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  • Categorieën

  • Recording reveals police efforts to recruit BLM activist as informant

    Swansea activist Lowri Davies recorded call from officer in ‘frightening and distressing’ attempted recruitment

    A secret recording has revealed how a covert police unit in Wales tried to recruit a Black Lives Matter activist to be an informant.

    The anti-racism campaigner Lowri Davies shared the recording with the Guardian to raise awareness of what she alleges were “distressing” techniques used to try to manipulate her into providing information to the police.

    Davies, a Swansea University law student, is one of the main organisers of a local Black Lives Matters (BLM) group that regularly supports protests about the deaths of black people after contact with police.

    She said two police officers spent 90 minutes seeking to convince her to become an informant, imploring her not to tell anyone about the attempted recruitment.

    lees meer

    Black Lives Matter: Swansea activist’s trust ‘destroyed by police approach’

    A Black Lives Matter activist said her trust was “destroyed” when police tried to recruit her as an informant.

    Swansea University law student Lowri Davies said she was called in March by a covert officer.

    The anti-racism campaigner said she was confused to be asked to give details of far-right activists protesting at Black Lives Matter demonstrations.

    South Wales Police said a complaint referring to contact made by a covert officer was being considered.

    Ms Davies received the call from the woman “out of the blue” on a Tuesday morning.

    “She says that she is a covert police officer and she works for informants, usually with drugs and burglary and, in my case, the protests,” she said.

    lees meer

    DECLASSIFIED UK Britain’s secret political police

    A shocking story of how a special squad of Britain’s Metropolitan Police, in collusion with MI5 – the domestic ‘security’ service – secretly infiltrated hundreds of UK political and campaign groups, and the question of whether the spying continues. As told by Asa Winstanley, who has personal experience.

    • “The man we’d thought had been our friend had actually been a spy for the state all along”
    • Industrial-levels of police infiltration of progressive campaign groups began during anti-Vietnam war movement in 1968
    • Metropolitan Police admits for the first time to Declassified that it spied for MI5
    • Justice campaigns led by families of people killed in police custody were a particular target of so-called “spycops”. The victims were mostly black men
    • Undercover police spied on Labour politicians and nearly every group to party’s left
    • Some women, who were tricked into romantic relationships, say it was like being “raped by the state”
    • Extinction Rebellion and Black Lives Matter believed to be the most likely targets of current undercover police infiltration

    lees meer

    De AIVD kan ook de boom in!

    Op dinsdag 14 september 2021, had ik tussen half 2 en 2 uur twee gemiste oproepen, 7 minuten van elkaar van een mij onbekend mobiel nummer (06XXX64615). Normaal bel ik niet terug als er geen bericht wordt achtergelaten, maar ik was die dag aan het werk en ging ervan uit dat iemand dringend iets werkgerelateerds van mij nodig had.

    Het nummer bleek van ene mevrouw Sterrenburg (?), werkzaam bij Binnenlandse Zaken. Ze wilde graag een vertrouwelijk gesprek met mij over wat er speelt in de samenleving, gezien mijn betrokkenheid bij Amelisweerd. Aangezien ze op dat moment ‘in de buurt’ was, zou ze het liefst meteen afspreken. Het werd niet duidelijk of ‘in de buurt’ betekende dat ze in de buurt van Utrecht, Amelisweerd of mijn huis was.

    lees meer

    Met police ‘tried to recruit ex-officer to spy on climate change activists’

    A former police officer who is now a prominent climate crisis campaigner has accused the Metropolitan police of attempting to recruit him to spy on Extinction Rebellion.

    Former detective sergeant Paul Stephens, who joined XR after he retired from the London force in 2018, claims he was approached by an officer he knew near Parliament Square during the group’s campaign of non-violent mass civil disobedience in London in October 2019.

    “He asked if I wanted to come on the books – to become a covert human intelligence source [Chis],” Stephens said. “But I turned him down straight away. I joined XR to make those in power do something about climate change, not to spy on peaceful people doing their bit for the planet.”

    The Met said it could “neither confirm nor deny any Chis activity in relation to Extinction Rebellion”.

    lees meer

    The NYPD Paid An Informant To Help A BLM Protester Charged With Sabotaging Police Van

    The NYPD sent a paid informant to surveil, befriend and ultimately drive a Black Lives Matter protester to attack a police van last month, according to a new federal complaint unsealed on Wednesday.

    The civilian informant — identified in the filing as the NYPD’s “confidential source” — was involved in the arrest of Jeremy Trapp, a 24-year-old Brooklyn man accused of sabotaging an NYPD vehicle.

    “At best, Mr. Trapp is unsophisticated and easily susceptible,” his defense attorney, Ashley Burrell, said during his arraignment on Wednesday afternoon.

    According to federal prosecutors, Trapp met the NYPD informant outside Brooklyn Criminal Court on July 13th, as protesters gathered to demand the release of individuals arrested during a demonstration in Bay Ridge.

    Trapp told the source that he thought cops were racist, that he wanted to harm police, and that he was previously involved in burning an NYPD vehicle, according to the complaint. After exchanging phone numbers, the two arranged to meet in the informant’s car.

    lees meer

    FBI Tracked an Activist Involved With Black Lives Matter as They Traveled Across the U.S., Documents Show

    Documents obtained by The Intercept indicate that the FBI surveilled Black Lives Matter activists — and that the Department of Homeland Security drafted a mysterious “race paper.”

    At the height of 2014’s Black Lives Matter protests in Ferguson, Missouri, FBI agents tracked the movements of an activist flying in from New York, and appear to have surveilled the homes and cars of individuals somehow tied to the protests, according to recently released documents provided to The Intercept.

    The documents, which include FBI emails and intelligence reports from November 2014, suggest that federal surveillance of Black Lives Matter protests went far beyond the online intelligence-gathering first reported on by The Intercept in 2015. That intelligence-gathering by the federal government had employed open-source information, such as social media, to profile and keep track of activists. The newly released documents suggest the FBI put resources toward running informants, as well as physical surveillance of antiracist activists.

    The heavily redacted records were obtained by two civil rights groups, Color of Change and the Center for Constitutional Rights, through a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit and are being published here for the first time. Internal communications from Department of Homeland Security officials, released through this lawsuit, also revealed the existence of a document described by DHS officials as the “Race Paper,” which was the subject of a filing by the civil rights groups on Monday.

    lees meer

    Newly Released Documents Show FBI Used Stakeouts And Informants To Follow Black Lives Matter Activists

    Newly released documents show that the FBI’s surveillance of the Black Lives Matter movement extends far beyond social media, according to The Intercept.

    The documents were acquired by two civil rights groups, Color of Change and The Center for Constitutional Rights, through a lawsuit under the Freedom of Information Act. The documents reveal that the FBI not only used social media to track the whereabouts of black activists, but they also used informants and stakeouts. One of the emails also mentioned the existence of a document called the “Race Paper.” While the papers don’t specifically mention Black Lives Matter, the inquest that resulted in their release was centered around the movement.

    A lot of the content is redacted, but what is available provides an overview of the FBI’s movements during the height of the Black Lives Matter fervor in late 2014.

    lees meer

    Why Was an FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force Tracking a Black Lives Matter Protest? Email obtained by The Intercept shows bureau discussion of Mall of America protest and an informant who relayed plans.

    Members of an FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force tracked the time and location of a Black Lives Matter protest last December at the Mall of America in Bloomington, Minnesota, email obtained by The Intercept shows.

    The email from David S. Langfellow, a St. Paul police officer and member of an FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force, informs a fellow task force member from the Bloomington police that “CHS just confirmed the MOA protest I was taking to you about today, for the 20th of DEC @ 1400 hours.” CHS is a law enforcement acronym for “confidential human source.”

    Jeffrey VanNest, an FBI special agent and Joint Terrorism Task Force supervisor at the FBI’s Minneapolis office, was CC’d on the email. The FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Forces are based in 104 U.S. cities and are made up of approximately 4,000 federal, state and local law enforcement officials. The FBI characterizes them as “our nation’s front line on terrorism.”

    lees meer

    Tamerlan Tsarnaev: Terrorist. Murderer. Federal Informant?

    Not long after Tamerlan Tsarnaev bombed the Boston Marathon,
    investigative reporter Michele McPhee went looking for answers. What she
    discovered, detailed in this exclusive excerpt from her new book,
    Maximum Harm, might just change how you think about our government and
    law enforcement forever.

    As darkness descended over the village of Utamysh, Russia, one mid-July
    night in 2012, international soldiers, intelligence agents, and local
    police made their way inside a convoy of covered troop carriers to a
    carefully hidden encampment. They even brought a light-armored tank,
    knowing the men inside were heavily armed.

    The hideout, a small farmhouse, was home to seven mujahideen, guerrilla
    fighters who had all vowed to bring sharia law back to Russia’s Northern
    Caucasus. They flew their own nationalist flag and consistently referred
    to Russian authorities as “invaders.” Two of the men, however, Islam and
    Arsen Magomedov, were more than mere guerrilla insurgents: They were
    notorious terrorists and commanders of the region’s most brutal criminal
    gangs. In all, they were suspected of orchestrating dozens of murders
    and deadly bombings of police checkpoints, civilian-filled trains, and
    Russian Federation television stations. Next to the Magomedovs stood
    five other men who ranged in age from 25 to 35, budding jihadists who
    had very few prospects when they left their families other than to go,
    as they said, “into the forests” to train. After a long day, the men
    went to bed—completely unaware that just outside the tiny village, under
    the cover of night, forces were preparing a raid that would level their
    camp.

    Russian Interior Ministry counterterrorism troops wanted to move in
    without being seen by the prying eyes of Utamysh villagers, so they
    evacuated some women and children living near the camp. Not everyone in
    the Muslim village supported the continuing carnage in their region, but
    most distrusted Russian Federation law enforcement officials. As in most
    military operations, the soldiers moved silently as they carefully
    checked their guns and grenades, switched the safeties off their
    automatic weapons, and even loaded a small rocket-propelled grenade.
    They wore combat gear, and not for aesthetic reasons. Inside the hideout
    were some of the most violent men in the Northern Caucasus, an area that
    has long been among the most volatile and lawless places in the world.
    At that time, it was not unusual for a Russian police officer to be
    assassinated weekly. The insurgents inside the Utamysh compound had been
    trained to believe that the Russians were invaders who—like
    pigs—deserved nothing less than slaughter, and had been taught that
    there was no greater honor than to die taking a Russian out.

    When the radicals heard the sound of dried dirt and rocks being crushed
    under the weight of the tank and the troop movers carrying the enemy to
    their front door, according to a video that was later released by the
    Russian Interior Ministry, the mujahideen grabbed their own guns, prayed
    that Allah would give them strength in battle, and fired.

    Tracer rounds and bombs lit up the village for hours. When the sun rose
    over the mountains on July 14, 2012, all seven of the Islamic militants
    were dead. The Russians photographed their slain bodies lying in the
    scrubby grass as proof of their deaths.

    The camp was a smoldering shell. Cars belonging to the insurgents were
    still burning. The walls of the farmhouse were pitted with gunfire, and
    its windows had all been blown out. Russian Federation counterterrorism
    coalition forces also lost a man: an officer with the Russian Interior
    Ministry. Three other Russian agents had been wounded.

    As the farmhouse continued to fume, while militants mourned and the
    Russian Interior Ministry prepared to bury its dead agent, one man left
    the region, somehow paying 2,050 euros for a one-way Aeroflot ticket
    from Sheremetyevo International Airport in Moscow to John F. Kennedy
    International Airport, and then to Logan airport on July 17, 2012. His
    name was Tamerlan Tsarnaev, a Russian expat whose entire family fled the
    region a decade earlier for Cambridge, Massachusetts, telling United
    States immigration officials that they would be killed because of their
    political affiliations if they ever returned home.

    It remains unclear how the unemployed 25-year-old on welfare paid for
    the flight or exactly what he spent his time in Russia doing, or for
    whom. Less than a year later, he and his younger brother, Dzhokhar,
    carried out the Boston Marathon bombings, an act of terror so immense it
    would paralyze the entire city. Tamerlan would die on April 19, 2013,
    not long after a wild firefight with police and a high-speed chase in a
    stolen SUV driven by Dzhokhar, who fled the shootout and prompted a
    nearly daylong manhunt before being captured.

    When Dzhokhar’s trial started nearly two years later, his famed
    death-penalty defense attorney, Judy Clarke, startled court spectators
    when she flat-out admitted her client was guilty of the bombings. At one
    point, she pointed to a photo of older brother Tamerlan and explained,
    “There’s little that occurred the week of April the 15th…that we
    dispute.” But what about in the months and years before that?

    Much is murky about Tamerlan’s life leading up to the deadly attack on
    Boylston Street. Four years after the blasts, his case, at first blush,
    seems to be an extreme cautionary tale about the shortcomings of the
    overbloated war on terror, its divided attentions rendering actual
    terrorists invisible. But upon closer inspection, a strange picture
    starts to emerge—one that counterterrorism experts and law enforcement
    officials have suggested points to Tamerlan having been a federal
    informant who went rogue.

    During Dzhokhar’s trial, his defense attorneys raised provocative
    questions about the FBI’s mysterious involvement with Tamerlan. Had
    agents pressured him to be an informant? And if so, did that pressure
    play a role in the bombings? “We base this on information from our
    client’s family and other sources that the FBI made more than one visit
    to talk with [Tamerlan’s parents] Anzor, Zubeidat and Tamerlan,
    questioned Tamerlan about his internet searches, and asked him to be an
    informant, reporting on the Chechen and Muslim community,” Dzhokhar’s
    lawyers stated in court records. “We further have reason to believe that
    Tamerlan misinterpreted the visits and discussions with the FBI as
    pressure and that they amounted to a stressor that increased his
    paranoia and distress. We do not suggest that these contacts are to be
    blamed and have no evidence to suggest that they were improper, but
    rather view them as an important part of the story of Tamerlan’s
    decline. Since Tamerlan is dead, the government is the source of
    corroboration that these visits did in fact occur and of what was said
    during them.”

    The FBI denies that Tamerlan was their informant, but to this day those
    questions have not been answered. What is the bureau trying to hide?

    ***

    THE TSARNAEV CONNECTION

    2009
    Tamerlan Tsarnaev participates in a photo essay titled “Will Box for
    Passport.”

    March 2011
    Russian counterterrorism agents warn the FBI about Tsarnaev.

    June 2011
    The FBI closes its investigation on Tsarnaev.

    September 11, 2011
    The bodies of three men with connections to Tsarnaev are found nearly
    decapitated in a Waltham apartment.

    October 2011
    Russian officials warn U.S. intelligence about Tsarnaev’s jihadist
    rhetoric; his name is added to two terror watch lists.

    January 21, 2012
    Despite being watch-listed, Tsarnaev is allowed to fly from New York to
    Russia.

    July 2012
    Radical extremist William Plotnikov and six other rebel fighters are
    killed by Russian forces in Dagestan; Tsarnaev leaves Russia, paying
    2,050 euros in cash for the flight.

    August 28, 2012
    Tsarnaev’s naturalized citizen application is reopened.

    January 23, 2013
    Tsarnaev’s citizenship is delayed once again.

    April 15, 2013
    Tsarnaev and his brother bomb the Boston Marathon.

    ***

    In 2011, the year before Tamerlan flew from Boston to Moscow, the
    Russians were already worried about him and his mother, Zubeidat. So in
    an unusual move, the agency shared its concerns with counterterrorism
    counterparts in the United States. To say the least, the relationship
    between the two countries—both of which were trying to eradicate Islamic
    terrorism—was based more on need than trust.

    Still, on March 4, 2011, the FSB sent its first message about Tamerlan
    and Zubeidat to the FBI’s legal attaché in Moscow. Later, it sent the
    same memo to the CIA. While the FBI refuses to release a copy of the
    letter, FSB officials read it to a congressional delegation that
    included Representative William Keating, a Democrat from Massachusetts
    and a former prosecutor. “It was amazing in its detail dealing with
    Tamerlan Tsarnaev,” Keating later said.

    The letter, according to Keating and others, described intercepted text
    messages between Tamerlan, his mother, and Magomed Kartashov, her second
    cousin—a former Dagestan police officer who had become a prominent
    Islamist and leader of a group called Union of the Just (a Muslim
    advocacy group that has been banned in Russia because of its alleged
    affiliations with Muslim militants). The organization sympathized with
    radical Islamic insurgents who had declared war against Vladimir Putin’s
    Russian forces. Zubeidat and Tamerlan, the letter stated, were becoming
    adherents of radical Islam.

    The FSB also provided full names, addresses, and phone numbers for many
    of the members of the Tsarnaev family, including Tamerlan and his
    mother. According to the FBI, it warned that Tamerlan “had changed
    drastically since 2010” and was preparing to travel to a part of Russia
    “to join unspecified underground groups,” namely, violent radical
    Islamists in the Caucasus who formed their own bandit groups, which were
    essentially ragtag insurgency gangs. The FBI’s legal attaché in Moscow
    sent a translated copy of the FSB’s warning concerning Tamerlan to the
    Counterterrorism Division of the FBI’s Boston field office, telling them
    “to take any investigative steps deemed appropriate and provide [the
    legal attaché in] Moscow with any information derived,” with the promise
    that the information would be forwarded to the Russians.

    After receiving the FSB’s letter, a special agent in that Boston
    Counterterrorism Division, referred to in an Office of the Inspector
    General (OIG) report as “the CT Agent,” was assigned to conduct what the
    FBI called a threat assessment based on the information that the FSB had
    shared regarding Tamerlan’s and his mother’s increasing extremism.

    In the months before Tamerlan left Boston for Russia, the CT Agent
    interviewed Tamerlan and his parents and reported his findings, the OIG
    said. The report concluded that there is no public evidence that the CT
    Agent contacted Tamerlan’s then-wife (Katherine Russell, also known as
    Karima Tsarnaeva)—at the least, notes about any contact with her never
    became part of any official file. Nor did the CT Agent visit the
    controversial Islamic Society of Boston mosque in Cambridge where
    Tamerlan prayed, despite its rumored connections to radical Islamists.
    The FBI would later issue a statement that in response to the FSB’s
    letter, agents “checked U.S. government databases and other information
    to look for such things as derogatory telephone communications, possible
    use of online sites associated with the promotion of radical activity,
    associations with other persons of interest, travel history and plans,
    and education history. The FBI also interviewed Tamerlan Tsarnaev and
    family members. The FBI did not find any terrorism activity, domestic or
    foreign.” And so the bureau closed its case on Tamerlan in June 2011.

    As it turned out, the CT Agent’s investigation into the Tsarnaevs was
    never shared with the police in Cambridge, where the Tsarnaevs lived,
    nor with the Boston police, which ran the Boston Regional Intelligence
    Center. The CT Agent, who could not be reached for comment, didn’t even
    share the information with his Joint Terrorism Task Force counterparts
    from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). When asked about the CT
    Agent, the FBI declined to speak about him or any specific agent. As for
    the Russians, the Boston FBI field office sent a letter to the FSB dated
    August 8, 2011, through its legal attaché in Moscow, stating that its
    agents had found “nothing derogatory” about the Tsarnaevs. Months later,
    though, Tamerlan flew to Russia, where he would meet the very men the
    FSB had warned American counterterrorism officials about: Tamerlan’s
    mother’s cousin, Magomed Kartashov, and William Plotnikov, a notorious
    extremist.

    In a strange twist, evidence would later show that Tamerlan somehow
    clandestinely recorded many of the conversations he had with Kartashov
    without his relative’s knowledge—recordings that would eventually be
    introduced by Dzhokhar’s attorneys during trial to bolster the defense’s
    assertion that the younger brother had come under Tamerlan’s corrupting
    influence, just as Tamerlan had sought guidance on jihad back in his
    homeland.

    On January 21, 2012, Tamerlan departed from Boston’s Logan Airport and
    connected at JFK for a flight to Moscow. By then he was on two different
    terrorist watch lists, though that fact never slowed him down.

    The first was the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE)
    database, which is the repository of all international terrorist
    identifier information shared by the FBI, CIA, and an alphabet soup of
    U.S. intelligence agencies. The National Counterterrorism Center
    maintains it by adding biographical or biometric identifiers. The second
    watch list was TECS, which is not an acronym but takes its name from an
    outdated system of identification checks from a now-defunct federal
    agency. TECS, aimed at flagging potential terror suspects as they cross
    borders, is a system allowing customs agents to file reports about any
    “encounter with a traveler, a memorable event, or noteworthy item of
    information particularly when they observe behavior that may be
    indicative of intelligence gathering or preoperational planning related
    to terrorism, criminal, or other illicit intention,” according to the
    DHS. Despite Tamerlan’s being on both of those lists, he still left
    Logan without a hitch.

    Nearly six months later, upon arrival in the United States after
    spending time overseas in a terrorist hot spot, he faced little to no
    resistance from U.S. Customs. The purpose of the FBI’s and CIA’s placing
    Tamerlan on the watch lists was to create an alert any time he traveled.
    But inexplicably, that never happened.

    Then there was the question of his passport, which Tamerlan had reported
    stolen—or at least that’s what he told his ex-wife, Katherine Russell.
    The last valid passport that Tamerlan possessed came from Kyrgyzstan,
    where he had grown up, and was slated to expire on November 16, 2012.
    Tamerlan applied for a Russian passport to replace the one issued in
    Kyrgyzstan that he had used to gain entry into the United States as a
    political refugee in 2002. But, as congressional investigators would
    discover, he left Russia without ever collecting the new passport.

    Still, when Tamerlan landed at Logan on July 17, 2012, he had no problem
    whatsoever. A customs agent “scanned Tsarnaev’s Alien Registration Card
    into the computer system used during primary inspection. The card was
    valid, and as a result, CBP [Customs and Border Protection] took
    Tsarnaev’s picture, collected his fingerprints, confirmed his identity,
    and admitted him into the country based on his LPR [legal permanent
    resident] status,” according to the OIG. However, the report states, the
    Customs and Border Protection officer who processed Tamerlan told
    investigators he “could not recall” processing Tamerlan or if he alerted
    the FBI regarding Tamerlan’s return to the United States without a
    passport. He did explain to the inspectors that officers like him
    communicate with the FBI about potential terrorist watch list suspects’
    travel with “email, orally, or via ‘sticky note.’”

    Stranger still was the testimony from then–Homeland Security Secretary
    Janet Napolitano during a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing on
    immigration policy on April 23, 2013—just days after Tamerlan died—that
    the name on his airline ticket did not match the name on his green card,
    saying, “there was a mismatch.” She publicly declined to elaborate.

    Surely to stop Tamerlan at the airport for additional screening based on
    his physical profile alone—he was a Muslim male with a long beard—or
    because he was leaving a terrorist hotbed would have been insensitive
    racial profiling. But the idea that a man whose name was on two
    terrorist watch lists somehow managed to clear customs because,
    government officials claimed, his name was misspelled on those lists, is
    inconceivable. This is especially true given the multimillion-dollar
    computer program the DHS had purchased to prevent that very sort of
    thing from occurring. Even after the Russians had inexplicably notified
    the United States in writing about his radicalization in 2011, and
    despite being on multiple terror watch lists, Tamerlan was allowed to
    travel to a terrorist hot spot and return without being questioned.

    All of this looks strange—even stupendously negligent—to the casual
    observer. But to the trained eye, it might look like something else
    entirely. Former Somerville Police Chief Tom Pasquarello, a longtime DEA
    agent who has supervised his own confidential informants, had noticed
    similarities between Tamerlan’s case and his own use of so-called CIs
    during multiple takedowns all over the world. As a longtime law
    enforcement official, he says, the seeming coincidences cannot be
    ignored. They make no sense—not Tamerlan’s trip to Russia, nor his
    return without a passport while on two separate terror watch lists.
    Unless, that is, Tamerlan was trying to lure like-minded radicals in an
    effort to collect information and report back to U.S. law enforcement.
    “You pull a string on Tamerlan’s life,” Pasquarello said, “and all you
    get is unanswered questions.”

    The use of Muslim informants has been a controversial topic since 9/11.
    Not long after the attack on the World Trade Center, former New York
    Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly turned to retired CIA officer David
    Cohen to create the Terrorist Interdiction Unit, a secretive squad that
    fell under the department’s Intelligence Division. The unit began
    recruiting Muslim police officers to go undercover, as well as Muslim
    confidential informants who’d been arrested and were willing to
    cooperate with the police. NYPD commanders and detectives assigned to
    the unit became among the most lauded and aggressive
    domestic-intelligence-collecting agencies in the country, coming up with
    the term “raker” to describe informants who infiltrated radical Islamist
    plots and raked for information. To this day, Kelly credits the unit
    with stopping multiple would-be terror attacks across the country. The
    unit’s tactics, however, would raise the ire of organizations including
    the ACLU, who accused the police department of abusing its powers to
    target mosques and infiltrate them with Muslim officers or informants.

    In many ways, what the NYPD created was nothing new. The U.S. Department
    of Justice began its relationship with cooperating informants in 1961,
    when Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy instructed FBI Director J. Edgar
    Hoover to order every agent in every field office throughout the country
    to infiltrate organized crime groups. The FBI knew it needed to access
    the dregs of the underworld in order to bring down its targets, and the
    way to do that was to tempt bottom feeders up into the light.

    Over time, informants started to pay off as the FBI began toppling the
    highest levels of organized crime. Eventually, it had informants inside
    the Mafia, the KKK, the Black Panthers, and biker gangs throughout the
    country. After 9/11, the bureau focused much of its effort on finding
    and maintaining Muslim informants to fight the war on terror. More
    recently, informants have infiltrated anarchist groups such as Black
    Bloc and Occupy Wall Street.

    With the resulting arrests came power for FBI case agents. In some
    instances, that power brought unfettered authority to offer sweetheart
    deals to turncoats, no matter how treacherous the cooperating informant
    was. The FBI tracks the productivity of its informants by aggregating
    their “statistical accomplishments”—that is, the number of indictments,
    convictions, search warrants, and other contributions to investigative
    objectives for which the informant gets credit. But what the FBI does
    not track are agents who let informants run amok.

    Boston has an especially fraught history with this. Entire FBI field
    offices have been tainted, as in the case with infamous mobster James
    “Whitey” Bulger. Bulger’s FBI handler was John Connolly, who had admired
    the rough-and-tumble mobster while growing up in the same South Boston
    housing development. Connolly’s boss was John Morris. Both men took
    bribes, and Connolly is now serving time in a Florida prison for
    allowing Bulger to set up mob-style hits on innocent people, while the
    agents made a name for themselves arresting Italian and Italian-American
    mobsters whom Bulger was trying to put out of business. Connolly went so
    far as to alert Bulger to an indictment pending against him. As a result
    of that tip, the mobster went on the lam with his companion, Catherine
    Greig, for 16 years. Then there was notorious mob captain Mark Rossetti,
    a feared enforcer who ran his criminal enterprise of drugs and
    loansharking out of East Boston. It was only after the Essex County
    district attorney indicted more than two dozen mobsters that Rossetti’s
    secret work as an FBI informant was exposed.

    Despite these high-profile scandals, the FBI informant program is still
    in widespread use—and Muslim informants make up a large part of it.
    During the height of Hoover’s Cointelpro operations in the 1960s and
    1970s, for instance, the FBI had roughly 1,500 total informants. In the
    1980s and 1990s the drug wars brought that number up to about 6,000.
    Then, after 9/11, the FBI recruited so many new informants—including
    accused criminals looking for leniency, liars looking for immigration
    favors, Muslims looking for revenge on the members of competing Islamic
    sects, and narcissistic egomaniacs who wanted to be revered as a Jason
    Bourne–type figure—that it had to hire an outside software company to
    help agents track their secret spies. Today, there are anywhere from
    15,000 to 20,000 snitches on the FBI’s payroll, and many of them inform
    on fellow Muslims in the United States and overseas. The vaunted NYPD
    Intelligence Division—working alongside members of the NSA, CIA, and
    FBI, as well as Muslim patriots—have uncovered jihadi-inspired plots
    that led to multiple criminal prosecutions.

    In February 2016, Homeland Security alerted 29 “high-target” cities,
    including Boston and New York, that their DHS funding would be slashed
    by 1.3 percent. Boston, which had received $18 million from the federal
    government earmarked for homeland security initiatives in fiscal year
    2015, received $17.7 million in fiscal year 2016. Rene Fielding, chief
    of Boston’s Office of Emergency Management, explained that the cuts
    collected from the cities would be used to fund “nonprofits”—primarily
    to provide security to mosques and synagogues.

    Privately, though, police officials complained that it was a way for DHS
    officials to pay imams at mosques for goodwill. The feds needed to make
    nice with angry activists who were part of the Council on
    American-Islamic Relations, the reasoning went, and grant money goes a
    long way with nonprofits.

    Sometimes, though, the program backfired and inadvertently turned
    informants into radicals. According to a report issued by Human Rights
    Watch and the Human Rights Institute at Columbia University Law School,
    “Indeed, in some cases the Federal Bureau of Investigation may have
    created terrorists out of law-abiding individuals by conducting sting
    operations that facilitated or invented the target’s willingness to act.
    According to multiple studies, nearly 50 percent of the more than 500
    federal counterterrorism convictions resulted from informant-based
    cases; almost 30 percent of those cases were sting operations in which
    the informant played an active role in the underlying plot.”

    The ACLU has filed several civil lawsuits against New York City and the
    NYPD saying that the Terrorist Interdiction Program started by Kelly
    used unconstitutional methods that essentially coerced Muslims to inform
    on their neighbors. Both Kelly, a Harvard University graduate, and his
    successor, William Bratton, a longtime Boston police commissioner,
    insisted the program was essential to stopping planned attacks.
    Meanwhile, the NYPD released a 2007 report, titled Radicalization in the
    West: The Homegrown Threat, stating that some of the warning signs
    someone was becoming radicalized included changes in appearance and
    behavior, and cited “wearing traditional Islamic clothing [and] growing
    a beard,” abstaining from alcohol, and “becoming involved in social
    activism.” In response, the ACLU argued that infiltrating mosques and
    hookah bars was illegal and that the NYPD’s “purported rationale for
    this unconstitutional surveillance” was nonsense.

    Nevertheless, those warning signs had certainly been observed in
    Tamerlan.

    While living in Cambridge, Tamerlan underwent a transformation from a
    womanizing Euro-trash party boy to a pious Muslim, albeit one who first
    showed signs of radicalization in 2010. He stopped drinking and doing
    drugs. He traded his designer clothes for traditional Muslim robes,
    wearing them to pizza parlors and Starbucks shops. He started attending
    the Islamic Society of Boston’s Cambridge mosque, which was initially
    incorporated in 1982 by Muslim students from MIT, Harvard, and other
    area colleges. Its first president listed on state records is Abdurahman
    M. Alamoudi, who is currently serving a 23-year federal prison sentence
    related to charges of funneling money to Libya. By the time Tamerlan
    began attending regularly, the mosque had long faced rumors of ties to
    extremists.

    Tamerlan had all the traits that comprised the perfect candidate to
    infiltrate a mosque that had been in the crosshairs of federal
    counterterrorism investigators, law enforcement officials in
    Massachusetts say privately. He was multilingual. He had tentacles in
    the drug and mixed martial arts worlds. And he was just the type who
    could help the fight against terrorism overseas in one of the most
    dangerous regions for Islamic extremists: his Mother Russia.

    When Tamerlan flew to Moscow in 2012, his name should have been flagged
    at Logan airport. After all, he was on the TIDE and TECS terrorist watch
    lists. His travel documents included an American permanent resident
    alien card that had been issued to him in 2007 and a passport issued in
    Kyrgyzstan in 2002 when he was 16, which would expire that year. He
    wasn’t stopped at JFK for additional screening, and he wasn’t stopped
    when he arrived in Moscow as a suspected terrorist.

    Among his Dagestani relatives and members of his Russian mosque,
    Tamerlan “looked like an American.” His cousin Magomed Kartashov had
    grown up across the street from Tamerlan’s great-grandmother and had
    known the Tsarnaev family when Tamerlan and Dzhokhar were young
    children. He hadn’t seen either boy in years until Tamerlan showed up in
    the Kizlyar region to visit relatives.

    Kartashov did not recognize his cousin, but they quickly embraced.
    Tamerlan was wearing a long raincoat and glasses, Kartashov later
    recalled to the FBI in June 2013 at the FSB offices in Dagestan while he
    was being jailed for allegedly supporting terrorism, according to court
    records. Kartashov remembered he hadn’t seen Tamerlan since he was about
    10, and that he’d grown up to be a “big guy.”

    Tamerlan didn’t wait long to ask Kartashov for help achieving the goal
    that had brought him to Russia. According to Kartashov, Tamerlan said
    that he wanted to go into the forests, and that he wanted to go to
    Syria. “I came here to get involved in jihad,” Tamerlan said.

    At first, it sounded like boasting from a spoiled westerner. But
    Tamerlan told Kartashov that he had followed Islamic teachings that
    urged Muslims to follow orders such as “cut their heads and make them
    kneel in front of you.” Kartashov said Tamerlan didn’t know what he was
    talking about and took these words too literally. However, investigators
    believe this is what happened to three men in Waltham months earlier,
    all mixed martial arts fighters who called Tamerlan a friend. While the
    case led investigators to Ibragim Todashev, a Russian with ties to
    Tamerlan who was shot dead by FBI agents under murky circumstances
    during an interview in Florida, the murders remain unsolved.

    From the outside, Tamerlan’s familial relationship with radicals in
    Russia would’ve made him the perfect FBI recruit. As would his
    connections to Muslim drug traffickers and budding Islamists who, on the
    highest of Muslim holidays in August 2012, posed in front of a black
    flag often associated with jihad. Law enforcement officials in
    Massachusetts later began to say that Tamerlan was an informant for the
    feds, a spy sent to Russia to help track and kill the men with whom he
    was in contact. Some believed that he was working for the U.S.
    government, motivated by the promise of citizenship.

    Tamerlan was desperate to become an American. In 2009, he even posed in
    a photo essay that read, “Will Box for Passport.” He’d wanted to compete
    in the Olympic Games on the U.S. boxing team, for which only citizens
    were eligible, and trained hard. But he destroyed any chance he might
    have had when police arrested him on a domestic violence charge—an
    offense of moral turpitude that legally made him ineligible for
    citizenship for the next five years. And yet, within weeks of his return
    from Russia, where many of the men he had been spotted with had been
    tracked and killed by Russian counterterrorism forces, Tamerlan’s case
    for citizenship was mysteriously reopened.

    When Janet Napolitano was grilled about security lapses in Tamerlan’s
    case at a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing on immigration in April
    2013, she admitted that the name on his travel document did not match
    the name on his identification. Napolitano, clearly frazzled, said that
    a misspelling allowed him to leave the country but that redundancies in
    the DHS computer system alerted U.S. authorities to be aware of his
    return. But, she said, by the time he came back to the United States six
    months later, the FBI alert on him had expired, so his reentry was not
    noted. “The system pinged when he was leaving the United States,”
    Napolitano testified. “By the time he returned, all investigations had
    been—the matter had been closed.” The response, many believe, was
    laughable. One federal agent not authorized to speak publicly explained
    it this way: “His time overseas should have triggered a secondary
    inspection for a number of reasons: immigration status, duration out of
    the country, area of travel, and the fact that he was watch-listed.”

    U.S. Senator Richard Blumenthal, a Democrat from Connecticut, pushed
    Napolitano for more answers and was told to wait for a
    classified—secret—briefing. Senator Charles Grassley asked Napolitano
    how a misspelling could have caused problems in 2012 when the
    Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 had
    amended certain sections of the Immigration and Naturalization Act
    pertaining to the control of foreign nationals’ travel. The 2007 law
    reiterated the need for exit data and required that such data be
    collected on all foreign nationals who entered the United States under
    the visa waiver program with the provision that air carriers are
    required to “collect and electronically transmit” passenger “arrival and
    departure” data to “the automated entry and exit control system”
    developed by the federal government. Clearly, according to Napolitano’s
    testimony, that didn’t happen. Inexplicably, once again she was only
    willing to answer behind closed doors. It would be better, Napolitano
    told the senators at the hearing, if they could discuss the matter in a
    classified setting.

    Whatever information Tamerlan’s immigration records contained, the DHS
    secretary was not at liberty to talk. It was a staggering admission,
    especially since DHS would eventually be forced to release Tamerlan’s
    alien file pursuant to a Freedom of Information Act request filed by
    multiple news organizations, including the Boston Globe, in February
    2016. Though dozens of pages were completely redacted, including the
    names of federal agencies that requested Tamerlan receive U.S.
    citizenship (and waive any fees for the application process), the U.S.
    Customs file still contained troubling information.

    First, Tamerlan had multiple names and dates of birth that he had used.
    Then there were the two State Department Medical Examination for
    Immigration or Refugee Applicant forms, which had startling
    discrepancies. In one, the attached picture was of an unidentified
    older-looking man wearing a black-collared polo shirt and contained a
    passport number. In the second, the picture was of a teenage Tamerlan
    wearing an identical shirt, and the passport number had been redacted.

    Another troubling form seemed innocuous at first glance: a notification
    instructing Tamerlan to report to 170 Portland Street in Boston on
    October 16, 2012, so he could finally take the official oath and become
    an American citizen. Even though Tamerlan was legally ineligible,
    somehow his naturalization application had been reopened on August 28,
    2012. Among other things, the October ceremony would have meant an
    impossibly short turnaround for an application opened just months
    earlier. It remains unclear whether Tamerlan showed up at 170 Portland
    Street and what happened if he did show up. But the document suggests
    that someone was pulling strings to help him obtain the very thing he
    had been craving so desperately for years.

    Tamerlan did not become a citizen on that October day, though the DHS
    will not say whether he attended. What is clear, however, is that in the
    weeks after that scheduled appearance, the FBI continued to email
    immigration officials, prodding them to approve Tamerlan’s citizenship
    application, according to the Office of the Inspector General’s report.
    Janet Napolitano, though, would not stick around to answer questions.
    She quit her job at the DHS months after the Boston Marathon bombings,
    right around the same time FBI Director Robert Mueller retired, as did
    the Boston FBI special agent in charge, Richard DesLauriers.

    On October 22, 2012—days after the scheduled oath ceremony for Tamerlan
    was somehow scuttled—an immigration services officer emailed the FBI’s
    CT Agent saying that Tamerlan’s name had popped up on a terrorist watch
    list and asking if he “represented a national security concern.” The
    next day, the CT Agent, who investigated the initial Russian FSB warning
    in 2011, assured immigration officials in writing that Tamerlan was not
    a risk if he gained full citizenship: “There is no national security
    concern related to [Tamerlan Tsarnaev] and nothing that I know of that
    should preclude issuance of whatever is being applied for,” he wrote.
    The CT Agent would tell officials that he did not remember whether he
    searched Tamerlan’s file or public sources before he replied to the
    immigration official. To this day, the FBI insists that Tamerlan’s case
    file was closed after the CT Agent’s initial investigation in 2011, and
    was only reopened after the Boston Marathon attack.

    On January 23, 2013, Tamerlan made a second attempt to become a U.S.
    citizen. He had an interview with Customs officials to discuss
    documentation related to his arrest for domestic violence and fully
    expected to walk away with his citizenship. Instead, the officer wrote,
    the paperwork relating to the dismissal of charges in his domestic
    violence arrest did not arrive and his status was delayed.

    Again.

    Two weeks later, on February 6, 2013, an angry Tamerlan walked into
    Phantom Fireworks in Seabrook, New Hampshire, and asked for the “biggest
    and loudest” pyrotechnics in the store.

    Michele McPhee’s book Maximum Harm will be released April 4 by ForeEdge,
    an imprint of University Press of New England.

    By Michele McPhee
    Boston Magazine | April 2017

    Find this story at 9 April 2017

    copyright http://www.bostonmagazine.com/

    519: Dead Men Tell No Tales (2014)

    Last May, a weird story made the news: the FBI killed a guy in Florida who was loosely linked to the Boston Marathon bombings. He was shot seven times in his living room by a federal agent. What really happened? Why was the FBI even in that room with him? A reporter spent six months looking into it, and she found that the FBI was doing a bunch of things that never made the news. Her Boston Magazine story.

    This story was reported by Susan Zalkind in a collaboration with Boston Magazine. Check out Susan’s print story for more about the murders in Waltham, MA, and the investigation into Ibragim Todashev.

    PROLOGUE

    Ira explains that in May 2013, the FBI shot a guy named Ibragim Todashev in his living room in Florida. Supposedly, right before he died, Todashev implicated himself in a crime, a pretty gruesome one, a triple murder of three drug dealers in Waltham Massachusetts, a Boston suburb. Law enforcement officials told reporters that he also named one of the alleged Boston Marathon bombers – Tamerlan Tsarnaev – as his accomplice in the crime. And then, right before he signed a confession, he supposedly freaked out, and an FBI agent shot him. Which is weird in itself. But weirder still is the fact that the FBI has been silent about what happened. They first promised an investigation on this last May. And since then, we’ve heard that it’s coming, but nine months later it hasn’t arrived. So many questions remain: what happened during that interrogation that led to them shooting Ibragim Todashev? If they had such good evidence connecting him to these murders, why didn’t they just arrest him? What evidence did they have? How good is the evidence connecting the alleged Boston bomber to the murders? Do they truly know who committed the triple murders? In the absence of solid information, conspiracy theories sprang up. Some people started to believe the FBI was hiding something. (7 minutes)

    ACT ONE

    Susan Zalkind spent six months investigating all this for Boston Magazine and This American Life. And she has a personal connection to the 2011 triple murder. She knew one of the three drug dealers who were killed: Erik Weissman was a friend of hers. In this half of the show, she explains what happened when she reached out to people who might have information on Ibragim Todashev, the man killed by the FBI in Florida. First his girlfriend Tatiana Gruzdeva and then his best friend Khusen Taramov are more or less kicked out of the country by federal authorities. Tatiana says she was told she was deported specifically because she spoke with Susan for a story. (17 minutes)
    Susan Zalkind

    ACT TWO

    Susan’s investigation continues, and she tells the story of a third person who was close to Ibragim Todashev who was whisked out of the United States thanks after actions by the FBI. (20 minutes)
    Susan Zalkind

    ACT THREE

    Susan lays out her theory of what the truth is in this case. And she explains what we still don’t know. (14 minutes)

    MAR 7, 2014

    Find this story at 7 March 2014

    © 1995 – 2014 Chicago Public Media & Ira Glass

    Did FBI Execute Friend of Boston Bombing Suspect During Interrogation? (2014)

    Names you know… Dhovar Tsarnev and Tamerlen Tsarnaev… Two young Chechen born brothers, raised in the United States, radicalized through the internet, and responsible for the deadly Boston Bombing attack.

    That is the story media has told you but what about the story they have all but ignored? About another Chechen with a lesser known name. Who is Ibragim Todashev and why was he killed by the FBI during an interrogation over the Tsarnev brothers?

    Today, you will hear from the widow of that man, and the questions she is still waiting to have answered.

    The first step toward truth is to be informed.

    As I said, it is a name most americans don’t know at all Ibragim Todashev. A 34 year-old Chechen, living in Orlando, Florida and friend of Boston bombing suspect Tamerlen Tsarnev.

    Here is the story.

    On May 22nd of this year, FBI agents and Massachusetts state police officers showed up in Orlando florida to interview Todashev.

    Before moving to Orlando, Todashev lived in Massachusetts. He was a mixed martial arts fighter and through that sport, became friends with boston bombing suspect Tamerlen Tsarnev.
    That was why, only weeks after the bombings, the FBI went to meet with Todashev. but it was during that interrogation when something went terribly wrong

    According to a statement released by the FBI,

    “The agent, two Massachusetts State Police troopers, and other law enforcement personnel were interviewing an individual in connection with the Boston Marathon bombing investigation when a violent confrontation was initiated by the individual. During the confrontation, the individual was killed and the agent sustained non-life threatening injuries.”

    So what violent confrontation took place? Media reports were all over the place on what happened. The New York Times claimed that Todashev pulled a knife on the agent. Other media claimed it was a samurai sword and then metal pole, some said a broom stick. That is, until
    the Washington Post was told by an unnamed law enforcement source that Todashev had neither a knife or gun, that he was completely unarmed but did lunge at the agent.

    Who saw this happen?

    Another important question. Because according to the FBI, who is doing an internal investigation, immediately prior to the killing, after hours of interrogation, all of the other interrogators withdrew and left the room, leaving the FBI agent who fired the shots alone with Todashev.

    That agent, claims that Todashev was about to sign a confession to his involvement along with Tamerlen Tsarnev in an unsolved triple murder in Massachusetts and it was just before he was going to sign that confession that he attacked.

    The ex-wife of Todashev spoke to me via Skype.

    Ben: “What do you make of the claim that all the agents left him and only the agent who killed Ibragim remained in the room with him?”

    Reni: “We still don’t know what exactly happened, how many were in there when he was shot. It is still not clear, they are not telling us anything. So far we know it was three of them when they started the interrogation of them but who was in there when he was shot, we still don’t know.”

    Aside from the very strange details surrounding an FBI agent left alone with a suspect, who then must defend himself and kill that suspect, are these details.

    The agent who shot and killed Todashev, reportedly shot him 7 times including in the head and chest. I say reportedly, because on July 8th, the autopsy report on Ibragim Toashev was finalized and ready for release. According to the Orlando medical examiners office forensic records coordinator,

    “The FBI has informed this office that the case is still under investigation and not to release this document.”

    All of which is not only unusual, but the entire investigation so far has been surrounded by secrecy. Another issue that the FBI has not even addressed is that while the claim was that Todashev attempted to attack the agent, friends and his ex-wife claim that Todashev was recovering from knee surgery.

    Ben: “You say that Ibragim was recovering from knee surgery, so what was the injury and how bad was that knee?”

    Reni: “He had done his surgery in the middle of march. For a month and a half he was still on crutches. He was still limping, he was still in pain and with a light touch to his knee, he would feel the pain. He was still in pain on the knee, he was still walking and limping on the knee.”

    Ben: “Is it true that he was on crutches at the time that he was killed?”

    Reni: “Not necessarily. He was on them sometimes and when he would feel the pain he would go and get the crutches.”

    Ben: “Obviously it is speculation on your part but why do you believe that Ibragim was killed?”

    Reni: “He got 7 shots and one of them was the back of the head. Clearly this was an execution.”

    Ben: “How do you know that one was to the back of the head?”

    Reni: “Because I saw the body.”

    Ben: “How do you know that it was an entry wound and not an exit wound for the bullet?”

    Reni: “I can’t tell, I’m not a professional but from what I see and the medical examiner in Orlando says that he had 7 shots, 1 in the back of the head.”

    Ben: “The medical examiner told you?”

    Reni: “Yes, they have told me from day one when I came to sign for the body and to take it.”

    Ben: “And he told you that he was shot in the back of the head? Incredible.”

    Reni: “He said that he had 7 shots, 1 in the head, 3 in the heart, 1 in the liver and I believe that 1 was somewhere in the shoulder or in the arm.”

    What you need to know, is that while the ACLU has requested an independent investigation in Florida and Massachusetts, both those requests have been rejected by law enforcement, saying that it would be inappropriate.

    Meanwhile, CAIR in Florida is reporting that a friend of Todashev, was arrested in September and was denied a lawyer for 6 days. That even though he repeatedly requested to speak with an attorney, the FBI agents allegedly responded, “That is not happening.”

    CAIR-Florida Civil Rights Director Thania Diaz Clevenger said in a statement.

    “It fits the pattern of abuse and troubling behavior by FBI agents beginning in the days prior to the killing of the unarmed Ibragim Todashev. One can only wonder if Mr. Todashev was denied his rights to legal council during the questioning that ultimately resulted in his death.”

    In addition, other Chechen friends of Todashev say they are being pressured by the FBI to spy on friends and neighbors. The story here that media just won’t cover is the incredible secrecy surrounding this young man’s death, the fact that he was killed so brutally during an interrogation and to so many people its not even that big of a deal because he might be connected to a terrorist.

    Ben Swann Nov 14, 2013

    Find this story at 14 November 2013

    © Ben Swann 2014

    The Murders Before the Marathon (2014)

    Waltham, September 11, 2011: Three men, throats slit, cash and drugs left on the bodies. Two years later, two dead suspects: Tamerlan Tsarnaev, and a friend who the FBI says was about to confess. One haunting question: Could solving this case have prevented the Boston Marathon bombings?

    waltham-triple-homocide

    It’s nearly midnight in a nondescript condo complex a few blocks from Universal Studios in Orlando, and Tatiana Gruzdeva has been crying all day. Though neither of us knows it yet, as she sits on the corner of her bed and sobs in tiny convulsions, the fact that she’s talking to me will lead to her being arrested by federal agents, placed in solitary confinement, and deported back to Russia.

    Next to us on the bed are nine teddy bears. Eight of them came with her from Tiraspol, Moldova. The ninth was a gift from her boyfriend, Ibragim Todashev. Today would have been Ibragim’s 28th birthday, but he is not here to see it, because in the early hours of May 22, 2013, a Boston FBI agent shot and killed him in this very apartment, under circumstances so strange that a Florida state prosecutor has opened an independent investigation. According to the FBI, just before Ibragim was shot—seven times, in two bursts, including once in the top of the head—he was about to write a confession implicating himself and alleged Boston Marathon bomber Tamerlan Tsarnaev in a brutal triple homicide that took place in Waltham, Massachusetts, in September 2011.

    I’m sitting awkwardly at one end of the twin bed. She’s crying quietly, cross-legged at the other end, wearing shorts and a white shirt with sequins. Most of her outfits have sequins or rhinestones. She’s 19. I’m 26. We both have long blond hair. We’ve both been close to men who were in trouble with the law, and lost them violently. We’ve been talking for about an hour, mostly about men, and parties, and moving forward after a tragedy. Ibragim was a good man, she says. He could never have committed a murder.

    “I’m here alone,” she cries. “I hope it never can be worse than this.”

    I try to comfort her, but it’s complicated. We both want to know why Ibragim Todashev was killed. She wants to clear his name. For me, and for the families of the Waltham murder victims, Ibragim’s shooting may have snuffed out the last chance at finding out what really happened that night. In the back of my mind is this question: Did her dead boyfriend kill my friend Erik?

    September 11, 2011 was a Sunday, and at twilight Erik Weissman was looking for somewhere to spend the night. That afternoon he’d visited his younger sister Aria at a diner down the street from their parents’ home, but he didn’t have a place of his own—he’d been couch-surfing since the cops busted him on drug charges back in January. He kept his belongings at his friend Brendan Mess’s apartment on a dead-end street in Waltham, and that’s where he usually stayed. Erik and Brendan were established pot dealers who occasionally worked together and shared an interest in sports, personal fitness, and designer weed. But Erik had cleared out of the apartment while Brendan was going through a dramatic breakup with his live-in girlfriend, Hiba Eltilib. He had recently been staying with a friend in Newton. “That chick is crazy,” Erik had repeatedly told the friend.

    That night his friend in Newton was busy, so around 7:30 p.m. Erik drove his Mercedes SUV back to Brendan’s place in Waltham. It was a warm night, cloudless. Brendan and Hiba had finally broken up, and Hiba had split for Florida, so the coast was clear. Brendan had invited another friend, Rafi Teken, to come over, too. Like Erik, Rafi had been avoiding Brendan’s place while Hiba was there. Rafi and Hiba were known to get into arguments of their own.

    At 7:30, Erik sent a text to his friend in Newton. Shortly thereafter, all three men stopped answering their phones.

    The bodies were found the next day. Erik was 31. Brendan was 25. Rafi was 37.

    It was Hiba who found them, of all people. On September 12, she returned unexpectedly from Florida—most of Brendan’s friends were under the impression that she wasn’t coming back—and after she couldn’t reach Brendan on her cell phone, she showed up at the apartment and asked the landlord to open the door. The bodies were inside. One news report says that Hiba left the house and screamed, “They’re all dead!” Another says she went outside, crying, with blood on her feet, and calmly asked for a cigarette.

    Their throats had been slashed with such force that their heads were nearly decapitated. A veteran Waltham investigator called it “the worst bloodbath I have ever seen,” and compared the victims’ wounds to “an Al-Qaeda training video.” About a pound and a half of high-grade marijuana covered two of the corpses. Rafi Teken’s face was left untouched. Erik Weissman had a bloody lip. But Brendan Mess, an experienced mixed martial artist who trained in jujitsu, had real fighting wounds. His arms were covered in scratch marks. He had puncture marks on his temple and the top of his head, another mark by his ear, and he was bruised around the lips. It didn’t scan like a robbery: There were eight and a half pounds of pot left in bags and glass jars, and $5,000 dollars left on the bodies—enough for a cheap funeral, for one of them.

    Hours later, Middlesex County District Attorney Gerry Leone stood amid a scrum of reporters on the dead-end street outside Brendan’s home at 12 Harding Avenue. State police had found a “very graphic crime scene” in the second-floor apartment, he said. “It does not appear to be a random act.” He told reporters that there was no evidence of a break-in—that it was likely the assailants and dead men knew one another. Assailants, plural? a reporter asked. Leone replied that there were “at least two people who are not in the apartment now, who were there earlier.”

    “This is a fluid, ongoing investigation,” he said. “We will have information as we develop the facts.”

    But they didn’t.

    ibragim-todashev-autopsy
    FROM TOP LEFT, PICTURES RELEASED BY IBRAGIM TODASHEV’S FATHER SHOW HIS WOUNDS—BULLET HOLES IN HIS TORSO AND THE TOP OF HIS HEAD—AS WELL AS THE BLOODY SCENE AT HIS ORLANDO APARTMENT.

    From the beginning, investigators failed to follow up on seemingly obvious leads. They didn’t visit the gym where Brendan trained, and Tamerlan Tsarnaev, one of Brendan’s best friends, was never questioned—even though several of Brendan’s friends say they gave his name to the police. Ten days after the murders, a state police detective essentially told one victim’s mother that investigators were waiting for the case to solve itself.

    It would take 18 months and two homemade bombs before FBI investigators exhumed the case—and once they did, they were able to move with uncanny speed. It took them mere hours to link Tamerlan to the Waltham triple homicide. The day after Tamerlan was killed in a shootout with Watertown police, plainclothes FBI agents detained his friend, Ibragim Todashev, at gunpoint. Although the FBI seems to have initially been looking for evidence of a wider terrorist cell in connection with the marathon bombings, within weeks its agents were questioning Ibragim about the Waltham murders. According to the FBI, agents were able to bring Ibragim to the brink of a written confession by pressuring him with circumstantial evidence.

    If you believe the FBI’s account, then you must also believe this: If Waltham police had figured out who hacked three men to death on September 11, 2011, there’s a good chance we would not be talking about the Boston Marathon bombings. Tamerlan Tsarnaev and Ibragim Todashev might be alive and in jail. Dzhokhar Tsarnaev might be just another mop-headed, no-name stoner at UMass Dartmouth. There would be no One Fund. Krystle Campbell, Lu Lingzi, and Martin Richard would still be alive. Sean Collier would have graduated from the MIT police department to the Somerville Police Department by now. And for the friends and family of the three men who died in Waltham, perhaps their grief would not still be paired with such haunting questions.

    I met Erik Weissman in the summer of 2006, after my freshman year of college. I was 19. He was 26. He’d come to sell us some high-end weed. I was with my friends from high school in a Newton attic, and it felt less like a drug deal than a Tupperware party. Erik had spotless sneakers, wire-rimmed nerd glasses, and a contagious smile. He produced a series of glass jars from a black duffel bag, each filled with a different strain of headies: Blue Dream, Grand Daddy, Alaskan Thunder Fuck. My friends were easily impressed; I teased him for talking game. My father, Norman Zalkind, is a criminal defense lawyer, and I grew up discussing his cases and clients at the kitchen table.

    A few days later, Erik picked me up and we drove around in his blue Audi, taking turns playing Lil Wayne and Buju Banton on our iPods and smoking Erik’s Sour Diesel. We did that a few times that summer: driving aimlessly, talking, smoking. He was one of the few friends who encouraged my cheesy freshman-year poetry. He thought of himself as an entrepreneur and a connoisseur of pot; he would fly to Amsterdam regularly to buy seeds of a particular variety that interested him. He talked about selling pot as if it were a community service, and told me repeatedly that he didn’t operate in violent circles. I told him about my father and his clients. I told him his line of work always ends badly. He laughed.

    Over time I stopped smoking pot, and we grew apart. The last I heard from him was sometime in January or February of 2011. He wanted my father’s number. He’d been busted when his landlord went into his apartment, saw his stash, and called the cops. Boston police had seized more than $20,000 in cash and tens of thousands of dollars’ worth of marijuana from his Roslindale home. He had always told me that he sold only pot, but in the raid police also seized cocaine, Vicodin, and OxyContin.

    I gave him the number for my dad’s law firm. He sounded scared.

    Soon after my dad took me out for oysters to thank me for the referral. He told me there was a problem with Erik’s warrant, and he didn’t think the case would go to trial.

    I never spoke to Erik again.

    There was a lot about him I learned only after his death. The drugs and money he lost when he was arrested left him $50,000 in debt to his Sour Diesel connection in California, his friends told me. He’d invested in a California bong company called Hitman Glass, but his money woes kept him from moving out West. In the months before they died, Erik and Brendan were working together to expand their pot business, trying to buy in larger quantities and purchasing equipment to grow marijuana on their own, according to another dealer who sometimes worked with them.

    Waltham is often described as a small, quiet, suburban town, but in 2011 it was teeming with much bigger drug operations. A few months before the murders, federal investigators indicted a steroid-popping Syrian national named Safwan Madarati, the Waltham-based head of a violent international drug ring. Madarati, the indictment revealed, hired thugs to assault and intimidate his enemies, and maintained “personal connections with members of the Watertown police department.” A former Watertown officer was among those charged in the case. In an unrelated case only a few months later, police arrested a former Watertown council member after they found $2 million worth of hydroponic pot in his Waltham warehouse. They were all convicted.

    Police quickly seized on Erik and Brendan’s pot dealing, and theorized that the murders must have been connected to a drug dispute or robbery. “Whose toes were they stepping on in Waltham?” one friend remembers being asked. Investigators grilled the victims’ friends about Erik and Brendan’s drug sources, and asked with whom they had financial disputes. “They were telling us that it could’ve been a drug deal that had gone wrong,” recalled Bellie Hacker, Erik’s mother. “But then it didn’t make sense because there was money left behind, and the marijuana.”

    For Bellie, the aftermath of the murder was excruciating. In addition to the cops’ theory about a drug deal gone wrong, there were other dark rumors circulating, some of them concerning Brendan’s ex-girlfriend, Hiba. “One of the theories was that Hiba hired someone to kill Brendan and just Erik and Rafi were there and they got killed, too,” Bellie said. According to news reports, police questioned Hiba on several occasions. Before dropping out of sight, she gave anonymous interviews to the New York Times and the Boston Globe disavowing any involvement in the crime. Bellie didn’t know what to believe. “Nothing really made sense,” she said.

    It didn’t help that police seemed to save their toughest questions for the victims’ families and friends. A few days after the murders, Erik’s sister, Aria, learned that her brother had kept a storage unit, and called the company to ask if she could get access to Erik’s belongings. They didn’t call back, and instead she got a hostile phone call from a detective, State Trooper Erik Gagnon, assigned to the Middlesex County DA’s office. What did she think she was going to find in that box? Gagnon asked. Drugs? Money? She remembers that Gagnon called her “deceitful” and threatened to prosecute her for interfering with the investigation. “How many murders have you solved?” he barked. (When I asked Gagnon about the conversation, he wouldn’t comment on it directly, but said, “If someone said I was being accusatory, maybe ask them why.”)

    Friends of Erik’s who spoke to the police after his murder had similar experiences. One friend, who did not have a police record, told me he was questioned by detectives just hours after carrying Erik’s casket at his funeral. “They were treating us less like friends and more like drug dealers,” he said.

    Then there were leads that the detectives seemed to ignore. They never visited the Wai Kru gym in Allston, where Brendan practiced mixed martial arts several times a week, according to gym owner John Allan. They never spoke to his training partner and best friend, Golden Gloves champion Tamerlan Tsarnaev, even though several friends gave the police his name in a list of Brendan’s closest contacts. Meanwhile, detectives called Aria into the police station and accused her of knowing who killed her brother. She broke down in tears as her mother defended her.

    Ten days after the bodies were found, detectives told Bellie that they were not actively pursuing leads in her son’s murder. Instead, she remembers state police detectives explaining, they were waiting for a suspect to shake loose. “They were basically waiting for someone to come forward and say who did it,” Bellie recalled. “They said, ‘Someday down the line, someone is going to need a plea bargain.’”

    It was September 22, 2011. The case would go cold for 582 days.

    There was a time, just after the bombs went off on Boylston Street, when it looked like the families might finally get some answers about who killed Rafi, Brendan, and Erik. On April 19, media outlets made the connection between Tamerlan and Brendan. Friends recalled that Tamerlan had acted differently after Brendan’s death, and hadn’t attended his memorial service. John Allan, the owner of Wai Kru gym, recalled approaching Tamerlan to offer his condolences, only to have Tamerlan laugh him off.

    Bellie was hopeful that the renewed attention would stir something up. “It got international news, everyone found out about it, the whole world knew about it, and someone will get the fire under their tush, and we’ll start really getting some answers,” she remembers thinking.

    A few days after the Watertown manhunt, Aria says, she spoke to Gagnon for the first time since 2011. He asked for her brother’s cell-phone number and the name of the gym Brendan Mess went to. The Middlesex County DA’s office had Boston cops send over the files from Erik Weissman’s previous arrests.For the first time, Brendan Mess’s younger brother Dylan and his friends were questioned about Tamerlan Tsarnaev. The FBI agents wanted to know if either Brendan or Tamerlan was involved in organized crime. If Tamerlan had guns. Who else he sparred with. If Tamerlan prayed, if he preached. The agents asked if the auto shops where Tamerlan and his father sometimes worked were part of an organized-crime ring.

    A few weeks later, in mid-May, FBI agents called on Dylan again. He and a friend met them at Dwelltime, a café near Inman Square. The agents, who were in plainclothes, took them into the back of a van and showed them a series of photo lineups. Dylan and his friend looked at each other, and told the agents that the man in the last photo looked vaguely familiar.

    The man in the photo, they would later learn, was Ibragim Todashev.

    No one who knew Ibragim Todashev seemed to have a complete picture of who he was. Even his own father, with whom he spoke regularly, did not know he had a wife in America, let alone a girlfriend. Ibragim was a womanizer. He was kind to children. He had a sweet tooth, and a temper. He was a trained MMA fighter who liked to hang out with a close-knit group of Chechnyan friends; he didn’t socialize outside of that circle. He was an erratic driver—he’ d been in several car accidents. He and his friends liked to drive luxury cars, but they’d buy old, broken-down ones and fix them up. He liked to listen to a Russian singer called Mr. Credo, who sings in a fake North Caucasus accent about buying drugs from the Taliban.

    Ibragim was the eldest of 12 children—his father, Abdulbaki Todashev, had two wives. The family was on the move constantly in the chaos of war-torn Chechnya. After the wars, Ibragim attended college in Russia for three years before leaving in 2008. He arrived in Boston with a student visa (though he would never attend school here), and shortly thereafter received asylum.

    Ibragim was welcomed into Boston’s insular Chechnyan community. Tamerlan was one of his first friends. They worked out together, and went clubbing. But it seems he never socialized with Tamerlan’s many American friends. He most likely knew Tamerlan’s friend Brendan, though, because the three of them once lived within a few blocks of one another around Inman Square, and they all trained at the Wai Kru gym.

    According to owner John Allan, Tamerlan introduced Ibragim to the gym shortly after Ibragim first arrived in Boston in 2008. Allan remembers them praying together before training. “[Ibragim’s] English was horrific, and it was really hard to communicate with him,” Allan recalled. “In the beginning I assumed the fights and problems were related to language. But later I learned he was just very hotheaded.” For some reason, Allan said, the word “motherfucker” would incite in Ibragim an inconsolable rage. “He would lose it. He would just lose it. He would be ready to fight 17 people and not care if he would win or lose. Sometimes it wouldn’t even be directed to him.”

    In 2010 Ibragim was working for a medical-transport company when he got into a verbal argument with another driver in traffic on Tremont Street. By the time police arrived, he was out of the car, being held back by several bystanders as he screamed, “You say something about my mother! I will kill you!”

    Ibragim met his wife, Reni Manukyan, when she came to visit his roommate in May 2010. He was 24; she was 20. They exchanged phone numbers, and when she went home to suburban Atlanta, they began a courtship via text message. The relationship moved fast. By July, Reni, an Armenian Christian, had converted to Islam and married Ibragim; a few months later Ibragim moved in with her in Georgia. But he had trouble finding work, and came back to Boston in the summer of 2011 to work at another medical-transport company. Reni came to visit that July to watch him fight a match (he lost). She remembered that his friend Tamerlan called frequently during that visit. Reni told reporters that Ibragim left Boston in August; she told me she had a bank statement that proves he was in Atlanta the day after the murders, but she said her lawyers advised her not to show it to me.

    By early 2012, Ibragim had moved to Orlando alone. A year later, when the bombs went off in Boston, he was living with a girlfriend in a condo complex located between Universal Studios and a swamp. A month later, the FBI shot him dead.

    Anonymous FBI sources gave numerous accounts of Ibragim’s death to the press, managing to be both vague and contradictory. The agency claimed that, just before being shot, Ibragim had been sitting at a table, about to write a statement that would implicate both himself and Tamerlan in the Waltham murders. In some reports, he lunged at an FBI agent with a knife, while others said he used a pole or a broomstick. It was an agonizing development: The FBI claimed he had been killed at precisely the moment he was about to give the answers so many of us had been waiting for.

    Whatever occurred in Ibragim’s apartment the night he was shot dead, his death put the FBI on the defensive. The agency quashed the coroner’s report, leading media outlets and the American Civil Liberties Union to call for an independent investigation. On its editorial page, the Globe declared that “the agency’s credibility is on the line” due to its lack of accountability in Ibragim’s death. Ibragim’s father accused the agency of “premeditated murder” and released photos of his son’s bullet-ridden corpse, showing that he’d been shot in the top of the head—even though the FBI contended that one of its agents had fired in self-defense. Instead of providing answers, the FBI’s investigation of Ibragim had turned into a sudden dead end.

    Bellie was infuriated. “Oh, I was so angry,” she said. “That was just horrible, because here we had an opportunity, they were starting to make connections and tie people and find out more information… and the man that could’ve given us answers is no longer available to us.”

    She added, “Where is there for us to go?”

    But there was at least one person who might know more about Ibragim. At the time of his death, he had been living with a woman named Tatiana Gruzdeva. I found her on Facebook: a slight 19-year-old with bleached blond hair and huge green eyes. She posted a lot of selfies. I sent her a friend request. On the night of September 18, she accepted it.

    We corresponded for a few minutes, and then she sent me her number. When I dialed, she picked up right away. Her voice sounded small, but she talked rapid-fire, her Russian accent thick but understandable. I told her I was a reporter, and that I wanted to hear her story.

    Two days later, I flew to Orlando to meet her.

    By the front door of 6022 Peregrine Avenue, a wire statue of a cow held a pink sign with the word “Welcome.” The apartment was all one room, with a lofted bed surrounded by a waist-high wall. Tatiana invited me in, and I looked around, taking in the sliver of a linoleum kitchen, distinguished from the carpeted living room by a small island. Tatiana slept in an upstairs loft, in a bed covered in stuffed animals, watched over by a poster of Muhammad Ali. The back wall was all windows, looking out on a black pond a few yards off, where a bale of turtles broke the surface to take in the evening air. Tatiana pointed out the place in the living room where the carpet had been cut out, because it had been stained with Ibragim’s blood.

    She had met Ibragim through a mutual friend, Khusen Taramov. Then she moved in. “First it was just friends,” she said, “and after, we starting having relationship and we were sleeping together like boyfriend and girlfriend.” She cooked him meals. Together they adopted a cat, Masia. “It was like a small family, me and him and the cat, he was like a little baby for us.”

    Tatiana knew that Ibragim had been married to Reni. She believed they were divorced.

    After the Boston bombings, Tatiana recalled, Ibragim seemed upset. “He didn’t tell me it was his friend, he just was so sad. I said, ‘What happen with you?’ He said, ‘Nothing.’ Long time he don’t want to tell me. And after, he tell me, ‘My friend is dead.’”

    The day after Tamerlan was identified as a marathon bombing suspect, Tatiana was washing the dishes when Ibragim stepped outside. Then she heard shouts outside the house: Get down! Get down! She saw Ibragim on the ground, surrounded by six or seven men. She didn’t know who they were, because they weren’t wearing uniforms. She says they told her they were FBI agents.

    They handcuffed Ibragim and made him sit in the middle of the room, and began questioning him about the Boston bombings, asking him what he knew and where he was on the day of the attack. Tatiana spoke up: “He was with me, he was in the house, we didn’t do anything wrong,” she told the agents.

    “They just kept asking again and again, the same questions,” she said. They asked if he knew Tamerlan Tsarnaev. He replied that the two of them had been friends. Tatiana said this was the first time she had heard the name.

    Eventually the FBI left with Ibragim, confiscating his phones and computers. About six hours later, Tatiana said, Ibragim came home, reassuring her that everything was okay. The next day, she said, agents returned their electronics.

    As best as I can tell, the FBI arrived on Ibragim’s doorstep looking for a terrorist. The marathon bombings had been the largest act of terrorism on American soil since 9/11, and if there were any chance that the Tsarnaevs had ties to a terrorist organization, federal agents had to find it. Wrapping up a drug murder was not their top priority.

    For the next month, Ibragim and Tatiana were under intense surveillance. Agents intercepted Ibragim’s wife, Reni, in an airport and questioned her for five hours; she was later interviewed several more times. They even tracked down his old Boston roommate.

    Meanwhile, Tatiana said, agents contacted the couple regularly on the phone, visited their home, and on several occasions called them into the local field office for more questioning. They asked Ibragim about a call from Tamerlan a month before the bombings, just after Ibragim had undergone knee surgery. “He asked how he feels after surgery and Ibragim tells him, ‘I’m better, what about you? How is your family?’ So they would talk just a little bit and that’s it,” Tatiana said. At some point, Ibragim deleted the call from his phone’s memory. “FBI asked him, ‘Why did you delete this phone call?’” Tatiana said. “And he said, ‘I was scared.’”

    When Ibragim and Tatiana left the house, he would point out cars to her. “When we go to the workplace or we go hang out with him, he show me in the street, ‘Look, look, they’re following us,’” Tatiana recalled.

    On May 4, according to an arrest report, Ibragim got into a fistfight over a parking space, beating a man unconscious. He fled the scene in his white Mercedes, pursued by Orange County Sheriff’s deputies. When they caught him, Officer Anthony Riccaboni got out of the car and drew his gun. Ibragim put his hands up, and Riccaboni got a good look at him.

    “I could see the features of the suspect’s ears. I immediately recognized the marks on his ears as a cage fighter/jujitsu fighter,” Riccaboni later wrote in his report. “I told this suspect if he tried to fight with us I would shoot him.”

    He made the suspect lie on the ground, but when he got up, he told Riccaboni something unexpected.

    “Once on his feet, the suspect commented that the vehicles behind us are FBI agents that have been following him,” Riccaboni wrote. “I noticed 3 (three) vehicles with dark tint. These vehicles began to leave the area. I noticed one vehicle was driven by a male, had a computer stand and appeared to be talking on a radio.”

    If Ibragim was right, FBI agents had just watched him beat a man bloody without intervening.

    Then they turned the pressure up higher.

    About two and a half weeks after Ibragim was first interrogated, the FBI called him back to their office yet again. While he was being interviewed, Tatiana said, two agents took her into an office, where they questioned her for three hours. At first they continued to ask her about the Boston bombings. The agents wanted to know if Ibragim was planning another attack.

    “They asked me, ‘Can you tell us when he will do something?’” Tatiana recalled. “I said, ‘No! I can’t!’ Because he wasn’t doing anything, and I didn’t know anything.”

    Then they brought up a new topic: a triple murder.

    “They said, ‘We think he did something else, before.’ They said he killed three people in Boston 2011 with a knife. I said, ‘It’s not true! I can’t believe it.’ You know, I was living with him seven months, and we have a cat.”

    Throughout the course of my reporting, Tatiana is the only one of Ibragim’s associates who recalled being questioned about the Waltham murders before Ibragim’s death.

    When agents didn’t get the answers they wanted, Tatiana said, they told her they would call immigration officials to detain her. Her visa had expired weeks before. “I said, ‘Come on guys, you cannot do this! Because all this two and a half weeks, you know my visa was expired and you didn’t do anything. And [now] because you need me and I say I don’t want to help you, you just call to immigration?’ And they said, ‘Yeah, that’s right.’ And they called immigration and immigration came and they took me and they put me in the jail.”

    For a week, she said, she was kept in an immigration detention facility. She was allowed to talk to Ibragim every day on the phone. She said he told her that when he had come to find her in the lobby the day she was detained, FBI agents mocked him, saying, “Where’s your girlfriend?”

    He told her he was so angry, he felt like hitting them for lying to him and stealing her away.

    Later that week, the facility had a visiting day, she said. Ibragim came to see her.

    “He kissed me, he hugged me like never, it was so sweet, like always. And he tell me, ‘I will marry you when you get out of here, or in the jail, whatever. If we can marry in the jail, we will marry in the jail.’”

    On May 21, the last night of his life, Ibragim was hanging out with friends when the FBI called him again. It was an agent Ibragim’s friends were by now familiar with, but knew only by his first name: Chris. The agent told Ibragim that men from Boston were here to ask him a few questions. Ibragim got nervous. He was afraid of a setup, he told his friend Khusen Taramov.

    “And I said, ‘All right, if you don’t want to do it, don’t do it. But if you don’t do it, they’re not gonna leave you alone. They’re gonna get more suspicious.’ And so he decided to go, and he wanted me to go with him,” Khusen told reporters later. Despite his temper and proclivity toward violence, Ibragim had stayed relatively calm under weeks of questioning and scrutiny. But now, heading to meet the “men from Boston,” his demeanor changed. Ibragim gave Khusen his family’s phone number back in Chechnya, and told him about the $4,000 he had in his apartment, inside his jacket pocket. In case he got locked up, Khusen thought. Then Ibragim said something strange: “Worst-case scenario,” he told Khusen cryptically, “forgive me.”

    When Khusen and Ibragim got to the apartment, Chris was with three other officers—an FBI agent from Boston, and two Massachusetts state troopers. Orlando police were on the scene as well.

    The officers took Ibragim into the apartment and Chris said he needed to interview Khusen outside.

    It was 7:30 p.m. At the same time, at two different locations in Georgia, agents were interviewing Reni yet again, and questioning Reni’s mother, Elena Teyer, for the first time.

    Agent Chris asked Khusen a few questions, “Like what do you think about bombings, or do you know these guys, blah blah blah, or what is my views on certain stuff. You know what I mean, lotta stuff, different questions,” Khusen said. Chris didn’t mention a triple murder.

    Khusen waited outside the house for four hours. Then at 11:30 p.m., he was told to leave, and that the agents would drop off Ibragim back at the plaza where the friends often hung out.

    What happened next inside the condo is known only to the officers who were there.

    Pictures later released by Ibragim’s family, of his inert body, show that he was shot four times in the chest, twice in the arm, and once in the top of the head.

    Neighbors remember hearing shots a little after midnight. One of them looked out the window to see the parking lot filled with police cruisers. Then he heard an ambulance coming.

    At Glades County Detention Center, in Moore Haven, corrections officers were suddenly hustling Tatiana from an immigration jail to a cell in solitary confinement.

    She didn’t know why they had moved her. When she asked, they said, “We’ll tell you tomorrow in the morning.”

    The next morning immigration officers came to her cell. They told her Ibragim was dead.

    “They said, ‘He’s gone.’

    “I said, ‘Come on, what do you mean? That’s not true.’

    “They said, ‘He died yesterday.’

    “I said, ‘No! I just talked with him.’

    “They said, ‘We have a paper, and it says that he’s dead, and you can make a phone call.’”

    She called Khusen. He told her it was true: Ibragim was dead. “And I’m screaming. I have panic attack. I realize, I realize, he is really dead. And it’s true, you know, it’s true. And I will not see him anymore. It’s not like a movie, it’s not like we broke up or something, I will not see him anymore, for all my life. And everything is flush in my heart, my heart was broken, because me and Ibragim, we had a plan, we had a plan to be together, we had a plan to have a family…. And now he’s not here and we’re not going to be together anymore.”

    She told me she was given a sedative, and was kept in solitary confinement for four more days before being returned to an immigration jail. Her detainment stretched for months longer. Finally, on August 9, she was released. Ibragim’s friend Ashurmamad Miraliev came to pick her up, along with Ibragim’s father, who had flown to Florida from Chechnya.

    They drove her back to the apartment she had shared with Ibragim, where he had been killed. “They said, ‘Don’t worry, the house is clean, and we cleaned everything.’”

    But the cat, Masia, was gone. With Ibragim dead, and Tatiana in jail, there was no one to feed it, and it had run away into the swamp.

    When FBI agents came to tell Reni Manukyan that her husband was dead, they claimed they had hard evidence of his guilt in the Waltham murders. “We have DNA that proves he was involved in that triple murder,” she remembered them saying. “The only thing I was telling them is, ‘This is not true, this cannot be true.’”

    With the exception of Ibragim’s alleged confession, no agency has ever offered an official explanation of how it connected either him or Tamerlan to the Waltham murders. Reni’s account is the only one that even suggests the FBI has physical evidence linking her husband to the crime. Last July, the New York Times quoted an anonymous official suggesting that DNA evidence may have linked Tamerlan to the crime scene. But as for Ibragim, the official said, they made their case based merely on “a lot of circumstantial pieces.”

    If, in fact, the FBI had only circumstantial evidence against Ibragim at the time they shot him, it might explain what happened next. Investigators who had previously asked Ibragim’s friends only about the bombings suddenly returned to ask them about the murders. Even though their suspects were both dead, the case remained open. After Ibragim’s death, the FBI continued its take-no-prisoners approach: Several of Ibragim’s friends found themselves detained, interrogated, and ultimately deported.

    The first to go was Tatiana. On October 1, after I’d published an account of my interview with her, she called me collect from Glades County Detention Center. She’d been arrested by Immigration and Customs Enforcement officers and placed back in solitary confinement—and, she says, immigration agents told her repeatedly that she was about to be deported for talking to Boston magazine. By October 11, she was on a plane back to Russia. An official from ICE confirmed that Tatiana had been in the country legally on what’s called a “deferred action” extension of her expired visa. The official could not tell me why she had been deported.

    Others felt the scrutiny of the FBI as well. Several of Ibragim’s Orlando friends worked in a pizza shop; the owner told me that after the FBI came to question him, he fired them. Reni’s mother, Elena—a noncommissioned officer with the U.S. Army—says she was told that she would be flagged as a security risk, preventing a promotion. Khusen left the United States in mid-June, to attend Ibragim’s funeral in Chechnya, but when he attempted to return to the U.S. in December, according to several sources, he was blocked from boarding a plane, despite having a green card.

    In one case, I was able to catch a glimpse of how the agency was maneuvering behind the scenes—and how, after Ibragim’s death, its focus seemed to shift from looking for a terror cell to investigating the Waltham murders. When it came to Ibragim’s friend Ashurmamad Miraliev, the agency worked clandestinely with local, state, and federal agencies to manufacture a charge against him, interrogate him without a lawyer present, and ultimately get him out of the country.

    After Ibragim’s death, Ashurmamad had come to live with Tatiana, supporting them both with pizza-delivery work. On September 18, while Ashurmamad was driving Tatiana to an appointment with her immigration officer, he was pulled over on an expired driver’s license. But this was no ordinary traffic stop. Between five and seven unmarked law-enforcement vehicles were present; Ashurmamad says FBI agents and local police took him out of his car and escorted him to the Orlando police headquarters. Tatiana never saw him again.

    Contacted later, Orlando Police Sergeant Jim Young looked up the arrest record and said it looked like a routine traffic stop—with no mention of FBI involvement. But Ashurmamad says he was questioned by the FBI for hours—he’s not sure exactly how long—and was denied requests to speak to his attorney. (The FBI has declined to comment on this case, but a Tampa Field Bureau public-affairs official told me it is their policy to question individuals “with their consent, or in the presence of their attorney.”)

    Agents had previously interviewed Ashurmamad and two of his roommates two days before Ibragim died. They questioned him about his own religious beliefs, the Boston Marathon bombings, and about Ibragim. Now, four months later, the interrogation was different. This time, agents were mostly interested in Ibragim and his involvement in the triple murder in Waltham. They wanted to know if there was someone else who might have been involved in the killings, and who else might have information.

    But after hours of questioning, when Ashurmamad asked to leave, the agents told him he was going to jail—on a state charge they claimed to have nothing to do with. That turned out to be an outstanding warrant for a witness-tampering charge. It was the first Ashurmamad had heard of it—but the next thing he knew, he was behind bars.

    The trumped-up charge stemmed from an incident the previous summer, when his friend Ibragim had gotten into a fight at a hookah bar with a manager named Youness Dammou. The next day, Youness walked into the pizza shop next door, where Ashurmamad worked. A screaming match ensued; Ashurmamad was angry that Youness had called police after the fight. At the time, police weren’t able to identify Ibragim as the assailant, and Youness never mentioned his confrontation with Ashurmamad, so the case was closed. Then almost a year later, on May 17—five days before Ibragim was shot—the case was suddenly reopened. I wanted to know why.

    I found Youness working in an Orlando strip mall. He told me it hadn’t been his idea to reopen the case. Instead, he had been approached by an FBI agent in May, who took him to meet with an Osceola County Sheriff’s Department detective in an unmarked cruiser in a Burger King parking lot. The agent sat in the front seat, Youness sat in the passenger seat, and the detective sat in the back. They showed him a picture of Ibragim. They told him about another fight Ibragim had been in recently—the incident in which agents apparently watched him beat up a man over a parking space without intervening. When he heard about the other assault, Youness was eager to press charges.

    The law-enforcement officers did not mention that Ibragim was involved in a larger investigation. A few days later, however, Youness saw Ibragim’s face on the news and learned his aggressor was a murder suspect—and dead.

    That was the last he heard about it until the end of August, when the detective came back with another request: The last time they’d met, Youness had recounted the incident with the man who’d screamed at him in the pizza shop, Ashurmamad Miraliev. (Youness hadn’t actually known the man’s name; in the case file the detective wrote that an “Agent Sykes” provided the identification.) The detective said Ashurmamad could be charged with a crime. Would Youness like to pursue charges against him? At first Youness said he wasn’t so sure, but then he agreed.

    So the FBI had been matchmaking: They had helped the sheriff’s department go fishing on a long-closed case to find a victim and a charge with which they could pressure or detain first Ibragim, and later Ashurmamad. The witness-tampering charge the FBI brought against Ashurmamad was so flimsy that it was dropped in just a month.

    And yet it didn’t matter. Although he had never been to Boston and never met the Tsarnaevs, Ashurmamad was nonetheless flagged—according to a note on the booking sheet—“ON TERRORIST WATCH LIST/PLACED PROTECTIVE CUSTODY AND HIGH RISK. HOUSE ALONE.” Ashurmamad was taken from the Orlando Police Department to the Osceola County jail, where he was kept alone in an 8-by-10 room. To meet with his lawyers, he had to have his hands and wrists shackled and be chained to the ground. Ashurmamad told me there were no windows, the light was always on, and he was always cold. He was there for a month until the tampering case was dropped. But he wasn’t released. His student visa had expired, and he’d missed a court date while he was in jail. So he was moved directly to an immigration detention facility, and on November 4, he was ordered to be deported back to Tajikistan.

    Nine months after Ibragim’s death, the FBI still hasn’t put the Waltham case to rest—or offered any further insight into the death of the man who might have closed it. Back in January, FBI director James Comey claimed the agency had completed its report on Ibragim’s shooting and was “eager” to share it—but almost two months later, the report somehow still hadn’t been released. The Florida prosecutor’s office was also investigating the shooting—but at the end of 2013, shortly after speaking with the Department of Justice, it announced the report would be delayed.

    When I spoke to Ibragim’s father in February, he said he was waiting to hear the FBI’s findings before deciding whether to file a wrongful-death lawsuit. But that account is unlikely to shed significant new light on Ibragim’s death: The FBI has a long, unbroken history of clearing its agents of wrongdoing in shooting incidents, the New York Times found in a review of 150 such cases over the past two decades. And according to WBUR’s David Boeri—quoting unnamed “law-enforcement sources familiar with accounts of what happened” that night—the FBI has little to add to the story it peddled to reporters on background shortly after the killing. Boeri’s sources told him that during the interrogation, Ibragim admitted to being present at the crime scene but “blamed Tsarnaev for the murders.” He also quoted law-enforcement sources saying that Ibragim had knocked over a table and come at the FBI agent with a pipe.

    According to a statement by the Middlesex County DA’s office, the triple-homicide case is “open and active” and state police, Waltham police, and the FBI are conducting a “thorough, far-reaching” investigation. “This investigation has not concluded and is by no means closed,” it said.

    They have not updated the statement in nine months.

    In late September, Aria Weissman and Dylan Mess invited me to accompany them to the annual Garden of Peace ceremony, which is held beside a dry, stone-lined riverbed near the State House to honor Massachusetts homicide victims. As she does every year, Massachusetts Attorney General Martha Coakley presided over the event. “We have more people who are here to listen and to find some peace tonight,” she said to the crowd that evening.

    Afterward, Aria, Dylan, and I approached Coakley and asked her why there hadn’t been any progress in the Waltham case. “We haven’t been getting any answers,” Aria told Coakley.

    Coakley was calm and respectful. “I know how frustrating and how difficult it is for you,” she told us. The triple murder, Coakley explained, was not her investigation—it was the Middlesex County DA’s concern. She said that she could and would follow up to make sure state police were working with Waltham police on the murder case. “The Waltham PD and the state police should be working together,” she told us.

    But two weeks later, Detective Patrick Hart of the Waltham police, who has been investigating the murders since before the Boston Marathon bombings, told me his department had not been contacted by Coakley’s office. “No one here knows,” he said at the time. “I think I would have been told.”

    Two days after I reported on Coakley’s exchange with Aria and Dylan, a victims’ advocate from the Middlesex County DA’s office reached out to Aria. The advocate said officials from the DA’s office were looking to sit down with the victims’ families and provide more information soon. But they never did.

    After Ibragim was killed, Bellie Hacker’s friends congratulated her. The case had been solved—she must be so relieved!

    “I’d say, ‘Don’t pay any attention, nothing is solved,’” she said.

    She’s still waiting to be shown evidence—to know, finally, what truly happened to Erik. “I was told that once they knew something, someone would knock on my door in the middle of the night,” she said. “I was told that I would be contacted even in the middle of the night.”

    State officials once told Bellie that they were waiting for a lead to shake loose, maybe from another case.

    They were right. But by then it was too late.

    By Susan Zalkind | Boston Magazine | March 2014

    Find this story at 7 March 2014

    Copyright © 2014 Metrocorp, Inc. All Rights Reserved.

    Stakeknife: Spy linked to 18 murders, BBC Panorama finds

    The British spy Stakeknife – described by an Army general as “our golden egg” – is now the subject of a £35m criminal inquiry called Operation Kenova.

    The inquiry has been triggered by a classified report which Northern Ireland’s Director of Public Prosecutions Barra McGrory QC has told Panorama “made for very disturbing and chilling reading”.

    What Stakeknife actually did has been wreathed in speculation since he was identified in 2003 as Belfast bricklayer Freddie Scappaticci.
    The one stand-out fact, however, has not been in doubt: for over a decade Scappaticci maintained his cover in the IRA by interrogating fellow British agents to the point where they confessed and were then shot.
    One British spy was preparing other British spies for execution.
    Step back over Stakeknife, PPS deputy asked
    Chief investigator calls for witnesses
    New investigation into Stakeknife launched
    Stakeknife linked to up to 50 murders
    And there were a lot of executions: 30 shot as spies by the IRA’s so-called Nutting Squad which, I am told, Scappaticci eventually came to head.
    Panorama has learned that Scappaticci is linked to at least 18 of those “executions”.
    ‘Draconian injunction’
    Not all the victims would have been registered agents like him who produced the best intelligence.
    Some were akin to “informers” – people with close access to IRA members, or who passed on what they saw and heard to the security forces.
    A few were innocent of the IRA’s charge of spying.
    Still, the spectacle of one British agent heading an IRA unit dedicated to rooting out and shooting other British spies is so extraordinary that I’ve often wondered how exactly the state benefitted by the intelligence services having tolerated this for the whole of the 1980s.
    The obvious person to ask is Scappaticci himself – but a draconian injunction stops journalists from approaching him, even to the point of making any enquiries about where he now lives or what he does.
    The Chief Constable of Bedfordshire Police, Jon Boutcher (left), is leading the investigation with the delegated authority of the PSNI Chief Constable George Hamilton
    Image caption

    Scappaticci was recruited by a section within military intelligence called the Force Research Unit, or FRU.
    I’m told the Army have assessed his intelligence as having saved some 180 lives.
    Can Scappaticci’s intelligence have been so valuable that the sacrifice of other agents was a price worth paying to maintain his cover?
    It’s not quite that simple.
    Had the cavalry been sent in every time Scappaticci tipped off his handlers about who was at risk, he himself wouldn’t have lasted long.
    Yet protecting him also meant the murders he knew about – or was even involved in – were never properly investigated, driving a “coach and horses” through the criminal justice system, according to Mr McGrory.
    Barra McGrory
    Image caption
    Barra McGrory said the report made for “disturbing and chilling reading”
    Also, the Army’s assessment that Stakeknife saved 180 lives doesn’t translate to the number of actual lives saved as a direct consequence of actioning Stakeknife’s intelligence by, for example, interdicting an IRA unit on active service.
    I understand that figure of 180 is partly the army’s guesstimate of lives that would have been lost had Stakeknife’s intelligence not led to arrests and the recovery of weapons.
    Of course Stakeknife also contributed significantly to “building a picture” of the IRA, an insight much valued by the intelligence services.
    An ex-FRU operative with access to his intelligence told me: “He knew all of the main players and picked up a tremendous amount of peripheral information.
    “As the [IRA] campaign changed and the political side became more important again he was highly placed to comment on that.”
    ‘Cunning and resilience’
    No doubt, but it’s hard to quantify “picture building” in terms of actual lives saved.
    One thing is for sure: leading a double life at the heart of an IRA unit with a Gestapo-like hold over its rank and file would have required cunning – and resilience.
    Especially since Scappaticci told his army handlers he disliked gratuitous violence.
    He seems to have managed the violence bit though, even when it was close to home.
    I’m told that in January 1988, Scappaticci sent a young boy up to the home of Anthony McKiernan, asking him to call by to see Scappaticci.
    The Scappaticcis and McKiernans were friends – children from both families had sleepovers.
    That was the last McKiernan’s wife and children saw of him. Accused by Scappaticci’s Nutting Squad of being a spy – something the family strongly deny – some 24 hours later, he was shot in the head.
    Bond films
    Unsurprisingly, Scappaticci’s ex-IRA comrades paint a less flattering picture than his handlers.
    They say he was a prodigious consumer of pornography, loved James Bond movies and – although he was on the IRA’s Belfast Brigade staff – was never a “true republican.”
    That might explain why, after Scappaticci was released from detention without trial in December 1975, he drifted away from the republican movement and got involved in a building trade VAT scam.
    There were family holidays in Florida.
    But then he was arrested by the police and agreed to work for the fraud squad as an informer.
    His former IRA comrades also speak of a man with an intimidating manner, handy with his fists and a large ego who liked to be at the centre of things.
    His appointment to the IRA’s Nutting Squad – a job most IRA members ran a mile from – certainly gave him that opportunity.
    It provided Scappaticci with unrivalled access to what the IRA high command were thinking and their war plans.
    Freddie Scappaticci
    Image caption
    Mr Scappaticci left Northern Ireland when identified by the media as Stakeknife, in 2003
    It also gave him access to the names of new IRA recruits on the pretext of vetting them, plus details of IRA operations on the pretext of debriefing IRA members released from police custody to establish whether they gave away too much to their interrogators.
    That explains why military intelligence was so eager to recruit Scappaticci when, in September 1979, he graduated to the FRU from spying for the fraud squad.
    He got an agent number – 6126 – and a codename. Stakeknife.
    His luck ran out in January 1990 after police agent Sandy Lynch was rescued from the clutches of the nutting squad.
    The police thought Lynch was about to be shot, Scappaticci having got him to confess. The ordinary CID who did not know Scappaticci was a spy found a thumb print in the house where Lynch had been held.
    Scappaticci fled to Dublin. However, a senior police officer who was in the know advised the FRU to get Scappaticci to concoct an alibi for his thumbprint.
    It worked. On his return to Belfast in the autumn of 1992, Scappaticci was arrested and then released without charge.
    Sidelined
    His handlers hoped he could return to spying. But by now the IRA were suspicious and removed him from the security unit.
    With Scappaticci’s access to IRA secrets gone, the FRU formally stood him down as an agent in 1995.
    How did he escape the same treatment at the hands of the IRA that he had helped mete out to others?
    Probably because the sight of his body dumped on a roadside would have provoked a slew of questions about those IRA leaders who appointed him to protect the IRA from spies like him – and who also ignored warnings from their more sceptical comrades along the border that “Scap” was not to be trusted.
    That did not stop the IRA in Belfast from putting Scap in his place.
    After being sidelined, he agreed to help the staunchly republican Braniff family clear the name of a brother, Anthony, who was shot as a spy in 1981. He was eventually exonerated by the IRA.
    But when Scappaticci spoke up for Anthony at a private meeting of republicans, to his embarrassment, the IRA’s most senior man in Belfast, Sean “Spike” Murray suddenly appeared and slapped him down.
    When Scap was eventually outed as Stakeknife by a former FRU operative in 2003, he was spirited to England where MI5 told him the IRA knew he had been a spy.
    Stakeknife’s gamble
    He rejected MI5’s offer of protective custody, flew straight back to Belfast and sought a meeting with the IRA.
    He gambled on not being shot because he calculated the IRA now had every reason to support a denial that he was a spy – even though he knew they didn’t believe him.
    His gamble was based on the fact that the IRA’s political wing Sinn Fein were now engaged in the peace process.
    Scappaticci calculated that were the IRA to admit they’d long suspected he was a spy, it would undermine the official line that they’d fought the British to an honourable draw.
    Any such admission would provoke the rank and file into questioning whether the IRA had been pushed into peace, paralysed by the penetration of agents like him.
    His gamble paid off.
    After meeting two of the most senior representatives of the IRA leadership, Martin “Duckster” Lynch and Padraic Wilson, I’m told Scappaticci and the IRA came to an understanding: Scappaticci would issue a firm denial which the IRA would not contest.
    To this day, that’s been the IRA’s official position – even though, as they say in Belfast, the dogs in the street know it’s nonsense.
    Once again, Agent 6126 had relied on his wits and native cunning.
    Whether the 71-year-old Scappaticci now outwits the 50 detectives trawling over everything he did, what his handlers allowed him to do, and what the IRA leaders authorised him to do, is another question.
    You might say he’s the spy who knows too much – because he knows the answers to all these questions.

    By John Ware
    Reporter, BBC Panorama
    11 April 2017
    Find this story at 11 April 2017

    watch the documentary
    Copyright http://www.bbc.com/

    Stakeknife: double agent in IRA ‘was given alibi by senior British officials’

    Panorama documentary claims agent who leaked secrets to British army is
    linked to 18 murders in 1980s and 90s

    One of Britain’s most important agents inside the IRA has been linked to
    18 murders and was provided with an alibi by a senior police officer to
    avoid getting him arrested during the Troubles, it has emerged.
    Army whistleblower to testify on IRA double agent Stakeknife
    Read more

    The Guardian can also reveal that the informer codenamed “Stakeknife”
    reported directly to the late Martin McGuinness in the 1980s and 90s
    when the man who would become Northern Ireland’s deputy first minister
    was the IRA’s northern commander and army council member.

    Stakeknife, whose real name is believed to be Freddie Scappaticci, was
    the IRA’s chief spycatcher, briefing McGuinness, all the while betraying
    some of the most important secrets to the British army.

    Further light is shone on the career of Stakeknife in the BBC Panorama
    documentary titled The Spy in the IRA to be broadcast on Tuesday night.

    The programme focuses on Scappaticci’s role as head of the IRA’s
    so-called “nutting squad”, whose task was to smoke out, interrogate and
    in most cases kill members suspected of being informers.

    Panorama claims to have linked Stakeknife directly to 18 murders of IRA
    members accused of being agents, with Scappaticci’s unit responsible for
    30 deaths overall.

    In the film, a retired Royal Ulster Constabulary DI, Tim McGregor,
    claims that a superior officer in the force thwarted his and his
    colleagues’ efforts to arrest Scappaticci. McGregor and fellow RUC
    officers wanted to question Scappaticci after a forensic investigation
    found his thumbprint in a Belfast house where the police believed one of
    their agents was about to be shot by the IRA.

    The programme alleges that an army report stated a senior police officer
    told Scappaticci’s handlers about the pending arrest and an alibi was
    concocted by them to prevent Stakeknife being taken into custody.

    McGregor tells Panorama that without that alibi Scappaticci would have
    been arrested and charged in connection with the other informer’s
    abduction.
    IRA informer accuses police of abandoning him to die
    Read more

    Northern Ireland’s director of public prosecutions, Barra McGrory, who
    was once a solicitor for the president of Sinn Féin, Gerry Adams,
    described any move to “allow” certain informers to die in order to
    promote and protect Stakeknife within IRA’s ranks as having “driven a
    coach and horses” through the criminal justice system.

    McGrory refused to comment on allegations aired in the programme over
    the retirement of the deputy director of public prosecutions after
    reviewing her decision in 2007 not to prosecute Scappaticci over claims
    he committed perjury in court. The Belfast-born son of Italian
    immigrants denied in court he was Stakeknife.

    The then senior DPP lawyer, now deputy DPP, who made that decision was
    Pamela Aitchison but her former boss McGrory tells the programme he
    could not discuss “personnel issues”.

    A former RUC assistant chief constable, Raymond White, also declines to
    state how many of his agents or informers he lost while Scappaticci led
    the IRA’s internal security unit.

    Meanwhile, the whistleblower who first exposed the existence of
    Stakeknife back in 2003 accused the agent’s associates of “turning a
    blind eye” to the corruption of the criminal justice system.

    Ian Hurst, a former military intelligence operative for the army’s Force
    Research Unit, told the Guardian: “The political class created this and
    other similar intelligence problems. That said, they needed and relied
    upon weak-minded or selfish people in sensitive positions to facilitate
    cover-ups.

    “The aim of the state cover-up was to degrade the available evidence and
    make it almost impossible to portion blame upon culpable individuals.
    The state succeeded on both points,” he said.
    ‘Stakeknife’: police spy in IRA to be investigated over murders
    Read more

    The “Stakeknife” scandal is being investigated by an independent police
    team led by former counter-terrorism detective John Boutcher, now chief
    constable of Bedfordshire. Boutcher’s Operation Kenova has a budget of
    £30m but has so far been unable to interview Ian Hurst, the man who
    first made public the existence of Stakeknife.

    A Ministry of Defence court injunction still bars Hurst from talking to
    police officers about his knowledge of Stakeknife from his time as a FRU
    officer.

    Another military intelligence officer who operated in the region when
    Stakeknife was being managed as a high-grade agent, compared the IRA
    relationship between Scappaticci and McGuinness respectively to that of
    the “operation manager” and the “managing director” in terms of deciding
    on the approach to suspected spies and their fate once unmasked.

    Henry McDonald Ireland correspondent
    Tuesday 11 April 2017 06.02 BST
    Find this story at 11 April 2017

    Copyright The Guardian

    TRIAL AND TERROR The U.S. government has prosecuted 796 people for terrorism since the 9/11 attacks. Most of them never even got close to committing an act of violence.

    The U.S. government segregates terrorism cases into two categories — domestic and international. This database contains cases classified as international terrorism, though many of the people charged never left the United States or communicated with anyone outside the country.

    Since the 9/11 attacks, most of the 796 terrorism defendants prosecuted by the U.S. Department of Justice have been charged with material support for terrorism, criminal conspiracy, immigration violations, or making false statements — vague, nonviolent offenses that give prosecutors wide latitude for scoring quick convictions or plea bargains. 523 defendants have pleaded guilty to charges, while the courts found 175 guilty at trial. Just 2 have been acquitted and 3 have seen their charges dropped or dismissed, giving the Justice Department a near-perfect record of conviction in terrorism cases.

    Today, 345 people charged with terrorism-related offenses are in custody in the United States, including 58 defendants who are awaiting trial and remain innocent until proven guilty.

    Very few terrorism defendants had the means or opportunity to commit an act of violence. The majority had no direct connection to terrorist organizations. Many were caught up in FBI stings, in which an informant or undercover agent posed as a member of a terrorist organization. The U.S. government nevertheless defines such cases as international terrorism.

    415 terrorism defendants have been released from custody, often with no provision for supervision or ongoing surveillance, suggesting that the government does not regard them as imminent threats to the homeland.

    A large proportion of the defendants who did have direct connections to terrorist groups were recruited as informants or cooperating witnesses and served little or no time in prison. At present, there have been 32 such cooperators. By contrast, many of the 296 defendants caught up in FBI stings have received decades in prison because they had no information or testimony to trade. They simply didn’t know any terrorists.

    DATA LAST UPDATED ON APRIL 20, 2017
    Find this story at 20 April 2017

    Copyright The Intercept

    THE RELEASED More Than 400 People Convicted of Terrorism in the U.S. Have Been Released Since 9/11

    Trial and TerrorTrial and Terror
    Part 1
    The U.S. government has prosecuted almost 800 people for terrorism since the 9/11 attacks. Most of them never committed an act of violence.

    OVER THE LAST 15 years, the U.S. government has quietly released more than 400 people convicted on international terrorism-related charges, according to a data analysis of federal terrorism prosecutions by The Intercept. Some were deported to other countries following their prison terms, but a large number of convicted terrorists are living in the United States. They could be your neighbors.

    The release of people convicted on terrorism-related charges with little if any monitoring by law enforcement might suggest U.S. government officials believe they can be fully rehabilitated following minor prison terms. A more likely explanation is that many of these so-called terrorists weren’t particularly dangerous in the first place.

    Among them is one of the Herald Square bombers, who plotted to attack the New York subway in 2004. Shahawar Matin Siraj and James Elshafay, egged on by informant Osama Eldawoody, conspired to plant bombs at the Herald Square station. They drew rough plans on napkins, surveilled the station, and discussed how they might acquire explosives. It was all talk. The two alleged bombers took different paths after their arrests. Siraj fought the charges and went to trial, where he was convicted and sentenced to 30 years in prison. He won’t be released until 2030. Elshafay pleaded guilty and received a comparably modest sentence of five years in prison and three years of supervised release. He’s been a free man since January 28, 2009.

    Or consider the case of Wassim I. Mazloum, who was part of an alleged terror cell in Toledo, Ohio, with Mohammad Zaki Amawi and Marwan Othman El-Hindi. The group’s leader was Darren Griffin, a former U.S. Army Special Forces member who became an informant for the Drug Enforcement Administration and FBI following a drug arrest. As part of a sting, Griffin trained the three men to use firearms, watched jihadi videos online with them, and conspired with Amawi in a half-baked plot to smuggle laptops from Jordan to Iraq. Mazloum, who was convicted at trial for his role, was released in April 2014.

    Others convicted on terrorism-related charges were more blustery than dangerous. Two of the men who operated the website RevolutionMuslim.com — Jesse Curtis Morton and Joseph Cohen — were released. Morton and Cohen (who went by Younus Abdullah Muhammad and Yousef Mohamid Al-Khattab, respectively) were converts to Islam and encouraged violence against various people, including Jewish-American community leaders and the creators of “South Park.” Cohen was released in August 2016. Morton became an FBI informant and was released in February 2015. He was a fellow at George Washington University’s Program on Extremism, which described him as a “reformed” extremist, until December 2016, when local police in Virginia arrested him for bringing crack cocaine to meet a prostitute. Because the drug and prostitution arrest violated his parole terms, Morton went back to prison — but he’s scheduled to be released again on April 23.

    Some of the more than 400 people convicted on terrorism-related charges and freed since 9/11 appear from government evidence to have been involved in genuine plots or to have been connected to dangerous actors. For example, Hassan Abu-Jihaad was a Navy signalman who was convicted at trial of providing material support to Al Qaeda by disclosing the location of the USS Benfold in an online forum. Using coded language, he also provided an FBI informant with information about the movements of U.S. Navy ships. He was released in January 2016.

    Still others are quietly reintegrating into society through halfway houses, or “residential re-entry management centers,” in the language of the U.S. Bureau of Prisons. Jamie Paulin-Ramirez, for instance, was once in the national spotlight as the co-conspirator of Colleen LaRose, better known by her online moniker, “JihadJane.” LaRose and Paulin-Ramirez were part of a small group that went to Ireland and plotted to murder Lars Vilks, a Swedish artist best known for his drawing of the Prophet Mohammed’s head on the body of a dog. In Ireland, Paulin-Ramirez married Ali Charaf Damache, who was arrested in Spain in December 2015 on a U.S. warrant alleging he was a terrorist recruiter. While Damache was fighting extradition from Spain, Paulin-Ramirez was finishing her prison term in a halfway house in Philadelphia, where she was released on March 21.

    IN THE WAR on terror, U.S. District Courts have represented the primary stage of what can fairly be described as national security theater. With a near-perfect record of conviction, the Justice Department since the 9/11 attacks has hauled into court nearly 800 people on terrorism-related charges. While Justice Department and FBI news releases and press conferences heralded the arrests of such defendants, the U.S. government has said precious little about the hundreds of people convicted on terrorism-related charges who have been released back into the United States or deported to their home countries. During the remainder of President Donald Trump’s first term in office, for example, 67 people convicted on terrorism-related charges are scheduled to be released, according to The Intercept’s data analysis.

    Those being released today, and the ones who will be released tomorrow, were yesterday examples the U.S. government held up as thwarted enemies caught by newly aggressive counterterrorism agents. One-fourth of those so far released were targets of FBI sting operations, in which an informant or undercover agent, posing as a terrorist operative, provided the means and opportunity for otherwise incapable individuals to move forward in terrorist plots. In congressional testimony, FBI Director James Comey and his predecessor, Robert Mueller, have specifically mentioned foiled plots from sting operations as examples of jobs well done, all part of a larger, ongoing pitch to justify to Congress and the public the more than $3 billion the FBI spends every year on counterterrorism efforts.

    The FBI declined to answer specific questions about the release of people convicted on terrorism-related charges and did not provide any information about programs or policies to monitor those who have been released. “The FBI’s mission is to stay ahead of threats to the U.S. and its interests in order to protect the American people and uphold the U.S. Constitution,” FBI spokesperson Carol Cratty said, offering instead a blanket statement. “It is our duty to follow up on information we receive by using all lawful investigative techniques and methods to ensure public safety.”

    The so-called Liberty City Seven case is indicative of how the U.S. government plays up the dangers of terrorism defendants when they are arrested but then never acknowledges that such purportedly dangerous individuals are routinely returned to their homes in the United States, in some cases just a few years after their arrests. As in other stings, the defendants in the Liberty City Seven case had no connection to terrorists. An undercover FBI informant, pretending to be an Al Qaeda agent, was the only alleged connection to terrorism. The case, one of the earliest of the FBI’s informant stings, was sloppier than most as well, because much of the bureau’s evidence seemed to support the men’s steadfast assertion that they were street hustlers trying to scam a big-talking Middle Easterner out of his money, not terrorists on the make. In fact, despite the government’s efforts to obfuscate this inconvenient fact, the seven men weren’t even Muslim; they considered themselves members of the Moorish Science Temple, blending together elements of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam in their belief system.

    “The Liberty City case was a bellwether for the FBI and the Justice Department,” said James J. Wedick, a former FBI supervisory agent who was hired by the defense team to review the evidence. “If they could get convictions based on a thin case like this, they had a green light to be even more aggressive with terrorism stings.”

    MIAMI – JUNE 23: Media stands outside the warehouse that the FBI raided last evening June 23, 2006 in the Liberty CIty neighborhood of Miami, Florida. The U.S. Justice Department was expected to provide details of an alleged plot to attack the Chicago Sears Tower, in which at least seven people who were staying in the warehouse were arrested in Miami. (Photo by Joe Raedle/Getty Images) Members of the media stand outside the warehouse raided by the FBI in the Liberty City neighborhood of Miami, Florida, June 23, 2006. Photo: Joe Raedle/Getty Images
    IN 2004, THE brothers Burson and Rothschild Augustin lived in a Miami apartment above Narseal Batiste. Batiste, a former Chicago street preacher, operated a small drywall and construction business and considered himself a student of Western religions, studying the Old Testament, New Testament, and Quran. Inspired by the Guardian Angels he had seen patrolling in Chicago, Batiste also fashioned himself something of a community activist and guardian.
    The Augustin brothers joined up with Batiste and, along with a half-dozen others, worked in his drywall business and together rented a warehouse in the Miami neighborhood known as Liberty City, where they offered martial arts training and religious studies to neighborhood kids. They called themselves the “Seas of David” and would sometimes wear military-style uniforms as they marched through the streets. The group was largely Batiste’s personality cult. He described himself as the “divine leader” and suggested once that “man has the authority to, on a certain level, be God.”

    A Yemeni man named Abbas al-Saidi ran a convenience store in Miami that Batiste and his guys frequented. Al-Saidi, who had worked as an informant for the New York Police Department, got in touch with the FBI and reported a suspicious group of men from Liberty City, who he claimed had sent him to Yemen to make connections with Al Qaeda. FBI agents turned al-Saidi into a paid informant, and on instructions from the bureau, he introduced Batiste to a second informant, Elie Assaad, who was posing as a representative of Osama bin Laden. Assaad was a seasoned hand for the FBI, having conducted another terrorism sting in South Florida that lured a young man named Imran Mandhai into a bomb plot. (Mandhai was released from prison in March 2015 and deported to Pakistan.)

    For Batiste, who is now incarcerated in a low-security facility in Texas, what happened next was nothing more than a street hustle; according to the U.S. government, the interaction between Batiste and Assaad was far more sinister.

    “Al-Saidi made it perfectly clear that he was dealing with the police, and if we played the game the way he would lay it out, we’d be able to get a certain amount [of money] and then just basically break off and just go about our business and do all the things that we wanted to do,” Batiste said in a phone interview from prison.

    FBI video footage of a meeting between Narseal Batiste and Elie Assaad, an informant posing as a representative of Osama bin Laden.

    Batiste and Assaad met in a hotel room to discuss their future together. A hidden FBI video camera recorded their meeting. Following al-Saidi’s advice to dress the part of a Muslim extremist, Batiste wore what appeared to be a turban and carried a walking staff. He looked more like a Halloween partygoer than an Al Qaeda operative. “I’ve never met someone like you,” Batiste confessed to Assaad. “Someone on a mission.” They both sat at a table, where Assaad was eating a room service meal.

    “I am a man that is determined. Whether I get any help from you or not, I’m going to do what needs to be done,” Batiste continued in the video, being as vague as possible. “And I’m well on my way of accomplishing that. I’m not far right now.”

    “You’re not far? So I’m not wasting my time,” Assaad said, holding a french fry. He then added: “They didn’t bring me from over there just to hear words. I will see some action, or no?”

    “Yeah, you’re not wasting your time,” Batiste said. “Absolutely, absolutely.”

    MIAMI – JUNE 23: The inside of a warehouse that the FBI raided is viewed through a hole in the door June 23, 2006 in the Liberty CIty neighborhood of Miami, Florida.The US Justice Department was expected to provide details of an alleged plot to attack the Chicago Sears Tower, in which at least seven people who were staying in the warehouse were arrested in Miami. (Photo by Joe Raedle/Getty Images) Inside the Liberty City warehouse rented by the FBI for Narseal Batiste and his friends, viewed through a hole in the door, June 23, 2006, Miami, Florida. Photo: Joe Raedle/Getty Images
    BUT THE LIBERTY City Seven plot consisted mainly of words. Assaad kept promising to transfer $25,000 to Batiste, who in turn said what he needed to say to string along Assaad. They talked about a harebrained plot to bomb the Sears Tower in Chicago. Batiste even boasted he could raise an army in Chicago. As time went by and no money arrived from Assaad, however, Batiste and his group became frustrated. So the FBI, through Assaad, rented them a newer, larger warehouse, complete with a refrigerator stocked with food and a new van they could use — all to keep them on the hook and to keep them plotting.
    “At that time, we were just thinking, OK, we got the warehouse, and then inside the warehouse, they had food and everything,” Rothschild Augustin remembered. “Like frozen food, fish and stuff. So we were thinking, wow, the money is coming. Then they had a van in there. So we were thinking that all that was ours, so we just kept going along with it.”

    The FBI had wired the new warehouse with cameras. Once they were in the warehouse, Assaad asked Batiste and his guys to swear a “bay’at,” or oath of allegiance, to Al Qaeda.

    “It was kind of like we got blindsided. We just show up and, ‘Hey, you are going to take this oath.’ What? What oath? Whatever, we just went through it, uncomfortable,” Rothschild Augustin said.

    Batiste was still trying to do whatever was necessary to sucker Assaad out of his money. Here was a guy giving them a warehouse, a van, and a promise to provide $25,000. So what if they had to pledge an oath like Boy Scouts? Each of the men stood before Assaad, gave his name, and then pledged allegiance to Al Qaeda. The hustle was finally working, everyone thought.

    “The so-called bay’at, oath thing, that was placed upon us — all that was basically acting, just making up stuff,” Batiste recalled.

    After the oath, Assaad asked Batiste to do one more thing: take pictures of the FBI office and federal courthouse in Miami. So Batiste and two of the guys gamely drove around Miami taking photographs from their van, with a camera provided by the FBI.

    FBI video footage of Elie Assaad administering an oath of allegiance to Al Qaeda.

    AT THIS POINT, Batiste’s spiritual adviser, a Chicago preacher named Sultan Khan Bey of the Moorish Science Temple, arrived in Miami and the case transformed into theater of the bizarre. An FBI surveillance vehicle recorded Batiste and his guys picking up Khan Bey and his wife, both dressed in colorful flowing African-inspired garb, from the airport in Fort Lauderdale.

    When Batiste explained to Khan Bey what had been happening — the generous Arab guy who gave them a warehouse with a refrigerator full of food in exchange for the oath and taking a few pictures — Khan Bey told the group what should have been obvious all along: They were fools being played by the feds. Khan Bey then held a trial of sorts for Batiste, banished him, and took possession of the warehouse and control of the small group. Another of Batiste’s spiritual advisers, Master G.J.G. Atheea, who unbeknownst to the others had agreed to wear a wire for the FBI, confronted Khan Bey at the warehouse and advocated for Batiste’s return as leader of the group. An argument erupted, and Khan Bey grabbed a gun and shot at Atheea, narrowly missing him.

    The gun was legal and registered to Lyglenson Lemorin, a Haitian-born member of the group who had carried it for security detail work in the past. Lemorin had mistakenly left the gun at the warehouse, where Khan Bey found it.

    Miami police arrested Khan Bey for the shooting, and federal prosecutors took over the case. Khan Bey cooperated by talking to agents with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives. It wasn’t his first run-in with the law. Khan Bey had been convicted of rape in 1977 and attempted murder in 1973. He pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and received a sentence of 14 months in prison, to be followed by three years of supervised release, with the stipulation that his sentence be served at a facility near his home in Chicago.

    During the madness in Miami, the group was falling apart. Lemorin, frustrated by Batiste and his ill-conceived scam, moved to Atlanta. Some of the other guys began to distance themselves from Batiste after the oath, believing he’d pushed the hustle too far. Patrick Abraham ignored all the folly around him by focusing on jobs with the drywall company.

    IMG_20160515_192731-1492629195 Patrick Abraham now lives in Haiti, where he teaches English at a school in Port-au-Prince. Photo: Trevor Aaronson
    ON JUNE 22, 2006, Abraham was driving to a worksite when he saw a Chevrolet Suburban accelerate past his van and then quickly stop in front of him. “I see people come out of everywhere and pull out guns, aiming at my window,” Abraham remembered. After the FBI agents rushed the car, one asked Abraham a question that perplexed him: “Do you have a bomb in the car?”
    “What?” Abraham asked, confused.

    “Do you have a bomb in the car?” the agent repeated.

    Abraham shook his head, exasperated. “Go ahead with the bullshit, man,” Abraham said, giving the agents permission to search his vehicle.

    The others were arrested in similarly dramatic ways. Seven agents, for example, arrested Rothschild Augustin while he was shopping for clothes.

    After their arrests, the FBI brought each of the Liberty City Seven individually into interrogation rooms at the bureau’s Miami office. Stanley Phanor, one of the guys who had remained loyal to Batiste throughout, didn’t understand why he had been arrested when he wound up in an interrogation room. A slender, soft-spoken man of Haitian descent, Phanor had gone by the nickname Sonny since he was a child. In the indictment, prosecutors listed him as “Brother Sunni,” perhaps as a way of making him seem more menacing and Islamic.

    None of the men accepted a plea deal, and they all stood trial together. The case was bullshit, they agreed. The first trial resulted in a hung jury for six of the seven defendants. Because he’d abandoned the group during the sting, Lemorin was acquitted — but was immediately detained by immigration officials for deportation.

    “On the one hand, they just seemed like a hapless group of guys and their defense all along was that they were just going along with it because they were going to rip off [the FBI informant],” said Jeffrey Agron, who was the jury foreman. “There were a fair number of people on the jury who believed that it was a scam. … On the other hand, when asked to pledge an allegiance to Al Qaeda, they did it. When asked to take pictures for the plot, they did take the pictures.”

    Family members of some of the seven men charged with plotting to destroy the Sears Tower in Chicago and other buildings, center left in white t-shirts, look on during a news conference where activists spoke, Thursday, June 29, 2006 at the Liberty City neighborhood warehouse in Miami where the FBI arrested most of the men. (AP Photo/Wilfredo Lee) Family members of the Liberty City Seven look on during a news conference on June 29, 2006, at the warehouse in Miami where the FBI arrested most of the men. Photo: Wilfredo Lee/AP
    IT TOOK THREE trials to convict five of the seven men. While Lemorin was acquitted in the first trial, Naudimar Herrera, a bit player in the group, was acquitted following the third trial. But five others — Narseal Batiste, Patrick Abraham, Stanley Phanor, Burson Augustin, and Rothschild Augustin — were convicted of conspiracy to provide material support to a terrorist organization, among other charges, and sent to prison. Following their convictions, Jeffrey Sloman, who was then the acting U.S. attorney in Miami, said the prosecution “helped make our community safer by rooting out nascent terrorists before they could carry out their threats.” The convicted men received sentences ranging from six to 13 years. If the Justice Department thought the men were dangerous, the U.S. Bureau of Prisons seemed to disagree. The Liberty City Seven members were incarcerated in medium and minimum security facilities once in BOP custody. The FBI paid Assaad $85,000 and al-Saidi $21,000 for their work on the sting.
    Burson Augustin was the first of the convicted Liberty City Seven defendants to be released, on September 21, 2012, after serving six years in prison. Instead of returning to Miami, he chose to move to Fort Myers, where he had an aunt and where no one else knew him. “I thought my best bet is to go to a place I don’t know,” Augustin said. “To get a fresh start.”

    A well-built man who wears thick dreadlocks pulled back into a ponytail, Augustin tried to make an honest living in Fort Myers, but he found it impossible to land a job with a terrorism conviction on his record. So Augustin went back to his old trade, hustling, and was soon busted for dealing cocaine. Because he was on supervised release at the time of the drug deal, his case went to federal court and he was sentenced to another four years in prison.

    Lemorin, a Haitian national who had fathered two children in Miami, fell victim to a unique kind of double jeopardy. After being acquitted in the first trial, the evidence from that trial was used against him in immigration court. It proved enough to justify his deportation order.

    His deportation was delayed because of the 2010 earthquake, which devastated Haiti. But one year after the earthquake, with the island still recovering from the destruction, Lemorin was on one of the first deportee planes to Port-au-Prince. In some ways, despite being acquitted, his punishment was in line with that of the other defendants: Between the time he was in a holding cell awaiting trial and his time in an immigration detention center, Lemorin spent nearly six years behind bars.

    When he arrived in Haiti, he found himself detained yet again. Not knowing who among the deportees was a violent criminal and who wasn’t, Haitian officials threw everyone into detention cells. Those whose families had money could offer bribes to get loved ones released. The ones without family or means were at the mercy of Haitian officials in a filthy prison where cholera was spreading and some detainees had already died.

    “There’s feces everywhere,” Lemorin remembered. “Feces on the wall, feces on everything, feces on the place where you take a shower.”

    When Lemorin finally got out of detention, his relatives in Leogane gave him a small plot of land on which to live. His mother in Miami collected old cellphones and other electronics and shipped them to Lemorin, who sold them to buy the concrete and rebar to build his new home. He only has walls around the bedroom, but the foundation is laid. In time, he hopes to build up the walls around a small living room and kitchen.

    In the United States, he was not only forced to leave behind his mother, but also his son and daughter. In April 2011, Lemorin learned that his 15-year-old son, Lukenson Lemorin, had been killed in a car accident in Miami. U.S. authorities denied Lemorin’s visa application to attend the funeral, he said, and he was forced to observe the service through a grainy Skype connection.

    “I got robbed of my son’s life because I beat the case,” Lemorin said, tears welling in his eyes. “Twelve jurors found me not guilty. … And when I’m supposed to be home with my son, I’m in Haiti, deported, sent back for the same trial I beat.”

    Two years after arriving in Haiti, Lemorin learned that his old friend Patrick Abraham had also been deported. Patrick had only distant relatives to help him in Haiti. But he had Lemorin, who offered to share his one-room home. On a recent evening, Abraham brought home a watermelon from Port-au-Prince. They sliced up and ate the watermelon together as they watched the kids from the village playing soccer with a deflated ball. Impoverished and isolated from the rest of the world, the pair seemed the world’s least probable terrorists.

    For his part, Lemorin isn’t bitter about his circumstances. He doesn’t blame the United States. “I love America,” he said. “America is a great country. But what happened to us, it’s not America that did it. It’s not America — it’s a few people in America that others put their trust in.”

    IMG_20160512_153116-1492629193 Burson Augustin is now back in South Florida, where he is trying to rebuild his life after serving a decade in prison. Photo: Trevor Aaronson
    ABOUT 700 MILES away, in Miami, the rest of the Liberty City Seven are mostly together. Burson and Rothschild Augustin live in a small studio apartment in Broward County, north of Miami. Burson landed a job as a valet on Miami Beach; these days, having learned from his experience in Fort Myers, when he fills out job applications, he just leaves the question about felony convictions blank. It’s best not to try to explain. Rothschild has bounced from job to job; he’s done stints sewing body armor in a factory in an industrial part of town and working in a juice bar in a trendy section of Miami.
    Stanley Phanor was released on June 28, 2016, after a short stay at a halfway house. He’s living with his mother in Little Haiti, where Burson and Rothschild Augustin sometimes visit. If the FBI is at all concerned with members of an alleged terror cell associating again in the city of their crime, the three are unaware of it. The Bureau of Prisons does not treat the release of people convicted on terrorism-related charges any differently than that of other criminals, and the FBI does not have a program to track and monitor released terrorists, at least not that it has acknowledged publicly. Phanor and the Augustin brothers haven’t been prohibited from seeing each other, and none of them have seen anything to suggest they are under physical surveillance. As far as they can tell, no one is paying any attention to them at all.

    They’ll have a new addition soon. The Liberty City Seven’s alleged ringleader, Narseal Batiste, will be released to a halfway house this summer, a little more than a decade after he purportedly tried to wage a ground war against the U.S. government.

    Trevor Aaronson
    April 20 2017, 7:12 p.m.

    Find this story at 20 April 2017

    Copyright https://theintercept.com/

    THE COOPERATORS Terrorism Defendants With Concrete Ties to Violent Extremists Leverage Their Connections to Avoid Prison

    Trial and TerrorTrial and Terror
    Part 2
    The U.S. government has prosecuted almost 800 people for terrorism since the 9/11 attacks. Most of them never committed an act of violence.

    ˅ EXPAND ALL PARTS
    SINCE THE 9/11 attacks, at least 30 people convicted of international terrorism-related offenses have become informants and/or cooperating witnesses in exchange for leniency in sentencing, according to an analysis by The Intercept of federal terrorism prosecutions.

    Using the threat of criminal prosecution to encourage someone to cooperate is a well-worn tactic that long predates the war on terror. But this tactic has been used to great effect by federal prosecutors in the 15 years since the 9/11 attacks. There’s a cruel irony in this system. The misguided men, and sometimes women, who are caught up in counterterrorism stings — where an undercover agent or informant encourages or facilitates plans for an attack — are often sentenced to decades in prison because they have no information to trade. Members of the so-called Liberty City Seven, a group of Miami men who discussed a bomb plot with an undercover informant posing as an Al Qaeda operative, spent six to 13 years behind bars; they couldn’t become cooperating witnesses, because they didn’t know any real terrorists. But the more dangerous a defendant, or the more extensive his contacts with terrorists, the more likely he can leverage his connections for leniency.

    One early informant was Mohammed Junaid Babar, an Al Qaeda operative who provided material support to efforts against U.S. forces in Pakistan. In exchange for more than six years of cooperation, Babar received a sentence of time served and 10 years of supervised release. As part of his supervised release, Babar was required to continue to cooperate with the government. His whereabouts have never been disclosed publicly, and the U.S. Bureau of Prisons has no public record of Babar having entered custody at any point during his cooperation.

    The case of Najibullah Zazi offers another example. Zazi trained with Al Qaeda in Pakistan and then mixed beauty-supply chemicals for backpack bombs in a motel outside Denver. He was arrested in September 2009, before he could drive to New York and place those bombs on the subway. Zazi, whose sentence has been pending since he pleaded guilty in February 2010, is currently working for the government as a cooperating witness.

    Some of the government’s cooperating witnesses have been plucked from far-flung battlefields. Bryant Neal Vinas, who went by the name Bashir al-Ameriki, was captured in Pakistan. After admitting that he fired rockets on a U.S. military base in September 2008, Vinas turned informant. He provided information about a plot to blow up a Long Island Rail Road commuter train in New York’s Penn Station as well as information about Belgian and French men who attended the same training camp he did. Vinas pleaded guilty in January 2009 to an indictment charging him with, among other offenses, conspiracy to kill Americans and material support for terrorists. His sentence has been pending since then, and there is no record of him ever being turned over to the U.S. Bureau of Prisons, suggesting he is in a witness security program.

    One of the most colorful and revealing cases of a terrorism defendant-turned-cooperator is that of Earnest James Ujaama, perhaps the most prolific cooperating witness in the war on terror. A would-be entrepreneur with an explosive temper and a penchant for running minor scams, Ujaama became a close associate of Abu Hamza al-Masri, the radical imam of the Finsbury Park Mosque in London, whom a senior Justice Department official once called “an unrepentant all-purpose terrorist.” But while Abu Hamza is now serving a life prison sentence, Ujaama is free, living in idyllic Berkeley, California, collecting approximately $2,000 per month from the federal government, at least until recently, and looking to tell his story to a receptive audience.

    I first heard from Ujaama on November 12, 2015, when he sent me an email. “I’m looking to tell the story of a case that I think you will be most interested in,” he wrote. Later that day, in another email, Ujaama disclosed the primary condition of his cooperation. He wanted me to write a book with him about his life. “I’ve listened to you speak,” he wrote. “I’ve watched your presentation. I like your work.”

    In a series of phone and email conversations, Ujaama described how he also wanted compensation for his story. “I don’t pay for access to people,” I told Ujaama.

    This sort of back-and-forth continued for months. Sometimes I initiated contact, because I was intrigued by Ujaama’s story. Sometimes he reached out to me, for reasons that were not always clear. Our exchanges always were short-lived. Ujaama is a chameleon-like man who has been many things: entrepreneur, author, college student, religious scholar, newsletter publisher, aspiring movie producer, website designer, even a mule carrying cash into Afghanistan. Now, it seemed, he was attempting to fashion a new career as a terrorism expert, but at his core, the slender 51-year-old with close-cropped hair and braces on his teeth is a hustler — someone who, in the words of one federal judge, always plays “fast and loose.”

    During his 13-year cooperation as a witness for the government, Ujaama has testified in two terrorism trials — including that of Abu Hamza, who was also known as Mustafa Kamel Mustafa — and would have testified in a third had the defendant not pleaded guilty. In a court filing, Assistant U.S. Attorney John P. Cronan called Ujaama’s cooperation with the government “extraordinary.”

    Finally, in October 2016, Ujaama wrote me once again. He was irritated by a 60 Minutes story about Mary Quin, a New Zealander who was kidnapped in Yemen by an Al Qaeda-affiliated group and portrayed by CBS News as the U.S. Department of Justice’s star witness in Abu Hamza’s trial. This was outrageous to Ujaama, because in his view, he was the star witness against the religious cleric with connections to Al Qaeda. “You should come see me. I’m in the Bay Area until November,” Ujaama wrote. We agreed to meet the following month.

    LONDON, United Kingdom: (FILES) Imam Abu Hamza al-Masri addresses followers during Friday prayer in near Finsbury Park mosque in north London, in this 26 March 2004 file photo. Hamza al-Masri was found guilty Tuesday 07 February 2006 of incitement of racial hatred and soliciting murder charges after a criminal trial in London. Hamza, 47, was convicted of six out of nine soliciting-to-murder charges and two out of four charges of “using threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour with the intention of stirring up racial hatred”.AFP PHOTO/ODD ANDERSEN/FILES (Photo credit should read ODD ANDERSEN/AFP/Getty Images) Imam Abu Hamza al-Masri addresses followers during Friday prayer near Finsbury Park Mosque in north London on March 26, 2004. Photo: Odd Andersen/AFP/Getty Images
    BORN IN DENVER as James Earnest Thompson, Ujaama moved to Seattle as a boy. “I grew up under the Black Panthers,” he said in court testimony. By most accounts he was whip-smart, driven, and eager to make a mark on the world.

    But Ujaama also had a fiery disposition. Once, when his girlfriend called police and reported that he had a gun, Ujaama got into a scuffle with a cop and broke the officer’s watch. Enacting revenge on his girlfriend for the incident, Ujaama poured a five-pound bag of sugar into her car’s gasoline tank.

    In the mid-1980s, Ujaama moved to Pelican, Alaska, to take a job at a seafood company, where he said he struggled with a racist culture there. “I just got tired of being called nigger,” he recalled. One day, frustrated by the racism, Ujaama grabbed a .375 Winchester rifle and shot out the window of the housing unit where he was staying. He went to jail for the incident.

    By the early 1990s, he’d returned to Seattle and joined the personal computer industry. Ujaama was a partner in Olympic Computers, which sold IBM clones at wholesale. But the company didn’t last; Ujaama began a scam, telling customers to send him checks so that he would get the money rather than his partner. In all, Ujaama raked in about $10,000 from the ploy.

    Then Ujaama switched to writing books, positioning himself as a motivational speaker and community activist. One book, “The Young People’s Guide to Starting a Business Without Selling Drugs,” encouraged young black men to become entrepreneurs. “When a person lacks knowledge and vision,” Ujaama wrote in the foreword, “that person becomes a soldier in the wrong war, an enemy to others and to themselves.”

    Ujaama followed these efforts with a work of fiction, “Coming Up,” a semi-autobiographical story about two friends — one becomes a drug dealer, the other a successful businessman. Ujaama moved to Los Angeles in the hopes of turning “Coming Up” into a movie. Although he claimed to have received a commitment for half of the money to produce the film adaptation, the promised funds were contingent on Ujaama raising the second half from other sources, which he couldn’t do. It was a flop, like most of Ujaama’s business ventures.

    Despite characterizing himself as an entrepreneur, Ujaama has never run a successful business, at least not according to any measure the IRS would endorse. He has never paid taxes, and in some years did not file tax returns at all. “The understanding I had was that I did not owe taxes,” he said.

    At a low point after failing to turn his book into a movie, Ujaama returned to Seattle and converted to Islam in late 1996. Ujaama devoted himself to Islam and moved to England to study under Abdullah El-Faisal, a Jamaican-born cleric who was imam of the Brixton Mosque in South London. Ujaama became something of an apostle for El-Faisal, traveling back and forth from London to Seattle, where he’d sell tapes of El-Faisal’s sermons. Yet rather than providing a portion of the sales to El-Faisal, Ujaama pocketed the proceeds.

    While in London, Ujaama married a Muslim woman from Somalia, and they had a child. El-Faisal had taught Ujaama that jihad training was a Muslim’s obligation, so in late 1998, Ujaama traveled to Afghanistan for training. “I was looking to learn physical jihad training, which would include hand-to-hand combat, how to use weaponry, and live as a Muslim,” Ujaama explained later in court testimony. He made his way to a training camp run by a conservative Muslim missionary group. The camp used an aging Soviet-built military barracks, a soccer field, a large artillery gun, and some broken-down tanks. Ujaama received weapons training and learned how to recite the Quran. But he wasn’t much of a militant. One night, while in the bathroom, Ujaama accidentally fired his rifle. He soon fell ill and left the camp after just two weeks.

    Ujaama returned to London and continued his studies under El-Faisal. At the time, El-Faisal was badmouthing Abu Hamza, the religious leader in London who would later be prosecuted in New York. Some of El-Faisal’s students asked Ujaama to meet with Abu Hamza and help mediate the dispute.

    Abu Hamza commanded a mysterious aura because, well, he looked like a James Bond villain. He had one eye and was missing both of his hands, forcing him to use a prosthetic hook. Born in Egypt, Abu Hamza studied civil engineering before coming to the United Kingdom in 1979. Various stories have circulated about how Abu Hamza sustained his injuries, including one that alleged his hands were chopped off after he was caught stealing in Saudi Arabia. In truth, according to Abu Hamza, he lost his hands and an eye during an explosives accident while assisting the Pakistani military in a road-building project.

    Ujaama recalled being “very impressed with Sheikh Abu Hamza” from that initial meeting. After listening to Abu Hamza’s taped lectures, Ujaama turned his back on El-Faisal. “I decided that he wasn’t a good person to follow,” Ujaama said. His spurned mentor began telling people that Ujaama had stolen money.

    But it didn’t matter. Ujaama had his new teacher, Abu Hamza, who had a growing international following through the website of his organization, Supporters of Sharia. When Ujaama decided to return to the United States in 1999, Abu Hamza gave him about a dozen tapes of his lectures. The tapes bore Supporters of Sharia’s logo — a shackled man behind bars reaching out of the cell with a Quran in hand. The lectures were “very angry, but serious,” according to Ujaama, who distributed copies in Seattle’s Muslim community. As he did with El-Faisal’s tapes, Ujaama pocketed the profits.

    It was during this return trip to Seattle that Ujaama heard about a ranch in southern Oregon. The entrepreneur in Ujaama saw an opportunity: He could build a training camp for Muslims and advertise it to Abu Hamza’s followers. Ujaama sent a fax to Abu Hamza describing his idea, but he also exaggerated the progress he’d made in turning the ranch into a training camp. He claimed he had secured weapons and recruits and had already started to build structures. He asked Abu Hamza to send two men from London to assist him.

    Oussama Kassir, center, Lebanese-born Swedish citizen wanted in the United States on suspicion of plotting to set up a terrorist camp there, is escorted by heavily armed policemen to the courtroom in Prague on Wednesday, April 25, 2007. The Czech court ruled today that Oussama Kassir can be extradited to the USA however he immediately appealed the decision of the Municipal Court in Prague. Kassir is charged in the USA with conspiracy aimed at providing material support to terrorists for which he faces up to a life sentence if found guilty. Kassir was arrested by the Czech police upon an international arrest warrant at Prague’s Ruzyne airport during a stop-over of his plane flying from Stockholm to Beirut in December 2005. (AP Photo/CTK) ** SLOVAKIA OUT ** Oussama Kassir, center, a Lebanese national and Swedish citizen wanted in the United States on suspicion of plotting to set up a terrorist camp, is escorted by armed police officers to the courtroom in Prague on April 25, 2007. Photo: CTK/AP
    THE MEN ABU HAMZA sent were Oussama Kassir, a Lebanese national and Swedish citizen who claimed to have been a bodyguard for Osama bin Laden, and Haroon Aswat, a slender British man. The brawny Kassir was to be a physical trainer at the camp, while the studious Aswat would act as a religious and Arabic tutor there. They flew to New York on November 26, 1999, and then took a Greyhound bus across the country to Seattle.

    After they arrived, Ujaama drove the two men for eight hours to southern Oregon, where Ujaama showed them the ranch. Instead of having the makings of a training camp, it was desolate. There were no stockpiles of weapons. There were no recruits. The only structures were dilapidated trailers.

    Ujaama, true to his roots, had been running a hustle. He just needed Abu Hamza’s stamp of approval and support, and he figured if he could get a couple of Abu Hamza’s guys on site, he could line up investments to get the weapons he claimed he already had and start the construction he said was already underway.

    But Kassir, realizing that Ujaama had lied about the camp, became angry. “He got in my face and began to point his finger at me,” Ujaama later testified.

    His training camp scheme dashed following the argument with Kassir, Ujaama fled back to Seattle, leaving behind the two men Abu Hamza had sent. Ujaama never returned to the ranch.

    Instead, Ujaama moved back to London in the spring of 2000 and returned to his studies under Abu Hamza. If the religious cleric was irritated by Ujaama’s overselling of the training camp, or his dispute with Kassir, he didn’t seem to show it. He took in Ujaama as a close aide, and Ujaama began to work on the Supporters of Sharia website, expanding the English-language portion in order to reach non-Arabic speakers.

    Eventually Abu Hamza had a mission for Ujaama. He asked him to travel to Afghanistan to deliver money and escort a member of the London mosque, a Ugandan-born British man named Feroz Abbasi. Abu Hamza gave Ujaama a letter addressed to the foreign minister of the Taliban government to guarantee safe passage into Afghanistan.

    Ujaama and Abbasi purchased plane tickets and traveled to Pakistan. After checking into a hotel in Quetta, Ujaama snuck away without telling Abbasi and headed to the Taliban embassy. “I decided that because he would interfere with what I was doing,” Ujaama said. At the embassy, Ujaama handed the Taliban representative the letter from Abu Hamza.

    The Taliban escorted Ujaama in an SUV across the border and to the Kandahar compound of Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi, a Libyan who ran a training camp in Afghanistan. Following Abu Hamza’s instruction, he gave al-Libi an envelope containing 500 British pounds. Ujaama then traveled to Khost to find a girls’ school to deliver another envelope of money, but wasn’t able to locate it. Instead, he encountered a man who wanted to send Ujaama to the front lines in the Taliban’s war against the Northern Alliance. Ujaama called Abu Hamza in London to intercede. “I’m not here for that purpose,” he said.

    The call prevented Ujaama’s military conscription, but Abu Hamza asked him about Abbasi. “I left him behind,” Ujaama said. Angry, Abu Hamza demanded that Ujaama go back to Pakistan and bring Abbasi to Afghanistan. Ujaama told Abu Hamza that he would collect Abbasi, even though he had no intention of doing so.

    Back at the Finsbury Park Mosque in London, Ujaama continued to assist Abu Hamza and work on the Supporters of Sharia website. In early September 2001, Ujaama agreed to travel once more to Afghanistan to deliver money.

    On September 11, 2001, on his way to Afghanistan, Ujaama was awoken to the Pakistani military police knocking on his hotel door. “They asked me if I needed protection,” Ujaama recalled. He learned that hijacked airplanes had been turned into weapons in New York, Washington, D.C., and Pennsylvania.

    Abu Hamza wanted Ujaama to continue into Afghanistan and deliver the money, but Ujaama refused. The U.S. military had begun bombing the country. Instead, Ujaama made his way to the United States, with 1,000 pounds of Abu Hamza’s cash in hand.

    Ujaama was arrested in July 2002 at his grandmother’s former home in Denver, Colorado. “The government is conducting a witch hunt,” Ujaama said in a public statement at the time. The federal government first held Ujaama on a material witness warrant, then indicted him on material support charges related to the supposed training camp in Oregon.

    Though he seemed destined for a lengthy prison sentence, Ujaama’s life was about to take a new turn.

    AFTER HIS ARREST, Ujaama followed a path similar to those of other post-9/11 terrorism defendants. As part of a plea deal, Ujaama admitted that he conspired to aid the Taliban. In exchange for a sentence of two years in prison, Ujaama agreed to be a witness in the U.S. government’s prosecutions of Abu Hamza and the two other men who collaborated with Ujaama on the purported training camp in Oregon — Oussama Kassir and Haroon Aswat. In 2004, prosecutors in Manhattan charged Abu Hamza, Kassir, and Aswat with terrorism-related charges.

    When they were indicted, Abu Hamza was in the United Kingdom, Kassir in the Czech Republic, and Aswat in Zambia. All three fought extradition to the United States, creating a prolonged legal battle that meant Ujaama would wait years to fulfill his obligation to testify in their cases.

    By December 2006, Ujaama grew impatient and frustrated by what he viewed as the government forcing him to testify against Abu Hamza. He fled to Belize, where he hoped he could be reunited with his wife and child, but he was arrested by local authorities. Since he violated his plea deal in Washington, federal prosecutors indicted Ujaama again in Manhattan, this time with additional charges. As part of a second cooperating agreement, Ujaama pleaded guilty to three terrorism-related counts, including a conspiracy to build the training camp in Oregon. He served an additional four years in prison.

    Ujaama testified against Kassir in 2009, helping the government to win a conviction and ensuring that the man he’d argued with on the ranch received a sentence of life in prison.

    Five years after Kassir’s trial, federal prosecutors finally put Abu Hamza on trial in Manhattan. Ujaama testified for four days in the spring of 2014, describing in detail how he helped his former mentor with the Supporters of Sharia website and newsletter, how he asked him to send two men to the ranch in Oregon, and how he delivered money to Afghanistan.

    Abu Hamza was convicted on May 19, 2014, and sentenced to life in prison. He is reportedly in solitary confinement and without his prosthetic limbs.

    Haroon Aswat pleaded guilty in March 2015 following the successful convictions of Kassir and Abu Hamza. He received a sentence of 30 years in prison.

    On October 23, 2015, Ujaama was sentenced, for the final time, in U.S. District Court in Manhattan. “I wish I would have never gotten involved with Abu Hamza,” Ujaama said at his sentencing. “And I think he’s a bad man.”

    Judge Katherine B. Forrest said she did not believe Ujaama posed a terrorist threat. If he posed any threat to society, she said, it was “petty fraud or something like that.” She sentenced Ujaama to time served, and in recognition of Ujaama’s years of cooperation with the government, she declined to give him any term of supervised release.

    For the first time since 2002, Ujaama was free.

    ujaama_edit-1492629291 Earnest James Ujaama poses for a photograph at the University of Washington, where he became a graduate student while serving as a government witness in terrorism prosecutions. Photo: Wikipedia
    UJAAMA NOW DIVIDES his time between Berkeley and Seattle. He’s collected at least $100,000 in payments from the government for his cooperation and has amassed student loan debt, which, as of late 2015, had reached $86,000. He expects to finish his doctoral studies at the University of Washington.
    Following my year of on-and-off exchanges with Ujaama, we met for the first time in Berkeley in December 2016. I agreed to one condition: We’d keep the first day off the record, and then once we’d gotten acquainted, our conversations thereafter would be on the record.

    But after speaking with me over coffee and lunch in Berkeley, Ujaama still wasn’t willing to participate in an interview for an article he couldn’t control. After several hours, I told him it was now his choice. I walked toward the Berkeley BART station. Ujaama followed. We chatted for another hour, standing in the train station lobby. I finally told him that if he wanted to be interviewed, he could come see me in San Francisco the next day.

    That evening, I emailed Ujaama to give him one last chance to talk, and to let him know I’d be writing about him, regardless of his cooperation.

    “Have a safe return home, bro,” was his only reply.

    The next week, I sent Ujaama a list of questions for this story. “I’m in the middle of a research project for my doctoral studies and am very busy,” he wrote. He didn’t respond to any of the questions.

    Ujaama doesn’t want to be seen as just another snitch in the ongoing war on terror. He clings to a personal brand of exceptionalism that paints him as both a victim of overzealous prosecution and a star actor on the larger stage of U.S. terrorism prosecutions. And while he insists he wants to spark reform, his case best illustrates the injustice of a system that gives light sentences to those who trade terrorist contacts and cooperation for leniency, while sending those with no such connections to prison for decades.

    In the meantime, during my discussions with Ujaama, his Wikipedia entry was being updated almost daily with granular detail about his life.

    The entry at one point refers directly to the editor responsible for the frequent updates: “This author is in possession of all court transcripts, sentencing memorandums, and primary documents related to United States vs. Earnest James Ujaama,” the entry read, noting that many of the documents are filed under seal. “Most of what is found on the Internet is piece-meal journalism, speculation or theory, and is outdated,” the entry continued.

    I sent Ujaama one final question. “Are you the one writing your Wikipedia entry?” I asked. Ujaama never responded.

    Trevor Aaronson
    April 20 2017, 7:14 p.m.

    Find this story at 20 April 2017
    Copyright The Intercept

    THE NEW TARGETS FBI Stings Zero In on ISIS Sympathizers. Few Have Terrorist Links.

    Trial and TerrorTrial and Terror
    Part 3
    The U.S. government has prosecuted almost 800 people for terrorism since the 9/11 attacks. Most of them never committed an act of violence.

    ˅ EXPAND ALL PARTS
    BOSTON POLICE CAPT. Robert Ciccolo was one of the first responders to the Boston Marathon bombings. When his 23-year-old son, Alexander, who had converted to Islam and given himself the name Ali Al Amriki, began telling his father he was “not afraid to die for the cause,” Ciccolo became alarmed. Alexander had a history of mental illness, and his interest in Islam had become an obsession. In October 2014, Ciccolo contacted the FBI about his son.

    The federal agents could have monitored Alexander, or perhaps confronted him. Instead, as the bureau does in most such cases, agents launched an investigation. They found Alexander’s Facebook page, listed under his nom de guerre. There was a photograph of a young man in a wooded area wearing a head covering and holding a machete. “Another day in the forest strengthening myself,” the caption read. Another photo on his Facebook page appeared to show a dead American soldier. “Thank you Islamic State!” read the caption.

    As part of a sting, an FBI informant contacted Alexander and offered to provide him with guns for an attack. After Alexander collected the weapons on July 4, 2015, FBI agents arrested him and charged him with terrorism-related offenses. As he was being processed at a detention center, he stabbed a nurse with a pen, causing a minor injury. His case made national news, and FBI Director James Comey told reporters that Alexander Ciccolo’s was among several plots related to the Fourth of July holiday that were foiled by counterterrorism agents. “I do believe that our work disrupted efforts to kill people, likely in connection with July 4,” Comey told reporters during a July 7, 2015, briefing.

    Alexander Ciccolo is among 63 men and women who have been arrested in FBI stings targeting ISIS sympathizers, according to an analysis of federal terrorism prosecutions by The Intercept.

    Demonstrating the evolving threat of terrorism in the United States, alleged ISIS sympathizers are now the primary targets of FBI stings, upstaging Al Qaeda, the Shabab, and all other terrorist groups. The first ISIS case in the United States culminated in an arrest in March 2014, and the number quickly grew. Fifty-eight people were charged in 2015 for alleged ISIS affiliations. In 2016, 32 FBI cases involved ISIS sympathizers, compared to just one each that year involving Al Qaeda and Shabab sympathizers.

    But as with earlier FBI stings that primarily targeted Al Qaeda sympathizers, most of the targets of the bureau’s ISIS stings are aspirational, not operational.

    In the majority of ISIS stings, targets were not in direct contact with ISIS representatives and did not have weapons of their own, government evidence showed. Instead, these targets were inspired by online propaganda to join ISIS and either made arrangements on their own to travel to Syria or were aided by FBI informants or undercover agents in their attempts join ISIS or plot attacks inside the United States.

    BOSTON, MA – JUNE 24: Boston cab drivers rallied this morning before attending a hearing, chaired by Capt. Robert Ciccolo, seen here, with Boston Police Hackney Division at Roxbury Community College regarding a proposed fare increase. (Photo by George Rizer/The Boston Globe via Getty Images) Capt. Robert Ciccolo chairing a hearing at Roxbury Community College. Photo: George Rizer/The Boston Globe/Getty Images
    After Alexander was arrested, FBI agents read him his Miranda rights. He then sat for an interview with FBI agents Paul Ambrogio and Julia Cowley.
    Dressed in a black T-shirt and jeans, he refused to talk about the guns, but he defended ISIS as a just organization, even as he demonstrated his ignorance about the group. The FBI recorded the interview.

    “ISIS claimed responsibility, right, for a lot of beheadings?” Ambrogio asked. “There’s someone who names himself Jihadi John and he beheads people, right? He does it in an online way so that people can see it. So what’s your feeling about that? They represent themselves as ISIS; they’re ISIS. What’s your feeling?”

    “The people that you see being executed are criminals,” Alexander answered. “They’re criminals. They’re the lowest of the low.”

    According to his family, Alexander, a high school dropout, had battled off and on with alcohol addiction. He was also admitted to a psychiatric institution when he was a teenager.

    As a child, he went back and forth between the homes of his father, a stern cop who did not respond to requests for comment for this story, and his mother, something of a free spirit. Alexander followed in his mother’s footsteps.

    “I raised him Catholic; he was baptized Catholic,” said Shelley MacInnes, his mother. “He stayed with his Catholic beliefs for quite a long time. I would say he is a very religious person and very spiritual, but as he got older, I think he started searching.”

    Alexander Ciccolo first gravitated toward Buddhism and spent time at the Grafton Peace Pagoda in Petersburgh, New York. In 2012, he and other members of the Peace Pagoda walked around Lake Ontario to raise awareness of the dangers of nuclear power. A photograph from the time shows him wearing a green V-neck T-shirt and holding a handwritten sign that reads: “Peace walk for no more Fukushima.”

    Shortly after, he returned to Massachusetts and announced that he would become a Muslim. “One day we were out having dinner, and he went to the bathroom,” MacInnes recalled. “He ran into an imam. … He was so excited. ‘Mom, you’re aren’t going to believe what just happened.’”

    Alexander became fixated on Islam and ISIS, and he would talk often with his parents about his newfound beliefs. “He’s always been an investigator, never takes anything at face value,” MacInnes said. “As far as ISIS goes, my personal opinion is that he was investigating the validity of that organization, rather than taking the media’s answer for it.”

    Following its sting playbook, the FBI introduced to Alexander an informant posing as an ISIS sympathizer. The informant and Alexander met for the first time in person on June 24, 2015. The young man told the informant that he wanted to travel to another state and use pressure cooker bombs to attack two bars and a police station. Over the course of a week, his plan changed from bombing bars and a police station to attacking a university. He boasted that he knew how to use sniper rifles and had grown up with guns. “I know what I’m doing,” he said.

    But Alexander didn’t have any weapons, aside from a couple of machetes. His only would-be bomb components were a pressure cooker purchased from Wal-Mart and some half-made Molotov cocktails.

    That’s where the FBI stepped in again. The undercover informant provided Alexander with two assault rifles and two handguns. As soon as Alexander took possession of the guns, FBI agents arrested him, charging him with attempting to provide material support to a terrorist organization and attempting to use weapons of mass destruction. He was also charged with being a felon in possession of firearms, owing to an earlier state conviction of driving under the influence.

    BRIGHTON — Buddhist nun Jun Yasuda, left, Lauren Carlbon and Alex Ciccolo on their recent peace walk through Brighton. Ms. Yasuda and her fellow walkers are traveling 600 km around Lake Ontario to spread awareness about the dangers of nuclear energy and weapons. July 26, 2012. Alexander Ciccolo, right, along with Buddhist nun Jun Yasuda and Lauren Carlbon, on a peace walk through Brighton, Mass., July 26, 2012. Photo: Dave Fraser/Metroland Media/The Independent
    WHETHER OUT OF mental illness, immaturity, or naiveté, Alexander Ciccolo professed support for ISIS, but it’s unclear whether he would have posed a threat had the FBI informant not encouraged him and provided him with weapons. In this way, Ciccolo’s case is prototypical of ISIS stings.

    In these cases, the FBI provides encouragement and capacity to otherwise hapless individuals.

    For example, in a similar case in April 2016, the FBI arrested a South Florida man who allegedly plotted to bomb a Jewish community center. An FBI informant gave James Medina, a homeless man with a history of making baseless threats of violence, the opportunity. It was in fact the FBI informant who first came up with the idea of crediting their attack to ISIS. Farther north, in upstate New York, Emanuel L. Lutchman, another homeless man, told an FBI informant that he had received directions from an overseas ISIS member and was planning an attack, using a machete and knives, on a New Year’s Eve celebration in Rochester. The FBI’s informant provided the $40 Lutchman needed to purchase the machete and knives.

    In other ISIS stings, the FBI has encouraged and helped to facilitate the international travel of would-be ISIS recruits. An example is the case of Jason Michael Ludke, a Milwaukee man who made contact with an FBI undercover employee through social media. The FBI undercover employee, pretending to be affiliated with ISIS, encouraged Ludke and his friend Yosvany Padilla-Conde to join the terrorist group. The pair drove from Wisconsin to Texas, where they were arrested. According to Padilla-Conde’s statements after the arrest, they were under the impression that the FBI undercover employee was going to assist them in crossing the border into Mexico and then traveling to Iraq or Yemen. Ludke and Padilla-Conde are facing charges of material support for terrorists.

    The analysis of terrorism prosecutions by The Intercept shows that federal judges have wrestled with appropriate punishments for those convicted of ISIS-related terrorism offenses.

    Some defendants who were arrested before they had an opportunity to travel to Syria have received relatively lenient sentences. Mohammed Hamzah Khan, of Bolingbrook, Illinois, was arrested as he attempted to board a flight to Turkey at O’Hare International Airport. He received about three years in prison. Shannon Maureen Conley, who lived in Colorado, received about four years after she was arrested at the airport in Denver, on her way to Turkey.

    At the same time, defendants whose support for ISIS consisted of online activity, such as distributing propaganda on social media, have received comparable sentences to, and in some cases more prison time than, defendants who tried to join ISIS on the battlefield. Heather Elizabeth Coffman, of Glen Allen, Virginia, used several social media accounts to communicate with FBI informants posing as ISIS agents. She was sentenced to 4 1/2 years in prison. Ali Shukri Amin, who also lived in Virginia, admitted that he operated a pro-ISIS Twitter account and blog and provided instructions to ISIS supporters on how to use Bitcoin to avoid currency transfer restrictions. He was sentenced to more than 11 years in prison.

    But the most significant prison sentences await those who, like Alexander Ciccolo, moved forward with terrorist plots in the United States, even if it was the FBI making them possible. Christopher Cornell, of Cincinnati, Ohio, plotted with an FBI informant to travel to Washington, D.C., and attack the U.S. Capitol. He was arrested as he was leaving a gun store. After pleading guilty to terrorism-related charges, Cornell was sentenced to 30 years in prison. Lutchman, who was involved in the purported plans to attack a New Year’s Eve celebration in upstate New York, pleaded guilty to material support and received a 20-year prison sentence.

    It’s still too early to establish conclusive trends about the sentencing of ISIS defendants in U.S. District Courts. Of the 110 ISIS defendants charged, only 45 have been sentenced.

    Yet the arrests of ISIS sympathizers continue at a steady clip, even when the targets of stings have proven themselves to be incompetent ISIS recruits.

    An example is Mohamed Rafik Naji, of New York, who attempted five times to travel to ISIS territory but never made it. That’s when an FBI informant, posing as an ISIS affiliate, contacted him through Facebook.

    The informant told him that ISIS needed someone to attack Times Square with a garbage truck. “I was saying if there is a truck, I mean a garbage truck, and one drives it there to Times Square and crushes them,” Naji told the informant, repeating the idea. Naji was indicted in November 2016 on a charge of material support for terrorists, the 93rd person to be charged in federal court in an ISIS-related case.

    Alexander Ciccolo is now undergoing psychological evaluation; his trial is pending. MacInnes, Ciccolo’s mother, believes he was an impressionable young man manipulated by the FBI and set up with weapons that he never could have obtained on his own. “I don’t think he even knew what his plan was,” MacInnes said.

    Trevor Aaronson
    April 20 2017, 7:15 p.m.

    Find this story at 20 April 2017

    Copyright https://theintercept.com/

    THE BANNED The Government’s Own Data Shows Country of Origin Is a Poor Predictor of Terrorist Threat

    Trial and Terror
    Part 4
    The U.S. government has prosecuted almost 800 people for terrorism since the 9/11 attacks. Most of them never committed an act of violence.

    WHILE THE TRUMP administration has struggled to provide evidence to support the need for a travel ban targeting Muslims, Attorney General Jeff Sessions has been working since at least 2015 to limit Muslim immigration.

    In November 2015, in a letter co-signed by Texas Sen. Ted Cruz, then-Alabama Sen. Sessions accused the Obama administration of refusing to provide immigration information about defendants who had been charged in U.S. District Court with international terrorism-related offenses.

    “It is quite telling that this administration — which seems to have unlimited resources to circumvent our immigration laws and further its executive amnesties — cannot find the time or resources to provide timely answers to these simple questions,” Sessions and Cruz wrote.

    So the two senators took matters into their own hands. Using a list of 580 terrorism-related defendants provided by the Justice Department, Sessions assigned the staff of the Subcommittee on Immigration and the National Interest, which he chaired at the time, to research the country of origin and immigration status of each defendant. The committee staff found that of the 580 terrorism defendants they researched, 375 were born outside the United States. To Sessions and Cruz, this validated their view that terrorism was a largely foreign threat.

    In another letter to the Obama administration in June 2016, Sessions and Cruz wrote that the information “makes clear that the United States lacks the ability to properly screen individuals prior to their arrival to the United States. It further makes clear that our nation has a serious assimilation problem.”

    The Sessions data, which included country of origin and immigration data for some, but not all, of the defendants, was among the sources used by The Intercept to build a database of international terrorism prosecutions since the 9/11 attacks. (The Intercept intends to keep the database up to date and expand the fields regularly; at present, staff members are researching, among other data, the country of origin for approximately 350 international terrorism-related defendants not found by the subcommittee staff.)

    A review of the Sessions data, however, suggests that neither country of origin nor immigration status is a clear indicator of heightened national security concern.

    COUNTRY OF ORIGIN NUMBER OF PEOPLE
    United States 73
    Pakistan 61
    Lebanon 27
    Somalia 21
    Colombia 20
    Yemen 20
    Iraq 19
    Egypt 17
    Jordan 16
    Afghanistan 10
    Palestine 9
    Saudi Arabia 9
    India 8
    Gaza 7
    Syria 7
    Morocco 6
    West Bank 6
    Indonesia 5
    Kuwait 5
    Canada 4
    El Salvador 4
    Iran 4
    Turkey 4
    United Kingdom 4
    Albania 3
    Bangladesh 3
    Guyana 3
    Mali 3
    Sri Lanka 3
    Sudan 3
    Tunisia 3
    Algeria 2
    Bosnia 2
    Eritrea 2
    Ethiopia 2
    France 2
    Haiti 2
    Kazakhstan 2
    Kosovo 2
    Libya 2
    Nigeria 2
    Senegal 2
    Singapore 2
    South Africa 2
    Tanzania 2
    Venezuela 2
    Angola 1
    Australia 1
    Brazil 1
    Cambodia 1
    Chile 1
    Denmark 1
    Djibouti 1
    Dominican Republic 1
    Germany 1
    Greece 1
    Guatemala 1
    Israel 1
    Ivory Coast 1
    Kuwait – Citizen of Jordan 1
    Lebanon – Canada 1
    Malaysia 1
    Mexico 1
    Nicaragua 1
    Pakistan – Canada 1
    Panama 1
    Paraguay 1
    Peru 1
    Philippines 1
    Qatar 1
    Russia 1
    South Korea 1
    Trinidad & Tobago 1
    United Kingdom – India 1
    Uzbekistan 1
    Vietnam 1
    Yugoslavia 1
    In June 2016, the Senate Subcommittee on Immigration and the National Interest chaired by Jeff Sessions released data on 580 terrorism defendants, including country of origin for 448, as part of his campaign to limit Muslim immigration. The data shows that national birthplace is a poor predictor of terrorist threat.

    While at first blush the Sessions data may seem to suggest disproportionate numbers of terrorism defendants from countries affected by the travel ban, or by immigrants who came to the United States as refugees, the data is incomplete — country of origin is not known for 132 defendants, or 23 percent — and inherently biased by prosecutorial targeting. Following the 9/11 attacks, with the FBI increasing its number of informants in Muslim communities due to a presidential mandate, Muslims became the primary focus of terrorism investigations and, by extension, prosecutions for charges related to international terrorism. Many of these prosecutions were not for serious offenses such as material support or weapons of mass destruction, but instead for nonviolent crimes such as immigration violations or lying to FBI agents.

    In addition, the U.S. government segregates terrorism prosecutions into two types — domestic and international. The Sessions data includes only prosecutions related to international terrorism and leaves out all prosecutions of domestic terrorists, who are in most cases born in the United States.

    Of the 580 defendants in the list, Sessions’s committee staff found the country of birth for 448 based on open-source research. Of those, U.S.-born American citizens represented the single largest group, with 73 defendants. The second largest group, consisting of 61 defendants, was from Pakistan, which is not affected by the travel ban.

    The numbers fall precipitously from there. The third-largest group, consisting of 21 defendants, was from Somalia, which is included in the travel ban. The other countries included in Trump’s travel ban were Iran (four), Libya (two), Sudan (three), Syria (seven), and Yemen (20). Iraq, which was in the first version of the travel ban but not the second, had 19 terrorism defendants in Sessions’s data.

    For comparison, 20 of the terrorism defendants in the Sessions data were born in Colombia, the same number of defendants who were born in Yemen. If the travel ban were indeed about restricting travel from terror-prone nations, as the Trump administration has claimed, the Sessions data would in theory provide a compelling case for adding Colombia, a Catholic-majority nation, to the ban list.

    The Trump administration’s travel ban, which was established by executive order and affected seven Muslim-majority nations in its first iteration and six in its second, also temporarily blocks refugees from entering the country. Of the 448 defendants for whom Sessions’s committee staffers could find information, 24 entered the United States as refugees. According to the Sessions data, not a single refugee from Syria has been charged with terrorism-related offenses in the United States. Trump’s first travel ban blocked Syrian refugees indefinitely. The current travel ban places a temporary halt on the entry of all refugees.

    Neither version of Trump’s travel ban is in effect, following multiple successful court challenges arguing that the executive orders discriminate against Muslims. The Trump administration has filed notice to appeal at least one ruling that halted the second version of the travel ban.

    Trevor Aaronson
    April 20 2017, 7:15 p.m.

    Find this story at 20 April 2017

    Copyright https://theintercept.com/

    Mossad Reportedly Turned French Spies Into Double Agents After Joint Syria Op

    Le Monde reveals how Israeli espionage agency allegedly exploited a successful chemical weapons operation to get French counterparts to become sources; former head of French counterintelligence agency being questioned as suspect in case.

    PARIS – An internal report written by French intelligence, parts of which were published in the daily newspaper Le Monde on Sunday, reveal efforts by the Mossad to develop relationships with French spies, “to the point of crossing the line of turning them into double agents.”
    The audit report recommends investigating Bernard Squarcini, the head of the General Directorate for Internal Security until 2012, on suspicion of maintaining unauthorized and unreported ties with the Mossad’s Paris bureau chief at the time (identified in the report only by his initials, D.K.).

    The background to all this was a joint operation launched by the Mossad and French counterintelligence agency in 2010 to collect intelligence about Syrian President Bashar Assad’s chemical warfare plans. The operation, code-named Ratafia, aimed to recruit a senior Syrian engineer, who was meant to come to France to do additional training in chemistry and also to help recruit other engineers.
    The Mossad and French agents would hold work meetings using assumed names, as is customary. The French agents, who belonged to three different counterintelligence units, were responsible for the operation in Paris, while the Mossad agents were responsible for the plot that would enable the Syrian target to leave the country for studies and to recruit others in the French capital.
    Police officers guard the General Directorate for Internal Security headquarters in Levallois Perret, outside Paris, 2015.
    Police officers guard the General Directorate for Internal Security headquarters in Levallois Perret, outside Paris, 2015.Christophe Ena / AP
    But according to the report, the Israelis exploited the operation to persuade an unknown number of French agents to also serve as intelligence sources for Israel.
    One of the French agents under surveillance was seen going up to the apartment of the Mossad’s Paris chief for dinner one Friday night. Later, he reported to his superiors that he was going to Dubai on vacation, when in fact he flew with his family to Israel, where he spent time with Mossad agents without permission and without reporting the meetings afterward.
    In addition, according to the report, suspicious sums of money were deposited in the bank accounts of those French agents who were involved in the Ratafia operation.
    The internal report calls for further investigation to understand what damage was done to the French intelligence service.
    Le Monde also published details about the Ratafia operation. The paper claimed that the Mossad succeeded in recruiting the Syrian engineer and extracted information from him about Assad’s chemical weapons arsenal.
    The French daily said the operation enabled Israel to prove that the scientific cooperation between the European Union and Syria was being used to boost Assad’s chemical weapons program, which led to the cancellation of the agreement with the Syrians in 2011.
    According to Le Monde, the Mossad’s interest in building relations with French spies was exposed because a different French espionage agency, responsible for information security, was keeping the agents under surveillance and photographed them with Mossad agents.
    The paper said that all the Mossad agents involved were identified by their real names. The French filed a formal complaint, and two Israeli diplomats in the Israeli Embassy in Paris left their posts and returned to Israel. The Mossad chief, D.K., also returned to Israel following the French complaint.
    According to the report, the two Mossad agents suspected of contacts with the French have left the service and are now private businessmen in Tel Aviv. But during 2016, the report noted, they made contact with Squarcini (the counterintelligence head they’d worked with) in Paris.
    Squarcini, who is now being questioned as a suspect in the case, told investigators he met the two “totally by chance.”
    A short time before the suspicions came to light, Squarcini himself launched an internal inquiry into whether the Mossad was trying to recruit French agents as sources. However, the agents he put under surveillance did not include those involved in the Ratafia operation, even though Squarcini was fully aware of the close ties that had developed between his people and the Mossad operatives, the report said.
    An investigating judge appointed by the French filed an official request with Israel to question the two ex-Mossad agents who made contact with Squarcini in 2016. It isn’t clear if he received a response.
    The judge is seeking to build on the internal investigative report and broaden the investigation into whether the Mossad infiltrated French intelligence under Squarcini.

    Dov Alfon Mar 27, 2017 5:40 PM

    Find this story at 27 March 2017

    Copyright http://www.haaretz.com/

    Associés dans l’opération « Ratafia », les espions français et israéliens se sont-ils espionnés entre eux ?

    Le Mossad aurait tenté d’infiltrer le service de contre-espionnage
    français dans le cadre de l’opération visant à lutter contre le
    programme d’armes chimiques syrien, à partir de 2010.

    Dans le monde de l’espionnage, si des services décident d’unir leurs
    efforts, cela n’en fait pas pour autant des amis. Rien ne les empêchera
    de s’espionner. Jamais. La preuve lors d’une opération qui a réuni, à
    partir de 2010, la sécurité intérieure française et le service secret
    israélien du Mossad pour lutter contre le programme d’armes chimiques
    développé par le régime syrien de Bachar Al-Assad.

    L’enquête de sécurité interne diligentée par la Direction centrale du
    renseignement intérieur (DCRI, devenue Direction générale de la sécurité
    intérieure en 2014) sur la tentative du Mossad d’infiltrer, à cette
    occasion, le service de contre-espionnage français illustre ces
    pratiques. Lorsque l’opération ayant pour nom de code « Ratafia »
    débute, en 2010, c’est encore l’union sacrée pour prendre au piège un
    Syrien qui doit effectuer des séjours en France. Il s’agit de l’amener à
    livrer des secrets sur le programme d’armes chimiques syrien auquel il
    appartient.

    Lorsque le Mossad obtient le soutien de plusieurs groupes de la DCRI et
    d’agents de la DGSE, tous ses membres agissent sous de faux noms et une
    dizaine d’entre eux sont des clandestins à l’exception de D.K., chef de
    poste du Mossad à Paris. Selon les accusations de la DCRI, auxquelles Le
    Monde a eu accès, le Mossad aurait profité du contact quotidien avec ces
    agents français lors des séjours de la cible syrienne pour nouer des
    liens jugés suspects.

    L’un des agents français a ainsi été vu fêtant le shabbat avec le chef
    de poste du Mossad à Paris, il est également parti faire du tir à Dubaï
    puis a rejoint, en famille, ses camarades du Mossad à Jérusalem. Une
    proximité revenant, selon la DCRI, à franchir la ligne jaune. Des
    soupçons portent également sur le versement de sommes d’argent en
    espèces et l’existence de cadeaux contraire aux règles internes.
    Résultat, plusieurs agents français intégrés dans l’équipe conjointe
    avec le Mossad se verront retirer leur habilitation secret défense et
    seront mutés dans des services subalternes.

    L’enquête interne de la DGSI se garde cependant de rappeler qu’un autre
    groupe de la DCRI, chargé de contre-espionnage, s’est arrangé pour
    prendre en photo, à leur insu, les agents du Mossad qui travaillaient
    avec les Français. Un audit sera, enfin, déclenché sur l’utilisation des
    fonds de l’opération « Ratafia » après la découverte de demandes de
    remboursement de frais douteux.

    Compromission

    Cette enquête interne a été évoquée dans le cadre d’une information
    judiciaire visant Bernard Squarcini, chef de la sécurité intérieure de
    2007 à 2012. Soupçonné d’avoir pu utiliser les moyens d’écoutes de son
    service à des fins personnelles, il s’est défendu en indiquant que le
    bref placement sur écoute d’un fonctionnaire qui lui est reproché était
    destiné à vérifier s’il n’avait pas été, à son tour, « touché » par ce
    service étranger. Ce qui se révéla infondé. « Le service de sécurité de
    la DCRI m’a informé qu’une entreprise de matériel côtoyait de très près
    des personnels ex-RG affectés aux missions de surveillance
    opérationnelle et qu’il s’agissait d’une tentative du Mossad ou de gens
    considérés comme très proches d’infiltrer le service », a ajouté M.
    Squarcini. S’il a évoqué la compromission de policiers de son service,
    il n’a, en revanche, pas dit un mot sur l’opération « Ratafia » menée
    avec le Mossad.

    La DCRI fit part de ses griefs à la hiérarchie du Mossad à Tel-Aviv.
    Deux membres de l’ambassade d’Israël à Paris furent priés de quitter la
    France, dont D. K. Ils ont quitté le Mossad et se sont reconvertis dans
    le privé. M. Squarcini a affirmé qu’il avait, par hasard, rencontré, en
    2016, ces deux hommes venus en France pour affaires.

    Fin décembre, les juges d’instruction ont émis, à l’attention de
    l’Inspection générale de la police nationale (IGPN), deux commissions
    rogatoires pour en savoir plus sur cette affaire. La première sur
    l’enquête de contre-espionnage visant le Mossad et les relations
    existant entre ce service et la DGSI, la seconde demande aux policiers
    d’entendre les deux anciens du Mossad qu’aurait rencontrés M. Squarcini.

    LE MONDE | 25.03.2017 à 11h26
    Par Jacques Follorou

    Find this story at 25 March 2017
    Copyright http://www.lemonde.fr/

    Police Scotland confirms secret G8 file on notorious undercover police unit

    POLICE Scotland has confirmed that a secret file was created on the activities of a disgraced undercover unit at the G8 summit at Gleneagles.

    The “intelligence briefings” on the National Public Order Intelligence Unit, whose officers had sex with the protestors they spied on, will now be examined by a watchdog as part of its covert policing probe. Police Scotland said they would not comment on the contents of the file.

    Two Met-based units – the Special Demonstration Squad and the NPOIU – were set up to keep tabs on so-called subversives and domestic extremists.

    Loading article content

    A key strategy was to embed undercover officers in campaign groups, which included anti-racism organisations, and report back to handlers.

    However, some of the tactics deployed by officers in the units, such as using the identities of dead babies and deceiving women into long-term sexual relationships before vanishing, have since been exposed.

    The Pitchford Inquiry, set up by Theresa May when she was Home Secretary, is examining undercover policing going back decades.

    Although the judicial-led investigation does not apply to Scotland, NPOIU activity took place north of the border in the run up to the G8 summit in Scotland in 2005.

    Mark “Stone” was a driver for campaigners at the G8, but was unmasked as undercover officer Mark Kennedy.

    He later said in an interview: “My superior officer told me on more than one occasion, particularly during the G8 protests in Scotland in 2005, that information I was providing was going directly to Tony Blair’s desk.”

    Ahead of the G8, the then Scottish Executive issued a Ministerial Certificate blocking the release of information connected with the summit. The blackout applied to all Scottish public authorities, including police forces, health bodies and the Government.

    However, it can be revealed that the SNP Government quietly revoked the certificate in 2010, a decision that could result in information on the summit being released.

    After being asked by this newspaper for the titles of all files produced by on the G8 in 2005, Police Scotland confirmed the names of 1168 files.

    Forty-four were created by the former Fife Constabulary, whose patch included the Gleneagles hotel, while 1124 files were produced by Lothian and Borders police.

    Many of the files are on routine policing matters, but one document is described as “intelligence briefings” on the “National Public Order Intelligence Unit”.

    Other files include “stop the war coalition – regulatory board” and “indymedia”, which was a left-wing website at the time.

    There was also correspondence with the security services on the “Senior Leadership Development Programme”, a funding request for a “special branch operation” in May 2005 and over a dozen files on the peaceful Make Poverty History march.

    After the UK Government refused to extend the Pitchford Inquiry to Scotland, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary in Scotland launched its own review of undercover policing.

    A spokesperson for HMICS said: “As outlined in our terms of reference HMICS will examine the scale and extent of undercover police operations in Scotland conducted by the SDS and the NPOIU. As part of our scrutiny, we will review the authorisations for undercover deployments during the G8 Summit in Scotland in July 2005. HMICS are currently engaged in this process with the full cooperation of Police Scotland. With specific regard to the intelligence file, HMICS will ?examine this file for any information that may inform our review process.”

    Donal O’Driscoll, a core participant in the Pitchford Inquiry who was spied on in Scotland, said: “We have long argued that the both the SDS and the NPOIU were active in Scotland, particularly around the 2005 G8. The existence of this file strengthens our case that there needs to be a full inquiry into the activities of spy cops in Scotland – and renders the exclusion of Scotland from the Pitchford Inquiry even more inexplicable.

    “We continue to have no confidence in the HMICS review. Nevertheless, I’d expect them to at least make the effort to examine this and related briefings as part of the bare minimum they need to do. Not least because it is now beyond dispute there were multiple undercover police from the NPOIU and foreign police forces present at the G8 protests. However, only a full public inquiry can get to the truth as to what the police and the state had planned and co-ordinated when they interfered in legitimate democratic protest.”

    A Police Scotland spokesperson said: “Police Scotland does not routinely comment on covert policing or intelligence. We will not offer any comment on the contents of any specific files. Any inquiries relating to the NPOIU should be directed to the Met Police. Police Scotland will also fully and openly co-operate with the review of undercover policing to be carried out by HMICS.”

    / Paul Hutcheon, Investigations Editor / @paulhutcheon

    Find this story at 25 March 2017
    © Copyright 2017 Herald & Times Group

    2 Lebanese, 2 Nepalese and 1 Palestinian Held for Spying for Israel

    The General Directorate of General Security announced Wednesday that it has arrested two Lebanese men, two Nepalese women and a Palestinian man on charges of “spying for Israeli embassies abroad.”

    “During interrogation, the detainees confessed to the charges, admitting that they had called phone numbers belonging to the Israeli enemy’s embassies in Turkey, Jordan, Britain and Nepal with the aim of spying and passing on information,” a General Security statement said.

    The investigations revealed that the two aforementioned Nepalese women were actively recruiting Nepalese domestic workers in Lebanon with the aim of spying for Israel.

    “They gave them the phone number of the Israeli embassy in Nepal so that they pass on information about their employers to the Mossad Israeli intelligence agency,” the statement added.

    “Following interrogation, they were referred to the relevant judicial authorities on charges of collaborating with the Israeli enemy and efforts are underway to arrest the rest of the culprits,” General Security said.

    by Naharnet Newsdesk 25 January 2017, 16:04

    Find this story at 25 January 2017

    Naharnet © 2017

    Did Hizballah Beat the CIA at Its Own Techno-Surveillance Game? (2011)

    The CIA found itself in some rough waters in the Middle East last week. On Thursday, an influential member of Iran’s parliament announced that the Islamic republic had arrested 12 “CIA agents” who had allegedly been targeting Iran’s military and its nuclear program. The lawmaker didn’t give the nationality of the agents, but the presumption is that they were Iranians recruited to spy for the CIA. The agency hasn’t yet commented, but from what I’ve heard it was a serious compromise, one which the CIA is still trying to get to the bottom of.

    Even more curious was the flap in Lebanon. In June, Hizballah’s secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah announced that the movement had arrested two of its own members as CIA spies. But it wasn’t until last week that the story got traction in Washington. The CIA confirmed that operations in Beirut had been compromised but declined to offer details. As in the case of the alleged Iranian debacle, it’s no doubt still doing a “damage assessment” — a process that can take years. Even then, it will be difficult to determine exactly what happened.

    From what I’ve been able to piece together, Hizballah aggressively went after the CIA in Lebanon using telephone “link analysis.” That’s a form of electronic intelligence gathering that uses software capable of combing through trillions of gigabytes of phone-call data in search of anomalies — prepaid cell phones calling each other, series of brief calls, analysis of a cell-phone company’s GPS tracking. Geeks who do this for a living understand how it works, and I’ll take their word for it.

    But it’s not the technology that’s remarkable, as much as the idea that it’s being employed by Hizballah, a militant Islamic organization better known for acts of terror than for electronic counterespionage. That’s another reminder that Hizballah has effectively supplanted the Lebanese state, taking over police and security functions that in other countries are the exclusively the domain of sovereign authority. Indeed, since Nasrallah’s announcement of catching the CIA agents, no Lebanese authority has questioned why Hizballah, rather than Lebanese intelligence, would be responsible for catching alleged spies for foreign powers in Lebanon. Nobody bothers to ask what would be a pointless question; everyone knows that when it comes to military and security functions, Hizballah might as well be the state.

    (Watch a video of Hizballah’s theme park.)
    Since I served in Beirut during the ’80s, I’ve been struck by the slow but inexorable shift of sovereign power to Hizballah. Not only does the movement have the largest military, with nearly 50,000 rockets pointed at Israel; it has de facto control over Lebanon’s spies, both military and civilian. It green-lights senior appointments. Hizballah also is wired into all the databases, keeping track of who enters the country, who leaves, where they stay, whom they see and call. It’s capable of monitoring every server in the country. It can even tap into broadband communications like Skype. And, of course, it doesn’t bother with such legal niceties as warrants. If foreigners are going to be caught spy in Lebanon, it will be Hizballah that catches them.

    I have a feeling last week’s events bodes ill for U.S. intelligence because it suggests that anyone capable from organized crime to terrorist groups can greatly enhance their counterintelligence capability by simply buying off-the-shelf equipment and the know-how to use it. Like a lot of people, I thought it would be easy coasting at the end of the Cold War after the KGB was defanged. Instead, globalization and the rapid spread of sophisticated technologies have opened an espionage Pandora’s box.

    By Robert Baer Wednesday, Nov. 30, 2011
    Find this story at 30 November 2011

    © 2016 Time Inc.

    Exclusive: CIA Spies Caught, Fear Execution in Middle East (2011)

    In a significant failure for the United States in the Mideast, more than a dozen spies working for the CIA in Iran and Lebanon have been caught and the U.S. government fears they will be or have been executed, according to four current and former U.S. officials with connections to the intelligence community.

    The spies were paid informants recruited by the CIA for two distinct espionage rings targeting Iran and the Beirut-based Hezbollah organization, considered by the U.S. to be a terror group backed by Iran.

    “Espionage is a risky business,” a U.S. official briefed on the developments told ABC News, confirming the loss of the unspecified number of spies over the last six months.

    “Many risks lead to wins, but some result in occasional setbacks,” the official said.

    Robert Baer, a former senior CIA officer who worked against Hezbollah while stationed in Beirut in the 1980’s, said Hezbollah typically executes individuals suspected of or caught spying.

    “If they were genuine spies, spying against Hezbollah, I don’t think we’ll ever see them again,” he said. “These guys are very, very vicious and unforgiving.”

    Other current and former officials said the discovery of the two U.S. spy rings occurred separately, but amounted to a setback of significant proportions in efforts to track the activities of the Iranian nuclear program and the intentions of Hezbollah against Israel.

    “Remember, this group was responsible for killing more Americans than any other terrorist group before 9/11,” said a U.S. official. Attacks on the U.S. embassy and Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983 killed more than 300 people, including almost 260 Americans.

    The U.S. official, speaking for the record but without attribution, gave grudging credit to the efforts of Iran and Hezbollah to detect and expose U.S. and Israeli espionage.

    “Collecting sensitive information on adversaries who are aggressively trying to uncover spies in their midst will always be fraught with risk,” said the U.S. official briefed on the spy ring bust.

    But others inside the American intelligence community say sloppy “tradecraft” — the method of covert operations — by the CIA is also to blame for the disruption of the vital spy networks.

    In Beirut, two Hezbollah double agents pretended to go to work for the CIA. Hezbollah then learned of the restaurant where multiple CIA officers were meeting with several agents, according to the four current and former officials briefed on the case. The CIA used the codeword “PIZZA” when discussing where to meet with the agents, according to U.S. officials. Two former officials describe the location as a Beirut Pizza Hut. A current US official denied that CIA officers met their agents at Pizza Hut.

    From there, Hezbollah’s internal security arm identified at least a dozen informants, and the identities of several CIA case officers.

    Hezbollah then began to “roll up” much of the CIA’s network against the terror group, the officials said.

    One former senior intelligence official told ABC News that CIA officers ignored warnings that the operation could be compromised by using the same location for meetings with multiple assets.

    “We were lazy and the CIA is now flying blind against Hezbollah,” the former official said.

    CIA Spies Caught in Iran

    At about the same time that Hezbollah was identifying the CIA network in Lebanon, Iranian intelligence agents discovered a secret internet communication method used by CIA-paid assets in Iran.

    The CIA has yet to determine precisely how many of its assets were compromised in Iran, but the number could be in the dozens, according to one current and one former U.S. intelligence official.

    The exposure of the two spy networks was first announced in widely ignored televised statements by Iranian and Hezbollah leaders. U.S. officials tell ABC News that much of what was broadcast was, in fact, true.

    Hezbollah’s leader, Sayyed Hasan Nasrallah, announced in June of this year that two high-ranking members of Hezbollah had been exposed as CIA spies, leading U.S. officials to conclude that the entire network inside Hezbollah had been compromised.

    In Iran, intelligence minister Heidar Moslehi announced in May that more than 30 U.S. and Israeli spies had been discovered and an Iranian television program, which acts as a front for Iran’s government, showed images of internet sites used by the U.S. for secret communication with the spies.

    U.S. officials said the Iranian television program showed pictures of people who were not U.S. assets, but the program’s video of the websites used by the CIA was accurate.

    Some former U.S. intelligence officials say the developments are the result of a lack of professionalism in the U.S. intelligence community.

    “We’ve lost the tradition of espionage,” said one former official who still consults for the U.S. intelligence community. “Officers take short cuts and no one is held accountable,” he said.

    But at the CIA, officials say such risks come with the territory.

    “Hezbollah is an extremely complicated enemy,” said a U.S. official. “It’s a determined terrorist group, a powerful political player, a mighty military and an accomplished intelligence operation, formidable and ruthless. No one underestimates its capabilities.”

    “If you lose an asset, one source, that’s normally a setback in espionage,” said Robert Baer, who was considered an expert on Hezbollah.

    “But when you lose your entire station, either in Tehran or Beirut, that’s a catastrophe, that just shouldn’t be. And the only way that ever happens is when you’re mishandling sources.”

    By MATTHEW COLEBRIAN ROSS Nov. 21, 2011

    Find this story at 21 November 2011

    COpyright http://abcnews.go.com/

    Lebanon better able to catch alleged Israeli spies (2010)

    A strengthening Lebanese government is helping the militant group Hezbollah bust alleged spy cells, sometimes using tools and tradecraft acquired from Western nations.

    Reporting from Beirut — The chief of Lebanon’s domestic security forces had a warning for the Hezbollah commander: “You’ve been infiltrated.”

    With that, Achraf Rifi, head of the U.S.-backed Internal Security Forces, handed over evidence showing that two trusted, mid-ranking Hezbollah commanders were working as informants for Israeli military intelligence, said a high-ranking Lebanese security official with knowledge of the April 2009 meeting.

    Wafiq Safa, the security chief for the powerful Shiite Muslim militia and political organization, was silent.

    “They were shocked,” said the security official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because he wasn’t authorized to speak on the subject.

    Things moved quickly after that. The Hezbollah commander called Rifi the next day to assure him that the militant group would “take care of” the alleged infiltrators, who were never heard from again, the security official said.

    A monthlong war between Hezbollah and Israel ended four years ago, and Israel’s occupation of southern Lebanon ended a decade ago. But a clandestine intelligence war between the Jewish state and the Iranian-backed militant group continues unabated, officials and security experts say.

    Now, a strengthening Lebanese government is helping Hezbollah bust alleged spy cells, sometimes using tools and tradecraft acquired from Western nations eager to build up Lebanon’s security forces as a counterweight to the Shiite group, which since a 2008 power-sharing agreement has been a member of the governing coalition.

    Although security officials here say they’re using newfound tools to ferret out spies watching Hezbollah, just like they would against anyone attempting to infiltrate the country, Western observers express concern.

    “There are deep Israeli worries that anything the West gives the Lebanese armed forces and the Internal Security Forces could be used against them,” said Mara Karlin, a former Lebanon specialist at the U.S. Defense Department, now a researcher at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.

    The United States and its Western allies play a delicate balancing game in Lebanon. Since 2006, Washington has given nearly $500 million in military aid to Lebanese security forces and has allocated $100 million for 2011, making Lebanon the second-largest recipient of American military aid per capita after Israel.

    U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense Alexander Vershbow met officials in Lebanon on Monday, emphasizing that continuing U.S. aid and training would allow the army to “prevent militias and other nongovernment organizations” from undermining the government.

    The use of sophisticated equipment in the foiling of alleged Israeli spies may be the first concrete illustration of the U.S. dilemma. According to Lebanese officials, Israeli analysts and a Western diplomat who spoke on condition of anonymity, Lebanon has redirected for use against Israel signal-detection equipment donated by France and intended to fight Islamic militants.

    “The technology used with Fatah Islam was used to detect Israeli spies and collaborators in Lebanon,” said retired Col. Kamal Awar, a U.S.-trained former member of the Lebanese Special Forces who now publishes Defense 21, an Arabic-language military journal. “They discovered they were talking with the Israeli guy on the other side of the border.”

    The U.S. military has also contributed to the Lebanese security forces’ communications abilities. Israeli analyst Ronen Bergman, author of “The Secret War with Iran,” who is writing a book about the history of his country’s intelligence efforts, said the U.S. gave Lebanon’s army sophisticated electronic equipment that allowed it to identify and trace even encrypted communications.

    But there is no evidence that the training and equipment have been used to foil the intelligence operations of Israel, a major American ally.

    Israel and Lebanon have long claimed counterintelligence coups and thwarted alleged traitors.

    In 2008, Israel charged Sgt. Maj. Lovai Balut of Military Intelligence Unit 504 of passing on information to Hezbollah, according to the Jerusalem Post. In June, the Israeli army arrested a soldier and several civilians accused of spying for Hezbollah and smuggling drugs into the Jewish state.

    But over the last two years, Lebanon’s security forces may have conducted one of the most extraordinary counterintelligence sweeps in the annals of espionage. Dozens of alleged spies have been arrested in Lebanon on suspicion of sending information to Israel on the whereabouts and movements of Hezbollah and other enemies of the Jewish state.

    The broad range of suspects suggests a widespread effort by Israeli security forces to infiltrate Hezbollah, which Israel views as a severe threat to its national security.

    They include a city official of a small town in Hezbollah’s Bekaa Valley stronghold. Ziad Homsy, allegedly recruited at a conference in the Far East, is serving a temporary sentence of hard labor pending a final verdict.

    “Homsy had fought against the Israeli occupation,” said a Lebanese army officer, speaking on the condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to speak on the topic. “It was not easy to recruit him. But he needed the money. He would never drive a Kia. It was either a Mercedes or an SUV or stay at home.”

    There is the case of Lebanese army reserve Brig. Gen. Adib Alam, arrested in 2009 on charges of spying for Israel, who was reportedly convinced that it would help counter Syria, which he despised for its dominant role in recent Lebanese history.

    One convicted spy, Marwan Faqih, was a car dealer who allegedly sold Hezbollah bigwigs SUVs equipped with tracking devices that allowed Israel to follow their movements. Hezbollah has denied that its members bought cars from him.

    This summer, Lebanese security forces arrested two people working for the country’s state-owned Alfa cellphone company who allegedly allowed Israel to breach the communications network, a matter that has roiled the Lebanese Cabinet and prompted the government to announce that it would seek redress against Israel at the U.N. Security Council.

    Three Lebanese nationals, one of whom was found guilty of providing Israel with sensitive information during its 2006 war with Hezbollah, have been sentenced to death for spying activities.

    The motives vary, security officials said. Some of those apprehended have political gripes against Hezbollah.

    “There are some political reasons, there are some psychological reasons,” the high-ranking security official said. “But mostly it’s money and sex.”

    According to Lebanese security officials and intelligence experts, the alleged spies used sophisticated electronic devices to communicate with their handlers via coded messages. In May 2009, the intelligence branch of the ISF paraded some of the devices before an eager press corps. They included laptop computers, satellite phones, a tracking device hidden in the lid of a water cooler and a wooden chest installed with an apparatus for transmitting and receiving messages.

    “If only part of this story is true, it means [Hezbollah] has been sharing its every step and move with a silent partner,” said Gad Shimron, a former Mossad officer and author of the book “Mossad Exodus.”

    Over the last several years, Lebanon has doubled the number of officers working in counterintelligence. Security officials believed that their efforts are bearing fruit by dismantling a robust Israeli spy infrastructure they say has been in place in the country for decades.

    “They were strong and we were weaker,” the Lebanese security official said. “The Israelis thought they had the technological edge that put them ahead of the Arabs by 30 years. But we showed them we’re catching up.”

    But some analysts speculate that Lebanese security forces are giving themselves too much credit, and that Hezbollah, Iran and Syria may have contributed to the country’s apparent counterintelligence successes.

    “Anecdotal data suggests Hezbollah is providing intelligence to ISF and LAF,” the Lebanese military, said Aram Nerguizian, a resident scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington think tank.

    Some of the successes involved blind luck. The alleged activities of Faqih, the SUV dealer, unraveled when a Hezbollah member took his car to a mechanic over a minor electrical problem.

    “The electrician started testing here and there,” the Lebanese army officer said. “He found a wire leading to a strange device. He told the owner.”

    Hezbollah detained Faqih soon afterward.

    July 31, 2010|By Borzou Daragahi, Los Angeles Times

    Find this story at 31 July 2010
    Copyright 2017 Los Angeles Times

    V-Mann fuhr Amri mindestens einmal nach Berlin

    Lkw-Attentäter Anis Amri war den Behörden als Islamist bekannt, mindestens einmal soll ihn ein V-Mann des Landeskriminalamtes nach Berlin gefahren haben. Dass Amri selbst V-Mann war, verneinen die Ermittler.

    Als gefährlicher Islamist war Anis Amri, der in Berlin zwölf Menschen tötete, den deutschen Sicherheitsbehörden wohl bekannt: Warum sie den für eine Abschiebung vorgemerkten Radikalen nicht aus dem Verkehr zogen, diese Frage stellt sich für Innen- und Justizminister in Bund und Ländern dringlicher denn je.

    Offenbar gab es engere Kontakte zwischen Amri und einem islamistischen V-Mann des Landeskriminalamtes (LKA) in Nordrhein-Westfalen. Wie der SPIEGEL berichtet, soll der V-Mann den späteren Attentäter mindestens einmal nach Berlin gefahren haben.

    Am Donnerstag berichteten Vertreter von Innenminister Thomas de Maizière (CDU) nach SPIEGEL-Informationen in einer Telefonkonferenz Mitgliedern des Innenausschusses von diesem neuen Detail im Fall Amri. Bekannt war bereits, dass Amri bei dem LKA-Informanten mit Anschlagsplänen geprahlt und sich nach Schnellfeuergewehren erkundigt hatte.

    Die nordrhein-westfälische Landesregierung sah sich nun Aufgrund einer Anfrage der CDU-Landtagsfraktion genötigt zu erklären, dass Amri selbst kein Zuträger war. “Er war kein V-Mann”, sagte ein Sprecher des Innenministeriums in Düsseldorf am Samstag. Ein CDU-Fraktionssprecher bestätigte, dass die Frage danach “ein Punkt unseres Fragenkatalogs an das Innenministerium” sei.

    Kauder bringt Amri-Untersuchungsausschuss ins Gespräch

    Zuvor hatte unter anderem die “Bild”-Zeitung die Frage aufgeworfen, ob eine Zusammenarbeit mit dem LKA vielleicht die Erklärung dafür sein könnte, dass Amri von den Sicherheitsbehörden nicht rechtzeitig gestoppt wurde. Der 24 Jahre alte Tunesier war von mehreren Behörden als islamistischer Gefährder eingestuft worden.

    Die Union kann sich offenbar vorstellen, die Pannen der Sicherheits- und Justizbehörden im Fall Amri in einem Untersuchungsausschuss des Bundestages aufzuklären. Einen entsprechenden Vorschlag werde Unionsfraktionschef Volker Kauder (CDU) seinem SPD-Kollegen Thomas Oppermann machen, hieß es am Rande der Klausur der CDU-Spitze im saarländischen Perl aus Unionskreisen.

    Für die nächsten Tage hat Bundesjustizminister Heiko Maas (SPD) einen Fehlerbericht im Umgang mit dem Fall Amri angekündigt. Er und de Maizière waren kurz nach dem Terrorangriff von Kanzlerin Angela Merkel aufgefordert worden, den Fall aufzuarbeiten und neue Schritte vorzuschlagen, wie man künftig besser mit Gefährdern umgehen kann.

    Dennoch war es ihm möglich, fünf Tage vor Weihnachten einen Lastwagen in einen Berliner Weihnachtsmarkt zu steuern und zwölf Menschen zu töten. Nach einer mehrtägigen Flucht wurde Amri dann von Polizeikräften im norditalienischen Mailand erschossen.

    Anmerkung der Redaktion: In einer früheren Version dieses Textes war davon die Rede, Anis Amri sei von einem V-Mann des Verfassungsschutzes mindestens einmal nach Berlin gefahren worden. Es war jedoch ein V-Mann des Landeskriminalamtes. Wir bitten den Fehler zu entschuldigen.

    Samstag, 14.01.2017 13:25 Uhr

    Find this story at 14 January 2017

    © SPIEGEL ONLINE 2017

    Italiens Behörden verschwiegen schwere Panne im Fall Amri

    Laut Informationen der Welt am Sonntag hätte Italien Anis Amri schon 2011 abschieben können. Die Behörden sollen damals eine beglaubigte Abschrift der Geburtsurkunde erhalten haben.

    Anis Amri, der Weihnachtsmarkt-Attentäter, hätte bereits im Sommer 2011 nach Tunesien abgeschoben werden können.

    Seit diesem Zeitpunkt waren italienische Behörden zweifelsfrei über seine wahre Identität informiert.

    Tunesische Stellen hatten die beglaubigte Abschrift der Geburtsurkunde Amris auf dem Dienstweg übermittelt.

    Warum das wichtig ist:
    Die zwölf Menschen, die beim Weihnachtsmarkt-Anschlag von Berlin getötet worden waren, könnten vermutlich noch leben, wenn die italienische Regierung konsequent gehandelt hätte.

    Die zwölf Menschen, die beim Weihnachtsmarkt-Anschlag von Berlin getötet worden waren, könnten vermutlich noch leben, wenn die italienische Regierung konsequent gehandelt hätte. Nach Informationen der „Welt am Sonntag“ hätte Anis Amri, der spätere Attentäter, bereits im Sommer 2011 nach Tunesien abgeschoben werden können.

    Seit diesem Zeitpunkt waren italienische Behörden zweifelsfrei über seine wahre Identität informiert. Tunesische Stellen hatten die beglaubigte Abschrift der Geburtsurkunde Amris auf dem Dienstweg übermittelt. Ausgestellt worden war das Dokument am 24. Juni 2011 und somit vier Jahre, bevor Anis Amri aus italienischer Abschiebehaft in die Freiheit und damit nach Deutschland entlassen wurde. Angeblich geschah dies – wie aus Rom wiederholt versichert wurde –, weil Tunesien Amris Staatsbürgerschaft bestritten habe.

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    Das tunesische Konsulat im sizilianischen Palermo hatte die Urkunde überstellt, als sich Amri als angeblich unbegleiteter minderjähriger Flüchtling auf der Insel aufhielt. Die italienische Regierung hatte deren Erhalt bisher verschwiegen. Informationen aus der Urkunde flossen jedoch ab Oktober 2011 nachweislich in offizielle italienische Dokumente wie Polizeiprotokolle und Gerichtsakten ein.

    Im Gefängnis von Sizilien wurde er zum religiösen Hardliner

    Der tunesische Konsul in Palermo, dessen Büro die Geburtsurkunde Amris übermittelt hatte, lehnte eine Stellungnahme ab. Wörtlich sagte Abderrahman Ben Mansour: „In diese Sache sind eine tunesische Behörde verwickelt und eine italienische, und ich fordere Sie auf, sich als Journalist aus diesem Fall absolut herauszuhalten.“

    Geheimdienst-Kontrolleure befassen sich mit Fall Amri
    Der Fall Anis Amri wirft immer mehr unglaubliche Fragen auf. Das Parlamentsgremium zur Kontrolle der Geheimdienste soll diese aufklären, ein erstes Treffen fand in Berlin statt.

    Quelle: Die Welt/Erdmann Hummel
    Die Freilassung Amris aus italienischer Abschiebehaft im Juni 2015 könnte Teil einer Geheimoperation des italienischen Inlandsnachrichtendienstes AISI gewesen sein. Dies berichteten gleichlautend zwei mit der Untersuchung des Falls Amri unmittelbar befasste Quellen aus dem italienischen Sicherheitsapparat unabhängig voneinander der „Welt am Sonntag“. Die AISI-Aktion habe zum Ziel gehabt, Amri als Köder in der islamistischen Szene Italiens einzusetzen. Wegen einer Panne habe man Amri jedoch aus den Augen verloren.

    Der Inlandsgeheimdienst habe zuvor die islamistische Radikalisierung Amris während dessen Inhaftierung in verschiedenen Gefängnissen Siziliens aufmerksam verfolgt, er war unter anderem wegen Brandstiftung und Körperverletzung verurteilt worden. Im Gefängnis von Agrigento habe sich Amri ab Anfang 2014 unter dem Einfluss eines ebenfalls tunesischstämmigen Mitgefangenen in kürzester Zeit vom gewaltbereiten Kleinkriminellen zum religiösen Eiferer entwickelt.

    Die italienische Regierung ist nun in Erklärungsnot

    Nach Kenntnis der italienischen Quellen handelte es sich bei der fehlgeschlagenen Observation Amris nach dessen Haftentlassung um eine rein italienische Operation. Deutsche Dienste seien weder beteiligt noch informiert gewesen. Eine Anfrage im Büro des italienischen Ministerpräsidenten Paolo Gentiloni, dem AISI unterstellt ist, blieb bis Redaktionsschluss unbeantwortet.

    Sollten sich diese Hinweise bestätigen, geriete die italienische Regierung nicht nur gegenüber der deutschen Öffentlichkeit, sondern auch gegenüber der eigenen Bevölkerung in Erklärungsnot. Unter den zwölf Todesopfern des Anschlags auf den Berliner Weihnachtsmarkt war auch eine 31-jährige Italienerin. Sie wurde am vergangenen Montag in ihrer Heimat in Anwesenheit von Staatspräsident Sergio Mattarella und Innenminister Marco Minniti beigesetzt.

    Von Helmar Büchel | Stand: 22.01.2017 | Lesedauer: 3 Minuten

    Find this story at 22 Januari 2017

    © WeltN24 GmbH

    Bericht der Behörden hat Lücken – Anis Amri: neue Fragen trotz Transparenz-Versprechen

    Offenheit und lückenlose Aufklärung, das versprechen die zuständigen Sicherheitsbehörden, um den Fall Amri aufzuarbeiten. Nun haben sie einen ersten Bericht vorgelegt – aber der beantwortet die Fragen nur auf den ersten Blick.

    Das Versprechen ist groß und bislang einmalig: Öffentlich und lückenlos soll die Arbeit der Sicherheitsbehörden im Fall Amri aufgearbeitet, sollen Unterlagen transparent gemacht werden. Das Bundesjustizministerium (BMJV) und das Bundesinnenministerium (BMI) haben in der vergangenen Woche dazu eine Chronologie vorgelegt.

    Auf den ersten Blick scheint sie alle Fragen zum Attentäter vom Berliner Breitscheidplatz zu beantworten. Um den Willen zur Transparenz zu bekräftigen, fügten die Ministerien im Laufe der Woche noch mehrere Updates hinzu.

    Doch wer sich den Details zuwendet, entdeckt viele offene Fragen, auf die es noch immer keine Antworten gibt. Nach rbb-Recherchen betrifft dies vor allem die Arbeit der Bundesbehörden.

    “Wir müssen Konsequenzen ziehen”

    Norbert Lammert hat bei der Gedenkminute des Bundestags die besonnene Reaktion der Bürger nach dem Anschlag auf den Berliner Weihnachtsmarkt gelobt – und zugleich Konsequenzen gefordert.
    Von keiner Gefahr zum “Foreign Fighter”

    Zur Erinnerung: Für die Berliner Behörden stellte Anis Amri im September 2016 keine Gefahr mehr dar. Alle Überwachungsmaßnahmen endeten am 21.09.2016. Doch nur wenige Tage später wird Amri plötzlich von den Sicherheitsbehörden als “Foreign Fighter” eingestuft.

    Wörtlich heißt es in der von BMI und BMJV erstellten neuen Chronologie für den 13.10. 2016: “Erfassung des Amri als ‘Foreign Fighter’ im Inpol-System bis zum 06.10.2017 und Mitteilung an das BKA hinsichtlich der Übermittlung an alle Schengenstaaten und Übermittlung der Zusatzinformation ‘Foreign Fighter’.”

    Hier beginnen die Fragen: Wer hat diese Einstufung veranlasst? Das beantwortet die Chronologie nicht. Nach Informationen des rbb kann dies nur durch eine Bundesbehörde veranlasst werden. Um welche Behörde es sich dabei handelt, ist bislang unklar.

    MEHR ZUM THEMA

    Stationen der Flucht des Attentäters Anis Amri nach dem Anschlag auf dem Breitscheidtplatz in Berlin (Quelle: dpa)
    Staatsanwaltschaft unzureichend informiert

    Berliner Behörden hätten Terroranschlag verhindern können

    Die Berliner Staatsanwaltschaft hätte Anis Amri in Haft nehmen und damit den Terroranschlag am Breitscheidplatz verhindern können – wenn sie besser informiert worden wäre. Das wurde am Mittwoch auf einer Sitzung des Innenauschusses des Bundestages deutlich.

    Verfassungsschutz weist Beteiligung zurück

    Ebenso offen ist ein Vermerk in einem sogenannten “Personagramm” zu Anis Amri, das dem rbb exklusiv vorliegt. Ein Personagramm wird von den Sicherheitsbehörden über so genannte Gefährder erstellt und bündelt alle Erkenntnisse und Maßnahmen zur jeweiligen Person.

    Das Personagramm zu Anis Amri wurde von den Sicherheitsbehörden in Nordrhein-Westfalen erarbeitet, es spiegelt den Erkenntnisstand vom 14. Dezember 2016 wider. Die Behörden vermerken darin nicht nur, dass sich Amri wieder in Berlin befinden soll, sondern auch, dass schon am 13. Oktober folgende Maßnahmen gegen ihn eingeleitet wurden: “PB07 / Nachrichtendienstliche Beobachtung durch BfV”. Ein Vermerk, der weitere Fragen aufwirft.

    Was sich hinter “PB07” verbirgt ist noch einfach zu beantworten: “Polizeiliche Beobachtung” im Zusammenhang mit Terrorismus / Exterrorismus. Schwieriger zu beantworten ist jedoch die Frage, was “Nachrichtendienstliche Beobachtung durch BfV” bedeutet. Nach Informationen des rbb kann diese Maßnahme nur durch eine Bundesbehörde veranlasst werden. Naheliegend ist da das Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV). Doch das BfV weist auf Anfrage des rbb jede Beteiligung zurück.

    Schriftlich heißt es: “Ihre Fragen nach dem Eintrag in den von Ihnen zitierten Unterlagen sind für uns nicht nachvollziehbar. Das genannte Datum 13.10.2016 kann hier nicht in Zusammenhang mit einem Tätigwerden des BfV gesetzt werden.”

    Nachfragen bei den Sicherheitsbehörden in Nordrhein-Westfalen blieben ebenso erfolglos, es gibt keine Erklärung für den Eintrag in einem der zentralen Dokumente für Gefährder. Die versprochene Transparenz, sie lässt zu wünschen übrig – solange zentrale Dokumente wie Amris Personagramm nicht lückenlos erklärt werden.

    Beitrag von Susanne Opalka, Jo Goll, René Althammer
    21.01.17 | 15:47 Uhr

    Find this story at 21 January 2017
    © rbb

    Anschlag in Berlin Sollte Anis Amri als V-Mann angeworben werden?

    War Anis Amri ein V-Mann der Sicherheitsbehörden? Eine Aussage der nordrheinwest-fälischen Ministerpräsidentin Hannelore Kraft machte stutzig. Sie hatte gesagt, beim Umgang mit Amri gehe es auch darum, „mehr Erkenntnisse über mutmaßliche (Terror)-Zellen zu erlangen“. Da müssten die Behörden abwägen.

    Entsprechende Berichte dementierten sowohl das Bundesinnenministerium als auch das NRW-Innenministerium. Amri sei kein V-Mann der Sicherheitsbehörden.

    Doch viele Episoden in dem mehrstufigen Behördenversagen im Fall Amri werfen Fragen auf:

    Nach einer Festnahme Amris in Ravensburg im Juli 2016 wegen falscher Pässe und Betäubungsmitteln wird er kurz darauf wieder freigelassen auf Verfügung des NRW-Innenministeriums, weil eine Abschiebung nicht möglich sei.

    Amri nahm laut „Welt am Sonntag“ selbst regelmäßig Ecstasy und Kokain und finanzierte sein Leben weitgehend als Dealer. Schon in seiner Heimat war der 24-Jährige demnach wegen Drogendelikten aufgefallen. Ermittler fragten sich, ob er bei dem Anschlag unter Drogeneinfluss gestanden habe.

    Offenbar führte der Drogenkonsum das LKA in Berlin zu einer fatalen Fehleinschätzung: Wie die „Bild“ berichtet, sei er für die Polizei nicht mehr als Islamist infrage gekommen, weil er Drogen nahm.

    Im November nahm die Polizei mehrere Islamisten aus seinem Umfeld fest – ihn selbst aber nicht.

    Außerdem hat nach Medieninformationen ein V-Mann Amri im März nach Berlin gefahren.

    Dazu kommt: Amri reiste mit mindestens 14 verschiedenen Identitäten durch Deutschland und kassierte mehrfach Unterstützungsleistungen vom Staat. Nach Informationen der „Rheinischen Post“ wurde das Verfahren gegen Amri wegen Sozialbetrugs aber nicht in der normal zuständigen Abteilung, sondern in der „politischen Abteilung“ durchgeführt.

    Wenn Amri also kein V-Mann war – sollte er dann angeworben werden?
    Frank Tempel, der Vizefraktionschef der Linken, sagte der „Bild am Sonntag“: „Es gibt eine Menge Indizien, dass da etwas faul ist.“
    Die Grünen-Fraktionschefin Kathrin Göring-Eckardt sagte der „Bild“: „Ich will keine Verdächtigungen äußern, bevor ich alle Fakten auf dem Tisch habe. Ich kann aber nicht verstehen, warum Herr Amri trotz der Faktenlage frei rumlaufen durfte.“

    In der kommenden Woche könnten weitere Details ans Licht kommen. Der Innenausschuss und das parlamentarische Kontrollgremium des Bundestags versuchen, einen ersten Überblick zu erlangen. Die Union will einen Untersuchungsausschuss gründen, die SPD fordert sogar einen Sonderermittler. Ziel ist herauszufinden, was genau in der Absprache und Zusammenarbeit der Landes- und Bundesbehörden schief lief.
    In einem sind sich die führenden Politiker einig: Etwaige Sicherheitslücken bei den Behörden müssen so schnell wie möglich geschlossen werden.

    15.01.2017, 12:24

    Find this story at 15 January 2017

    Copyright http://www.focus.de/

    Acht wertvolle Stunden vergingen, bis nach Amri gefahndet wurde

    Laut Informationen der Welt am Sonntag hätte Italien Anis Amri schon 2011 abschieben können. Die Behörden sollen damals eine beglaubigte Abschrift der Geburtsurkunde erhalten haben.

    Bei der Jagd nach dem Attentäter vom Berliner Breitscheidplatz kam es nach Recherchen der „Welt“ zu einer Verzögerung.

    Obwohl die Identität am Tag nach dem Attentat ermittelt war, dauerte es, bis bundes- und europaweit gefahndet wurde.
    Anis Amri reiste drei Tage lang ungehindert von Deutschland in die Niederlande, anschließend weiter nach Italien.
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    Die Geldbörse lag unter dem Fahrersitz des Lastwagens. Darüber befand sich eine Decke. Bei einer ersten groben Sichtung war sie den Ermittlern wohl deshalb nicht aufgefallen. Erst bei einer genaueren Untersuchung des Führerhauses wurde das Portemonnaie schließlich gefunden – und damit ein entscheidender Hinweis auf den Attentäter vom Berliner Breitscheidplatz. Darin befand sich Bargeld und ein Stück Papier. Es war eine Duldung, ausgestellt vom Landratsamt im nordrhein-westfälischen Kleve auf einen „Ahmed Elmasri, geboren am 01.01.1995 in Skendiria/Tunesien“.

    Der Name war falsch. Bei der Person, so stellten die Ermittler schnell fest, handelte es sich um den 24-jährigen Tunesier Anis Amri. Der im Duldungsbescheid angegebene Name war eine seiner 14 Identitäten, die den Behörden bekannt waren. Amri galt schon länger als radikaler Islamist, war sogar als „Gefährder“ eingestuft. Monatelang hatten gleich mehrere Sicherheitsbehörden gegen ihn ermittelt, ohne handfeste Beweise zu finden.

    Amri erschoss Lkw-Fahrer offenbar Stunden vor Anschlag
    Der polnische Lkw-Fahrer, der nach dem Lastwagenanschlag in Berlin tot auf dem Beifahrersitz gefunden wurde, hatte laut Informationen der „Bild“ schon Stunden vor der Tat einen Kopfschuss erlitten.

    Quelle: Die Welt
    Mit den gefundenen Papieren rückte er plötzlich wieder ins Visier der Fahnder. Die Geldbörse im Lkw machte Anis Amri schlagartig zum neuen Hauptverdächtigen des Anschlags auf den Weihnachtsmarkt in Berlin mit zwölf Toten und Dutzenden Verletzten. Doch obwohl die Identität des Terrorverdächtigen nun bekannt war, vergingen wichtige Stunden, bis eine bundesweite und auch europaweite Fahndung nach ihm ausgelöst wurde. Das zeigen Recherchen der „Welt“, und das bestätigten Sicherheitsbehörden auf Nachfrage.

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    Das Bundesinnen- und das Bundesjustizministerium haben in der vergangenen Woche eine 19 Seiten lange Chronologie veröffentlicht. Sie trägt den Titel „Behördenhandeln um die Person des Attentäters vom Breitscheidplatz Anis Amri“. Aufgelistet sind darin die Erkenntnisse der Behörden zur Gefährlichkeit des Islamisten und auch die erfolglosen Versuche, ihn abzuschieben. Was auffällt: Es fehlen die Aktionen der Ermittler in den Stunden und Tagen unmittelbar nach dem Anschlag. Genau in diesem Zeitraum kam es jedoch womöglich zu einer folgenschweren Fahndungspanne – oder zumindest zu einer fragwürdigen Entscheidung der Terrorfahnder.

    Was geschah in den Stunden nach dem Anschlag?

    Am Montag, 19. Dezember 2016, um kurz nach 20 Uhr, war Anis Amri mit dem zuvor gestohlenen polnischen Lastwagen in den Weihnachtsmarkt am Breitscheidplatz gerast. Der Attentäter überlebte und konnte in dem Wirrwarr unerkannt fliehen. Kurze Zeit später nahm die Polizei nach einem Zeugenhinweis unweit des Berliner Tiergartens einen Verdächtigen fest: den pakistanischen Asylbewerber Naved B.

    Doch es ließen sich keinerlei Belege dafür finden, dass der Mann tatsächlich der Attentäter ist – weder Fingerabdrücke im Lkw noch DNA. Und so wuchsen innerhalb der Berliner Polizei in den folgenden Stunden die Zweifel daran, ob man wirklich den richtigen Täter gefasst hatte.

    Anis Amri soll regelmäßig Drogen genommen haben
    Der Attentäter von Berlin, Anis Amri, war Drogendealer und hat auch selbst regelmäßig Drogen konsumiert. Das geht aus einem Sachstandsbericht hervor. Auch in Berlin verkaufte der Tunesier demnach Drogen.

    Quelle: Die Welt
    Am Tag nach dem Attentat, am Morgen des 20. Dezember, begann die Berliner Polizei damit, den Lastwagen vom Breitscheidplatz abzuschleppen. Die Bremsen saßen fest, die Zugmaschine des Lasters war schwer beschädigt. Der Abtransport verzögerte sich daher. Es ging nur um Schrittempo voran. Erst am frühen Vormittag erreichte tonnenschwere Gefährt schließlich die Julius-Leber-Kaserne in Berlin-Reinickendorf. Dort, in einer Halle, fand die eigentliche Untersuchung durch die Tatortgruppe des LKA Berlin statt.

    Spürhunde, sogenannte Mantrailer, wurden in die Fahrerkabine geschickt. Sie sollten den Geruch des Attentäters aufnehmen. Dann durchsuchten die Ermittler das Fahrerhaus. Überall lagen Glassplitter, Kleidungsstücke und Holzteile herum. Beim Aufprall und bei der Vollbremsung des Lastwagens waren Dutzende Einzelteile durch das Führerhaus geflogen. Zwischen 15 und 16 Uhr entdeckten die LKA-Ermittler im Fußraum unter dem Fahrersitz die Geldbörse mit dem Duldungsschreiben von „Ahmed Elmasri“ aus Kleve.

    Es wurden Datenbanken abgefragt und Behördenanfragen verschickt. Schnell war „Ahmed Elmasri“ als Anis Amri identifiziert. Es war ein weiterer Hinweis darauf, dass der tags zuvor festgenommene Pakistaner Naved B. wohl unschuldig ist. Der neue Hauptverdächtige hieß jetzt Anis Amri. Und der war noch nicht gefasst.

    Warum wurde mit der Fahndung so lange gewartet?

    Was dann geschah, wirft einige Fragen auf: Denn obwohl die Identität des Attentäters den Ermittlern wohl spätestens am Dienstagnachmittag bekannt war, gab es nach Informationen der „Welt“ zunächst keine bundesweite Fahndung nach Anis Amri. In Berlin hatte man einen islamistischen „Gefährder“ als den mutmaßlichen Todesfahrer vom Breitscheidplatz ermittelt, jedoch die Polizeibehörden in 14 Bundesländern nicht über den neuen Verdächtigen in Kenntnis gesetzt.

    Dabei hatte es am frühen Abend des 20. Dezember 2016, gegen 18.30 Uhr, bereits eine wichtige Telefonschaltkonferenz gegeben. Teilgenommen hatten die LKA-Präsidenten und ein Vertreter des Bundeskriminalamtes (BKA). Man habe, so informierte ein Ermittler aus Berlin, einen „sehr wertigen Hinweis“ auf einen neuen Verdächtigen. Ein LKA-Vertreter hakte nach, wollte wissen, um wen es sich handelt. Doch in Berlin, wo man seit Stunden bereits die Duldungspapiere von Anis Amri aus Kleve vorliegen hatte, herrschte Zurückhaltung. Man wollte keine weiteren Details nennen und lediglich ein betroffenes Bundesland informieren – in diesem Fall Nordrhein-Westfalen.

    So vergingen Stunden, bis schließlich eine bundesweite und sogar europaweiten Fahndung nach dem Terrorverdächtigen ausgelöst wurde. Das LKA Berlin, das zu diesem Zeitpunkt mit der Besonderen Aufbauorganisatio (BAO) „Weihnachtsmarkt“ noch die Federführung bei den Ermittlungen innehatte, verschickte erst am 21. Dezember, um 0.06 Uhr, ein elektronisches Schreiben („VS-Nur für den Dienstgebrauch – Vorrangstufe: SOFORT“) an die Polizeibehörden der Länder, an die Bundespolizei, den Verfassungsschutz, den Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) und das Zollkriminalamt.

    Das Dokument liegt der „Welt“ vor. Es enthält neben Fotos von Anis Amri auch diverse Alias-Namen des Islamisten und den Hinweis: „Es besteht der dringende Verdacht, dass er mit dem Anschlagsgeschehen in direkter Verbindung steht.“ Und bei „Antreffen ist nicht eigenständig heranzutreten“. Stattdessen solle das LKA informiert werden, um „Spezialkräfte“ einzusetzen.

    Anis Amri ist tot – Ein Italiener ist Held des Terrordramas
    Anis Amri ist tot. In Italien endet das Drama vom Terroranschlag auf den Weihnachtsmarkt am Breitscheidplatz, bei dem Amri einen Lastwagen in eine Menschenmenge gelenkt haben soll.

    Quelle: Die Welt
    Die eindringliche Warnung war durchaus berechtigt. Immerhin ging es um einen gefährlichen Terroristen, der bereits zwölf Menschen kaltblütig ermordet hatte. Elf wurden überrollt und zerquetscht, ein polnischer Lkw-Fahrer zuvor mit einer Pistole erschossen. Warum aber wurde die Warnung vor Amri den Polizeidienststellen bundesweit erst so spät mitgeteilt?

    Und noch etwas fällt auf: Im Schreiben des Berliner LKA gibt es eine Zeitangabe, die im Widerspruch steht zu den offiziellen Angaben. Es heißt, die Geldbörse von Amri sei im Fußraum des Lkw am „20.12., 20:39 (…) festgestellt“ worden. Auf Nachfrage teilte die Berliner Polizei allerdings mit, die Geldbörse sei schon zwischen „15.00 und 16.00 Uhr“ aufgefunden worden.

    Acht Stunden, vielleicht neun, vergingen

    Vom Fund der Geldbörse bis zum Auslösen der bundes- und europaweiten Personenfahndung vergingen demnach mindestens acht, vielleicht sogar neun Stunden. In diesem Zeitraum waren lediglich die Polizeibehörden in Berlin, Nordrhein-Westfalen und das BKA über den Verdacht gegen Anis Amri informiert. Es seien verdeckte Maßnahmen gelaufen, heißt es aus Sicherheitskreisen. Man habe das bekannte Umfeld des „Gefährders“ im Blick gehabt.

    Außerdem habe man nicht das Risiko eingehen wollen, dass Amri von der Suche nach ihm Wind bekommt. Etwa durch Presseveröffentlichungen. So zumindest ein Erklärungsversuch. Fraglich aber ist, ob neben den verdeckten Maßnahmen nicht auch eine umfassendere Fahndung angebracht gewesen wäre. Immerhin handelte es sich um einen Verdächtigen, der bereits auf brutale Weise gemordet hat – und der vermutlich bewaffnet war. Kann man da das Risiko eingehen nur den Freundeskreis, bekannte Wohnanschriften oder die frequentierten Moscheen zu observieren?

    Das BKA bestätigte auf Nachfrage der „Welt“, dass auch erst am 21. Dezember 2016 ein Fahndungseintrag nach Anis Amri ins Schengener Informationssystem (SIS) erfolgte. Sprich, eine europaweite Jagd nach dem Islamisten gestartet wurde.

    In dieser Zeit reiste Anis Amri, ein bewaffneter Zwölffach-Mörder, nicht nur durch die Bundesrepublik, sondern durch vier weitere EU-Staaten. Sein Weg führte über das niederländische Nijmegen und Amsterdam, weiter nach Brüssel, dann über Lyon, Chambery nach Turin und schließlich in einen Vorort von Mailand, wo er am frühen Morgen des 23. Dezember 2016 von italienischen Polizisten bei einem Schusswechsel getötet wurde.

    Es ist reine Spekulation, ob Anis Amri in Deutschland weiter gemordet hätte, falls er auf seiner Flucht auf Polizisten gestoßen wäre. Klar ist aber: Bundesweit hätten Polizeibeamte stundenlang nicht gewusst, dass sie den Attentäter vom Breitscheidplatz vor sich haben.

    Von Florian Flade | Stand: 25.01.2017 | Lesedauer: 7 Minuten
    Find this story at 25 January 2017

    © WeltN24 GmbH

    Berlin Anschlag – Anis Amri: Viele Widersprüche

    Bei der Jagd nach dem Attentäter vom Berliner Breitscheidplatz, Anis Amri, kam es offenbar zu einer Verzögerung von mehreren Stunden. Obwohl die Identität des Islamisten bereits am Tag nach dem Attentat ermittelt war, wurde lange Zeit nicht bundesweit oder europaweit nach Amri gefahndet, schreibt die “Welt”.
    Demnach stießen die Ermittler des Berliner Landeskriminalamtes (LKA) am 20. Dezember 2016 bereits zwischen 15:00 und 16:00 Uhr bei der Untersuchung des Lastwagens auf eine Geldbörse mit einem Duldungsschreiben des Landratsamtes Kleve (NRW).

    Ausgestellt war das Papier dem Bericht zufolge auf “Ahmed Elmasri”. Dabei handele es sich um einen Alias-Namen, der von Anis Amri bei einem Asylverfahren verwendet worden war. Obwohl das Duldungsschreiben schon kurze Zeit später dem als “Gefährder” eingestuften Anis Amri zugeordnet werden konnte, habe es stundenlang keine bundesweite Fahndung nach dem flüchtigen Islamisten gegeben.
    Erst am 21. Dezember 2016, um 00:06 Uhr, verschickte das LKA Berlin laut “Welt” eine interne Personenfahndung nach Anis Amri an Polizeidienststellen bundesweit, das Bundeskriminalamt (BKA), den Verfassungsschutz, den Bundesnachrichtendienst (BKA) und das Zollkriminalamt. Außerdem sei dann auch eine europaweite Fahndung durch einen Eintrag im Schengener Informationssystem (SIS) ausgelöst worden.
    Das Fahndungsschreiben aus Berlin enthalte zudem eine widersprüchliche Angabe zum Auffinden der Geldbörse und des Duldungsschreibens aus Kleve, schreibt die Zeitung weiter. Das Beweisstück sei am “20.12., 20:39 Uhr” festgestellt worden, heißt es demnach. Schon am 20. Dezember 2016 gegen 18:30 Uhr habe es eine Telefonkonferenz gegeben, an der LKA-Präsidenten und ein Vertreter des BKA teilgenommen hätten.
    Laut “Welt” teilte dabei ein Ermittler aus Berlin mit, dass man einen “sehr wertigen Hinweis” auf einen Tatverdächtigen vorliegen habe. Weitere Details seien den Bundesländern jedoch mit Verweis auf laufende “verdeckte Maßnahmen” nicht mitgeteilt worden.
    Anis Amri gelang nach dem Terroranschlag am Breitscheidplatz mit zwölf Toten die Flucht. Er reiste drei Tage lang ungehindert von Deutschland in die Niederlande, anschließend weiter über Belgien und Frankreich bis nach Italien. In Mailand wurde der Islamist schließlich am 23. Dezember 2016 bei einem Schusswechsel mit Polizisten getötet.

    25.01.2017

    Find this story at 25 Januari 2017

    © MMnews 2012

    Attentäter von Berlin Wie die Behörden Amri beobachteten – und doch die falschen Schlüsse zogen

    Spätestens Ende 2015 geriet der Attentäter von Berlin ins Visier der Ermittler. Seitdem gab es viele Warnungen vor dem radikalisierten Tunesier – und viele Runden, in denen Polizei und Geheimdienste über den Gefährder diskutierten. Eine Rekonstruktion.

    Mehr als ein Jahr beschäftigten sich die Sicherheitsbehörden mit dem Attentäter von Berlin. Sie wussten, dass Anis Amri in Kontakt mit dem IS stand und Bomben bauen wollte. Dennoch hielt man einen Anschlag für eher unwahrscheinlich. Eine Rekonstruktion der schwierigen Arbeit der Terrorfahnder.

    Mai 2015: Amri kommt in Italien nach einer knapp vierjährigen Haftstrafe auf freien Fuß und reist weiter Richtung Norden – nach Deutschland. Angeblich im Juli trifft er in Deutschland ein.

    November 2015: Spätestens im November fällt Amri den Behörden zum ersten Mal auf: Der Tunesier bietet sich einem V-Mann des Landeskriminalamtes Nordrhein-Westfalen an, der in der islamistischen Szene tätig ist. Amri sagt ihm, er wolle “etwas in Deutschland unternehmen” und könne sich eine Kalaschnikow für einen Anschlag besorgen.

    Anschlag auf Berliner Weihnachtsmarkt Die Fehler der Terror-Fahnder im Fall Amri
    Die Fehler der Terror-Fahnder im Fall Amri
    Mehr als ein Jahr lang beschäftigte sich die Polizei mit dem Attentäter von Berlin. Sie wusste, dass er in Kontakt mit dem IS stand und Bomben bauen wollte. Dennoch hielt man einen Anschlag für eher unwahrscheinlich. Von Hans Leyendecker und Georg Mascolo mehr …
    Januar 2016: Das Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz notiert: Amri reist unter verschiedenen Identitäten im ganzen Land herum. In Berlin, Nordrhein-Westfalen, Niedersachsen und Baden-Württemberg werbe er “offensiv” darum, mit ihm Anschläge zu begehen.

    ANZEIGE

    17. Februar 2016: Amri wird offiziell als “Gefährder” eingestuft (“Funktionstyp: Akteur”): “Aktuell sind bei Amri Verhaltensmuster feststellbar, die auf eine Intensivierung von Anschlags-Planungen hindeuten könnten und die Tiefe seiner radikal-islamistischen Gesinnung untermauern.”

    18. Februar 2016: Amri reist mit dem Bus nach Berlin, wird dort von der Polizei abgepasst. Das Bundeskriminalamt übernimmt die Auswertung seines Handys. Berlin, NRW und das Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz erhalten eine Kopie der Daten: Diese zeigen, wie radikalisiert er bereits ist. Am 2. Februar, so wird ersichtlich, hat Amri über das Chat-Programm “Telegram” Kontakt zu mutmaßlichen IS-Kämpfern aufgenommen.

    Ende Februar 2016: Amri ist Thema bei einer Runde von Polizei und Nachrichtendienstlern aus Bund und Ländern: Die Kommission Staatsschutz hat ein achtstufiges Prognose-Modell erarbeitet. Die Gefahr durch Amri wird mit einer 5 bewertet, “eher unwahrscheinlich”: keine konkreten Hinweise auf einen Anschlag, aber das BKA notiert auch, dass Amri “für radikale Ansichten und Ansinnen empfänglich sein dürfte”. Die Karlsruher Staatsschützer lassen vom LKA NRW alles zusammenschreiben, was über Amri bekannt ist – und leiten den Fall an den Berliner Generalstaatsanwalt weiter.

    14. März 2016: Berlin leitet Ermittlungen ein: Amri wird observiert, seine Kommunikation überwacht – doch bis auf kleinere Delikte passiert nichts. Im Juni zweifelt die Justiz daran, ob man überhaupt weiter überwachen soll. Im September enden die Ermittlungen.

    30. Mai 2016: Amris Asylantrag wird nach kurzer Prüfung abgelehnt. Amri soll so schnell wie möglich abgeschoben werden, allerdings hat die tunesische Regierung die notwendigen Papiere noch nicht zur Verfügung gestellt. Diese treffen erst zwei Tage nach dem Anschlag im Dezember ein.

    19. und 20. Juli 2016: Im Gemeinsamen Terrorismusabwehrzentrum (GTAZ) tritt die “Arbeitsgruppe Statusrechtliche Begleitmaßnahmen”, kurz AG Status zusammen. Vertreter des Innenministeriums, des BKA und des Verfassungsschutzes sitzen am Tisch, aber auch das Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge. Der Fall Anis Amri steht auf der Tagesordnung, doch nach Prüfung aller Erkenntnisse notiert die AG Status als Fazit: “Eine akute Gefährdungslage liegt derzeit nicht vor.”

    19. September 2016: Auch andere halten Amri für gefährlich. Der marokkanische Geheimdienst etwa übermittelt dem BND-Büro in Rabat eine Warnung, auch der dortige BKA-Verbindungsbeamte wird informiert. Die Marokkaner wiederholen wenig später ihre Warnung sogar.

    2. November 2016: Der Fall Amri wird ein letztes Mal besprochen. Die Arbeitsgruppe “Operativer Informationsaustausch” im GTAZ urteilt wieder, es sei “kein konkreter Gefährdungssachverhalt erkennbar”.

    8. November 2016: Der Generalbundesanwalt lässt Abu Walaa und drei seiner engsten Gefolgsleute verhaften – der “Prediger ohne Gesicht”, den ein Zeuge später als den wichtigsten Mann des IS in Deutschland bezeichnet. Anis Amri war öfter im Rahmen der Ermittlungen gegen den Iraker aufgetaucht. Er übernachtete immer wieder bei Mitgliedern des salafistisch-dschihadistischen Netzwerks. Nach der Festnahme Abu Walaas muss Amri geahnt haben, dass es nun auch für ihn eng werden könnte.

    14. Dezember 2016: In einem amtlichen Papier des nordrhein-westfälischen Staatsschutzes wird behauptet, dass sich Amri in verschiedenen Moscheen und Unterkünften in Berlin aufhalte. Er wechsle dabei die Schlaforte.

    19. Dezember 2016: Anis Amri verübt am Berliner Breitscheidplatz den schwersten islamistischen Anschlag auf deutschem Boden. Zwölf Menschen sterben.

    4. Januar 2017, 06:07 Uhr
    Von Georg Mascolo

    Find this story at 4 January 2017

    Copyright http://www.sueddeutsche.de

    Was the Berlin Christmas market attacker an undercover agent?

    A report published just over a week ago by the Federal Criminal Office (BKA) raises the question of whether Anis Amri was an intelligence agent.
    Amri allegedly drove into a Christmas market with a lorry on December 19 and killed 12 people. He is also accused of shooting and killing the lorry’s Polish driver.
    Just days after the attack, it was already clear that Amri had prepared the attack under the noses of the police and intelligence agencies. He had been under constant surveillance over the previous two years and was in contact with an agent with the North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) state intelligence agency.
    On the basis of the BKA’s confidential report, it is possible to reconstruct Amri’s activities in Germany quite precisely. The police and intelligence agencies concentrated on Amri almost weekly and followed all of his actions.
    Amri came from Italy to Germany in the summer of 2015. He had already received a four-year custodial sentence. He was initially sent to a refugee accommodation centre in Emmerich (Kreis Kleve), NRW.
    Already at that time, the 22-year-old was noticed because he had pictures of ISIS fighters on his mobile phone. In December 2015, other refugees reported to the immigration authorities in Kreis Kleve that he “supposedly maintained contact with Islamic State.” Eventually, the authorities were aware of 14 identities used by Amri.
    Amri became involved with the Salafist movement, into which the NRW state intelligence agency had embedded at least one agent. He reported repeatedly to the police about Amri. “The source spilled over,” wrote the Süddeutsche Zeitung, which saw the BKA report. These reports filled entire files.
    On the basis of these reports, the state prosecutor ordered Amri’s phone to be tapped in November 2015. Somewhat later, Italian intelligence agencies sent photos and detailed personal information to Germany.
    In February 2016, the intelligence agent reported that Amri was becoming more withdrawn and reading the Koran, as if he wanted to be purified as some suicide attackers do prior to an attack. He was designated as a “threat” by the NRW state intelligence agency.
    At the same time, the state BKA in NRW sent their intelligence about the Islamist network in which Amri was involved to the state prosecutor in Karlsruhe. The top German prosecutor took up an investigation against the group for supporting terrorism and recruitment for a terrorist organisation and in November ordered the arrest of its leader, Abu Walaa, as well as the hardcore members of the group. However, Anis Amri was left at large.
    A variety of intelligence agencies were now watching him as he travelled regularly between Dortmund and Berlin. He was driven at least once by the intelligence agent. Between March and September, the Berlin state prosecutor conducted an investigation into Amri. He was intercepted and observed, but allegedly not for terrorist planning but for petty drug trafficking. According to the Süddeutsche Zeitung, the BKA report alleges that “religious questions” supposedly fell into the background during Ramadan.
    On July 30, police arrested Amri on a bus at the border with Switzerland because drugs and false identities were found on him. After two days, he was released from the justice detention centre in Ravensburg after consultations with the immigration authorities in Kreis Kleve and the NRW Interior Ministry.
    The head of the justice detention centre in Ravensburg told Westdeutsche Rundfunk that if everything had been known at the time that was known by the authorities in NRW, they could have held Amri longer. But the authorities kept the information to themselves.
    Then on September 19, Morocco’s intelligence agency warned the BKA and the foreign intelligence service (BND) that the Tunisian could carry out an attack. Two days later, on September 21, 2016, the Berlin police ended their observations, allegedly because there was no evidence of an impending criminal act.
    A new warning was sent from Morocco to the German intelligence agencies in October. The NRW state intelligence agency was warned on several occasions by the Moroccan and Tunisian intelligence agencies about Amri, the last time on October 26. The NRW state intelligence agents merely checked the location of his phone and found he was residing in the Berlin-Brandenburg area.
    The Joint Terrorism Defence Centre (GTAZ), in which 40 security agencies at the state and federal levels are represented, held a total of seven meetings about Amri. But nobody allegedly saw any risk.
    Nonetheless, the authorities entered Amri’s name into a nationwide police Inpol database as a “foreign fighter”—i.e., as a terrorist—last October. This information was sent to all 26 countries party to the Schengen agreement.
    Amri was not arrested due to a lack of legal means, even though this is how it is portrayed. The authorities could have filed an application for deportation or security detention with a court and held Amri for up to 18 months as a “threat.” They could have then arrested him under a charge of terrorism. But none of this occurred. Amri remained concealed and on December 19 was able to carry out his attack.
    The BKA in particular played down the threat posed by the young Tunisian. In December 2015, the BKA deemed it “very unlikely” that Amri would carry out an attack. At one of the GTAZ meetings, an official of the BKA stated that the agent reporting about Amri had been part of a previous case in which he had provided “exclusive intelligence.” (“Exclusive means in general: there was nothing to it,” the Süddeutsche Zeitung explained.)
    The BKA designated Amri as a standard petty criminal to whom religious rituals meant nothing. “In the course of the measures, indications of planning for religiously motivated acts of violence did not arise.” The BKA report stated further, “The impression emerged of a young man on the move, erratic and appearing quite unstable.”
    As is now known, Amri prayed at a mosque in Berlin-Moabit shortly before the attack.
    Who was responsible for playing down the threat of Amri is one of the open questions in the case. Was he even perhaps an agent for one of the authorities? This suspicion was even held by some police authorities, because all pending investigations against Amri were halted, even an investigation for social welfare fraud in Duisburg. Additionally, there was no inquiry against him for grievous bodily harm and drug trafficking. Based on historical experience, this is a clear sign that someone is under the protection of a senior police or intelligence authority.
    Amri cannot comment on these latest details. The 24-year-old was shot and killed by Italian police on December 23 in Milan.
    The insistence by all state intelligence agencies that they were unaware that Amri was preparing an attack is worthless. This is well known from numerous previous attacks—the terrorist attacks of November 13, 2015, in Paris; April 15, 2013, in Boston; and September 11, 2001, in New York City. In every case, the security services had the attackers under surveillance for a long time and did not intervene to stop them from carrying out their plots.
    Each attack provided the justification for a huge build-up of the state apparatus, and the latest attack on the Berlin Christmas market is no different.
    Interior Minister Thomas de Maizière (Christian Democrats—CDU) responded at the beginning of January with the demand for the restructuring and centralisation of the security apparatus. The BKA had to be strengthened and the state intelligence agencies dismantled in favour of a federal administration and the construction of a “genuine federal police.” He published these demands under the headline “Guidelines for a strong state in difficult times” in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung.
    CDU chair Thomas Strobl, interior minister in Baden-Württemberg, subsequently called for unlimited detention pending deportation for threats and criminals.
    On Tuesday, the federal government decided to appoint a special investigator or initiate a parliamentary investigatory committee into the December 19 attack. Merely an internal investigatory group of the Parliamentary Control Commission (PKGr) will shortly present a report. The question must be asked: Who has an interest in this cover-up?

    By Dietmar Henning
    25 January 2017

    Find this story at 25 January 2017

    Copyright © 1998-2017

    Amri war laut Bundesregierung kein V-Mann

    Die Bundesregierung hat Spekulationen dementiert, wonach der Berliner Attentäter ein V-Mann gewesen sein soll. Im Bundestag befasst sich ein Kontrollgremium mit dem Fall.

    Wurde der Berliner Attentäter Anis Amri von den Sicherheitsbehörden nicht rechtzeitig gestoppt, weil er mit dem Verfassungsschutz zusammenarbeitete? Diese Fragen hatten Medien aufgeworfen. Das Innenministerium weist diese Spekulationen nun zurück: “Amri war weder als Vertrauensperson noch als V-Mann der Sicherheitsbehörden des Bundes tätig”, sagte ein Sprecher von Innenminister Thomas de Maizière (CDU). “Es wurde auch nicht versucht, ihn anzuwerben.”

    Der Spiegel hatte berichtet, dass es offenbar engere Kontakte zwischen Amri und einem islamistischen V-Mann des Landesverfassungsschutzes in Nordrhein-Westfalen gegeben hatte. Der V-Mann soll den späteren Attentäter mindestens einmal nach Berlin gefahren haben. Bekannt wurde auch, dass Amri bei dem V-Mann mit Anschlagsideen geprahlt habe – und sich offenbar auch nach Waffen erkundigt hatte. Die nordrhein-westfälische Landesregierung hatte daraufhin erklärt, der 24 Jahre alte Tunesier Amri sei kein V-Mann des Landesverfassungsschutzes gewesen. Die CDU-Landtagsfraktion hatte eine entsprechende Anfrage an die Landesregierung gestellt.
    Amri war von mehreren Behörden als islamistischer Gefährder eingestuft worden. Dennoch war es ihm möglich, am 19. Dezember einen Lastwagen in einen Berliner Weihnachtsmarkt zu steuern und zwölf Menschen zu töten. Amri war wenige Tage nach dem Anschlag bei einer Polizeikontrolle in Italien erschossen worden, nachdem er das Feuer auf die Beamten eröffnet hatte.
    SPD bevorzugt Sonderermittler

    Die Geheimdienstkontrolleure des Bundestages befassen sich am heutigen Montag mit möglichen Fehlern der Sicherheitsbehörden. In einer geheimen Sondersitzung soll dem Parlamentarischen Kontrollgremium nach Informationen der Nachrichtenagentur dpa ein vom Bundeskriminalamt erstellter Bericht vorgelegt werden. Darin seien alle Erkenntnisse, die den deutschen Sicherheitsbehörden über den Tunesier in den vergangenen Jahren vorlagen, chronologisch aufgelistet.
    Anschließend soll sich der Bundestag in seiner ersten Sitzungswoche nach der parlamentarischen Weihnachtspause intensiv mit den Hintergründen des Anschlags beschäftigen. Am Dienstag wollen Unionsfraktionschef Volker Kauder (CDU) und CSU-Landesgruppenchefin Gerda Hasselfeldt mit SPD-Fraktionschef Thomas Oppermann über die weiteren Schritte zur notwendigen Aufarbeitung des Falles durch den Bundestag sprechen.

    Der Innenminister unterstützt den Vorstoß. Er sei “sehr offen” für einen Untersuchungsausschuss, sagte Thomas de Maizière. “Unsere chronologische Aufarbeitung der Vorgänge, die wir in Kürze vorlegen werden, wird eine gute Grundlage für die Arbeit des Ausschusses sein.” Oppermann äußerte sich in der Bild am Sonntag offen für einen Untersuchungsausschuss, machte aber klar, dass er einen Sonderermittler für das wirksamere Instrument hält. Kauder hatte zuvor erklärt, es müsse insbesondere um die Frage gehen, ob es bei der Zusammenarbeit der Sicherheitsbehörden von Bund und Ländern oder in einzelnen Bereichen Versäumnisse gegeben habe.

    16. Januar 2017, 7:30 Uhr Quelle: ZEIT ONLINE, dpa, mp 26 Kommentare
    Find this story at 16 January 2017

    Copyright http://www.zeit.de/

    Anfrage der CDU-Landtagsfraktion War Anis Amri ein V-Mann des Verfassungsschutzes?

    Der Berliner Attentäter Anis Amri war nach Angaben der nordrhein-westfälischen Landesregierung kein V-Mann des Landesverfassungsschutzes.

    Ein Sprecher des Innenministeriums in Düsseldorf stellte am Samstag klar: „Er war kein V-Mann“.

    Die CDU-Landtagsfraktion hatte zuvor eine entsprechende Anfrage an die Landesregierung gestellt.

    Anfrage der CDU-Landesfraktion

    „Es ist ein Punkt unseres Fragenkatalogs an das Innenministerium“, bestätigte ein CDU-Fraktionssprecher. Medien hatten zuvor die Frage aufgeworfen, ob eine Zusammenarbeit mit dem Verfassungsschutz vielleicht die Erklärung dafür sein könnte, dass Anis Amri von den Sicherheitsbehörden nicht rechtzeitig gestoppt wurde.

    Der 24 Jahre alte Tunesier war von mehreren Behörden als islamistischer Gefährder eingestuft worden. Dennoch war es ihm möglich, am 19. Dezember einen Lastwagen in einen Berliner Weihnachtsmarkt zu steuern und zwölf Menschen zu töten.

    Über die CDU-Anfrage an die Landesregierung hatte am Samstag “Bild” berichtet.

    Schwere Vorwürfe gegen rot-grüne Koalition

    Der nordrhein-westfälische CDU-Vorsitzende Armin Laschet erhob im Fall Amri erneut schwere Vorwürfe gegen die rot-grüne Koalition in Düsseldorf, die sich im Mai zur Wiederwahl stellt.

    „Die Landesregierung in NRW hat es sträflich versäumt, hier die ausländerrechtlichen Möglichkeiten zu nutzen, um diesen Attentäter zu stoppen“, sagte Laschet den Dortmunder „Ruhr Nachrichten“ (Samstag).

    Die Hauptverantwortung dafür trage Innenminister Ralf Jäger (SPD). „Der NRW-Innenminister als oberste Landesbehörde hätte effektive Maßnahmen gegen Amri ergreifen müssen.“

    Indirekt forderte Laschet die Abberufung Jägers durch Ministerpräsidentin Hannelore Kraft: „Wenn Frau Kraft keinen besseren für die Innere Sicherheit findet als Herrn Jäger, ist das ein Armutszeugnis für die SPD und ihr persönliches Problem.“

    (dpa)

    14.01.17, 14:07 Uhr
    Find this story at 14 January 2017

    Copyright 2017 DuMont Mediengruppe

    Abschiebeverfahren im Fall Anis Amri war keineswegs Eilsache

    Bislang hieß es, dass der Tunesier Anis Amri via Eilverfahren in seine Heimat abgeschoben werden sollte. Doch nach stern-Informationen wurde er auf Anweisung des NRW-Innenministeriums wie ein normaler abgelehnter Asylbewerber behandelt.

    Die Stadt Köln hat dem stern gegenüber bestätigt, dass die Passersatzpapiere für den Weihnachtsmarktattentäter von Berlin, Anis Amri, entgegen bisherigen Aussagen nicht via Eilverfahren oder priorisiert beantragt wurden. “Die Anfrage war keine Eilsache”, hieß es von der Pressestelle in Köln. Wie der stern am Wochenende von der Stadt Köln und aus dem Innenministerium zudem erfuhr, gibt es bei der Bearbeitung von Passersatzpapieren generell kein Eilverfahren. Warum nicht, konnten die Behörden nicht erklären.

    Anis Amri war im Abschiebeverfahren ein normaler abgelehnter Asylbewerber, für den Passersatzpapiere benötigt werden – wie für hunderte andere auch.
    Antrag ohne Hinweis auf Gefärderstatus

    Es dauerte mehr als zwei Monate, bis die Anfrage der Zentralen Ausländerbehörde (ZAB) den tunesischen Behörden überhaupt übermittelt wurde. Auch auf die Gefährlichkeit des seit Monaten von insgesamt 40 Sicherheitsbehörden beobachteten “Gefährders” hatte die ZAB nicht hingewiesen. Zudem wurden die Papiere unter der Personalie Ahmed Almasri beantragt, von der man wusste, dass sie nicht stimmt. Anis Amri wurde nur als einer von zwölf Alias-Namen genannt.
    Zur Begründung hieß es, dass “seitens des Ministeriums entschieden wurde, dass die Passersatzpapier-Beschaffung auf normalem Wege ohne Hinweis auf den Gefährderstatus beantragt werden soll”.
    In einer Sitzung im gemeinsamen Terrorabwehrzentrum GTAZ im Juli hatten mehr als einen Monat zuvor alle beteiligten Behörden, unter anderem das LKA Nordrhein-Westfalen, das Bundeskriminalamt und auch das nordrhein-westfälische Innenministerium allerdings noch gemeinsam beschlossen, dass das NRW-Innenministerium “die Passbeschaffungsmaßnahmen zusammen mit der Ausländerbehörde Kleve prioritär durchführt”. Warum es sich an diese Vereinbarung nicht hielt, und warum man die Passersatzpapiere nicht wenigstens unter den lange bekannten richtigen Personalien beantragen ließ, um die Ausstellung der Papiere zu beschleunigen, ist unklar.
    Keine Kenntnis, welche Identität Amris die echte war

    Es habe zu diesem Zeitpunkt zwar festgestanden, dass Amri unter weiteren Identitäten registriert worden war, es sei ihnen jedoch nicht bekannt gewesen, welche davon die echte ist, sagte der Sprecher des Innenministeriums in Nordrhein-Westfalen dem stern.
    Erst durch die Mitteilung von Interpol Tunis im Oktober habe man zweifelsfrei erfahren, dass die wahre Identität Anis Amri lautet. Nachvollziehbar ist das nicht, schließlich saß das Innenministerium bei den “Gefährder-Sitzungen” im Terrorabwehrzentrum mit am Tisch

    Find this story at 21 January 2017

    © stern.de GmbH

    Terrorverdächtiger aus Neuss Ermittler finden keine Spur zu Anis Amri

    Ein Spezialeinsatzkommando nimmt im nordrhein-westfälischen Neuss einen 21-Jährigen fest, der unter Terrorverdacht steht. Doch Waffen oder Sprengstoff finden die Ermittler bei ihm nicht. Auch Beweise für die Anschlagsplanung fehlen bisher.

    FDP will Rücktritt von Innenminister Jäger: Amri hatte offenbar Kontakt zu V-Mann aus NRW

    Das Bundesinnenministerium hat zurzeit keine Hinweise, dass der Terrorverdächtige aus dem nordrhein-westfälischen Neuss in Kontakt mit dem Berliner Attentäter Anis Amri stand. Ein Sprecher von Innenminister Thomas de Maizière sagte, zwar liege ihm kein minütlich aktualisierter Erkenntnisstand vor, zudem gehe es um zwei laufende Ermittlungsverfahren. Basierend auf den damit verbundenen Einschränkungen könne er aber von möglichen Zusammenhängen nicht berichten.

    Amri hatte kurz vor Weihnachten auf einem Berliner Weihnachtsmarkt zwölf Menschen getötet. Gelebt hatte er zuvor hauptsächlich in Nordrhein-Westfalen und galt vor allem in der dortigen Islamistenszene als gut vernetzt.

    Ein Spezialeinsatzkommando hatte den 21-Jährigen aus Neuss am Samstagabend in seiner Wohnung festgenommen. Beweise für den Terrorverdacht des jungen Mannes haben die Ermittler bisher allerdings nicht gefunden. Ein Sprecher der Staatsanwaltschaft Düsseldorf sagte, bei der Polizeiaktion seien am Samstagabend weder Waffen noch Sprengstoff entdeckt worden. Derzeit würden die bei ihm beschlagnahmten Datenträger ausgewertet.

    Die Sicherheitsbehörden gehen davon aus, dass der 21-Jährige einem 17-Jährigen aus Wien bei der Vorbereitung eines Terroranschlags in Österreich geholfen hat. Der 17-Jährige war am Freitag in Wien festgenommen worden. Nach bisherigem Ermittlungsstand haben sich die beiden in islamistischen Foren sozialer Netzwerke kennengelernt. Im Dezember soll der Wiener Verdächtige zwei Wochen bei einem Bekannten in Neuss verbracht haben.

    Bei seiner Vernehmung habe der 21-Jährige nicht bestritten, eine islamistische Auffassung zu vertreten, sagte der Sprecher der Düsseldorfer Staatsanwaltschaft. “Er bestreitet aber, sich mit dem IS beschäftigt zu haben.” Im Rahmen der Ermittlungen soll sein Hintergrund ausgeleuchtet werden.

    Quelle: n-tv.de , chr/dpa/AFP

    Montag, 23. Januar 2017
    16.01.17 – 01:36 min

    Find this story at 23 January 2017

    © n-tv.de

    ‘Jihadi John’ case raises questions about UK counter-terrorism strategy (2015)

    Emails released by CAGE revealed how MI5 repeatedly tried to recruit Mohammed Emwazi as an informant and put him on a terror watchlist to stop him leaving Britain

    The identifying of “Jihadi John”, a masked militant who has beheaded and tortured hostages held by the Islamic State in Syria, as 26-year-old British national, Mohammed Emwazi, has ignited a debate about the young recruit’s life, identity and path to Islamist militancy.

    Observers have pointed to Emwazi’s privileged upbringing – Emwazi came from a “well-to-do family,” growing up in West London and graduating from college with a degree in computer programming, according to the Washington Post – as proof that poverty did not fuel his radicalism.

    Jihadi John is middle class & educated, demonstrates again that radicalisation is not necessarily driven by poverty or social deprivation.

    — Shiraz Maher (@ShirazMaher) February 26, 2015
    Less attention has been paid to the alleged interactions between Emwazi and the British security services and how, if at all, these may have impacted on the young militant.

    Emails exchanged between Emwazi and Asim Qureshi, director of CAGE, a group which primarily lobbies on behalf of detainees held on terrorism charges, suggest that, before he travelled to Syria in 2012, Emwazi had several encounters with British authorities.

    In Amsterdam in 2009 an officer from MI5, Britain’s domestic security agency, tried to recruit Emwazi after accusing him and two others of trying to reach Somalia, where the militant group al-Shabab is based, according to emails he sent to Qureshi.

    “Listen Mohammed: You’ve got the whole world in front of you; you’re 21 years old; you just finished Uni – why don’t you work for us?” Emwazi recalled an MI5 officer asking him in Amsterdam’s airport in a June 2010 email he sent to Qureshi.

    CAGE has been accused of sympathising with some of the foreign fighters it is regularly in contact with.

    Qureshi, a graduate of the London School of Economics, has taken part in rallies by Islamist groups in the UK who call for “jihad” in Chechyna and Iraq.

    He told Middle East Eye he had met with Emwazi in the fall of 2009 shortly after he returned to the UK to discuss what had happened.

    “Mohammed was angry about the way he had been treated, he felt they (MI5) had bullied and disrespected him,” Qureshi said.

    In 2010 counterterrorism officials in Britain detained Emwazi again – fingerprinting him and searching his belongings – and later preventing him from travelling to Kuwait, his birthplace, where he had landed a job working for a computer company.

    “I had a job waiting for me and marriage to get started,” Emwazi wrote in a June 2010 e-mail to Qureshi. But now “I feel like a prisoner, only not in a cage, in London. A person imprisoned & controlled by security service men, stopping me from living my new life in my birthplace & country, Kuwait.”

    Qureshi said he last heard from Emwazi in January 2012.

    “Mohammed was harassed repeatedly by MI5 from the summer of 2010 until 2013. He told me he was once strangled by an officer at Heathrow airport during interrogation,” said Qureshi.

    Qureshi said that Emwazi, who has been described by those who knew him as “polite with a penchant for wearing stylish clothes while adhering to the tenets of his Islamic faith,” had used “every means possible” to try and change his personal situation.

    “Suffocating domestic policies aimed at turning a person into an informant but which prevent a person from fulfilling their basic life needs would have left a lasting impression on Emwazi,” said Qureshi.

    “When are we going to finally learn that when we treat people as if they’re outsiders they will look for belonging elsewhere?”

    We have an entire system of injustice that allows peoples lives to be ruined. Security services create suspect communities #MohammedEmwazi

    — CAGE (@UK_CAGE) February 26, 2015
    Analysts have dismissed CAGE’s assertion that the security services had a role in Emwazi’s radicalisation.

    “I think it’s a bit rich that Jihadi John has decided to go to Syria and participate in this conflict because of some interaction with the security services,” Shiraz Maher, a senior fellow at the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, told the Telegraph. “As if he (Jihadi John) is resolved of all responsibility, as if he is not a salient individual capable of making his own decisions.”

    Haras Rafiq, managing director of the anti-radicalisation think-tank the Quilliam Foundation, called the claim that Britain was in anyway to blame “rubbish.”

    “It’s not the British or Kuwaitis fault. It is his fault and the people who radicalised him. Jihadi John is a cold-hearted killer,” he said.

    Moazzam Begg, a British-Pakistani citizen and former Guantanamo Bay detainee, said that British security forces were not to blame but that their increasingly intrusive strategies had contributed to a “climate of fear and alienation” amongst Muslims in Britain.

    “It’s not an excuse, it’s part of an explanation why this man must have felt greatly alienated,” said Begg.

    “Scores and scores have been harassed, stopped whenever they travel, approached by security services … There are people who feel they are stuck, they have nowhere to turn to, it’s crucial we get this point across, some of us have had our lives completely destroyed.”

    Begg said the British government was still refusing to engage with the idea that British policies, foreign and domestic, might be influencing potential jihadists.

    “When people get alienated, they feel unwelcome and afraid … I feel that way all the time, I’ve been arrested, I’ve had my house turned upside down, I’ve been prosecuted and made to feel like I don’t belong here. If I was to leave tomorrow for Syria would it be right to say that the security services drove me away?”

    Thursday 26 February 2015 22:48 UTC
    Last update: Tuesday 3 March 2015 22:30 UTC

    Find this story at 26 February 2015

    © Middle East Eye 2014

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