chemical warfare productions capabilities (including detailed satellite imagery); Soviet arms shipments to Syria and other Arab states; naval forces, port facilities, and lines of communication of various Middle Eastern and North African countries; the MiG-29 fighter; and Pakistan’s nuclear program. Also included was a U.S. assessment of Israeli military capabilities.4
Pollard’s disclosures were alarming to U.S. officials for several reasons, some of which were noted in their official declarations (Document 6, Document 8). One, despite the fact that both the U.S. and Israeli considered each other legitimate intelligence targets, was Israel’s willingness to run a human penetration operation directed at the U.S. government. Another, was the damage to the intelligence sharing arrangement with Israel – since its acquisition of material from Pollard weakened the U.S. position vis-a-vis intelligence exchanges with Israel. In addition, there was no guarantee that such documents, revealing both sources and methods as well as assessments, would not find their way to the Soviet Union via a Soviet penetration of the Israeli intelligence or defense community – as had happened with a number of other allies. Further, since Israel was a target of U.S. intelligence collection – particularly technical collection – operations, the documents could be used by Israeli counterintelligence and security organizations to help Israel neutralize or degrade U.S. collection operations.
Of all the spy cases from 1985, the Pollard case has been the one that has had the longest life in terms of media coverage – in part because of efforts, both by private citizens and the Israeli government to have his life sentence commuted. Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin’s 1993 appeal to President Bill Clinton resulted in a letter from defense secretary Les Aspin expressing his opposition and stressing three points: the requirement to maintain control over the disclosure of intelligence to foreign governments, the damage done by Pollard’s disclosures, and Pollard’s alleged inclusion of classified information in letters from prison. In 1998, in an attempt to facilitate his release, the Israeli government publically acknowledged (Document 13). Pollard’s role as an Israeli asset. And, former Director of Central Intelligence, George J. Tenet reports that the subject was raised by the Israeli government in 2006, and he threatened to resign if Pollard was released. As recently as January 2011, Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu asked President Barack Obama, without success, to free Pollard.5
Relevant to that debate and as well as the historical record are the specifics of the Pollard’s professional career, what he compromised, and the assessment of the damage from the compromised material. While some of that information has been disclosed, either officially or unofficially, much of the official record has been redacted from released documents. The recent release of a significantly less-redacted copy of the damage assessment performed by the DCI’s Foreign Denial and Deception Analysis Committee (Document 11b) thus, even if it has no impact on views concerning Pollard’s fate, adds significantly to the historical record concerning his activities.
Among the specific items of note in the newly released assessment are an account of Pollard’s claim (p. I-18) upon his late arrival for an interview, that he spent the weekend rescuing his wife from the Irish Republican Army after they had kidnaped her. Pollard’s connection with a naval intelligence unit, Task Force-168, responsible for human intelligence activities is also among the topics discussed in the damage assessment. The committee’s report also provides new insight to exactly what information the Israelis wanted and why – as well as what information they did not want (pp. 38-46), including U.S. capabilities or plans. With regard to Syria, for example, Pollard was requested to provide documents concerning a suspected research and development facility, an electronics intelligence (ELINT) system, remotely piloted vehicles, a national command, control, and communications center in Damascus, Syrian military units with attached Soviet advisors, and medical intelligence on Syrian president Hafiz al-Assad. A common denominator for Israeli requests concerning Syria and other countries was the predominant focus on military intelligence relevant to Israeli security.
The study also describes (on p. 38) an incident involving LAKAM chief Rafi Eitan, in which he requested documents or information from Pollard on a variety of topics. According to Pollard, his case officer, standing behind Pollard, shook his head “no” in response to many of Eitan’s requests – including those for information on the PLO’s Force 17, CIA psychological studies or other intelligence containing ‘dirt’ on senior Israeli officials, as well as information identifying the “rats” in Israel (by which he apparently meant Israelis who provided information to the United States).
The study also reports (p. 60) on Israeli use of the NSA’s RASIN (Radio Signal Notation) manual, which was requested on at least two occasions, in assisting its monitoring of a communications link between the Soviet General Staff and the Soviet military assistance group in Damascus.
THE DOCUMENTS
Document 1: Central Intelligence Agency, Foreign Intelligence and Security Services: Israel, March 1979. Secret.
Source: http://niqnaq.files.wordpress.com/2011/07/cia-1979-israel-foreign-intelligence-security-services.pdf
This 47-page study of the Israeli intelligence was part of an ongoing effort by the CIA’s Counterintelligence Staff to prepare surveys of foreign intelligence communities of interest. It covers the functions, organizations, administrative practices, and methods of operation of the Mossad, Shin Bet, and AMAN (Military Intelligence) as well as discussing the Foreign Ministry’s intelligence unit and the national police. Notably absent from the study is any mention of LAKAM, the unit which was responsible for running Jonathan Pollard.
Document 2a: Department of Defense, Report Number: 6 849 0139 79, March 12, 1979. Classification Redacted.
Document 2b: Defense Intelligence Agency, IR 6 849 0557 79, LTC. AVI SELLA, – BIO REPORT, October 18, 1979 . Classification Redacted.
Source: Freedom of Information Act Release.
These reports are part of the continuing collection of biographic information by Defense and military service intelligence units on foreign military leaders, including those below the level of general. Document 2b notes Sella’s current position, his physical description, family, and military career.
Document 3: [Deleted], Deputy Director of Security, Personnel Security and Investigations, Central Intelligence Agency, Memorandum for: The Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Subject: Jonathan Jay Pollard, January 2, 1986. Secret.
Source: Freedom of Information Act Release.
This memo provides details on Pollard’s activities during a June 1984 visit to the CIA, including his attendance at a briefing on anti-terrorism efforts and his access to documents.
Document 4: William Taft, Deputy Secretary of Defense, “Damage Assessment – Pollard Espionage Case,” February 13, 1986.
Source: Editor’s Collection.
This brief memo notes, in relation to the Pollard damage assessment, that any documents acknowledging the fact that the U.S. gathered intelligence against specific non-Soviet Bloc nations should be classified, at a minimum, CONFIDENTIAL – NOT RELEASBLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS.
Document 5: [Deleted], Counterintelligence Branch, Special Activities Division, Central Intelligence Agency, Subject: Recent Meeting on Pollard Case, July 8, 1986. Secret.
Source: Freedom of Information Act Release.
This memo reports on a meeting which focused on the desire of Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger to be able to communicate to the U.S. District Court his perception of the extent of damage resulting from Pollard’s espionage activities and provides details on support to be provided in production of the affidavit.
Document 6: Caspar Weinberger, Declaration of the Secretary of Defense, United States of America v. Jonathan Jay Pollard, 1986. Secret.
Source: Editor’s Collection
This heavily redacted declaration by Secretary of Defense Weinberger, prepared to influence the judge’s sentencing decision, discusses the damage to national security (including to intelligence sharing arrangement), and the significance of the disclosures (including harm to U.S. foreign policy, the compromise of sources and methods, and the risk to U.S. personnel).
Document 7: Robert A. Hibey and Gordon A. Coffee, “Defendant Jonathan J. Pollard’s Second Memorandum In Aid of Sentencing,” Criminal No. 86-0207, United States District Court for the District of Columbia, March 2, 1987. Classification Not Available.
Source: irmep.org/ila/pollard/04021987Pollard_Sentencing_memo2.pdf.
This classified memorandum, from Pollard’s defense team, discusses damage to the United States, Pollard’s access to classified documents and his decision to provide information to Israel, his limitations on the delivery of information, Israeli payments to Pollard, charges that he repeatedly disclosed classified information to others, and the possibility of parole.
Document 8: Supplemental Declaration of Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense, United States of America v. Jonathan Jay Pollard, Criminal No. 86-0207, United States District Court of Columbia, March 4, 1987. Unclassified.
Source: www.irmep.org/ila/pollard/03041987weinberger.pdf.
This short declaration supplements Weinberger’s more extensive classified 1986 statement (Document 6) concerning Pollard’s activities, in response to Pollard’s second memorandum (Document 7) in aid of sentencing.
Document 9: Defense Intelligence Agency, “Biographic Sketch: Colonel Aviam Sella,” May 20, 1987. Secret.
Source: Freedom of Information Act Release.
This biographic sketch is one of many routinely prepared by DIA of foreign military officials. Prepared after Pollard’s arrest and U.S. protests of plans to promote Sella to commanding officer of the Tel Nov airbase, it discusses Sella’s significance, provides personal data, and reviews his career from the time he joined the Israeli Air Force in 1964.
Document 10: James P. Lynch, Director of Security, Central Intelligence Agency, To: Director, Public Affairs, Subject: U.S. News & World Report Story on Jonathan Pollard, May 21, 1987. Secret.
Source: Freedom of Information Act Release.
In this memo, the CIA’s director of security addresses an upcoming U.S. News & World Report story on Pollard. The format for its two pages specifies each “expected allegation” followed by “fact.” The final page discusses the suggested response to press inquiries.
Document 11 A-B: Foreign Denial and Deception Analysis Committee, Director of Central Intelligence, The Jonathan Jay Pollard Espionage Case: A Damage Assessment, October 30, 1987. Top Secret/Codeword.
A: Released by CIA in 2006 in response to a Mandatory Declassification Review request.
B: Released in 2012 by the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel in response to the Archive’s appeal of CIA’s 2006 withholding.
This assessment was one of two prepared in the aftermath of Pollard’s arrest (the other was prepared for the Department of Defense by several naval intelligence and security organizations). Two versions of the CIA document are included here to show the amount of material the agency excised in 2006, compared with what ISCAP released in 2012.
The main body of the study examines Pollard’s personal history and espionage career, Israeli intelligence priorities and requests, material provided by Pollard, as well as losses and vulnerabilities. Supplemental tabs provide a detailed chronology and a summary of security and counterintelligence lessons learned. Portions that were redacted in 2006 are enclosed in rectangles.
Document 12: Bruce Riedel, “Book Review: The Territory of Lies,” Studies in Intelligence, 33, 3 (Fall 1989). Unclassified.
Source: CIA Historical Review Program.
This review by a senior CIA intelligence analyst focuses on what Riedel describes as “the first in-depth assessment of this case in the public arena by an Israeli.” It notes that the book adds new details on LAKAM and that its “most important contribution” was “to refute the Israeli Government’s official position that the Pollard operation was a rogue mission.” Riedel also addresses the question of whether LAKAM would be replaced by another covert intelligence organization.
Document 13: Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Government Statement on Jonathan Pollard – 12 May 1998,” May 12, 1998, Unclassified.
Source: www.mfa.gov.il.
As part of an attempt to obtain Pollard’s release, this note on the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs website acknowledges Pollard’s role as an agent for the LAKAM.
Document 14: National Counterintelligence Executive, CI Reader: An American Revolution into the New Millennium, Volume 3, n.d., accessed December 11, 2012, Unclassified (Extract)
Source: www.ncix.gov/publications/ci_references/docs/CI_Reader_vol3.pdf
This extract concerning Jonathan Pollard is drawn from a multi-volume study performed for the National Counterintelligence Executive, a component of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. It summarizes Pollard’s activities, the reaction of the Israeli government, the legal consequences for Pollard, and Pollard’s quest for clemency.
NOTES
[1] Jeffrey T. Richelson, A Century of Spies: Intelligence in the Twentieth Century (New York: Oxford, 1995), pp. 388-403.
[2] Scott Armstrong, “Israelis Have Spied on U.S. Secret Papers Show,” Washington Post, February 1, 1982.
[3] The most significant media account on Pollard is Wolf Blitzer, Territory of Lies: The Exclusive Story of Jonathan Jay Pollard: The American Who Spied On His Country For Israel And How He Was Betrayed (New York: Harper & Row, 1989). With regard to the count of stolen documents, see Director of Central Intelligence Foreign Denial and Deception Analysis Committee, The Jonathan Jay Pollard Espionage Case: A Damage Assessment, October 30, 1987, p. 45.
[4] Richelson, A Century of Spies, pp. 401-402.
[5] Ibid., p. 403; George J. Tenet with Bill Harlow, At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA (New York: Harper Collins, 2007), p. 67; M.E. “Spike” Bowman, “The Drumbeats for Clemency for Jonathan Jay Pollard Reverberate Again,” Intelligencer, Winter/Spring 2011, pp. 7-10; Jonathan S. Tobin, “The Pollard Spy Case, 25 Years Later,” Commentary, March 2011, pp. 37-43.
Posted – December 14, 2012
Edited by Jeffrey T. Richelson
Find this story at 14 December 2012
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Capturing Jonathan Pollard27 december 2012
De Amerikaanse voormalig spion Jonathan Pollard zit een levenslange gevangenisstraf uit. Als werknemer bij de VS Marine Inlichtingendienst stal hij honderdduizenden geheime documenten en verkocht die aan Israël. De man die hem ontmaskerde, schreef er een boek over.
Bradley Manning wordt verdacht van het lekken van geheime documenten van de Amerikaanse overheid. Deze documenten werden openbaar gemaakt voor Wikileaks. Nog voordat Manning een eerlijk proces heeft gekregen, zit hij al een ruim een jaar in eenzame opsluiting.
De omvang en gevoeligheid van de Wikileaks-documenten vallen echter in het niet in vergelijking met het aantal geheime stukken dat Jonathan Pollard begin jaren ’80 aan de Israëliërs heeft overhandigd. Pollard werkte voor de Naval Intelligence Service. Van juni 1984 tot zijn aanhouding in november 1985 wandelde hij bijna dagelijks het gebouw van de Naval Intelligence Command uit met een tas vol top secret documenten.
De Amerikaanse overheid schat dat hij ruim een miljoen stukken aan de Israëliërs heeft overhandigd. Een van de stukken was het tiendelige boekwerk Radio-Signal Notations (RASIN), een gedetailleerde beschrijving van het netwerk van de wereldwijde elektronische observatie door de Amerikanen.
Pollard onderzocht
Capturing Jonathan Pollard werd in 2006 door de Naval Institue Press gepubliceerd. Het boek is van de hand van Ronald Olive, destijds werkzaam voor de Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS). Als medewerker van de NCIS kreeg Olive in 1985 de taak om te onderzoeken of Pollard geheime stukken lekte.
Het onderzoek volgde op een tip van een medewerker van de Anti-Terrorism Alert Center (ATAC) van de NIS, de afdeling waar Pollard werkte. Deze man zag Pollard het gebouw uitlopen met een stapel papier. De stapel was verpakt in bruin inpakpapier en tape met de code TS/SCI, Top Secret/Sentive Compartmented Information. TS/SCI is een nog zwaardere kwalificatie als top secret.
Pollard stapte met de stukken bij zijn vrouw Ann in de auto. Nog even dacht zijn collega dat Pollard naar een andere inlichtingendienst, zoals de DIA (Defense Intelligence Service) zou rijden om daar de documenten af te geven. Dit leek onwaarschijnlijk omdat Pollard eerder tegen hem had gezegd dat hij verkeerde documenten had besteld bij het ‘archief’ en dat hij deze nu moest terugbrengen en vernietigen. Pollard en Ann reden echter een geheel andere kant op.
Olive beschrijft vervolgens de ontmaskering van Jonathan en Ann. In Pollards werkruimte wordt een camera opgehangen die registreert hoe de spion een aktetas vol TS/SCI documenten propt en het gebouw verlaat. Pollard en zijn vrouw ruiken onraad en proberen de sporen van spionage te wissen. Ann moet een koffer vol super geheime documenten, die in hun huis liggen, vernietigen. Zij raakt in paniek en de koffer belandt bij de buren.
Gevoelige snaar
Het boek van Ronald Olive is nog even actueel als het eerste boek dat over deze spionagezaak is verschenen in 1989, Territory of Lies: The American Who Spied on His Country for Israel and How He Was Betrayed.
Begin dit jaar wordt een petitie, ondertekend door meer dan 10.000 Israëliërs, aan de Israëlische president Shimon Peres gezonden. Hierin roepen politici, kunstenaars en andere bekende en onbekende Israëliërs de president op om Pollard vrij te krijgen. Op 1 september 2010 berichtte de LA Times zelfs dat de vrijlating van Pollard de bevriezing van de bouw van Israëlische nederzettingen in de bezette gebieden zou verlengen.
Pollard raakt kennelijk een gevoelige snaar, zowel in Israël als in de Verenigde Staten. Schrijver Olive op zijn beurt bevindt zich in een gezelschap van allerlei mensen die er voor ijveren om de spion zijn gehele leven achter slot en grendel te houden, hoewel levenslang in de Verenigde Staten niet echt levenslang hoeft te zijn. Bij goed gedrag kunnen gevangenen na dertig jaar vrijkomen.
In 1987 werd Pollard veroordeeld tot levenslang na een schuldbekentenis en toezegging dat hij de Amerikaanse overheid zou helpen bij het in kaart brengen van de schade die hij door zijn spionage-activiteiten had veroorzaakt. Die schade werd door de toenmalige minister van Defensie Casper Weinberger vastgelegd in een memorandum van 46 pagina’s, welke nog steeds niet openbaar is gemaakt. Pollard’s vrouw kreeg vijf jaar gevangenisstraf voor het in bezit hebben van staatsgeheime documenten.
Capturing Jonathan Pollard is geen spannend fictie / non-fictie boek met een twist, zoals Spywars van Bagley. Olive beschrijft droog het leven van de spion vanaf het moment dat hij bij de CIA solliciteert, tot aan de dag van zijn veroordeling. Natuurlijk is de schrijver begaan met de geheimhouding van Amerikaanse strategische informatie en verbaast het niet dat hij bij het verschijnen van het boek in 2006 een pleidooi hield om Pollard niet vrij te laten.
Niet kieskeurig
Hoewel de volle omvang van het lekken van Pollard niet duidelijk wordt beschreven, blijkt dat Pollard niet bepaald kieskeurig was. De Israëliërs hadden hem lijsten meegegeven van wat zij graag wilden hebben, vooral informatie over het Midden-Oosten, maar ook over de Russen en operaties van de Amerikanen in het Middellandse Zee gebied.
Zodra Pollard echter stukken langs ziet komen die ook voor andere landen interessant zouden kunnen zijn, probeert hij ook daar te winkelen. Zo poogt hij geheime documenten aan de Chinezen, Australiërs, Pakistani en de Zuid-Afrikanen, maar ook aan buitenlandse correspondenten te slijten.
Het gegeven dat landen elkaars strategische informatie en geheimen proberen te stelen, is niet nieuw. Het bestaan van contra-spionage afdelingen toont aan dat geheime diensten daar zelf ook rekening mee houden. De Australiërs dachten dan ook dat Pollard onderdeel uitmaakte van een CIA-operatie. Hoewel ze dat eigenlijk niet konden geloven, vermeed hun medewerker Pollard en werd de zaak niet gemeld bij Amerikaanse instanties.
Als onderdeel van thrillers en spannende lectuur zijn de spionage praktijken van Pollard, zoals Olive die beschrijft, niet bijster interessant, want het leidt af van waar het werkelijk om draait. Daarentegen is het boek van grote waarde waar het gaat om de beschrijving van de persoon Pollard, de wijze waarop hij kon spioneren, zijn werkomgeving, de blunders die worden gemaakt – niet alleen het aannemen en overplaatsen van Pollard, maar ook de wijze waarop geheimen zo eenvoudig kunnen worden gelekt – eigenlijk de totale bureaucratie die de wereld van inlichtingendiensten in zijn greep heeft.
Hoewel deze persoonlijke en bureaucratische gegevens niet breed worden uitgemeten – Olive is zelf een voormalig inlichtingenman – verschaft het boek een veelheid aan informatie daarover. De schrijver lijkt die persoonlijke details specifiek aan Pollard te koppelen, alsof het niet voor andere medewerkers zou gelden.
Opschepper
Dit gaat ook op ook voor de gemaakte fouten van de bureaucratie rond de carrière van de spion. Zo lijkt Pollard van jongs af aan een voorliefde te hebben gehad om spion te worden, of in ieder geval iets geheims te willen doen in zijn leven. Tijdens zijn studie schept hij erover op dat hij voor de Mossad zou werken en had gediend in het Israëlische leger. Zijn vader zou ook voor de CIA werkzaam zijn.
Aan deze opschepperij verbindt Olive een psychologisch element. Het zou een soort compensatie zijn voor de slechte jeugd van Pollard die vaak zou zijn gepest. Ook zijn vrouw zou niet bij hem passen omdat die te aantrekkelijk is. Pollard moet dat compenseren door stoer te doen. Later, toen hij voor een inlichtingendienst werkte, voelde hij zich opnieuw het buitenbeentje. Zijn carrière verliep alles behalve vlekkeloos, regelmatig werd hij op een zijspoor gezet.
Olive schetst een beeld van een verwend kind, dat niet op juiste waarde werd ingeschat en stoer wilde doen. Was Pollard echter zoveel anders dan zijn voormalige collega analisten of medewerkers van de inlichtingendienst? Werken voor een inlichtingendienst vereist een zekere mate van voyeurisme, een gespleten persoonlijkheid. Buiten je werk om kun je niet vrijelijk praten over datgene waar je mee bezig bent.
Dat doet wat met je psyche, maar trekt ook een bepaald soort mensen aan. Het werk betreft namelijk niet het oplossen van misdrijven, maar het kijken in het hoofd van mogelijke verdachten. Het BVD-dossier van oud-provo Roel van Duin laat zien dat een dienst totaal kan ontsporen door zijn eigen manier van denken. Dat komt echter niet voort uit de dienst als abstracte bureaucratie, maar door toedoen van de mensen die er werken.
Roekeloos
Pollard gedroeg zich arrogant en opschepperig, misschien wel om zijn eigen onzekerheid te maskeren. Dergelijk gedrag wordt door de schrijver verbonden aan zijn spionage-activiteiten voor de Israëliërs. Pollard was echter niet getraind in het lekken van documenten en ging verre van zorgvuldig te werk. Hij deed het zo openlijk dat het verbazingwekkend is dat het zo lang duurde voordat hij tegen de lamp liep. Hij zei bijvoorbeeld tegen de Israëliërs dat zij alleen de TS/SCI documenten moesten kopiëren en dat ze de rest mochten houden.
In de loop van de anderhalf jaar dat hij documenten naar buiten smokkelde, werd hij steeds roekelozer. Dat hij gespot werd met een pak papier onder zijn arm terwijl hij bij zijn vrouw in de auto stapte, was eerder toeval dan dat het het resultaat was van grondig speurwerk van de NCIS.
Eenmaal binnenin het inlichtingenbedrijf zijn de mogelijkheden om te lekken onuitputtelijk. Als Pollard wel getraind was geweest en zorgvuldiger te werk was gegaan, dan had hij zijn praktijk eindeloos kunnen voorzetten. Welke andere ‘agenten’ doen dat wellicht nog steeds? Of welke andere medewerkers waren minder roekeloos en tevreden geweest met het lekken van enkele documenten?
Die medewerkers vormen gezamenlijk het systeem van de dienst. Pollard schepte graag op, maar de schrijver van Spy Wars, Bagley, klopte zich ook graag op de borst en, hoewel in mindere mate, Ronald Olive ook. Iets dat eigenlijk vreemd is, als het aantal blunders in ogenschouw wordt genomen nadat Pollard ontdekt was. Alleen omdat de Israëliërs Pollard de toegang tot de diplomatieke vestiging ontzegden, zorgde ervoor dat hij alsnog gearresteerd en levenslang kreeg in de VS. Hij was echter bijna ontsnapt.
Blunders
Het is daarom niet gek dat inlichtingendiensten een gebrek aan bescheidenheid vertonen. Vele aanslagen zijn voorkomen, wordt vaak beweerd, maar helaas kunnen de diensten geen details geven. Het klinkt als Pollard, op bezoek bij Olive, die breed uitmeet dat hij die en die kent op de Zuid-Afrikaanse ambassade en of hij die moet werven als spion. Olive was werkzaam voor de NCIS. Pollard bezocht hem voordat hij werd ontmaskerd. Zijn eigen gebrek aan actie in relatie tot de twijfels over Pollard toont aan dat geen enkel bureaucratisch systeem perfect is, ook niet dat van inlichtingendiensten.
Het is niet verbazingwekkend dat de carrière van Pollard bezaaid is met blunders. Hij werd dan wel afgewezen door de CIA, maar waagde vervolgens een gokje bij een andere dienst en had geluk. Hij werd bij de NIS aangenomen en kroop zo langzaamaan in de organisatie. De fouten die bij het aannamebeleid en bij de evaluaties van Pollard zijn gemaakt, worden door Olive gepresenteerd als op zichzelf staand, maar de hoeveelheid blunders en gebrekkige administratie lijken zo talrijk dat het geen toevalstreffers zijn.
Bij elke promotie of overplaatsing lijkt slechts een deel van zijn persoonsdossier hem te volgen. De NIS wist vanaf het begin niet dat Pollard eerder door de CIA werd afgewezen. Als zijn toegang tot geheime documenten wordt ingetrokken, wacht Pollard net zo lang tot bepaalde medewerkers zijn overgeplaatst of vertrokken. Hij wordt dan wel afgeschilderd als een verwend kind dat met geheimen speelt, regelmatig moet Olive echter toegeven dat Pollard een briljant analist is. Pas in de laatste maanden van zijn spionage-activiteiten, lijdt zijn werk onder de operatie om zoveel mogelijk documenten naar buiten te smokkelen.
Waarom Pollard de Amerikaanse overheid schade toebracht, wijdt Olive vooral aan zijn joodse afkomst. Niet dat de schrijver alle joodse Amerikanen verdenkt, maar een belangrijke reden voor het fanatiek lekken wordt verklaard aan de hand van Pollard’s wens om naar Israël te emigreren. Olive gaat echter voorbij aan het geld dat de spion aan zijn activiteiten verdiende. Aanvankelijk 1.500 dollar per maand, na een paar maanden 2.500 en twee volledig verzorgde reizen met zijn vrouw naar Europa en Israël en tot slot een Zwitserse bankrekening met jaarlijks een bonus van 30.000 dollar.
Los van de Zwitserse rekening schat de Amerikaanse overheid dat Pollard rond de 50.000 dollar aan zijn spionagewerk heeft overgehouden. Eigenlijk niet eens veel in vergelijking met de één miljoen documenten die hij leverde. De onderhandelingen over het geld maken echter duidelijk dat Pollard wel degelijk geïnteresseerd was om zoveel mogelijk te verdienen. De prijs werd gedrukt omdat de Israëliërs niet erg toeschietelijk waren en Pollard ze sowieso wilde helpen.
Afkomst
Zijn joodse afkomst zat hem in de weg, want waarschijnlijk had hij alleen al voor het tiendelige boekwerk Radio-Signal Notations (RASIN) 50.000 dollar kunnen krijgen. Uiteindelijk blijkt Pollard een gewoon mens die de verlokking van het geld niet kon weerstaan. Andere agenten zijn hem voorgegaan en hebben zijn voorbeeld gevolgd.
Het nadeel van zijn afkomst blijkt ook uit het feit dat hij zijn Israëlische runner een ‘cadeautje’ gaf. Aviem Sella had mee gevochten in de zesdaagse Yom Kippur oorlog en was een van de piloten die de Iraakse kernreactor in Osirak bombardeerde. Pollard gaf hem destijds satellietbeelden van die aanval. Sella wordt nog steeds gezocht voor Verenigde Staten voor spionage.
De operatie werd door een andere veteraan, Rafi of Rafael Eitan, geleid. Onder diens leiding spoorde de Mossad Adolf Eichmann op. Eitan en Sella werden rijkelijk beloond voor hun werk met Pollard, maar moesten hun promoties inleveren omdat de Amerikanen eind jaren ’80 furieus reageerden. Na de arrestatie van Pollard beweerden de Israëliërs dat ze helemaal niet zoveel documenten hadden gekregen van de spion en de onderhandelingen over teruggave uiterst stroef waren verlopen.
Uiteindelijk werd maar een fractie van de documenten teruggegeven aan de Amerikanen. De Israëliërs waren vooral bezig om na zijn veroordeling Pollard vrij te krijgen. Premier Nethanyahu sprak vorig jaar de Knesset toe over het lot van Pollard, terwijl de Israëlische ambassadeur in de VS hem juli 2011 bezocht in de gevangenis.
Tot nu toe lijken de Amerikanen niet van zins om hem vrij te laten. Na de veroordeling van Pollard kwam de campagne Free Pollard op gang. Zijn vrouw verdween uit beeld. Niet alleen Israëliërs nemen deel aan de campagne, maar ook Alan Dershowitz, professor aan de Harvard Law School en andere academici. In het laatste hoofdstuk More sinned against than sinning beschrijft Olive enkele andere spionnen die documenten verkochten aan buitenlandse mogendheden.
Capturing Jonathan Pollard was nog niet gepubliceerd toen de stroom Wikileaks-documenten op gang kwam. Die documenten laten echter zien dat een waterdicht systeem niet bestaat en dat mensen voor geld of om andere redenen geheime stukken lekken. De Wikileaks-documenten onderstrepen dat er sinds de jaren ’80 weinig is veranderd. Met als enige verschil de hardvochtige wijze waarop verdachte Manning in deze zaak wordt behandeld en de gebrekkige aandacht die hij krijgt van professoren en andere betrokkenen bij de Wikileaks-documenten.
Capturing Jonathan Pollard: How One of the Most Notorious Spies in American History Was Brought to Justice. Auteur Ronald J. Olive. Uitgeverij US Naval Institute Press (2006).
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Jailed US spy gave Israel information on Pakistan nuclear program27 december 2012
An American intelligence analyst, who was jailed in 1987 for spying for Israel, gave his spy handlers information on Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, according to declassified documents. Former United States Navy intelligence analyst Jonathan Jay Pollard is currently serving a life sentence for selling classified information to the Israeli government between 1985 and 1987. On December 14, the Central Intelligence Agency declassified its official damage assessment of Pollard’s espionage, who some counterintelligence officials believe was the most prolific mole that ever spied on the US government for a foreign country. This was the second time that the CIA declassified the document, titled The Jonathan Jay Pollard Espionage Case: A Damage Assessment, following an appeal by George Washington University’s National Security Archive. Even though this latest version of the declassified document is still heavily redacted, it contains some new information. One new revelation is that Pollard’s Israeli handlers specifically asked him to acquire intelligence collected by the US government on the Pakistani nuclear weapons program. In a section titled “Implications of Compromises: What Israel Gained from Pollard’s Espionage”, the CIA assessment states that Pollard focused on “Arab and Pakistani nuclear intelligence” and gave his Israeli handlers information on a secret Pakistani “plutonium reprocessing facility near Islamabad”. Further information in the declassified report about this subject is completely redacted. The question is, what kind of information on Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program did Tel Aviv acquire from Pollard? According to A.Q. Khan, the so-called father of the Pakistani nuclear bomb, Islamabad was able to detonate a nuclear device “within a week’s notice” by as early as 1984. IntelNews has also reported that the US was aware of Pakistan’s plans to build the bomb in the 1970s and had been working along with other Western countries, including the United Kingdom, to prevent Pakistan’s covert attempts to purchase ‘gray area’ technologies for its nuclear weapons program. In 2009, Imtiaz Ahmad, former director of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence directorate, spoke of a 1979 ISI operation called RISING SUN, which involved the alleged unmasking of Rafiq Munshi, a US-trained Pakistani nuclear scientist, who Ahmed says was a CIA agent. The operation also resulted in the exposure of several undercover CIA agents, posing as diplomats, stationed in the US embassy in Islamabad and the consulate in Karachi. Another question is whether Israel knew by 1987 that CIA operations against the Pakistani nuclear weapons program ended soon after Ronald Reagan was elected US President. His administration actively supported the Pakistani nuclear program in light of Pakistan’s adversarial relationship with the Soviet Union.
December 18, 2012 by Joseph Fitsanakis 2 Comments
By JOSEPH FITSANAKIS | intelNews.org |
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Schäuble hat sich für Morde nicht interessiert16 december 2012
Berlin – Bundesfinanzminister Wolfgang Schäuble steht nach seinem Auftritt im NSU-Untersuchungsausschuss des Bundestags in der Kritik. Der Ausschussvorsitzende Sebastian Edathy warf dem damaligen Innenminister Desinteresse an der Aufklärung der Morde vor. Schäuble habe sich für die Sache so gut wie gar nicht interessiert, sagte der SPD-Politiker dem RBB-Inforadio. Zudem seien 2006 in Schäubles Ministerverantwortung gravierende Fehlentscheidungen getroffen worden. Unter anderem habe man die Abteilungen für Links- und Rechtsextremismus beim Verfassungsschutz zusammengeführt.
15.12.12
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Stellungnahme zu Ermittlungspannen vor dem NSU-Ausschuss Ex-Innenminister Schäuble weist Vorwürfe von sich16 december 2012
zBerlin – Der frühere Bundesinnenminister Wolfgang Schäuble (CDU) war als Zeuge vor den NSU-Untersuchungsausschuss des Bundestages geladen worden – und wies eine Mitverantwortung für Ermittlungspannen bei der Aufdeckung der Zwickauer Terrorzelle von sich.
„Ich kann nichts erkennen, was mich in irgendeiner Weise belasten würde“, sagte der heutige Bundesfinanzminister.
Ein Minister greife in der Regel nicht in Einzelentscheidungen seiner Behörde ein – er übernehme stattdessen Führungsaufgaben. Er selbst habe sich nicht als „oberster Polizist im Land“ gesehen. „Deswegen bin ich mit diesen schrecklichen Morden amtlich nur sehr marginal befasst gewesen“, sagte der Minister.
Schäuble wies in der Anhörung auch Vorwürfe zurück, er habe die Ermittlungen erschwert, indem er 2006 dem Bundeskriminalamt (BKA) die Ermittlungen nicht übertragen habe. „Ich kann mich nicht erinnern, dass mir ein solcher Vorschlag gemacht worden ist”, sagte der Bundesfinanzminister.
Der Ausschuss argumentierte, dass die Ermittlungen des BKA einen zweiten Blick gebracht hätten und dadurch unter Umständen hilfreich gewesen wären.
NSU-Akten-Affäre
Ungeheuerliche Ermittlungspannen bei der Zwickauer Terrorzelle. BKA-Chef Zierke sagte vor dem Untersuchungsausschuss: „Wir haben versagt”.
mehr…
Schäuble verteidigte vor dem Ausschuss auch die Zusammenlegung der Abteilungen für die Bekämpfung von Links- und Rechtsextremismus beim Verfassungsschutz. Die Gefahr durch den islamistischen Terrorismus sei vor der Fußball-WM 2006 hoch eingeschätzt worden – eine zentrale Terrorbekämpfungsabteilung in Berlin sei für notwendig erachtet worden. Die Gefahr des rechtsextremen Terrors sei dadurch nicht minder berücksichtig worden.
Schäuble war von 2005 bis 2009 Chef des Innenressorts. In dieser Zeit tappten die Ermittler mit ihren Untersuchungen zur rechtsextremen Terrorzelle NSU noch völlig im Dunkeln.
Der Ausschuss befasst sich seit Beginn des Jahres mit den Verbrechen des Nationalsozialistischen Untergrunds (NSU) und den Ermittlungspannen bei deren Aufdeckung. Der Terrorzelle werden zehn Morde zwischen 2000 und 2007 an türkisch- und griechischstämmigen Kleinunternehmern und einer Polizistin zur Last gelegt. Die Gruppierung flog aber erst im November 2011 auf. Die Sicherheitsbehörden kamen ihr jahrelang nicht auf die Spur.
Unterdessen lehnte Beate Zschäpe (37) eine Untersuchung durch einen psychiatrischen Gutachter ab. Das ließ die mutmaßliche Rechtsterroristin dem Oberlandesgericht München über ihre Anwälte mitteilen, ergaben Recherchen der „Panorama”-Redaktion des NDR.
Gerichtspsychiater Henning Saß vom Uniklinikum Aachen sollte herausfinden, ob die Voraussetzungen für eine Sicherungsverwahrung von Zschäpe bestehen. Die Nazi-Braut, die bisher noch keine Aussage gemacht hat, soll ein Gespräch mit dem renommierten Psychiater abgelehnt haben.
Der emeritierte Professor Saß ist einer der bekanntesten Psychiater in deutschen Gerichtssälen. Nun soll Saß auf Grundlage der Ermittlungsakten ein erstes Gutachten erstellen. Dazu wollte das Oberlandesgericht München (OLG) keine Stellung nehmen.
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14.12.2012 – 17:42 Uhr
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Man charged with spying on Moroccan dissidents16 december 2012
Just days after a man was sentenced for spying for Syria, German federal prosecutors said Friday they had brought charges against a German-Moroccan national on suspicion of observing opposition members.
The federal prosecutor’s office said the 59-year-old suspect identified only as Bagdad A. was believed to have worked as an agent for the Moroccan secret services in Germany from May 2007 to February this year.
“The accused has a broad network of contacts among Moroccans living in Germany,” it said in a statement.
“In 2007, he told the Moroccan foreign intelligence service he was willing to use his contacts to provide information about Moroccan opposition members living in Germany.”
It said he remained in “constant” contact with his employers until February this year and informed them in particular about demonstrations held by opposition groups.
A spokesman for the prosecutors said the man was not currently in custody but that the authorities had determined there was little risk of flight as his family lived in Germany.
On Wednesday, a German court gave a two-year suspended jail sentence to a 48-year-old man of dual German-Lebanese nationality for spying on opponents of the Syrian regime in Germany.
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Published: 7 Dec 12 16:34 CET
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Russian whistleblower: police accused of ignoring evidence16 december 2012
Row over unexplained Surrey death of Alexander Perepilichnyy, a key witness in fraud case of £140m in tax stolen from Russia
A security vehicle at the entrance to St George’s Hill private estate near Weybridge, Surrey in November, where Alexander Perepilichnyy died in mysterious circumstances. Photograph: Olivia Harris/Reuters
Police and anti-fraud agencies have been criticised by the alleged victim of a multimillion-pound international fraud for ignoring dossiers of evidence – including death threats and intimidation – linking the crime with the UK, months before a witness connected to the case was found dead in unexplained circumstances.
The body of Alexander Perepilichnyy, 44, was found outside his Surrey home on 10 November. His cause of death is described as “unexplained” following two postmortems, with further toxicology tests to come.
He was a key witness in a fraud case involving the theft of £140m in tax revenue from the Russian government. The alleged fraudsters are said to have stolen three companies from a UK-based investment firm, Hermitage Capital, and used them to perpetrate the fraud – leaving Hermitage in the frame for the criminal acts.
The case is known as the “Magnitsky case”, after one of Hermitage’s Russian lawyers, Sergei Magnitsky, who was found dead in a Russian prison in 2009 with his body showing signs of torture.
A motion from the parliamentary assembly of the Council of Europe said Magnitsky had been “killed … while in pre-trial detention in Moscow after he refused to change his testimony”.
Bill Browder, the founder of Hermitage Capital, has been trying to secure convictions for the death of Magnitsky, as well as those implicated in the alleged fraud against his company, for four years.
Documents seen by the Guardian show that in January and February Browder’s lawyers passed a criminal complaint to the City of London police, the Serious Fraud Office (SFO), the Financial Services Authority (FSA) and Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA).
The complaint alleged Britain had ties to the alleged criminal conspiracy from its earliest stages: a UK citizen, Stephen John Kelly, served as a nominee, or “sham” director, for British Virgin Islands-based offshore companies involved in liquidating the companies used to claim the allegedly fraudulent tax refunds. Separately, a crucial couriered package of evidence, used as a pretext to raid offices in Russia, was sent from UK soil.
And, significantly, the complaint alleged lawyers working in the UK for Hermitage on the case had been subject to death threats made by phone, and intimidation via surveillance of their offices.
Hermitage claim the alleged theft of the companies was carried out using documents taken from their offices during a police raid, then “representatives” of the companies engaged in an elaborate series of steps to secure a tax rebate of about £140m. The three firms, now with no assets and more than £600m of debts, were then sold on and liquidated via the British Virgin Islands.
The Conservative MP Dominic Raab wrote to the same police and anti-fraud agencies again in August also encouraging an investigation, after being contacted by Hermitage with respect to their complaints.
Raab had previously urged action in the House of Commons against individuals allegedly implicated in Magnitsky’s death, mirroring a US bill that was formally passed by the Senate on Thursday evening.
Raab also informed the Home Office last month that one of the alleged leaders of the Russian criminal gang had apparently travelled to the UK on two occasions in 2008, despite having previous convictions in relation to a multimillion-pound fraud, and asked them to investigate. He also passed details of 60 individuals allegedly involved in the plot to UK authorities to assist in monitoring of their movements.
Raab said the lack of information from any UK authorities was troubling.
“The first thing is, we don’t know about Perepilichnyy and his cause of death,” he said. “But we do know there was some sort of hit-list in Russia with his name on it and he’s obviously given evidence in these money-laundering proceedings.
“I think the key thing is the Home Office give the police all the support they can. At the moment, there’s a lack of transparency, it’s very difficult to know. We’ve got no idea if anything’s been actioned, or even how many people linked to the case have been travelling in and out of Britain. We just don’t know.”
City of London police said they had met Hermitage but had found no evidence of UK involvement in the alleged offences.
“Detectives met with the company’s solicitors and having reviewed the complaint concluded there was no evidence of criminality in the UK and would be taking no further action,” said a spokesman”.
The SFO, FSA and SOCA declined to comment, citing policies barring them from confirming or denying the existence of any specific investigations.
A spokesman for the Home Office confirmed they had been contacted by Raab and were looking into his queries, but said they did not comment on individual visa cases.
Surrey police have still been unable to establish a cause of death for Perepilichnyy, who collapsed and died outside his luxury home in Weybridge, Surrey. He had been out jogging, his wife Tatyana said, and was found in the street wearing shorts and trainers.
Perepilichnyy appears to have been part of the alleged criminal group but to have fallen out with other members of the syndicate. He fled to Britain three years ago, taking with him bank documents, details of Credit Suisse accounts and other evidence.
In the UK Perepilichnyy kept a low profile, with few Russians in the capital having heard of him. He passed a bundle of evidence to Hermitage Capital; Hermitage then handed the documents over to the Swiss police. As a result Swiss investigators closed down several accounts allegedly belonging to figures in the criminal gang.
Andrei Pavlov, a Russian lawyer, told Kommersant, Russia’s leading daily, that Perepilichnyy appeared exhausted and frightened during two meetings the men had last year. “He wanted to make peace with [ex-partner Vladlen] Stepanov,” the lawyer said. Pavlov did not respond to repeated requests for comment by the Guardian’s deadline.
Stepanov, and his ex-wife Olga Stepanova, are among those accused by Hermitage of taking part in a complex scheme to illegally funnel Russian taxes from companies once owned by Hermitage. Information released by Hermitage, and uncovered by Magnitsky, shows how Stepanova, the former head of a Moscow tax office, and her husband bought wildly expensive properties in Moscow, Montenegro and Dubai.
In a video interview with Vedomosti, a respected financial daily, in May 2011, Stepanov attempted to explain his personal wealth, which he claims was gained through investing the money he made in the 1990s from tunnel construction and optics. He called Browder’s investigations “fabricated facts”. “With these fabricated facts, they have blamed me for everything – that there is blood on my hands.”
He also said he had fallen out with Perepilichnyy, calling him a man with “many problems”.
“He ran away. He’s not here. He doesn’t answer the phone. He’s hiding. It’s like he doesn’t exist.” Perepilichnyy is believed to have fled to the UK after becoming unable to pay back debts amid the global financial crisis.
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James Ball, Luke Harding and Miriam Elder
The Guardian, Sunday 9 December 2012 18.35 GMT
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Fourth person involved in Russian fraud scheme found dead in UK16 december 2012
A Russian whistleblower who had been helping authorities in Western Europe investigate a gigantic money-laundering scheme involving Russian government officials, has been found dead in the United Kingdom. Alexander Perepilichnyy, who had been named by Swiss authorities as an indispensible informant in the so-called Hermitage Capital scandal, was found dead outside his home in Weybridge, Surrey, on November 10. The 44-year-old former businessman, who sought refuge in England in 2009, and had been living there ever since, is the fourth person linked to the money-laundering scandal to have died in suspicious circumstances. The company, Hermitage Capital Management, is a UK-based investment fund and asset-management company, which Western prosecutors believe fell victim to a massive $250 million fraud conspiracy perpetrated by Russian Interior Ministry officials who were aided by organized crime gangs. In 2006, the company’s British founders were denied entry to Russia, in what was seen by some as an attempt by the administration of Vladimir Putin to protect its officials involved in the money-laundering scheme. The scandal widened in late 2009, when Hermitage Capital lawyer Sergei Magnitsky, who had been arrested in connection with the case, died while in police custody. According to the coroner’s report, Magnitsky, who was 37 and in good physical health, died suddenly from acute heart failure at a Moscow detention facility. Some observers speculate that the lawyer was killed before he could turn into a whistleblower against some of the perpetrators of the fraud scheme. Following Magnitsky’s death, Alexander Perepilichnyy was elevated as a key witness in the case, after providing Swiss prosecutors with detailed intelligence naming several Russian government officials involved in the money-laundering scheme, as well as their criminal contacts outside Russia. This led to the freezing of numerous assets and bank accounts in several European countries. There is no word yet as to the cause of Perepilichnyy’s death. British investigators said yesterday that the first post-mortem examination had proved inconclusive and that a toxicological examination had been ordered for next week.
November 30, 2012 by Joseph Fitsanakis 3 Comments
By JOSEPH FITSANAKIS | intelNews.org |
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Alexander Litvinenko murder: British evidence ‘shows Russia involved’16 december 2012
Hearing ahead of full inquest also hears Litvinenko was working for MI6 when he was poisoned with polonium-210
Alexander Litvinenki died in a London hospital in November 2006, three weeks after drinking poisoned tea. Photograph: Natasja Weitsz/Getty Images
The government’s evidence relating to the death of Alexander Litvinenko amounts to a “prima facie case” that he was murdered by the Russian government, the coroner investigating his death has been told.
The former KGB officer was a paid MI6 agent at the time of his death in 2006, a pre-inquest hearing also heard, and was also working for the Spanish secret services supplying intelligence on Russian state involvement in organised crime.
Litvinenko died in a London hospital in November 2006, three weeks after drinking tea which had been poisoned with the radioactive isotope polonium-210.
The director of public prosecutions announced in May 2007 that it would seek to charge Andrei Lugovoi, a former KGB officer, with murder, prompting a diplomatic crisis between the UK and Russia, which refused a request for Lugovoi’s extradition. Britain expelled four Russian diplomats, which was met by a tit-for-tat expulsion of four British embassy staff from Moscow. Lugovoi denies murder.
At a preliminary hearing on Thursday in advance of the full inquest into Litvinenko’s death, Hugh Davies, counsel to the inquest, said an assessment of government documents “does establish a prima facie case as to the culpability of the Russian state in the death of Alexander Litvinenko”.
Separately, a lawyer representing the dead man’s widow, Marina, told the coroner, Sir Robert Owen, that Litvinenko had been “a paid agent and employee of MI6” at the time of his death, who was also, at the instigation of British intelligence, working for the Spanish secret service.
“The information that he was involved [in] providing to the Spanish … involved organised crime, that’s the Russian mafia activities in Spain and more widely,” Ben Emmerson QC told the hearing.
Emmerson said the inquest would hear evidence that the murdered man had a dedicated MI6 handler who used the pseudonym Martin.
While he was dying in hospital, Emmerson said, Litvinenko had given Martin’s number to a Metropolitan police officer and, without disclosing his MI6 connection, suggested the police follow up the connection. He said Litvinenko had also had a dedicated phone that he used only for phoning Martin.
“Martin will no doubt be a witness in this inquiry, once his identity has been made known to you,” Emmerson told the coroner.
The inquest would also hear evidence that Lugovoi had been working with Litvinenko in supplying intelligence to Spain, the lawyer said, adding that the murdered man had also had a separate phone used only for his contact with the other Russian.
While he was dying in hospital, Litvinenko had phoned Lugovoi on this phone to tell him he was unwell and would be unable to join him on a planned trip to Spain, Emmerson said. The purpose of the trip was for both men to deliver intelligence about Russian mafia links to the Kremlin and Vladimir Putin.
So advanced were the arrangements for the trip that the conversation “descended to the level of discussing hotels”, Emmerson said.
The case against Lugovoi centres on a meeting he and another Russian, Dmitry Kovtun, had with Litvinenko at the Palm bar at the Millennium hotel in Mayfair on 1 November 2006. It is alleged that Litvinenko’s tea was poisoned with the polonium-210 at that meeting. Kovtun also denies involvement.
At the instigation of MI6, Emmerson said, Litvinenko had been supplying information to a Spanish prosecutor, José Grinda González, under the supervision of a separate Spanish handler who used the pseudonym Uri.
Emmerson cited a US embassy cable published in the 2010 Wikileaks disclosures that detailed a briefing given by Grinda González on 13 January 2010 to US officials in Madrid. At that meeting, the lawyer said, the prosecutor had quoted intelligence from Litvinenko that Russian security and intelligence services “control organised crime in Russia”.
“Grinda stated that he believes this thesis is accurate,” the lawyer quoted.
He said that payments from both the British and Spanish secret services had been deposited directly into the joint account Litvinenko shared with his wife.
Contrary to Davies’s submission, Emmerson said the inquest should consider whether the British government had been culpable in failing to protect Litvinenko, arguing that “the very fact of a relationship between Mr Litvinenko and his employers MI6” placed a duty on the government to ensure his safety when asking him to undertake “dangerous operations”.
“It’s an inevitable inference from all of the evidence that prior to his death MI6 had carried out a detailed risk assessment and that risk assessment must in due course be disclosed.”
Neil Garnham QC, counsel for the Home Office, representing MI6, said the government would not comment on claims that Litvinenko was a British agent. “It is central to Mrs Litvinenko’s case that her husband was an employee of the British intelligence services. That is something about which I cannot or will not comment. I can neither confirm or deny it.”
The Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation has indicated that it would like to be formally designated an “interested party” in the inquest, which would give it the right to make submissions to the coroner and appoint lawyers to cross examine witnesses.
…
Esther Addley
The Guardian, Thursday 13 December 2012 19.00 GMT
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Strange truth of a life caught up with MI6’s ‘Martin’ and the KGB16 december 2012
Inquiry told Alexander Litvinenko was spying for Britain and Spain – and Russia killed him
Secret details of Alexander Litvinenko’s life as a British intelligence agent were revealed yesterday at a preparatory hearing into the poisoned former KGB officer’s death.
The inquiry was told that the 43-year-old not only worked for MI6, but was helping the Spanish intelligence services investigating organised crime in Russia.
Mr Litvinenko died in hospital three weeks after being poisoned with radioactive polonium-210 after meeting fellow former KGB contacts for tea at a Mayfair hotel in 2006. The night before, the High Court judge Sir Robert Owen was told, he met with his MI6 handler “Martin”.
The inquest next May is likely to increase tensions between the UK and Russia, with the British government providing evidence that the foreign state was involved in the murder of its former agent.
Ben Emmerson QC, representing Mr Litvinenko’s widow Marina, claimed the British had failed to protect the former KGB officer: “At the time of his death Mr Litvinenko had been for a number of years a registered and paid agent in the employ of MI6.
“That relationship between Mr Litvinenko and his employers MI6 is sufficient to trigger an enhanced duty by the British government to ensure his safety when tasking him on dangerous operations.”
Paid through a bank account or in cash, Mr Litvinenko had a dedicated telephone to MI6, which tasked him with helping Jose Grinda Gonzalez, the Spanish prosecutor for corruption and organised crime.
A US embassy cable described how Mr Gonzalez had met the Americans and told them he was working on a thesis by Mr Litvinenko that “the Russian intelligence and security services – Grinda cited the Federal Security Service (FSB), the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) and military intelligence (GRU) – control organised crime in Russia. Grinda stated that he believes the thesis is accurate”.
As an agent to the Spanish intelligence services through a handler called “Uri”, Mr Litvinenko had been planning a trip to Madrid with Mr Lugovoi – a member of the FSB, and the man suspected of the murder – until he became ill from poisoning.
Mr Emmerson continued: “He made a phone call to Mr Lugovoi in hospital to discuss their planned trip together to Spain to provide intelligence to the Spanish prosecutor investigating Russian mafia links with the Kremlin and Vladimir Putin. He explained he was ill and could no longer go on their planned trip.”
Both Mr Lugovoi and Mr Kovtun – who also met him for tea at the Mayfair hotel – have denied any involvement in the killing but have refused to surrender to the British authorities.
Neil Garnham QC, representing the Government, responded that he could not comment on assertions that Mr Litvinenko was in the pay of MI6: “I can neither confirm nor deny.”
Hugh Davies, the barrister to the inquest, revealed that almost a year after it was invited to participate in the inquest, the Russian government had applied to be represented. On Wednesday, Mr Davies explained a letter was received requesting that the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation – sometimes compared with the American FBI – be granted “interested-person status” at the inquest in May.
He added that, having examined documents supplied by the British government, the inquiry team had failed to find evidence that supported a wide variety of theories including claims Mr Litvinenko had been murdered by the Russian oligarch Boris Berezovsky, the Spanish mafia, Italian academic Mario Scaramella or Chechen organisations.
However, he added: “Taken in isolation, our assessment is that the government material does establish a prima facie case as to the culpability of the Russian state in the death of Alexander Litvinenko.”
Sir Robert, sitting as Assistant Deputy Coroner, is expected to rule early next year on what will be admissible at the inquest as well as whether there is a case under the European Convention of Human Rights that the British state was culpable in the death “either in itself carrying out, or by its agents, the poisoning or by failing to take reasonable steps to protect Mr Litvinenko from a real risk to his life”.
A tangled web: Litvinenko’s network
*Alexander Litvinenko served in the KGB and its successor the Federal Security Service (FSB) but left in 2000, having been arrested for exceeding the authority of his position, charges which were dismissed.
*In 1998, Mr Litvinenko and other FSB officers accused their superiors of ordering the assassination of the Russian tycoon Boris Berezovsky. He later worked on the oligarch’s security team and the men became friends.
*Having fled to Britain seeking asylum, he began working as an agent of MI6.
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Terri Judd
Friday, 14 December 2012
Find this story at 14 December 2012
© independent.co.uk
Alexander Litvinenko accusation puts MI6 in an unflattering light16 december 2012
Allegations of involvement in Libyan rendition and the death of the Russian spy raise questions about MI6’s handling of sources
The MI6 headquarters in Vauxhall, London. Photograph: Martin Argles for the Guardian
Spying is a dangerous game, in reality as in fiction. It is also exotic. Sometimes the sheer adrenaline and excitement can make the spy drop his – or her – guard and judgment can be affected. Spies – both spymasters and their agents – can be seduced by the prospect of praise heaped on them by their political masters.
MI6 may have succumbed to these pressures and temptations in their handling of the former KGB spy, Alexander Litvinenko – and also of two prominent Libyan dissidents it helped to abduct and render to Muammar Gaddafi. The two cases are separate but they will both bring unwelcome publicity to Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service for months to come.
Litvinenko was killed in November 2006, poisoned by the radioactive isotope polonium-210. Yesterday, at a pre-inquest hearing into her husband’s death, Litvinenko’s widow, Marina, articulated her belief that MI6 failed to protect him. Her counsel, Ben Emmerson, said: “Mr Litvinenko had been for a number of years a regular and paid agent and employee of MI6 with a dedicated handler whose pseudonym was Martin.”
He added that at the behest of MI6, Litvinenko was also working for the Spanish security services, where his handler was called Uri (the Russian was supplying the Spanish with information on organised crime and Russian mafia activity in Spain, the hearing heard). Emmerson said the inquest should consider whether MI6 failed in its duty to protect Litvinenko against a “real and immediate risk to life”.
He suggested there was “an enhanced duty resting on the British government to ensure his safety when tasking him with dangerous operations involving engagement with foreign agents”. Emmerson continued: “It is Marina Litvinenko’s belief that the evidence will show that her husband’s death was a murder and that Andrey Lugovoy [also a former KGB officer] was the main perpetrator”.
It is easy for victims of espionage to blame the spymaster. MI6 should know that. What risks the MI6 handlers took with Litvinenko, what advice and warnings they gave him, whether or not he heeded them, may – or may not – emerge during the inquest.
MI6 did not emerge well from another inquest earlier this year. The coroner at the inquest into the death of Gareth Williams a GCHQ employee seconded to MI6 and found dead in a zipped-up bag in his London flat, sharply attacked MI6 officers for hampering the police investigation into the case. For more than a week after Williams’s disappearance, MI6 did not alert the police or get in touch with any member of his family. A senior MI6 officer identified as F blamed G, Williams’s close colleague, referring to a “breakdown in communications”.
Ironically, perhaps, in light of Emmerson’s comments at Thursday’s pre-inquest hearing, G said Williams was frustrated by the bureaucracy – what he called “the amount of process risk mitigation” – inside MI6. Williams’s family solicitor said their grief was exacerbated by MI6’s failings.
Sir John Sawers, the head of MI6 apologised “unreservedly”, saying lessons in the Williams case had been learned, “in particular the responsibility of all staff to report unaccounted staff absences”.
Lessons may have been learned over Litvinenko’s death. We can be sure they are also being learned over the abduction in 2004 of two prominent Libyan dissidents – Sami al-Saadi and Abdel Hakim Belhaj – and their families. Al-Saadi settled on Thursday, accepting an offer of £2.2m in compensation. Belhaj intends to keep fighting and pursue his court case against ministers and officials.
…
Richard Norton-Taylor
guardian.co.uk, Friday 14 December 2012 16.45 GMT
Find this story at 14 December 2012
© 2012 Guardian News and Media Limited or its affiliated companies. All rights reserved.
British agents ‘facilitated the murder’ of Belfast solicitor Pat Finucane during the Troubles16 december 2012
David Cameron deeply sorry for ‘shocking’ state collusion
They went to London in hope more than expectation. The family of Pat Finucane never supported this review of evidence by a “lawyer with strong links to the Conservative Party”, demanding instead the public inquiry they were initially promised by Tony Blair.
They leave with the personal apology of a Prime Minister for the “collusion” of British agents in Pat’s murder. But not, they say, the truth.
Mr Finucane’s wife Geraldine was in the House of Commons chamber to hear David Cameron say he was “deeply sorry” after the findings of the Da Silva report were made public today. But, ultimately, she was there to hear him refuse the public inquiry she believes her family needs and deserves.
“This report is a sham. This report is a whitewash. This report is a confidence trick dressed up as independent scrutiny and given invisible clothes of reliability. Most of all, most hurtful and insulting of all, this report is not the truth,” she told reporters afterwards.
She said the family wanted to be in the Commons to hear the words from Mr Cameron’s own lips. “We could have watched it on a television screen at home but we felt that was important. We felt that, after all this time, we needed to be there,” she told the Independent.
The sombre mood in the chamber this afternoon matched the occasion: a British government denied any “over-arching state conspiracy” but admitted to the collusion of agents of the state in the murder. “It was measured, rather than being raucous. [The Commons] can often come across very rowdy on television but this was not the occasion for that,” said Mrs Finucane.
Appearing before reporters dressed all in red, she said this latest report into her husband’s murder at the hands of Loyalist paramilitaries in 1989 was the result of a “process in which we have had no input; we have seen no documents nor heard any witnesses”. In short, she said, the family has had no opportunity to see the evidence for themselves.
“We are expected to take the word of the man appointed by the British government,” she said.
Flanked by her sons Michael and John and her brother-in-law Martin Finucane, she added: “Despite all these misgivings, we have tried our best to keep an open mind until we have read and considered the final report. We came to London with the faint hope that, for once, we would be proved wrong. I regret to say that, once again, we have been proved right.
“At every turn, it is clear that this report has done exactly what was required: to give the benefit of the doubt to the state, its cabinet and ministers, to the Army, to the intelligence services, to itself.
“At every turn, dead witnesses have been blamed and defunct agencies found wanting. Serving personnel and active state departments appear to have been excused. The dirt has been swept under the carpet without any serious attempt to lift the lid on what really happened to Pat and so many others.
Michael Finucane, dressed – like his brother and his uncle – in a dark suit and tie, said that the public inquiry the family seeks has been promised to them by Ed Miliband, if he becomes Prime Minister. The refusal to grant one by successive governments, he said, was because the British state “has the most to hide”.
He said he accepted the use of the word ‘collusion’ in the report, as opposed to the stronger accusation of conspiracy because the former more accurately encapsulated “not just the deliberate acts of people who decide to do something, but also a culture that encourages and fosters them”.
…
Kevin Rawlinson
Wednesday, 12 December 2012
Find this story at 12 December 2012
© independent.co.uk
David Cameron admits ‘shocking levels of collusion’ in Pat Finucane murder16 december 2012
Prime minister apologises to Finucane’s family after report reveals special branch repeatedly failed to warn lawyer of threat
The prime minister’s frankest admission yet that the state colluded in the 1989 murder of the Belfast lawyer Pat Finucane has failed to quell demands from his family, human rights organisations and the Irish government for a full public inquiry.
Fresh revelations on Wednesday – about special branch’s repeated failure to warn Finucane that his life was under threat, the RUC’s “obstruction” of justice, and MI5’s “propaganda initiatives” that identified the lawyer with republican paramilitaries who were his clients – only reinforced calls for a more thorough investigation.
David Cameron’s apology to Finucane’s family in the Commons followed publication of a scathing report by the former war crimes lawyer Sir Desmond de Silva QC that cleared ministers but blamed “agents of the state” for the killing. The prime minister acknowledged there had been “shocking levels of collusion” in what was one of the most controversial killings of the Troubles.
The extent of the co-operation between the security forces and Finucane’s loyalist killers was unacceptable, Cameron added. “On the balance of probability,” he admitted, an officer or officers from the Royal Ulster Constabulary did propose Finucane as a target to loyalist terrorists.
The report made for extremely difficult reading, Cameron said. “I am deeply sorry,” he told the Finucane family, who were in the Commons gallery to hear his statement. He said he “respectfully disagreed” with the demand for a full, independent public inquiry, citing the cost of the Bloody Sunday tribunal as one reason.
Cameron, however, tried to divert blame away from the Tory former cabinet minister Douglas Hogg over comments he made before the murder in which Hogg said some solicitors in Northern Ireland were unduly sympathetic to the IRA.
The Ulster Defence Association was responsible for shooting Finucane dead in front of his family at their north Belfast home in February 1989, but de Silva said state employees “furthered and facilitated” the murder of the 38-year-old father-of-three.
The family and human rights campaigners have insisted over the past 23 years that there was collaboration between the UDA in west and north Belfast and members of the security forces.
In his report, de Silva concluded: “My review of the evidence relating to Patrick Finucane’s case has left me in no doubt that agents of the state were involved in carrying out serious violations of human rights up to and including murder.
“However, despite the different strands of involvement by elements of the state, I am satisfied that they were not linked to an overarching state conspiracy to murder Patrick Finucane.”
Dismissing the report and Cameron’s statement as a “confidence trick” and a sham, Finucane’s widow Geraldine said: “At every turn, dead witnesses have been blamed and defunct agencies found wanting. Serving personnel and active state departments appear to have been excused. The dirt has been swept under the carpet without any serious attempt to lift the lid on what really happened to Pat and so many others.”
She demanded that the government order a public inquiry so witnesses can be cross-examined and account for their actions. Her calls were echoed by the Irish government and human rights groups. The Irish premier, Enda Kenny, said he supported the Finucanes’ campaign. He said: “I spoke with prime minister Cameron … before his statement to the House of Commons, and repeated these points to him once again. I have also spoken today with Geraldine Finucane and I know that the family are not satisfied with [the] outcome.”
Micheal Martin, the current Fianna Fáil leader, who was Ireland’s foreign minister during a critical time of the peace process, said the UK government was still obliged under an international agreement to set up a public inquiry into the murder.
He said the UK government under Tony Blair had committed itself to such an inquiry.
Patrick Corrigan, Amnesty International’s director in Northern Ireland, said: “The Finucanes, and indeed the public, have been fobbed off with a ‘review of the paper work’ – which reneges on repeated commitments by the British government and falls short of the UK’s obligations under international law.”
Gerry Adams, the Sinn Féin president and Irish deputy, said: “The information provided by Desmond de Silva is a damning indictment of British state collusion in the murder of citizens. It reveals some of the extent to which this existed. It does not diminish the need for a public inquiry. On the contrary, it makes such an inquiry more necessary than ever.”
The SDLP MP Mark Durkan questioned the idea in the report that there was no overall, structured policy of collusion. He said: “Between special branch, FRU and secret services we had a culture of anything goes but nobody knows. And as far as Desmond de Silva is concerned now we still have to accept that nobody knows!”
…
Henry McDonald and Owen Bowcott
The Guardian, Wednesday 12 December 2012 21.17 GMT
Find this story at 12 December 2012
© 2012 Guardian News and Media Limited or its affiliated companies. All rights reserved.
Meet operative PP0277: A secret agent – or just a vulture hungry for dead camel?16 december 2012
Sudan says he’s an Israeli operative – but his handlers say he’s too easily distracted for that. Matthew Kalman reports on a spy thriller
Shortly before the mysterious bombing of a weapons factory in Khartoum in October, an Israeli operative code name PP0277 left a remote site near Sde Boker in Israel’s Negev desert.
Carrying a sophisticated tracking device concealed in a box on his leg, he made his way south across the Sinai desert, over the Red Sea, and into Sudan. On 1 December, however, his mission came to an abrupt halt. Having covered up to 350 miles a day, PP0277 had stopped moving at a village near the Sudanese town of Krinkh.
It was on Thursday that his fate finally became clear when the mayor of Krinkh, Hussein al-A’ali, announced that PP0277 had been captured – declaring him to be an Israeli spy “capable of taking photos and sending them back to Israel”.
It was then that Ohad Hatzofe, the Israeli who sent PP0277 on his fateful flight, did not know whether to laugh or cry. For PP0277 is not a top Mossad agent, but a young griffon vulture who, Mr Hatzofe insists, was simply making its semi-annual winter migration to Africa.
Far from sporting a history of directing spying missions inside enemy territory, Mr Hatzofe is an avian ecologist for Israel’s Nature and Parks Authority. He has tagged more than 1,000 migrating birds in the past 20 years, all as part of a major international project to track and preserve rare species among the billion-plus birds that fly north, then south, over Israel each year.
Like all such creatures, PP0277 wore tags clearly marking him in English as part of the academic research, asking anyone who found him to contact Mr Hatzofe. And as Mr Hatzofe told The Independent: “It’s not very secret, marking a supposed spy with the words ‘Tel Aviv University’ and my email address.”
Nor is their reconnaissance information confidential. The birds are fitted with tiny boxes containing GPS and GSM transmitters with a solar energy panel and three small antennae. The data from the tagged birds is uploaded to Movebank, an accessible international database linked to Google Earth.
Spying missions between the two countries are not unlikely. Sudan is thought by the West to be helping Iran ship arms through Egypt to Gaza to supply Hamas. For its part, Israel is believed to have launched air strikes on Sudanese targets in 2009, 2011 and earlier this year.
But even if the Israeli authorities were to conceive such an outlandish espionage mission, Mr Hatzofe said it would proved somewhat bird-brained as the feathered recruits would make terrible spies.
“If I wanted to send a spy to Sudan I’d send one less interested in dead camels and goats. That tends to distract them,” he said. “We have more operatives in Sudan right now and one piece of intelligence we’ve gathered is that there seems to be a concentration of slaughterhouses not far from Port Sudan.”
Nor can Israeli vultures boast an illustrious history when it comes to making it through the airspace of hostile nations undetected. Saudi Arabia detained one of PP0277’s fellow vultures last year. Despite similar tags labelling it as a specimen tracked in a similar fashion by the same university, it prompted fears of an airborne “Zionist plot” against the kingdom.
Mr Hatzofe cautioned against Mossad getting any genuine spying ideas from the accusations, however. “I’d condemn anyone who tried using wild animals for military or espionage purposes. These creatures are already becoming rare and that would only put them in greater danger,” he said.
Animals at war
Sudan’s Vulturegate may sound like a laugh, but the use of living creatures for military purposes is by no means far-fetched: for half a century, for example, the US Navy has had a marine mammals programme which trains dolphins and sea lions for wartime tasks.
Although a 1973 Mike Nichols movie called The Day of The Dolphin would have us believe that the animals are being trained for aggressive missions such as killing enemy frogmen and laying mines or even nuclear weapons, the US Navy insists they are being trained merely for defensive purposes such as mine-detection, sentry duty and the recovery of objects lost on the seabed. Yet the California-based programme has been surprisingly extensive and has involved the use of at least ten species of whales and dolphins – and also investigated, yes, the potential role of birds.
…
Matthew Kalman
Saturday, 8 December 2012
Michael McCarthy
Find this story at 8 December 2012
© independent.co.uk
Israel suspected over Iran nuclear programme inquiry leaks16 december 2012
Western officials believe Israel may have leaked information from IAEA investigation in bid to raise global pressure on Tehran
A satellite image of Iran’s military complex at Parchin. The IAEA is investigating Tehran’s past nuclear activities and current aspirations. Photograph: DigitalGlobe – Institute for Science and International Security
Israel is suspected of carrying out a series of leaks implicating Iran in nuclear weapons experiments in an attempt to raise international pressure on Tehran and halt its programme.
Western diplomats believe the leaks may have backfired, compromising a UN-sanctioned investigation into Iran’s past nuclear activities and current aspirations.
The latest leak, published by the Associated Press (AP), purported to be an Iranian diagram showing the physics of a nuclear blast, but scientists quickly pointed out an elementary mistake that cast doubt on its significance and authenticity. An article in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists declared: “This diagram does nothing more than indicate either slipshod analysis or an amateurish hoax.”
The leaked diagram raised questions about an investigation being carried out by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors after it emerged that it formed part of a file of intelligence on alleged Iranian nuclear weapons work held by the agency.
The IAEA’s publication of a summary of the file in November 2011 helped trigger a new round of punitive EU and US sanctions.
Western officials say they have reasons to suspect Israel of being behind the most recent leak and a series of previous disclosures from the IAEA investigation, pointing to Israel’s impatience at what it sees as international complacency over Iranian nuclear activity.
The leaks are part of an intensifying shadow war over Iran’s atomic programme being played out in Vienna, home to the IAEA’s headquarters.
The Israeli spy agency, the Mossad, is highly active in the Austrian capital, as is Iran and most of the world’s major intelligence agencies, leading to frequent comparisons with its earlier incarnation as a battleground for spies in the early years of the cold war.
The Israeli government did not reply to a request for comment and AP described the source of the latest leak only as “officials from a country critical of Iran’s atomic programme”.
An “intelligence summary” provided to AP with the graph appeared to go out of its way to implicate two men in nuclear weapons testing who had been targeted for assassination two years ago. One of them, Majid Shahriari, was killed on his way to work in Tehran in November 2010 after a motorcyclist fixed a bomb to the door of his car. The other, Fereydoun Abbasi-Davani, was wounded in a near identical attack the same day.
A book published earlier this year by veteran Israeli and American writers on intelligence, called Spies Against Armageddon, said the attacks were carried out by an assassination unit known as Kidon, or Bayonet – part of the Mossad.
One western source said the “intelligence summary” supplied with the leaked diagram “reads like an attempt to justify the assassinations”.
According to one European diplomat, however, the principal impact of the leak would be to compromise the ongoing IAEA investigation into whether Iran has tried to develop a nuclear weapon at any point. “This is just one small snapshot of what the IAEA is working on, and part of a much broader collection of data from multiple sources,” the diplomat said.
“The particular document turns out to have a huge error but the IAEA was aware of it and saw it in the context of everything it has. It paints a convincing case.”
Sources who have seen the documents said the graph was based on a spreadsheet of data in the IAEA’s possession which appears to analyse the energy released by a nuclear blast. The mistake was made when that data was transposed on to a graph, on which the wrong units were used on one of the axes.
There is widespread belief among western governments, Russia, China and most independent experts that evidence is substantial for an Iranian nuclear weapons programme until 2003. There is far less consensus on what activities, if any, have been carried out since. The IAEA inquiry has so far not found a “smoking gun”.
Analysts say that the recent leaks may have shown the IAEA’s hand, revealing what it knows and does not know, and therefore undermined the position of its inspectors in tense and so far fruitless talks with Iranian officials about the country’s past nuclear activities.
Iran rejects the evidence against it as forged and has not granted access to its nuclear scientists or to a site known as Parchin where IAEA inspectors believe the high-explosive components for a nuclear warhead may have been tested.
The IAEA says it has evidence that the site is being sanitised to remove any incriminating traces of past experiments.
David Albright, a nuclear expert at the Institute for Science and International Security in Washington, said he had no knowledge of who was behind the leak but added: “Whoever did this has undermined the IAEA’s credibility and made it harder for it to do its work.”
…
Julian Borger, diplomatic editor
The Guardian, Monday 10 December 2012 20.47 GMT
Find this story at 10 December 2012
© 2012 Guardian News and Media Limited or its affiliated companies. All rights reserved.
DIY graphic design16 december 2012
This week the Associated Press reported that unnamed officials “from a country critical of Iran’s nuclear program” leaked an illustration to demonstrate that “Iranian scientists have run computer simulations for a nuclear weapon that would produce more than triple the explosive force of the World War II bomb that destroyed Hiroshima.” The article stated that these officials provided the undated diagram “to bolster their arguments that Iran’s nuclear program must be halted.”
The graphic has not yet been authenticated; however, even if authentic, it would not qualify as proof of a nuclear weapons program. Besides the issue of authenticity, the diagram features quite a massive error, which is unlikely to have been made by research scientists working at a national level.
The image released to the Associated Press shows two curves: one that plots the energy versus time, and another that plots the power output versus time, presumably from a fission device. But these two curves do not correspond: If the energy curve is correct, then the peak power should be much lower — around 300 million ( 3×108) kt per second, instead of the currently stated 17 trillion (1.7 x1013) kt per second. As is, the diagram features a nearly million-fold error.
This diagram does nothing more than indicate either slipshod analysis or an amateurish hoax.
In any case, the level of scientific sophistication needed to produce such a graph corresponds to that typically found in graduate- or advanced undergraduate-level nuclear physics courses.
While such a graphic, if authentic, may be a concern, it is not a cause for alarm. And it certainly is not something proscribed by the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement between the International Atomic Energy Agency and Iran, nor any other international agreements to which Iran is a party. No secrets are needed to produce the plot of the explosive force of a nuclear weapon — just straightforward nuclear physics.
Though the image does not imply that computer simulations were actually run, even if they were, this is the type of project a student could present in a nuclear-science course. The diagram simply shows that the bulk of the nuclear fission yield is produced in a short, 0.1 microsecond, pulse. Since the 1950s, it has been standard knowledge that, in a fission device, the last few generations of neutron multiplication yield the bulk of the energy output. It is neither a secret, nor indicative of a nuclear weapons program.
Graphs such as the one published by the Associated Press can be found in nuclear science textbooks and on the Internet. For instance, The Effects of Nuclear Weapons, by physicists Samuel Glasstone and Philip Dolan, features a similar diagram as its Figure 7.84. This iconic book is freely available online and is considered to be the open-source authority on the subject of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon effects. Another graphic can be found in Figure 2.11 of the textbook The Physics of the Manhattan Project.
…
By Yousaf Butt and Ferenc Dalnoki-Veress | 28 November 2012
Find this story at 28 November 2012
Copyright © 2012 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. All Rights Reserved.
AP Exclusive: Graph suggests Iran working on bomb16 december 2012
The undated diagram that was given to the AP by officials of a country critical of Iran’s atomic program allegedly calculating the explosive force of a nuclear weapon _ a key step in developing such arms. The diagram shows a bell curve and has variables of time in micro-seconds and power and energy, both in kilotons _ the traditional measurement of the energy output, and hence the destructive power of nuclear weapons. The curve peaks at just above 50 kilotons at around 2 microseconds, reflecting the full force of the weapon being modeled. The Farsi writing at the bottom translates “changes in output and in energy released as a function of time through power pulse” (AP Photo)
VIENNA (AP) — Iranian scientists have run computer simulations for a nuclear weapon that would produce more than triple the explosive force of the World War II bomb that destroyed Hiroshima, according to a diagram obtained by The Associated Press.
The diagram was leaked by officials from a country critical of Iran’s atomic program to bolster their arguments that Iran’s nuclear program must be halted before it produces a weapon. The officials provided the diagram only on condition that they and their country not be named.
The International Atomic Energy Agency — the Vienna-based U.N. nuclear watchdog — reported last year that it had obtained diagrams indicating that Iran was calculating the “nuclear explosive yield” of potential weapons. A senior diplomat who is considered neutral on the issue confirmed that the graph obtained by the AP was indeed one of those cited by the IAEA in that report. He spoke only on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to discuss the issue.
The IAEA report mentioning the diagrams last year did not give details of what they showed. But the diagram seen by the AP shows a bell curve — with variables of time in micro-seconds, and power and energy both in kilotons — the traditional measurement of the energy output, and hence the destructive power of nuclear weapons. The curve peaks at just above 50 kilotons at around 2 microseconds, reflecting the full force of the weapon being modeled.
The bomb that the United States dropped on Hiroshima in Japan during World War II, in comparison, had a force of about 15 kilotons. Modern nuclear weapons have yields hundreds of times higher than that.
The diagram has a caption in Farsi: “Changes in output and in energy released as a function of time through power pulse.” The number “5” is part of the title, suggesting it is part of a series.
David Albright, whose Institute for Science and International Security is used by the U.S. government as a go-to source on Iran’s nuclear program, said the diagram looks genuine but seems to be designed more “to understand the process” than as part of a blueprint for an actual weapon in the making.
“The yield is too big,” Albright said, noting that North Korea’s first tests of a nuclear weapon were only a few kilotons. Because the graph appears to be only one in a series, others might show lower yields, closer to what a test explosion might produce, he said.
The senior diplomat said the diagram was part of a series of Iranian computer-generated models provided to the IAEA by the intelligences services of member nations for use in its investigations of suspicions that Iran is trying to produce a nuclear weapon. Iran denies any interest in such a weapon and has accused the United States and Israel of fabricating evidence that suggests it is trying to build a bomb.
Asked about the project, Iran’s chief IAEA delegate, Ali Asghar Soltanieh, said he had not heard of it. IAEA spokeswoman Gill Tudor said the agency had no comment.
Iran has refused to halt uranium enrichment, despite offers of reactor fuel from abroad, saying it is producing nuclear fuel for civilian uses. It has refused for years to cooperate with the U.N. nuclear agency’s efforts to investigate its program.
Iran’s critics fear it could use the enriched uranium for military purposes. Such concerns grew this month when the IAEA said Iran is poised to double its output of higher-enriched uranium at its fortified underground facility — a development that could put Tehran within months of being able to make the core of a nuclear warhead.
In reporting on the existence of the diagrams last year, the IAEA said it had obtained them from two member nations that it did not identify. Other diplomats have said that Israel and the United States — the countries most concerned about Iran’s nuclear program — have supplied the bulk of intelligence being used by the IAEA in its investigation.
“The application of such studies to anything other than a nuclear explosive is unclear to the agency,” the IAEA said at the time.
The models were allegedly created in 2008 and 2009 — well after 2003, the year that the United States said Tehran had suspended such work in any meaningful way. That date has been questioned by Britain, France, Germany and Israel, and the IAEA now believes that — while Iran shut down some of its work back then — other tests and experiments continue today.
With both the IAEA probe and international attempts to engage Iran stalled, there are fears that Israel may opt to strike at Tehran’s nuclear program. The Jewish state insists it will not tolerate an Iran armed with nuclear arms.
An intelligence summary provided with the drawing linked it to other alleged nuclear weapons work — significant because it would indicate that Iran is working not on isolated experiments, but rather on a single program aimed at mastering all aspects of nuclear arms development.
The IAEA suspects that Iran has conducted live tests of conventional explosives that could be used to detonate a nuclear weapon at Parchin, a sprawling military base southeast of Tehran. The intelligence summary provided to the AP said data gained from those tests fed the model plotted in the diagram. Iran has repeatedly turned down IAEA requests to visit the site, which the agency fears is undergoing a major cleanup meant to eliminate any traces of such experiments.
…
By GEORGE JAHN
— Nov. 27 11:43 AM EST
Find this story at 27 November 2012
© 2012 Associated Press
Canada: RCMP spied on Rae during student days: documents7 december 2012
Bob Rae: Interim Leader of the Liberal Party of Canada and Former Premier of Ontario
OTTAWA – The RCMP spied on Bob Rae during his student activist days and likely amassed a personal dossier on the future Liberal leader, newly declassified documents reveal.
Mountie security agents, wary of late-1960s campus turmoil, kept a close eye on the University of Toronto student council — apparently relying on a secret informant to glean information about Rae and other council members.
The RCMP Security Service conducted widespread surveillance of universities, unions, peace groups and myriad other organizations during the Cold War in an effort to identify left-wing subversives.
A surprised Rae says he had no idea the RCMP was watching him.
“The notion that any of this posed a kind of a threat to the established order certainly would have come as news to all of us,” he said in an interview.
“The only thing sinister, frankly, in all of this is how much of it was being recorded and reported and presumably being put in a file somewhere.”
Hundreds of pages of RCMP files on the Students’ Administrative Council at the University of Toronto were released to The Canadian Press by Library and Archives Canada.
The RCMP’s intelligence branch was disbanded in 1984 following a series of scandals, and a new civilian agency, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, took over most domestic spying duties.
In 1968-69, Rae was a member of the student council led by Steven Langdon who, like Rae, would later serve as a New Democrat MP. The two were seen as moderates on a council that included more extreme representatives on both the left and right of the political spectrum.
Rae also helped put together large conferences, known as teach-ins — one on China and a followup on religion and politics for which Michael Ignatieff, another Liberal leader in the making, served as a principal organizer.
“It was an exciting time,” Rae recalled. “We did manage to reform the governance of the University of Toronto. There was a lot of activism and discussion about ideas and about politics.
“That’s what you do in university. The idea that there’s a cop at the back of the room who’s writing everything down — I guess that was also a reality of the time.”
Rae became interim Liberal leader following Ignatieff’s resignation from the post last year. As the party prepares for a biennial conference in Ottawa this weekend, there is renewed speculation that Rae is eyeing a run at the permanent leadership next year.
As a budding student politician, Rae was seized with issues including the university’s plans for increasing graduate program enrolment and renovations to campus residences.
A secret and heavily redacted memo prepared by an RCMP sergeant on Nov. 4, 1968 — likely based on details from an informant — notes seven individuals including Rae were planning to meet to discuss student business.
A space after Rae’s name is blacked out — almost certainly cloaking the number of the personal file the RCMP would have opened on him, said Steve Hewitt, author of Spying 101: The RCMP’s Secret Activities at Canadian Universities, 1917-1997.
“So they’re obviously interested in monitoring student politicians — who are the ones they need to keep a longer-term watch on, who are the real radicals?” said Hewitt.
For privacy reasons, the public is allowed access to RCMP files on individuals only 20 years after the person’s death. While a number of files of historical value — including a large one on former NDP leader Tommy Douglas — were transferred to Library and Archives, many were destroyed.
Hewitt believes the RCMP file on Rae would have been preserved for posterity given that he was a young member of Parliament in the early 1980s before going on to become the first NDP premier of Ontario.
In an odd twist, Rae would later serve on the Security Intelligence Review Committee — the federally appointed watchdog that keeps an eye on CSIS — before re-entering politics as a Liberal. At the review committee he directly wrestled with the tension between the legitimate right to protest and security officials’ fears of extremist activity.
…
The Canadian Press
Published Thursday, Jan. 12, 2012 7:09AM EST
Find this story at 12 January 2012
More on Bob Rae
© 2012 All rights reserved.
Naval intelligence officer sold military secrets to Russia for $3,000 a month7 december 2012
A Canadian naval intelligence officer has pleaded guilty to spying for Russia, a public admission of an embarrassing espionage scandal that has damaged Canada’s reputation among allies and will likely reverberate for years.
In a Halifax court Wednesday, Sub-Lieutenant Jeffrey Delisle, 41, pleaded guilty to two charges under the Security of Information Act of “communicating with a foreign entity,” and a Criminal Code offence of breach of trust.
His admission lifts a publication ban placed on details of the Crown’s case against SLt. Delisle. A prosecutor at bail hearings in the spring said Russia was the beneficiary of SLt. Delisle’s four-and-a-half years of espionage, and cited intelligence sources who feared it could push Canada’s relations with allied intelligence organizations “back to the Stone Age.”
The sailor, whose last post was the ultra-secure Trinity naval intelligence gathering centre in Halifax, had access to top military secrets – databases with protected information from Canada and the country’s allies through intelligence-sharing systems such as the “Five Eyes” network linking Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Britain and the United States.
SLt. Delisle, the court was told, searched military databases for the term “Russia,” smuggled the details out of his office using a USB memory stick – and handed the fruits of his labours over to agents for Moscow every 30 days.
The information was mostly military but also contained reports on organized crime, political players and senior defence officials. It included e-mails, phone numbers and a contact list for members of the intelligence community.
The naval officer has been held in custody at the Central Nova Scotia Correctional Facility in Halifax since his arrest in January and will not be sentenced until early next year.
SLt. Delisle could be looking at a long stay behind bars but not life imprisonment, his lawyer suggested.
The Crown, meanwhile, will be scouring the world for case law to convince a judge that the sailor must remain imprisoned as there are no precedents in law. This is the first time anyone in Canada will be sentenced under the Security of Information Act, which was created more than a decade ago in response to the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks.
SLt. Delisle was a rare catch for the Russian government: a spy who walked in from the cold.
It was back in mid-2007 that the Canadian Forces member first embarked on his traitorous side career. He strode into the Russian embassy in Ottawa, volunteering to sell out his country. He would earn about $3,000 a month for this service.
“I said I wanted to talk to a security officer, which are usually GRU,” SLt. Delise said of Russian military intelligence, in a statement read by a Crown prosecutor this spring. “I showed my ID card. They took me into an [office] … asked me a bunch of questions, took my name and off I go.”
It would be the only time SLt. Delisle would meet personally with a Russian handler on Canadian soil.
SLt. Delisle had an escape plan in place – one he never got a chance to use, the court heard. If he needed to seek refuge or re-establish contact with the Russians, he was told he could walk into a Russian embassy – preferably not the one in Ottawa – and inform them he was “Alex Campbell.”
The Russians would then ask him “Did I meet you at a junk show in Austria?” And he was supposed to reply: “No, it was in Ottawa.”
The “day I flipped sides,” as SLt. Delisle described it to his Canadian police interrogators, came as his marriage of nearly a decade was unravelling.
The naval officer told authorities he didn’t do it for money but rather for “ideological reasons” – and was acutely aware his life as he knew it was now over.
“That was the end of my days as Jeff Delisle,” the sailor said, according to the Crown prosecutor. “It was professional suicide.”
The Canadian sailor was paid by wire transfer for the first four years. At first he was paid $5,000 but this quickly dropped to about $2,800 a month and then finally $3,000 every 30 days. This continued until about five months before he was caught, when the Russians changed how they paid him.
The Russians had devised a simple method for SLt. Delisle to hand over information. He and his Russian handler shared a single e-mail account on Gawab.com, a Middle Eastern provider.
The Canadian spy would log in and compose an e-mail. He’d copy and paste the stolen information into the body of the e-mail. But instead of sending the message he would save it in the draft e-mail folder and log out.
The Russians would subsequently log in to the Gawab account, retrieve the information and then write him a draft e-mail in reply – one that was saved but never sent.
In the months before they arrested SLt. Delisle, Canadian authorities managed to break into the Gawab account and trick the sailor into leaving purloined secrets for them.
He also felt pressured to comply with the Russians, who made not too subtle threats.
“They had photos of me. They had photos of my children. I knew exactly what it was for,” the Crown said SLt. Delisle told them.
The Canadian spy’s relationship with Moscow began to change in late summer of 2011. It started with a trip to Brazil to meet a Russian handler named “Victor.”
The Crown’s narrative has gaps in it but it appeared that either the sailor or the Russians believed his ability to gather intelligence might be curtailed.
Moscow proposed that the Canadian Forces member’s role change – that he become what they called “the pigeon” – the liaison between all agents in Canada working for Russia’s military intelligence unit.
…
STEVEN CHASE and JANE TABER
OTTAWA and HALIFAX — The Globe and Mail
Published Wednesday, Oct. 10 2012, 8:52 PM EDT
Last updated Wednesday, Oct. 10 2012, 10:50 PM EDT
Find this story at 10 October 2012
© Copyright 2012 The Globe and Mail Inc. All Rights Reserved.
U.S. supplied vital information in early days of Canada’s navy spy probe7 december 2012
American intelligence officials supplied vital information in the early days of the investigation that climaxed with the arrest of an accused spy inside Canada’s top-secret naval signals centre, sources say.
The involvement of the United States in building the case against Sub-Lieutenant Jeffrey Delisle adds a key new detail to a story that Ottawa is anxious to keep under wraps.
The Canadian government has been tight-lipped on how it learned that there was a leak of confidential secrets to a foreign power – and the way it went about building a case against the sub-lieutenant.
Canadian officials have privately identified Russia as the recipient of secrets, and the Russian ambassador to this country said last February that Moscow has an agreement with the Canadian government to “keep quiet” about any connection between his nation and the spy case.
SLt. Delisle is in custody after being charged in January with passing state secrets to a foreign country. The sailor, who last worked at Trinity, a Halifax naval intelligence hub, faces the possibility of life in prison if convicted.
SLt. Delisle, 41, has not yet entered a plea; his next court appearance is in June.
The Globe and Mail reported in March that the fallout from the Delisle case has done significant damage to Ottawa’s treasured intelligence-sharing relationships with key allies such as the U.S. It’s also embarrassed the Department of National Defence, which is now looking to restore confidence in its ability to keep secrets.
A source familiar with the matter said Canada helped build its investigation of SLt. Delisle through contact with its biggest ally: “It’s not just one nugget of information that I would describe as a tipoff. [Rather]It’s an accumulation of information that leads to an investigation coming to a point where, okay, we have enough to go after this person.”
The extent of what the U.S told Canada is still unclear. “Sometimes we’re able to match – or in some cases co-ordinate – some of that intelligence and paint the picture that we need to make decisions,” the source said.
The source said Canada and the U.S. have a privileged relationship in sharing this type of information through security forces including the Central Intelligence Agency, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, and the Communications Security Establishment Canada.
…
STEVEN CHASE
OTTAWA — The Globe and Mail
Published Wednesday, May. 23 2012, 4:00 AM EDT
Last updated Wednesday, Oct. 10 2012, 10:48 AM EDT
Find this story at 23 May 2012
© Copyright 2012 The Globe and Mail Inc. All Rights Reserved.
Canada: Harper government had to resist urge to blame Russia in spy case7 december 2012
OTTAWA—The Harper government had a host of military and possibly commercial reasons for not blaming and shaming Russia in the aftermath of an embarrassing spy scandal involving a junior intelligence officer, a series of internal briefings suggest.
The case of Sub-Lt. Jeffery Delisle, which exploded across the front pages in January, has largely disappeared into a black hole of secrecy and court-ordered silence that even a Wall Street Journal story failed to dislodge last spring.
The New York-based publication recently quoted U.S. intelligence sources saying Delisle’s breach in communications secrets was roughly as big in volume as the notorious U.S. data loss to WikiLeaks.
Yet, the Harper government has remained mute, even in the face of suggestions the case caused a major rift with Washington.
Several sources within the government and the military say there was a vigorous debate within the halls of power about whether to call out the former Cold War adversary over Delisle, whose case has been adjourned until June 13 while his lawyer awaits security-washed documents.
A small cadre of cabinet ministers, notably Defence Minister Peter MacKay, argued for a measured, nuanced response to the crisis, which continues to have the potential to cause serious strains among allies, said the sources.
The Conservatives have previously shown no hesitation to paint Moscow as a bogey man, especially when it comes to justifying their military build-up in the Arctic.
But to alienate Russia over the alleged betrayal by a navy sub-lieutenant, potentially setting off tit-for-tat diplomatic expulsions, had more downsides than upsides, sources and briefing documents suggest.
The rivalry over Arctic boundaries, which is expected to come to a head next year with a United Nations submission, is being driven by the suggestion of mineral wealth under the melting polar sea.
The Department of Foreign Affairs and National Defence have repeatedly pointed out, in internal briefing reports, that Russian interest in the Arctic is weighted towards oil and gas exploration — something that Canada can appreciate and possibly exploit.
“Indeed, these commonalities could yield political and commercial opportunities for co-operation between Moscow and Ottawa,” said a July 12, 2011 briefing note prepared for MacKay.
“From a defence perspective, in spite of disagreements over Russian (Long Range Aviation) flights, there is mutual interest with regard to co-operation in (search-and-rescue) and Arctic domain awareness. Defence is continuing to explore the potential for further co-operation with Russia in these fields.”
The note was written as security services investigated Delisle’s alleged treachery.
Among the more sensitive areas of mutual co-operation is an international counter-terrorism exercise known as Vigilant Eagle.
The manoeuvres, which began in 2008, see NORAD and the Russian air force practise how to handle a hijacked airliner in international airspace. Tension over Russia’s intervention in Georgia cancelled the 2009 event, but at the time of Delisle’s arrest plans were already well advanced for Canada’s participation in the 2012 edition.
Russian co-operation in the Arctic and elsewhere was paramount to Canada’s interests, as well as Moscow’s ability to influence events in potential global flashpoints such as Iran and North Korea, MacKay reportedly argued with his colleagues.
The government’s initial reaction was to go public with the allegations, but sources said cooler heads pointed out that such a reaction would complicate relations with the erstwhile ally, which has been engaged in increasingly aggressive spy operations.
Defence and intelligence experts have said there is growing exasperation with Russia.
“As you know, about a year ago, a British minister complained publicly about Russian espionage, the scale of it and the intensity of it and the aggressiveness,” said Wesley Wark, an expert at the University of Ottawa. “He asked the question: What are you doing? And warned them to scale it back because you’re causing us problems in terms of us pursuing other legitimate targets.”
…
Published on Monday May 21, 2012
Murray Brewster
The Canadian Press
Find this story at 21 May 2012
© Copyright Toronto Star 1996-2012
Canada reportedly expels Russian diplomats over spy affair7 december 2012
Canadian government officials have refused to confirm or deny media reports that Ottawa expelled several Russian diplomats recently in connection with an alleged espionage affair. The alleged expulsions are reportedly connected with the case of Royal Canadian Navy Sub-Lieutenant Jeffrey Paul Delisle. Earlier this week, Delisle became the first person to be charged under Canada’s post-9/11 Security of Information Act, for allegedly passing protected government information to an unspecified foreign body. According to media reports, Delisle, who had top-level security clearance, worked at Canada’s ultra-secure TRINITY communications center in Halifax. Canadian authorities have refused to reveal the country for which Delisle allegedly spied. But late last night, CTV revealed that the names of two Russian diplomats and two technicians stationed at the embassy of the Russian Federation in Ottawa had been quietly dropped from the list of recognized diplomatic officials in Canada. The list, which is approved periodically by the Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, contains the names of all foreign diplomats legally permitted to operate in Canada. One of the missing names, that of Lieutenant Colonel Dmitry V. Fedorchatenko, bears the title of the embassy’s Assistant Defense Attaché. Russian consular officials in Canada rejected speculation that the missing diplomats were expelled by the Canadian government in connection with the Delisle affair. It appears that Canadian counterintelligence investigators had been monitoring Jeff Delisle for quite some time, perhaps even before 2010. If Delisle acted —as he is reported to have done— as an unregistered foreign agent of Russia, it is certainly not surprising that he was a naval officer. He was probably selected by the Russians because he was a member of the Royal Canadian Navy. Ever since Canada joined NATO, in the late 1940s, its tactical contribution to the Organization has been mostly naval. Along with Norway and Iceland, Canada has acted as NATO’s ‘eyes and ears’ in the north Atlantic Ocean. Since the end of the Cold War, Canada has been particularly critical when it comes to the maneuvers of Russian submarines —whether conventional or nuclear— in the northern seas. Delisle’s precise intelligence duties are not clear at this moment, and may never be publicly revealed; but if he had any access at all to ACOUSTINT (Acoustical Intelligence) data on Russian vessels, or other maritime intelligence collected by Canadian naval forces, he would have been especially useful to the GRU (Russian military intelligence). Meanwhile, Washington has remained silent on the subject.
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January 20, 2012 by Joseph Fitsanakis Leave a comment
By JOSEPH FITSANAKIS | intelNews.org |
Find this story at 20 January 2012
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