The notion that several children of the sleeper spies arrested in 2010 in the United States were groomed by Russian authorities to become foreign spies as adults is more evidence of the absurdity of the whole operation.

Tim Foley, 20, is the eldest son of Donald Heathfield and Tracey Foley, whose real names are Andrei Bezrukov and Yelena Vavilova. Tim became a problem for U.S. authorities from the outset of the spy scandal. He had already finished his sophomore year at George Washington University when his parents were arrested by U.S. authorities. Following the deportation of the Russian agents from the United States, Foley informed the university that he still planned to continue his studies there. But since Foley reportedly knew sensitive details about his parents’ activities, Russian authorities have not allowed him to return to the United States.

On July 31, The Wall Street Journal reported that the FBI had determined Tim Foley’s desire to serve Russia’s intelligence services after bugging the Foleys’ home. According to FBI officials, Tim’s parents told their son they wanted him to follow in their footsteps, after which Tim stood up and swore allegiance to “Mother Russia,” the Journal said.

As a result of this article, many journalists concluded that the Russian spies could have posed a greater threat to U.S. national security than was thought two years ago because their children grew up in that country and could better integrate into American life and one day infiltrate U.S. government agencies.

In 2010, the United States and Russia interpreted the spy scandal differently. Washington saw it as proof of the failure and backwardness of Russian intelligence, while Moscow claimed it was a proud achievement that it could infiltrate U.S. society. Russian leaders believed the Foreign Intelligence Service had finally restored the prestigious status that it lost after the end of the Cold War.

At the time, I explained to U.S. journalists that Russia’s secret operation was a complete failure. After all, the spies had been working undercover for years and had failed to obtain a single government secret. What’s more, the Russian side considered the operation a success only because the agents had managed to initially fool U.S. authorities with fake passports. But the agents did absolutely nothing of importance while in the United States, so their accomplishment of securing fake passports was negligible at best.

This notion that a spy operation is successful by simply establishing a physical presence in a foreign country was inherited by the Foreign Intelligence Service from its predecessor, the KGB. It is worth noting that the Foreign Intelligence Service is the only intelligence agency in Russia that was not subjected to post-Soviet reforms. It was simply spun off into a separate agency after the Soviet collapse. As a result, the agency kept all of the outdated traditions and practices of the KGB without understanding that they have no relevance to today’s environment.

One of the largest anachronisms of this Soviet legacy was the practice of sending Russian citizens to live in the West undercover. This emerged in the late 1940s when new secret agents were needed to replace a decreasing supply of Communist sympathizers in the West. In reality, the practice of using Communist sympathizers was never really successful anyway because they did not have professional intelligence backgrounds, nor did they have the social connections needed to secure sensitive government posts. Faced with a shortage of foreign agents, Russian intelligence came up with the idea of sending sleeper agents that Moscow hoped would be able to strike from within Western society at the needed moment — that is, if the Cold War turned hot.

Why has this outdated practice continued in Russia when almost every other country gave it up many years ago?

One of the biggest problems is that the Foreign Intelligence Service answers directly to President Vladimir Putin, not to the parliament or the public. It was therefore a relatively easy task to convince Putin of the wisdom of continuing the old tradition of supporting sleeper agents in foreign countries. What’s more, the opportunity to plant Russian agents in the United States appealed to Putin’s ongoing desire to outdo Russia’s former Cold War enemy any way he could. Still stuck in the past, Putin views this superpower rivalry much in the same way he wants Russian athletes to get more medals than the Americans at the Olympic Games.

…

Find this story at 08 August 2012

Andrei Soldatov is an intelligence analyst at Agentura.ru and co-author of “The New Nobility: The Restoration of Russia’s Security State” and “The Enduring Legacy of the KGB.”
© Copyright 2012. The Moscow Times. All rights reserved.

Afghan man who lost relatives in missile strike says UK role in supplying information to US military may be unlawful

Britain’s role in supplying information to an American military “kill list” in Afghanistan is being subjected to legal challenge amid growing international concern over targeted strikes against suspected insurgents and drug traffickers.

An Afghan man who lost five relatives in a missile strike started proceedings against the Serious Organised Crime Agency (Soca) and the Ministry of Defence demanding to know details of the UK’s participation “in the compilation, review and execution of the list and what form it takes”.

Legal letters sent to Soca and the MoD state the involvement of UK officials in these decisions “may give rise to criminal offences and thus be unlawful”. They say Britain’s contribution raises several concerns, particularly in cases where international humanitarian laws protecting civilians and non-combatants may have been broken.

“We need to know whether the rule of law is being followed and that safeguards are in place to prevent what could be clear breaches of international law,” said Rosa Curling from the solicitors Leigh Day & Co. “We have a family here that is desperate to know what happened, and to ensure this kind of thing never happens again.”

Targeting Taliban commanders in precision attacks has been an important part of Nato’s strategy in Afghanistan, and it has involved US, British and Afghan special forces, and the use of drones.

But who is put on the “kill list” and why remains a closely guarded secret – and has become a huge concern for human rights groups. They have questioned the legality of such operations and said civilians are often killed.

Soca refused to discuss its intelligence work, but the agency and the MoD said they worked “strictly within the bounds of international law”. Its role in the operation to compile a “kill list” was first explained in a report to the US Senate’s committee on foreign relations.

The report described how a new task force targeting drug traffickers, insurgents and corrupt officials was being set up at Kandahar air field in southern Afghanistan. “The unit will link the US and British military with the DEA [Drug Enforcement Agency], Britain’s Serious and Organised Crime Agency, and police and intelligence agencies from other countries.” The 31-page report from 2009 acknowledged the precise rules of engagement were classified.

But it said two generals in Afghanistan had explained they “have been interpreted to allow them to put drug traffickers with proven links to insurgency on a kill list, called the joint integrated prioritised target list”.

“The military places no restrictions on the use of force with these selected targets, which means they can be killed or captured on the battlefield,” the Senate report said. “It does not, however, authorise targeted assassinations away from the battlefield. The generals said standards for getting on the list require two verifiable human sources and substantial additional evidence.”

The legal challenge has been brought by an Afghan who believes his relatives were unlawfully killed in a case of mistaken identity during one “kill list” operation. A bank worker in Kabul, Habib Rahman lost two brothers, two uncles and his father-in-law in a US missile attack on their cars on 2 September 2010. They had been helping another member of the family who had been campaigning in Takhar province in northern Afghanistan in the runup to the country’s parliamentary elections. In total, 10 Afghans were killed and several others injured.

Rahman says most of those who died were election workers. But the attack was praised by Nato’s International Security and Assistance Force (Isaf) which said the target had been a man in the convoy called Muhammad Amin. The US accused him of being a Taliban commander and member of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and said the people who had been travelling with him had been insurgents.

A detailed study of the incident by the research group Afghanistan Analysts Network contradicted the official account, saying Isaf had killed Zabet Amanullah. Amin was tracked down after the incident and is still alive, said the study’s author, Kate Clark. “Even now, there does not seem to be any acknowledgment within the military that they may have got the wrong man,” she said. “It is really very bizarre. They think Amin and Amanullah are one and the same.”

Rahman’s lawyers acknowledge they do not know whether information provided by Britain contributed to this attack, but hope the legal challenge will force officials to be more open about the British contribution to the “kill list”.

The letters to Soca’s director general, Trevor Pearce, and the defence secretary, Philip Hammond, point to the Geneva conventions, which say that persons taking no active part in hostilities are protected from “violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds”.

They also draw on the International Committee of the Red Cross, which has said anyone accompanying an organised group who is not directly involved in hostilities “remains civilian assuming support functions”.

The legal letters, the first step towards seeking judicial review, say “drug traffickers who merely support the insurgency financially could not legitimately be included in the list” under these principles. The lawyers believe that, even if Isaf had targeted the right man, it may have been unlawful for others to have been killed in the missile strike.

“The general practice of international forces in Afghanistan and the experience of our client suggest that proximity to a listed target is, on its own, sufficient for an individual to be considered a legitimate target for attack. Such a policy would be unlawful under the international humanitarian law principles,” they say.

Curling said: “Ensuring the UK government and its agencies are operating within their legal obligations could not be more important. Our client’s case suggests the establishment and maintenance of the ‘killing list’ is not in line with the UK’s duties under international humanitarian law. Our client lost five of his relatives in an attack by the international military forces as a result of this list. It is important that the Ministry of Defence and Soca provide us with the reassurances sought.”

…

Find this story at 9 August 2012

Nick Hopkins
guardian.co.uk, Thursday 9 August 2012 19.56 BST

© 2012 Guardian News and Media Limited or its affiliated companies. All rights reserved.

DANBURY, Connecticut (AP) — For more than a decade they toiled in the strange, boxy-looking building on the hill above the municipal airport, the building with no windows (except in the cafeteria), the building filled with secrets.

They wore protective white jumpsuits, and had to walk through air-shower chambers before entering the sanitized “cleanroom” where the equipment was stored.

They spoke in code.

Few knew the true identity of “the customer” they met in a smoke-filled, wood-paneled conference room where the phone lines were scrambled. When they traveled, they sometimes used false names.

At one point in the 1970s there were more than 1,000 people in the Danbury area working on The Secret. And though they worked long hours under intense deadlines, sometimes missing family holidays and anniversaries, they could tell no one — not even their wives and children — what they did.

They were engineers, scientists, draftsmen and inventors — “real cloak-and-dagger guys,” says Fred Marra, 78, with a hearty laugh.

He is sitting in the food court at the Danbury Fair mall, where a group of retired co-workers from the former Perkin-Elmer Corp. gather for a weekly coffee. Gray-haired now and hard of hearing, they have been meeting here for 18 years. They while away a few hours nattering about golf and politics, ailments and grandchildren. But until recently, they were forbidden to speak about the greatest achievement of their professional lives.

“Ah, Hexagon,” Ed Newton says, gleefully exhaling the word that stills feels almost treasonous to utter in public.

It was dubbed “Big Bird” and it was considered the most successful space spy satellite program of the Cold War era. From 1971 to 1986 a total of 20 satellites were launched, each containing 60 miles (100 kilometers) of film and sophisticated cameras that orbited the earth snapping vast, panoramic photographs of the Soviet Union, China and other potential foes. The film was shot back through the earth’s atmosphere in buckets that parachuted over the Pacific Ocean, where C-130 Air Force planes snagged them with grappling hooks.

The scale, ambition and sheer ingenuity of Hexagon KH-9 was breathtaking. The fact that 19 out of 20 launches were successful (the final mission blew up because the booster rockets failed) is astonishing.

So too is the human tale of the 45-year-old secret that many took to their graves.

Hexagon was declassified in September. Finally Marra, Newton and others can tell the world what they worked on all those years at “the office.”

“My name is Al Gayhart and I built spy satellites for a living,” announced the 64-year-old retired engineer to the stunned bartender in his local tavern as soon as he learned of the declassification. He proudly repeats the line any chance he gets.

“It was intensely demanding, thrilling and the greatest experience of my life,” says Gayhart, who was hired straight from college and was one of the youngest members of the Hexagon “brotherhood”.

He describes the white-hot excitement as teams pored over hand-drawings and worked on endless technical problems, using “slide-rules and advanced degrees” (there were no computers), knowing they were part of such a complicated space project. The intensity would increase as launch deadlines loomed and on the days when “the customer” — the CIA and later the Air Force — came for briefings. On at least one occasion, former President George H.W. Bush, who was then CIA director, flew into Danbury for a tour of the plant.

Though other companies were part of the project — Eastman Kodak made the film and Lockheed Corp. built the satellites — the cameras and optics systems were all made at Perkin-Elmer, then the biggest employer in Danbury.

“There were many days we arrived in the dark and left in the dark,” says retired engineer Paul Brickmeier, 70.

He recalls the very first briefing on Hexagon after Perkin-Elmer was awarded the top secret contract in 1966. Looking around the room at his 30 or so colleagues, Brickmeier thought, “How on Earth is this going to be possible?”

One thing that made it possible was a hiring frenzy that attracted the attention of top engineers from around the Northeast. Perkin-Elmer also commissioned a new 270,000-square-foot (25,000-square-meter) building for Hexagon — the boxy one on the hill.

Waiting for clearance was a surreal experience as family members, neighbors and former employers were grilled by the FBI, and potential hires were questioned about everything from their gambling habits to their sexuality.

“They wanted to make sure we couldn’t be bribed,” Marra says.

Clearance could take up to a year. During that time, employees worked on relatively minor tasks in a building dubbed “the mushroom tank” — so named because everyone was in the dark about what they had actually been hired for.

Joseph Prusak, 76, spent six months in the tank. When he was finally briefed on Hexagon, Prusak, who had worked as an engineer on earlier civil space projects, wondered if he had made the biggest mistake of his life.

“I thought they were crazy,” he says. “They envisaged a satellite that was 60-foot (18-meter) long and 30,000 pounds (13,600 kilograms) and supplying film at speeds of 200 inches (500 centimeters) per second. The precision and complexity blew my mind.”

Several years later, after numerous successful launches, he was shown what Hexagon was capable of — an image of his own house in suburban Fairfield.

“This was light years before Google Earth,” Prusak said. “And we could clearly see the pool in my backyard.”

There had been earlier space spy satellites — Corona and Gambit. But neither had the resolution or sophistication of Hexagon, which took close-range pictures of Soviet missiles, submarine pens and air bases, even entire battalions on war exercises.

According to the National Reconnaissance Office, a single Hexagon frame covered a ground distance of 370 nautical miles (680 kilometers), about the distance from Washington to Cincinnati. Early Hexagons averaged 124 days in space, but as the satellites became more sophisticated, later missions lasted twice as long.

“At the height of the Cold War, our ability to receive this kind of technical intelligence was incredible,” says space historian Dwayne Day. “We needed to know what they were doing and where they were doing it, and in particular if they were preparing to invade Western Europe. Hexagon created a tremendous amount of stability because it meant American decision makers were not operating in the dark.”

Among other successes, Hexagon is credited with providing crucial information for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks between the United States and the Soviet Union in the 1970s.

From the outset, secrecy was a huge concern, especially in Danbury, where the intense activity of a relatively small company that had just been awarded a massive contract (the amount was not declassified) made it obvious that something big was going on. Inside the plant, it was impossible to disguise the gigantic vacuum thermal chamber where cameras were tested in extreme conditions that simulated space. There was also a “shake, rattle and roll room” to simulate conditions during launch.

“The question became, how do you hide an elephant?” a National Reconnaissance Office report stated at the time. It decided on a simple response: “What elephant?” Employees were told to ignore any questions from the media, and never confirm the slightest detail about what they worked on.

But it was impossible to conceal the launches at Vandenberg Air Force base in California, and aviation magazines made several references to “Big Bird.” In 1975, a piece on the TV news magazine “60 Minutes” on space reconnaissance described an “Alice in Wonderland” world, where American and Soviet intelligence officials knew of each other’s “eyes in the sky” — and other nations did, too — but no one confirmed the programs or spoke about them publicly.

For employees at Perkin-Elmer, the vow of secrecy was considered a mark of honor.

“We were like the guys who worked on the first atom bomb,” said Oscar Berendsohn, 87, who helped design the optics system. “It was more than a sworn oath. We had been entrusted with the security of the country. What greater trust is there?”

Even wives — who couldn’t contact their husbands or know of their whereabouts when they were traveling — for the most part accepted the secrecy. They knew the jobs were highly classified. They knew not to ask questions.

“We were born into the World War II generation,” says Linda Bronico, whose husband, Al, told her only that he was building test consoles and cables. “We all knew the slogan ‘loose lips sink ships.'”

And Perkin-Elmer was considered a prized place to work, with good salaries and benefits, golf and softball leagues, lavish summer picnics (the company would hire an entire amusement park for employees and their families) and dazzling children’s Christmas parties.

“We loved it,” Marra says. “It was our life.”

For Marra and his former co-workers, sharing that life and their long-held secret has unleashed a jumble of emotions, from pride to nostalgia to relief — and in some cases, grief.

The city’s mayor, Mark Boughton, only discovered that his father had worked on Hexagon when he was invited to speak at an October reunion ceremony on the grounds of the former plant. His father, Donald Boughton, also a former mayor, was too ill to attend and died a few days later.

Boughton said for years he and his siblings would pester his father — a draftsman — about what he did. Eventually they realized that the topic was off limits.

“Learning about Hexagon makes me view him completely differently,” Boughton says. “He was more than just my Dad with the hair-trigger temper and passionate opinions about everything. He was a Cold War warrior doing something incredibly important for our nation.”

For Betty Osterweis the ceremony was bittersweet, too. Not only did she learn about the mystery of her late husband’s professional life. She also learned about his final moments.

…

Find this story at 13 August 2012

Helen O’Neill is a New York-based national writer for The Associated Press. She can be reached at features(at)ap.org.

August 13, 2012
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First Posted: 12/25/11 07:31 PM ET Updated: 12/27/11 08:50 AM ET

This volume re-publishes The Hexagon Story as part of the Center for the Study of National Reconnaissance’s (CSNR) Classics series. The introductory information explains how this history of the Hexagon program focuses on the Air Force involvement with the program as it became operational and matured and contains limited discussion of the early Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) contributions to development of the program.

Find the story 10 August 2012 

See the pictures 10 August 2012 

Mit Spionagesatelliten kundschafteten die USA während des Kalten Krieges die Militärgeheimnisse des Gegners aus. Dann stürzte plötzlich eine Kapsel mit Überwachungsfotos in den Pazifik – und eine panische Rettungsaktion begann. 40 Jahre später hat der CIA die spektakulären Bilder der Operation freigegen. Neun Monate und mehr als 100.000 Dollar hatte die CIA investiert – und alles, was die Geheimdienstler schließlich in Händen hielten, war ein verwischtes Foto. Wer wollte, sah Puderzucker auf einem dunklen Tisch oder die ersten Schreibversuche eines Kindes. Nur ganz entfernt erinnerte das Foto an das, was es eigentlich war: ein Luftbild, fotografiert von einem Satelliten. Das Foto war von KH-9 Hexagon aufgenommen worden, einem Spionagesatelliten, den die USA am 15. Juni 1971 ins All geschickt hatten. Der unsichtbare Knipser war eine Hightech-Waffe im Kalten Krieg, mit ihm sollten die militärischen Geheimnisse der Sowjetunion festgehalten werden: Häfen, Werften, Flugplätze, Radaranlagen. Jedenfalls war das der Plan. KH-9 Hexagon war neben den beiden Kameras auch mit vier Kapseln ausgerüstet, die die hochauflösenden High-Definition-Aerial-Filme des Typs 1414 der Firma Eastman Kodak zurück zum Boden befördern sollten. Das Transportprinzip war so genial wie spektakulär: Die Kapseln lösten sich vom Satelliten und fielen Richtung Erde. Irgendwann öffnete sich ein Fallschirm, die Fotofracht wurde abgebremst und schließlich mitten in der Luft von einer Militärmaschine eingesammelt. Doch schon bei der ersten Mission von KH-9 kam es am 10. Juli 1971 zu einer verhängnisvollen Panne: Der Fallschirm öffnete sich nicht. Statt eingefangen zu werden, stürzte die Kapsel mit der Bezeichnung RV 1201-3 bei Hawaii in den Pazifik. Wenig später begannen CIA, der Militärnachrichtendienst NRO und die US Navy mit der Suche nach dem versunkenen Schatz. Doch warum dauerte die Bergung fast neun Monate? Und was passierte genau in jener Zeit? Die CIA hat nach 40 Jahren jetzt Akten freigegeben, die einen seltenen Einblick in die Arbeit des Geheimdienstes bieten – und spektakuläre Fotos einer Mission zeigen, die beinahe gescheitert wäre. Auffällige Luftblasen In einem internen Geheimdienst-Memo vom Tag des Unfalls wird zunächst von einem Helikopter berichtet, der den Bremsfallschirm gesichtet habe. Und: Militärmaschinen hätten Funksignale der Kapsel empfangen – doch schon im nächsten Telegramm folgt die Ernüchterung: Die Funksignale stammen nicht von der Kapsel, sondern von einem Flugzeug. Die Suche an der mutmaßlichen Aufprallstelle wird ergebnislos abgebrochen. Während die Fotokapseln RV 1 und 2 sicher aufgenommen wurden, fehlt von Nummer 3 zunächst jede Spur. Erst die Meldung einer Militärmaschine über auffallend viele Luftblasen auf dem Ozean bringt eine erste Spur. Schließlich können die Koordinaten der Absturzstelle ungefähr festgestellt werden: 24 Grad 50 Minuten nördliche Breite. 164 Grad 0 Minuten westliche Länge. Zwei Wochen sind seit der Panne vergangen. Weitere zwei Wochen später steht ein grober Rettungsplan. In einem Memo an den Direktor des Militärnachrichtendienstes wird das Vermessungsschiff “USNS DeSteiguer” genannt, das in der Lage sei, “ein Suchgerät mehr als 20.000 Fuß in die Tiefe zu lassen.” Die Suche durchführen soll ein Expertenteam des Marine-Physik-Labors MPL – für die Bergung fällt in dem Memo der Name des Hightech-Tauchboots “Trieste II”, das seit 1964 für die Marine im Einsatz ist. Bergung in 5000 Metern Tiefe Vier Tage Suchzeit plant das NRO für die “DeSteiguer” ein, unmittelbar danach soll das bemannte Tauchboot den wertvollen Geheimnisträger sichern. Beginnen soll das Unternehmen am 1. Oktober 1971. Doch auch dieses Datum ist bald Makulatur. Erst im Dezember geht die “Trieste II” auf Tauchfahrt, sichtet die Kapsel – und kann doch nicht bergen. Stürme mit 40 bis 50 Knoten und mehr als vier Meter hohe Wellen peitschen über den Pazifik. Die Bergung der so wichtigen Fotokapsel hat fast schon komische Züge angenommen, als die Sicherung von RV 3 schließlich auf März 1972 verschoben wird. Grund dafür ist nicht das Wetter, sondern die anstehende Nachfolge-Satellitenmission “1202”. Wegen der seien auch die Druck-Kapazitäten beim Kooperationspartner Eastman Kodak “bis Februar 1972 belegt”, heißt es in einem Geheimschreiben vom Dezember 1971. Kodak hätte also ohnehin keine Zeit für die Fotos der versunkenen Kapsel. …

Find this story at 13 August 2012 Eingereicht von: Christian Gödecke © SPIEGEL ONLINE 2008 Alle Rechte vorbehalten Vervielfältigung nur mit Genehmigung der SPIEGELnet GmbH

BOSTON — More than 30 federal officers in an airport program intended to spot telltale mannerisms of potential terrorists say the operation has become a magnet for racial profiling, targeting not only Middle Easterners but also blacks, Hispanics and other minorities.

In interviews and internal complaints, officers from the Transportation Security Administration’s “behavior detection” program at Logan International Airport in Boston asserted that passengers who fit certain profiles — Hispanics traveling to Miami, for instance, or blacks wearing baseball caps backward — are much more likely to be stopped, searched and questioned for “suspicious” behavior.

“They just pull aside anyone who they don’t like the way they look — if they are black and have expensive clothes or jewelry, or if they are Hispanic,” said one white officer, who along with four others spoke with The New York Times on the condition of anonymity.

The T.S.A. said on Friday that it had opened an investigation into the claims.

While the Obama administration has attacked the use of racial and ethnic profiling in Arizona and elsewhere, the claims by the Boston officers now put the agency and the administration in the awkward position of defending themselves against charges of profiling in a program billed as a model for airports nationwide.

At a meeting last month with T.S.A. officials, officers at Logan provided written complaints about profiling from 32 officers, some of whom wrote anonymously. Officers said managers’ demands for high numbers of stops, searches and criminal referrals had led co-workers to target minorities in the belief that those stops were more likely to yield drugs, outstanding arrest warrants or immigration problems.

The practice has become so prevalent, some officers said, that Massachusetts State Police officials have asked why minority members appear to make up an overwhelming number of the cases that the airport refers to them.

“The behavior detection program is no longer a behavior-based program, but it is a racial profiling program,” one officer wrote in an anonymous complaint obtained by The Times.

A T.S.A. spokesman said agency inspectors recently learned of the racial profiling claims in Boston. “If any of these claims prove accurate, we will take immediate and decisive action to ensure there are consequences to such activity,” the statement said.

The agency emphasized that the behavior detection program “in no way encourages or tolerates profiling” and bans singling out passengers based on nationality, race, ethnicity or religion.

It is unusual for transportation agency employees to come forward with this kind of claim against co-workers, and the large number of employees bringing complaints in Boston could prove particularly damaging for an agency already buffeted with criticism over pat-downs, X-ray scans and other security measures.

Reports of profiling emerged last year at the behavior programs at the Newark and Hawaii airports, but in much smaller numbers than those described in Boston.

The complaints from the Logan officers carry nationwide implications because Boston is the testing ground for an expanded use of behavioral detection methods at airports around the country.

While 161 airports already use behavioral officers to identify possible terrorist activity — a controversial tactic — the agency is considering expanding the use of what it says are more advanced tactics nationwide, with Boston’s program as a model.

The program in place in Boston uses specially trained behavioral “assessors” not only to scan the lines of passengers for unusual activity, but also to speak individually with each passenger and gauge their reactions while asking about their trip or for other information.

The assessors look for inconsistencies in the answers and other signs of unusual behavior, like avoiding eye contact, sweating or fidgeting, officials said. A passenger considered to be acting suspiciously can be pulled from the line and subjected to more intensive questioning.

That is what happened last month at Logan airport to Kenneth Boatner, 68, a psychologist and educational consultant in Boston who was traveling to Atlanta for a business trip.

In a formal complaint he filed with the agency afterward, he said he was pulled out of line and detained for 29 minutes as agents thumbed through his checkbook and examined his clients’ clinical notes, his cellphone and other belongings.

The officers gave no explanation, but Dr. Boatner, who is black, said he suspected the reason he was stopped was his race and appearance. He was wearing sweat pants, a white T-shirt and high-top sneakers.

He said he felt humiliated. “I had never been subjected to anything like that,” he said in an interview.

Officers in Boston acknowledged that they had no firm data on how frequently minority members were stopped. But based on their own observations, several officers estimated that they accounted for as many as 80 percent of passengers searched during certain shifts.

The officers identified nearly two dozen co-workers who they said consistently focused on stopping minority members in response to pressure from managers to meet certain threshold numbers for referrals to the State Police, federal immigration officials or other agencies.

The stops were seen as a way of padding the program’s numbers and demonstrating to Washington policy makers that the behavior program was producing results, several officers said.

Instead, the officers said, profiling undermined the usefulness of the program. Focusing on minority members, said a second officer who was interviewed by The Times, “takes officers away from the real threat, and we could miss a terrorist we are looking for.”

Some Boston officers went to the American Civil Liberties Union with their complaints of profiling, and Sarah Wunsch, a lawyer in the group’s Boston office, interviewed eight officers.

“Selecting people based on race or ethnicity was a way of finding easy marks,” she said. “It was a notch in your belt.”

The transportation agency said it did not collect information on the race or ethnicity of travelers and could not provide such a breakdown of passengers stopped through the behavior program.

But the agency defended the program’s overall value. Behavior detection “is clearly an effective means of identifying people engaged in activity that may threaten the security of the passengers and the airports and has become a very effective intelligence tool, enabling law enforcement to bust larger operations and track any trends in nefarious activity,” the agency said in its statement.

“In addition, the deterrent value of the program can’t be overstated,” it said. Monitoring passengers’ behavior “adds another layer of security to the airport environment and presents the terrorists with yet one more challenge they need to overcome” in their efforts to defeat airport security measures, the agency said.

But government analysts and some researchers say the idea of spotting possible terrorists from their behavior in a security line relies on dubious science.

A critical assessment of the program in 2010 by the Government Accountability Office noted that aviation officials began the behavior program in 2003, in the wake of the Sept. 11 attacks, without first determining if it had a scientific basis.

Nine years later, this question remains largely unanswered, even as the agency moves to expand the program, the accountability office said in a follow-up report last year. It said that until the agency is able to better study and document the validity of the science, Congress might consider freezing tens of millions of dollars budgeted for the program’s growth.

Based on past research, the accountability office said the link between a person’s behavior and mental state is strongest in reading “simple emotions” like happiness and sadness.

…

Read this article at 11 August 2012

August 11, 2012

By MICHAEL S. SCHMIDT and ERIC LICHTBLAU

© 2012 The New York Times Company

Sieben Monate lang hortete das sächsische Landesamt für Verfassungsschutz Geheimakten – ohne dass ein Verantwortlicher davon erfuhr. Das hat jetzt den Präsidenten der Behörde, Reinhard Boos, zum Rücktritt gezwungen. Er ist der dritte hochrangige Verfassungsschützer, den die NSU-Affäre das Amt kostet.

Seine Ladung für eine Anhörung im Untersuchungsausschuss des Sächsischen Landtags zum “Nationalsozialistischen Untergrund” (NSU) war längst beantragt: Jetzt gewinnt der für September geplante Auftritt von Reinhard Boos vor dem Gremium besondere Brisanz. Sachsens Innenminister Markus Ulbig (CDU) gab am Mittwoch vor dem Landtag in Dresden bekannt, dass Boos um 23 Uhr am Abend zuvor von seinem Amt des Präsidenten des sächsischen Landesamtes für Verfassungsschutz (LfV) zurückgetreten sei.

Es ist der dritte Rücktritt eines Verfassungsschutzchefs im Zusammenhang mit dem Neonazi-Terror: Zuvor musste Heinz Fromm, Präsident des Bundesamtes für Verfassungsschutz, gehen. Thüringen schickte seinen Verfassungsschutzchef Thomas Sippel in den vorläufigen Ruhestand. Nordrhein-Westfalens Verfassungsschutzchefin Mathilde Koller hatte aus persönlichen Gründen, wie sie sagte, um ihre Versetzung in den Ruhestand gebeten.

Es gehe um eklatantes Fehlverhalten einzelner Mitarbeiter des sächsischen Verfassungsschutzes, sagte Ulbig. Und um einen “überaus peinlichen Vorgang”, wie es die SPD-Innenexpertin Sabine Friedel formulierte.

Seit sieben Monaten läuft die Aufklärung eines beispiellosen Verbrechens in Deutschland – rechtsextremistische Terroristen haben zehn Menschen getötet – und der Verfassungsschutz in Dresden hortete offenbar Geheimakten, die für die Aufklärung dringend notwendig sein können.

Erst jetzt seien Protokolle des Bundesamtes für Verfassungsschutz zu einer Überwachung von Ende 1998 aufgetaucht, sagte Ulbig – Unterlagen zum rechtsterroristischen NSU-Komplex also, die längst als verloren galten und nicht in die parlamentarische Kontrolle miteinbezogen wurden. Es geht um Protokolle einer Telefonüberwachung, die das Landesamt im Auftrag des Bundesamtes angefertigt hat. Gerüchten zufolge soll es sich um Akten handeln, die das Bundesamt bereits geschreddert hat.

Was genau in den Protokollen festgehalten wurde, ist noch unklar. Die Telefonüberwachung selbst sei zwar in Berichten an die Parlamentarische Kontrollkommission (PKK) Sachsens berücksichtigt worden. Neu sei aber, dass im Landesamt noch Protokolle dieser Überwachung existierten, hieß es.

Welche Brisanz haben die Akten? “Schwer zu sagen – immerhin lösen sie den Rücktritt des Präsidenten aus”, sagt Kerstin Köditz, Landtagsabgeordnete der Linken. Man könnte meinen, der Fund der Akten sei positiv: Die aufgetauchten Informationen könnten die Arbeit der Untersuchungsausschüsse und die NSU-Ermittlungen insgesamt voranbringen. Wäre dies der Fall, bleibt die Frage, warum Boos dennoch umgehend zurücktrat. Nur weil seine Behörde Unterlagen zurückhielt? Unter Abgeordneten hält sich der Verdacht, es könnten noch größere Versäumnisse dahinterstecken.

Gegen Mitarbeiter des sächsischen Verfassungsschutzes seien unverzüglich disziplinarische Schritte eingeleitet worden, sagte Ulbig, der wiederholt beteuert hatte, dass Sachsen alle Dokumente veröffentlicht habe.

Bauernopfer Boos

Somit kann man Boos auch als Bauernopfer sehen. Dieser bedaure diesen Vorfall zutiefst und sei tief enttäuscht, berichtete der Minister. Unter diesen Umständen könne er das Amt nicht mehr mit dem gebotenen Vertrauen weiter führen, habe Boos ihm gesagt. Ulbig betonte aber, dass Boos als Präsident des LfV die Aufklärung zum Fallkomplex NSU “von Beginn an unterstützt und sein Ehrenwort für eine umfassende Aufklärung” gegeben habe.

Boos, 55, geboren in Iserlohn, ist seit August 1992 in Sachsen im Öffentlichen Dienst. Von 1999 bis 2002 war er schon einmal Präsident des sächsischen Verfassungsschutzes, wechselte dann ins Dresdner Innenministerium, 2007 kehrte er als Präsident des LfV zurück. Vor wenigen Wochen hatte er einem Journalisten auf die Frage, ob er sich nach den Abgängen seiner Amtskollegen im Bund und in Thüringen einsam fühle, geantwortet: “Wie ich mich fühle? Wunderbar.”

Anfang Juli – mitten in der Debatte um das Versagen deutscher Sicherheitsbehörden im Fall des NSU-Terrortrios – hatte sich Innenminister Ulbig bei der Präsentation des Jahresberichts 2011 noch hinter seinen Verfassungsschutzchef gestellt – und erneut dem Verfassungsschutz des Nachbarlandes Thüringen die Schuld in die Schuhe geschoben. Dieser habe bei der Zielfahndung nach den Rechtsterroristen die Federführung innegehabt, nicht die Sachsen. Den einzigen Vorwurf, den Ulbig damals gelten ließ: Man habe sich auf die Kollegen verlassen – und das leider unkritisch.

Immer wieder hatte Boos beteuert, dass seine Behörde keine Erkenntnisse im Ermittlungsverfahren gegen die Zwickauer Terrorzelle zurückgehalten habe, alle Anfragen des Bundeskriminalamtes (BKA) seien “umfassend beantwortet worden”. Diese Fragen bezogen sich auf André E., der nach Aufdeckung der NSU-Morde am 24. November kurzzeitig festgenommen worden war.

“Ein überaus peinlicher Vorgang”

Es gab Gerüchte, dass der sächsische Verfassungsschutz einen Informanten geschützt habe, Boos dementierte vehement. Weder André E. noch weiter im Ermittlungsverfahren beschuldigte Personen seien V-Männer oder Informanten des Landesamtes in Sachsen gewesen. André E. sei dem Amt lediglich als Teilnehmer eines rechtsextremen Konzerts im Mai 2011 in Mecklenburg bekannt gewesen, mehr Angaben zu ihm habe man nicht.

Tatsächlich aber gilt André E. aus Johanngeorgenstadt als wichtige Figur in der sächsischen Neonazi-Szene, sein Zwillingsbruder Maik taucht im brandenburgischen Verfassungsschutzbericht von 2010 als “Stützpunkt”-Vertreter der NPD-Jugendorganisation auf.

Beide galten in der Szene als gefährlich und gewaltbereit. In den Resten des abgebrannten Wohnmobils der NSU-Zelle fanden Ermittler BahnCards auf André E.s Namen und den seiner Frau Susann, die von Beate Zschäpe und Uwe Böhnhardt benutzt und von E. selbst bezahlt worden sein sollen. Laut “Berliner Zeitung” soll der Verfassungsschutz dreimal versucht haben, André E. als V-Mann anzuwerben.

“Der ganze Vorgang beweist, dass Sachsen sieben Monate lang keine wirkliche Aufklärung betrieben hat, und diese Akten nicht in die Untersuchung miteinbezogen wurden”, sagt SPD-Innenexpertin Friedel.

…

Find this story at 11 July 2012

11. Juli 2012, 15:30 Uhr

Von Julia Jüttner

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Vervielfältigung nur mit Genehmigung der SPIEGELnet GmbH

Seine Aussagen lassen erahnen, wie anstrengend Helmut Roewer sein kann. Der Ex-Chef des Thüringer Verfassungsschutzes lobt sich vor dem Neonazi-Untersuchungsausschuss in den höchsten Tönen, gibt sich bockig, will von Fehlern nichts wissen. Ex-Mitarbeiter sprechen von “menschenverachtendem” Umgang.

Helmut Roewer trägt himbeerrote Schuhe. Und wenn man seinen ehemaligen Untergebenen Glauben schenken mag, kann man froh sein, dass er überhaupt welche trägt, als er am Montag im Untersuchungsausschuss des Thüringer Landtags zum “Nationalsozialistischen Untergrund” (NSU) in Erfurt den Saal betritt.

Mehr als sieben Stunden lang hatten zuvor zwei ehemalige Verfassungsschützer Einblick in das Chaos gegeben, über das Roewer in seiner Zeit als Präsident des Landesamtes für Verfassungsschutz (LfV) herrschte. Roewer war von 1994 bis 2000 Chef der Behörde, dann wurde er wegen einer Reihe von Affären suspendiert.

Wie ein “balzender Auerhahn” habe Roewer eines Abends in seinem Büro mit sechs Mitarbeiterinnen an drei zusammengeschobenen Schreibtischen gesessen, die Jalousien unten, bei Kerzenschein, Rotwein und Käse, berichtet Karl Friedrich Schrader, einst Referatsleiter 22, Abteilung Rechtsextremismus. “Sie lachen darüber”, ruft Schrader den Landtagsabgeordneten zu, “heute lache ich auch darüber, aber damals war das nicht zum Lachen!”

Schrader, 67, ist ein braungebrannter, redseliger Mann mit schneeweißem Schnauzer, dunklen Augenbrauen und Janker. 37 Jahre lang war er bei der Polizei, als Roewer ihn zum Verfassungsschutz holte, ihn neben dem Referatsleiter zum Personalratsvorsitzenden machte, und ihm versprach, er könne dort vor der Rente noch einmal richtig Karriere machen. So erzählt es Schrader vor dem Untersuchungsausschuss. Die Zusammenarbeit der beiden endete mit einem Hausverbot für Schrader, der inzwischen zwei Monate im Jahr als Jäger- und Farmverwalter in Namibia weilt.

Beschwerden über Roewers Führungsstil

Schrader beschreibt Roewer als unberechenbaren Vorgesetzten, der in “menschenverachtender Form” über seine Mitarbeiter geherrscht habe. Er selbst sei aus dem Urlaub zurückgekehrt und seine Stelle war gestrichen. Wenn es Ärger mit einem Referatsleiter gegeben habe, habe Roewer das Referat aufgelöst und Kritik mit demselben Satz abgebügelt: “Ich führe das Amt!”

Es sei auch vorgekommen, dass Roewer ihn empfangen habe, die nackten Füße auf dem Tisch, verdreckt vom Barfußlaufen, sagt Schrader. Ein anderes Mal sei Roewer mit dem Fahrrad durch den sechsten Stock geradelt. “Da dachte man: In welchem Laden arbeitet man da?”

Wie anstrengend Roewer sein kann, kann man erahnen, als er am Montag um halb sieben vor den Untersuchungsausschuss tritt. Er ist der wichtigste Zeuge. Ein schmächtiges Männchen, die dunklen Haare über die Glatze am Hinterkopf gekämmt. Mehr als vier Stunden hat er auf seine Befragung warten müssen, die Stimmung ist entsprechend. Trotz mürrischer Miene wirkt es so, als würde er das Blitzlichtgewitter und die Aufmerksamkeit der vielen Kameras genießen.

Er sei 63 Jahre alt, ledig, Schriftsteller und wohne in Weimar, sagt Roewer. Und ihm wäre es lieb, wenn man ihm Fragen stellen würde, auf einen abendfüllenden Vortrag sei er nämlich nicht vorbereitet. Klare Ansage. Und das ist auch schon die längste Passage, die Roewer am Stück spricht, meist gibt er Ein-Wort-Antworten. Seine bockige, widerspenstige Art bei der Anhörung verlangt den Befragern, aber auch den Zuschauern reichlich Geduld ab. Es geht konkret um den Zeitraum zwischen 1994 und 1998, also bevor die Neonazis Uwe Böhnhardt, Uwe Mundlos und Beate Zschäpe in den Untergrund abtauchten. Die Zeit nach 1998 wird der Ausschuss im Herbst bearbeiten.

“Ich galt als Spitzenkraft. So ist das”

Der Rechtsextremismus war bereits ein Problem, als Roewer im April 1994 vom Bundesinnenministerium in Bonn nach Thüringen kam. Und noch mehr das Amt selbst. Keine einzige Person dort habe die erforderlichen Voraussetzungen erfüllt – “außer mir”, behauptet Roewer. Es ist eine gnadenlose Abrechnung mit seinen ehemaligen Mitarbeitern. “Ein Teil wurde fortgebildet, der andere Teil war nicht fortbildungsfähig. Das waren die hartnäckigsten. Denn gute Leute finden immer einen Job, dumme nicht.”

Eine Weisheit folgt auf die andere. Er habe nach Anweisung des Innenministeriums das Amt neu strukturieren müssen, sagt er. “Aber gute Leute können in jeder Gliederung arbeiten, nicht so gute in keiner.” Sich selbst lobt Roewer in höchsten Tönen. “Ich hatte Erfahrung auf dem Gebiet des Verfassungsschutzes, ich galt als Spitzenkraft. So ist das.”

Von Versäumnissen, Fehlern, Pannen will der ehemalige Präsident des Thüringer Verfassungsschutzes nichts hören. Den Verdacht, seine Behörde habe damals V-Leute vor Polizeimaßnahmen gewarnt, weist er empört von sich. Dabei war es ausgerechnet Tino Brandt, ein angeblich von Roewer angeworbener V-Mann, der bei einer Durchsuchung um 6 Uhr morgens die Beamten erwartete – mit einem Computer, bei dem gerade die Festplatte ausgebaut worden war, wie die Ausschussvorsitzende Dorothea Marx (SPD) ihm vorhält.

V-Mann mit Narrenfreiheit

Immer wieder landet das Gremium bei Brandt, der in den Akten als V-Mann 2045, Deckname “Otto”, geführt wird: Er war der wichtigste V-Mann, den der Thüringer Verfassungsschutz damals in der Szene hatte, wenn nicht sogar der einzige. Ein weiterer ehemaliger Verfassungsschützer, Norbert Wiesner, berichtet am Montag von den Schwierigkeiten beim Anwerben von Spitzeln, meist sei die Zusammenarbeit an der Unzuverlässigkeit der potentiellen Kandidaten gescheitert. Gerade im Skinhead-Bereich habe man fortwährend das gleiche Problem gehabt: “Die besaufen sich und können sich dann am nächsten Tag an nichts mehr erinnern.”

Brandt, der Neonazi aus Rudolstadt, genoss Narrenfreiheit unter Roewer. Mehrfach sei er massiv darauf hingewiesen worden, sein Engagement bei der NPD herunterzufahren, berichtet am Montag Wiesner. Brandt aber ignorierte die Ansagen.

Im Gegenteil: Nach seiner Enttarnung prahlte er damit, wie er die Behörde ausgetrickst und mit den 100.000 Euro, die er kassiert hatte, die Szene aufbaute. Vor dem Neonazi-Ausschuss in Erfurt erklärt Wiesner, Brandt habe ständig neue Handys und Computer gefordert und Ersatz für die Autos, die er zu Schrott fuhr.

Über Brandt reden alle an diesem Montag – nur Roewer nicht. Die Behörde habe 1994 “überhaupt nicht” über eigene Erkenntnisse verfügt, sagt er stattdessen. Um dies abzustellen, habe man ihn geholt. “Eine führungsstarke und durchsetzungskräftige Persönlichkeit war gesucht – ich.” An Selbstbewusstsein fehlt es dem kleinen Mann nicht im Geringsten, stolz betet er seine Vita herunter, spricht von “sehr guten Noten” im ersten und zweiten Jura-Staatsexamen.

Amnesie-Schub bei Roewer

Kurz nach Roewers Dienstantritt in Erfurt kam es zum Buchenwald-Skandal: Böhnhardt und Mundlos marschierten in braunen SA-Uniformen durch die Gedenkstätte. Niemand ahnte damals, dass die beiden in den folgenden Jahren neun Migranten und eine Polizistin töten werden, eine beispiellose Mordserie in der Geschichte Deutschlands.

Umso schlimmer, dass Roewer – wenn es stimmt, was er sagt – die Situation damals richtig einschätzte: Er sieht die Anti-Antifa als Zentrum der rechtsextremen Bewegung, die Gründung des Thüringer Heimatschutzes (THS) beobachtet er argwöhnisch, hält sie für “die militanteste Organisation von allen Kameradschaften in Thüringen”, wie er am Montag behauptet. Erst recht, weil THS-Mitglieder die NPD unterwandern. Er habe sich im Mai 2000 für ein Verbot des Heimatschutzes eingesetzt, sagt er, angeblich vergeblich.

Befragt zur “Operation Rennsteig”, bei der das Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz ab 1997 gemeinsam mit den Thüringer Kollegen zwölf V-Leute im THS gewinnen konnte, befällt Roewer ein Amnesie-Schub. “Ich habe keine konkreten Erinnerungen”, redet er sich heraus. Auch an den ominösen V-Mann Günther, den keiner in der Behörde kannte außer ihm und der 40.800 Mark kassierte, will sich Roewer nicht wirklich erinnern.

Roewers Auftritt am Montag ist mühselig: Wie er sich feiert und auf Erinnerungslücken beruft, wenn ihn die beiden Linken-Abgeordneten Martina Renner und Katharina König in die Mangel nehmen. Candle-Light-Dinner und Radausflüge im Büro streitet er ebenso ab wie willkürliche Personalentscheidungen. Wer lügt? “Einer sagt die Unwahrheit”, konstatiert König und beantragt Vereidigung.

…

Find this story at 10 July 2012

10. Juli 2012, 07:28 Uhr

Von Julia Jüttner, Erfurt

© SPIEGEL ONLINE 2012
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A scandal over a botched probe of ten murders blamed on German neo-Nazis felled the third top official this month as the head of a state intelligence service stepped down Wednesday.
Mystery deepens – did agent aid murder? – National (5 Jul 12)
File shredding scandal leads to security reform – National (4 Jul 12)
Intelligence chief resigns over mistakes – National (2 Jul 12)

Reinhard Boos, the head of the secret service bureau in the eastern state of Saxony, resigned in an affair that last week claimed Germany’s domestic intelligence chief after his office admitted to shredding key files.

Heinz Fromm, president of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV), resigned last week after 12 years in charge while the leader of Thuringia’ bureau, Thomas Sippel, was also dismissed.

The Thuringia bureau has been branded the “chaos office” by German media this week, following testimony from Sippel’s predecessor Helmut Roewer, who was reportedly prone to revealing confidential information in his office during impromptu wine and cheese parties.

A colleague also testified that during his tenure from 1994 to 2000, Roewer wandered around the office barefoot, chatted about top secret sources in the kitchen, and once rode a bike around the sixth floor of the building.

Roewer himself testified he was too drunk to remember who handed him the envelope that contained his own appointment in 1994.

Roewer was still in charge when the neo-Nazi terror trio Uwe Mundlos, Uwe Böhnhardt und Beate Zschäpe disappeared in the late 1990s before their murder series began.

Saxony’s Interior Minister Markus Ulbig said that the state security services had only recently learned that they had transcripts from wiretapped telephone calls related to the neo-Nazi probe dating from 1998.

“The reason this fact only came to light now is apparently linked to the gross misconduct of individual staff members,” Ulbig told the state legislature.

“The president (of the Saxony state intelligence service) deeply regrets this occurrence which is why he has asked me to give him another post from August 1 of this year.”

Ulbig said he had ordered the transcripts to be reviewed and sent to federal prosecutors to aid their ongoing investigation of the murders, mainly of Turkish-born shopkeepers throughout Germany between 2000 and 2007. Boos had led the office since 2007 and also between 1999 and 2002.

It emerged in November that a far-right trio calling itself the National Socialist Underground (NSU) was likely behind the murder spree.

The case broke open only when two members of the NSU were found dead in an apparent suicide pact and the other, a woman, turned herself in.

Investigators initially suspected criminal elements from the Turkish community were behind the rash of killings in a probe marked by repeated missteps and allegations of a cover-up.

A parliamentary committee is investigating the affair and the German government has pledged a root-and-branch reform of the security services.

Find this story at 11 July 2012

Published: 11 Jul 12 15:23 CET
Online: http://www.thelocal.de/national/20120711-43699.html

AFP/The Local/bk

Family accuses Met Police of whitewash and racism and awaits result of a third inquiry

Scotland Yard has been accused of a “cover up” after it emerged that its own review into the controversial death of a man believed to be an informant did not address key evidence which suggested officers bungled the investigation.

Kester David, 53, was found burned to death under railway arches in north London two years ago. Police concluded that he had committed suicide, but his family claim that he was murdered, possibly connected to him being a police informant, and that detectives failed to carry out a proper investigation because he was black.

In response, Inspector Brian Casson conducted an internal inquiry into the initial investigation. He found that officers had made a “catalogue of errors” that amounted to “a failing in duty”.

However, The Independent has established that the Met then ordered another review, carried out in March this year by DSI Keith Dobson, which did not address Casson’s findings.

Dobson’s report, obtained by The Independent, says: “I have not discovered anything which would have altered the ‘course and direction’ of the original investigation or alter the conclusions and findings which are documented by the investigators and experts involved…Based on all the information supplied to me I concur with that conclusion.”

Last night Mr David’s brother Roger Griffith described the Dobson report as an attempted “whitewash” by the Met and part of a sustained attempt to cover up the failings of the original detectives, whom he believes were motivated by racism.

He said: “The Dobson report was a cover up which ignored everything Casson found and concluded that the original investigation was a good job. It was a complete whitewash.”

He added: “How is it right that two police officers who failed us so tragically are still on the streets? They seemed hell bent on not investigating and putting forward that it was suicide…The two officers should be suspended now, so that no other mother has to go through what our mum has been put through.”

An inquest into Mr David’s death recorded an open verdict in January 2011 amid unanswered questions and a missing DNA report. After the critical Casson report was leaked to the press, Met Commissioner Bernard Hogan-Howe ordered a new inquiry, which is still ongoing.

Inspector Casson, who was investigating the family’s complaints, found two key witnesses who had called 999 with evidence that pointed to foul play, but were never interviewed by the detectives.

One man, who was awake feeding his baby daughter, reported hearing two screams of ‘no’ by a man who sounded panicked, frightened and in pain at 4.20am. He was first interviewed by the Inspector Casson – almost 18 months after the incident.

The second caller was a Morrisson’s supermarket night shift worker who had seen a white Mercedes van in the car park, which borders the Travis Perkin yard where Mr David was found, and two men walking towards the yard at 3.45am. He had never before seen a vehicle in the car park at that time of night. The CCTV footage was never recovered.

Mr David’s burnt body was found without shoes but there was a pair of white Reebok trainers found close-by, which his family said did not belong to him. The detectives concluded that they were his because, they told the coroner, DNA taken from the shoes “would have” belonged to a close relative. This was not true; there is no mention of a close relative in the excerpt of the DNA report quoted by Casson, the same report apparently lost by the detectives so never seen by the coroner or family.

The forensic scientist actually found two DNA profiles, one was dominant so most likely belonged to regular wearer of the shoes, but this was not run against the police DNA database. Casson’s inquiry found that it was perfect match to a white man from the travelling community.

At the inquest, Detective Kirk told the coroner that the CCTV footage showing Mr David buying a canister of petrol a few hour before he is believed to have died, pointed to a planned suicide. The inquest was not shown footage from a few minutes later which showed an RAC van attend as Mr David’s car had broken down because it was out of fuel. This footage was “not discovered” by the original investigation.

Casson also found that crucial mobile phone analysis was not done.

The Casson report recommended “a severity assessment” be conducted in light of his findings. Even the Dobson report recommends they are “considered for local management action” because of the insensitivities shown to the family and the inaccurate information they passed on. But both still remain on full duty.

They family do not understand why the IPCC, which is currently investigating five alleged cases of racism, decided not to get involved pending the outcome of the criminal investigation. The IPCC said it was reviewing this decision following the family’s request not to delay the investigation.

The Met did not comment on Mr Griffith’s view that the Dobson report was a whitewash and an attempt to cover up the actions of racist officers but said: “There is a fresh on-going investigation into the death of Kester David by the Specialist Crime and Operations Directorate (SC&O1)… detectives retain an open mind about the circumstances surrounding the incident.

“An investigation into an unexplained death of this nature is reviewed as a matter of course after 28 days, usually internally, but in this case by an external police force ensure Mr David’s family is as reassured as they can be about the effectiveness of our investigative process.”

She added: “The investigation into this complaint has not been completed… the Directorate of Professional Standards awaits the outcome of the [criminal] investigation. No action has been taken against any officer at this stage. No disciplinary action can be considered until SC&O1 have finalised their investigation.”

Timeline: Kester David Case

7 July 2010 Kester David dies around 4am. His burnt body is found under railway arches of Palmers Green station, north London, at 11am.

…

Find this story at 7 July 2012 

Nina Lakhani
Saturday, 7 July 2012

© independent.co.uk

DENVER — As Chris Lindley drove to work that morning in August 2008, a call set his heart pounding.

The Democratic National Convention was being held in Denver, and Barack Obama was to accept his party’s presidential nomination before a crowd of 80,000 people that night.

The phone call was from one of Lindley’s colleagues at Colorado’s emergency preparedness agency. The deadly bacterium that causes tularemia — long feared as a possible biological weapon — had been detected at the convention site.

Should they order an evacuation, the state officials wondered? Send inspectors in moon suits? Distribute antibiotics? Delay or move Obama’s speech?

Another question loomed: Could they trust the source of the alert, a billion-dollar government system for detecting biological attacks known as BioWatch?

Six tense hours later, Lindley and his colleagues had reached a verdict: false alarm.

BioWatch had failed — again.

President George W. Bush announced the system’s deployment in his 2003 State of the Union address, saying it would “protect our people and our homeland.” Since then, BioWatch air samplers have been installed inconspicuously at street level and atop buildings in cities across the country — ready, in theory, to detect pathogens that cause anthrax, tularemia, smallpox, plague and other deadly diseases.

But the system has not lived up to its billing. It has repeatedly cried wolf, producing dozens of false alarms in Los Angeles, Detroit, St. Louis, Phoenix, San Diego, the San Francisco Bay Area and elsewhere, a Los Angeles Times investigation found.

Worse, BioWatch cannot be counted on to detect a real attack, according to confidential government test results and computer modeling.

The false alarms have threatened to disrupt not only the 2008 Democratic convention, but also the 2004 and 2008 Super Bowls and the 2006 National League baseball playoffs. In 2005, a false alarm in Washington prompted officials to consider closing the National Mall.

Federal agencies documented 56 BioWatch false alarms — most of them never disclosed to the public — through 2008. More followed.

The ultimate verdict on BioWatch is that state and local health officials have shown no confidence in it. Not once have they ordered evacuations or distributed emergency medicines in response to a positive reading.

Federal officials have not established the cause of the false alarms, but scientists familiar with BioWatch say they appear to stem from its inability to distinguish between dangerous pathogens and closely related but nonlethal germs.

BioWatch has yet to face an actual biological attack. Field tests and computer modeling, however, suggest it would have difficulty detecting one.

In an attack by terrorists or a rogue state, disease organisms could well be widely dispersed, at concentrations too low to trigger BioWatch but high enough to infect thousands of people, according to scientists with knowledge of the test data who spoke on condition of anonymity.

Even in a massive release, air currents would scatter the germs in unpredictable ways. Huge numbers of air samplers would have to be deployed to reliably detect an attack in a given area, the scientists said.

Many who have worked with BioWatch — from the Army general who oversaw its initial deployment to state and local health officials who have seen its repeated failures up close — call it ill-conceived or unworkable.

“I can’t find anyone in my peer group who believes in BioWatch,” said Dr. Ned Calonge, chief medical officer for the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment from 2002 to 2010.

“The only times it goes off, it’s wrong. I just think it’s a colossal waste of money. It’s a stupid program.”

Officials at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the federal agency that would be chiefly responsible for rushing medications to the site of an attack, told White House aides at a meeting Nov. 21 that they would not do so unless a BioWatch warning was confirmed by follow-up sampling and analysis, several attendees said in interviews.

Those extra steps would undercut BioWatch’s rationale: to enable swift treatment of those exposed.

Federal officials also have shelved long-standing plans to expand the system to the nation’s airports for fear that false alarms could trigger evacuations of terminals, grounding of flights and needless panic.

BioWatch was developed by U.S. national laboratories and government contractors and is overseen by the Department of Homeland Security. Department officials insist that the system’s many alerts were not false alarms. Each time, BioWatch accurately detected some organism in the environment, even if it was not the result of an attack and posed no threat to the public, officials said.

At the same time, department officials have assured Congress that newer technology will make BioWatch more reliable and cheaper to operate.

The current samplers are vacuum-powered collection devices, about the size of an office printer, that pull air through filters that trap any airborne materials. In more than 30 cities each day, technicians collect the filters and deliver them to state or local health labs for genetic analysis. Lab personnel look for DNA matches with at least half a dozen targeted pathogens.

The new, larger units would be automated labs in a box. Samples could be analyzed far more quickly and with no need for manual collection.

Buying and operating the new technology, known as Generation 3, would cost about $3.1 billion over the next five years, on top of the roughly $1 billion that BioWatch already has cost taxpayers. The Obama administration is weighing whether to award a multiyear contract.

Generation 3 “is imperative to saving thousands of lives,” Dr. Alexander Garza, Homeland Security’s chief medical officer, told a House subcommittee on March 29.

But field and lab tests of automated units have raised doubts about their effectiveness. A prototype installed in the New York subway system in 2007 and 2008 produced multiple false readings, according to interviews with scientists. Field tests last year in Chicago found that a second prototype could not operate independently for more than a week at a time.

Most worrisome, testing at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory in Washington state and at the Army’s Dugway Proving Ground in Utah found that Generation 3 units could detect a biological agent only if exposed to extremely high concentrations: hundreds of thousands of organisms per cubic meter of air over a six-hour period.

Most of the pathogens targeted by BioWatch, scientists said, can cause sickness or death at much lower levels.

A confidential Homeland Security analysis prepared in January said these “failures were so significant” that the department had proposed that Northrop Grumman Corp., the leading competitor for the Generation 3 contract, make “major engineering modifications.”

A spokesman for the department, Peter Boogaard, defended the performance of BioWatch. Responding to written questions, he said the department “takes all precautions necessary to minimize the occurrence of both false positive and false negative results.”

“Rigorous testing and evaluation” will guide the department’s decisions about whether to buy the Generation 3 technology, he said.

Representatives of Northrop Grumman said in interviews that some test results had prompted efforts to improve the automated units’ sensitivity and overall performance.

“We had an issue that affected the consistency of the performance of the system,” said Dave Tilles, the company’s project director. “We resolved it. We fixed it…. We feel like we’re ready for the next phase of the program.”

In congressional testimony, officials responsible for BioWatch in both the Bush and Obama administrations have made only fleeting references to the system’s documented failures.

“BioWatch, as you know, has been an enormous success story,” Jay M. Cohen, a Homeland Security undersecretary, told a House subcommittee in 2007.

In June 2009, Homeland Security’s then-chief medical officer, Dr. Jon Krohmer, told a House panel: “Without these detectors, the nation has no ability to detect biological attacks until individuals start to show clinical symptoms.” Without BioWatch, “needless deaths” could result, he said.

Garza, the current chief medical officer, was asked during his March 29 testimony whether Generation 3 was on track. “My professional opinion is, it’s right where it needs to be,” he said.

After hearing such assurances, bipartisan majorities of Congress have unfailingly supported additional spending for BioWatch.

Olympic prototype

The problems inherent in what would become BioWatch appeared early.

In February 2002, scientists and technicians from Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory deployed a prototype in and around Salt Lake City in preparation for the Winter Olympics. The scientists were aware that false alarms could “cause immense disruptions and panic” and were determined to prevent them, they later wrote in the lab’s quarterly magazine.

Sixteen air samplers were positioned at Olympic venues, as well as in downtown Salt Lake City and at the airport. About 5:30 p.m. on Feb. 12, a sample from the airport’s C concourse tested positive for anthrax.

Utah Gov. Mike Leavitt was at an Olympic figure skating competition when the state’s public safety director, Bob Flowers, called with the news.

“He told me that they had a positive lead on anthrax at the airport,” Leavitt recalled. “I asked if they’d retested it. He said they had — not just once, but four times. And each time it tested positive.”

The Olympics marked the first major international gathering since the Sept. 11, 2001, airliner hijackings and the deadly anthrax mailings that fall.

“It didn’t take a lot of imagination to say, ‘This could be the real thing,'” Leavitt said.

But sealing off the airport would disrupt the Olympics. And “the federal government would have stopped transportation all over the country,” as it had after Sept. 11, Leavitt said.

Leavitt ordered hazardous-materials crews to stand by at the airport, though without lights and sirens or conspicuous protective gear.

“He was ready to close the airport and call the National Guard,” recalled Richard Meyer, then a federal scientist assisting with the detection technology at the Olympics.

After consulting Meyer and other officials, Leavitt decided to wait until a final round of testing was completed. By 9 p.m., when the results were negative, the governor decided not to order any further response.

“It was a false positive,” Leavitt said. “But it was a live-fire exercise, I’ll tell you that.”

Pressing ahead

The implication — that BioWatch could deliver a highly disruptive false alarm — went unheeded.

After the Olympics, Meyer and others who had worked with the air samplers attended meetings at the Pentagon, where Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz was building a case for rapidly deploying the technology nationwide.

On Jan. 28, 2003, Bush unveiled BioWatch in his State of the Union address, calling it “the nation’s first early-warning network of sensors to detect biological attack.”

The next month, a group of science and technology advisors to the Defense Department, including Sidney Drell, the noted Stanford University physicist, expressed surprise that “no formal study has been undertaken” of the Salt Lake City incident. The cause of that false alarm has never been identified.

“It is not realistic to undertake a nationwide, blanket deployment of biosensors,” the advisory panel, named the JASON group, concluded.

The warning was ignored in the rush to deploy BioWatch. Administration officials also disbanded a separate working group of prominent scientists with expertise in the pathogens.

That group, established by the Pentagon, had been working to determine how often certain germs appear in nature, members of the panel said in interviews. The answer would be key to avoiding false alarms. The idea was to establish a baseline to distinguish between the natural presence of disease organisms and an attack.

The failure to conduct that work has hobbled the system ever since, particularly in regard to tularemia, which has been involved in nearly all of BioWatch’s false alarms.

The bacterium that causes tularemia, or rabbit fever, got its formal name, Francisella tularensis, after being found in squirrels in the early 20th century in Central California’s Tulare County. About 200 naturally occurring infections in humans are reported every year in the U.S. The disease can be deadly but is readily curable when treated promptly with antibiotics.

Before BioWatch, scientists knew that the tularemia bacterium existed in soil and water. What the scientists who designed BioWatch did not know — because the fieldwork wasn’t done — was that nature is rife with close cousins to it.

The false alarms for tularemia appear to have been triggered by those nonlethal cousins, according to scientists with knowledge of the system.

That BioWatch is sensitive enough to register repeated false alarms but not sensitive enough to reliably detect an attack may seem contradictory. But the two tasks involve different challenges.

Any detection system is likely to encounter naturally occurring organisms like the tularemia bacterium and its cousins. Those encounters have the potential to trigger alerts unless the system can distinguish between benign organisms and harmful ones.

Detecting an attack requires a system that is not only discriminating but also highly sensitive — to guarantee that it won’t miss traces of deadly germs that might have been dispersed over a large area.

BioWatch is neither discriminating enough for the one task nor sensitive enough for the other.

The system’s inherent flaws and the missing scientific work did not slow its deployment. After Bush’s speech, the White House assigned Army Maj. Gen. Stephen Reeves, whose office was responsible for developing defenses against chemical and biological attacks, to get BioWatch up and running.

Over the previous year, Reeves had overseen placement of units similar to the BioWatch samplers throughout the Washington area, including the Pentagon, where several false alarms for anthrax and plague later occurred.

Based on that work and computer modeling of the technology’s capabilities, Reeves did not see how BioWatch could reliably detect attacks smaller than, for example, a mass-volume spraying from a crop duster.

Nevertheless, the priority was to carry out Bush’s directive, swiftly.

“In the senior-level discussions, the issue of efficacy really wasn’t on the table,” recalled Reeves, who has since retired from the Army. “It was get it done, tell the president we did good, tell the nation that they’re protected.… I thought at the time this was good PR, to calm the nation down. But an effective system? Not a chance.”

Why no illness?

It wasn’t long before there was a false alarm. Over a three-day period in October 2003, three BioWatch units detected the tularemia bacterium in Houston.

Public health officials were puzzled: The region’s hospitals were not reporting anyone sick with the disease.

Dr. Mary desVignes-Kendrick, the city’s health director, wanted to question hospital officials in detail to make sure early symptoms of tularemia were not being missed or masked by a flu outbreak. But to desVignes-Kendrick’s dismay, Homeland Security officials told her not to tell the doctors and nurses what she was looking for.

“We were hampered by how much we could share on this quote-unquote secret initiative,” she said.

After a week, it was clear that the BioWatch alarm was false.

In early 2004, on the eve of the Super Bowl in Houston, BioWatch once again signaled tularemia, desVignes-Kendrick said. The sample was from a location two blocks from Reliant Stadium, where the game was to be played Feb. 1.

DesVignes-Kendrick was skeptical but she and other officials again checked with hospitals before dismissing the warning as another false alarm. The football game was played without interruption.

Nonetheless, three weeks later, Charles E. McQueary, then Homeland Security’s undersecretary for science and technology, told a House subcommittee that BioWatch was performing flawlessly.

“I am very pleased with the manner in which BioWatch has worked,” he said. “We’ve had well over half a million samples that have been taken by those sensors. We have yet to have our first false alarm.”

Asked in an interview about that statement, McQueary said his denial of any false alarm was based on his belief that the tularemia bacterium had been detected in Houston, albeit not from an attack.

“You can’t tell the machine, ‘I only want you to detect the one that comes from a terrorist,'” he said.

Whether the Houston alarms involved actual tularemia has never been determined, but researchers later reported the presence of benign relatives of the pathogen in the metropolitan area.

Fear in the capital

In late September 2005, nearly two years after the first cluster of false alarms in Houston, analysis of filters from BioWatch units on and near the National Mall in Washington indicated the presence of tularemia. Tens of thousands of people had visited the Mall that weekend for a book festival and a protest against the Iraq War. Anyone who had been infected would need antibiotics promptly.

For days, officials from the White House and Homeland Security and other federal agencies privately discussed whether to assume the signal was another false alarm and do nothing, or quarantine the Mall and urge those who had been there to get checked for tularemia.

As they waited for further tests, federal officials decided not to alert local healthcare providers to be on the lookout for symptoms, for fear of creating a panic. Homeland Security officials now say findings from lab analysis of the filters did not meet BioWatch standards for declaring an alert.

Six days after the first results, however, CDC scientists broke ranks and began alerting hospitals and clinics. That was little help to visitors who already had left town, however.

“There were 100 people on one conference call — scientists from all over, public health officials — trying to sort out what it meant,” recalled Dr. Gregg Pane, director of Washington’s health department at the time.

Discussing the incident soon thereafter, Jeffrey Stiefel, then chief BioWatch administrator for Homeland Security, said agency officials were keenly aware that false alarms could damage the system’s credibility.

“If I tell a city that they’ve got a biological event, and it’s not a biological event, you no longer trust that system, and the system is useless,” Stiefel said on videotape at a biodefense seminar at the National Institutes of Health on Oct. 6, 2005. “It has to have a high reliability.”

Ultimately, no one turned up sick with tularemia.

Culture of silence

Homeland Security officials have said little publicly about the false positives. And, citing national security and the classification of information, they have insisted that their local counterparts remain mum as well.

Dr. Jonathan Fielding, Los Angeles County’s public health director, whose department has presided over several BioWatch false positives, referred questions to Homeland Security officials.

Dr. Takashi Wada, health officer for Pasadena from 2003 to 2010, was guarded in discussing the BioWatch false positive that occurred on his watch. Wada confirmed that the detection was made, in February 2007, but would not say where in the 23-square-mile city.

“We’ve been told not to discuss it,” he said in an interview.

Dr. Karen Relucio, medical director for the San Mateo County Health Department, acknowledged there was a false positive there in 2008, but declined to elaborate. “I’m not sure it’s OK for me to talk about that,” said Relucio, who referred further questions to officials in Washington.

In Arizona, officials kept quiet when BioWatch air samplers detected the anthrax pathogen at Super Bowl XLII in February 2008.

Nothing had turned up when technicians checked the enclosed University of Phoenix Stadium before kickoff. But airborne material collected during the first half of the game tested positive for anthrax, said Lt. Col. Jack W. Beasley Jr., chief of the Arizona National Guard’s weapons of mass destruction unit.

The Guard rushed some of the genetic material to the state’s central BioWatch lab in Phoenix for further testing. Federal and state officials convened a 2 a.m. conference call, only to be told that it was another false alarm.

Although it never made the news, the incident “caused quite a stir,” Beasley said.

The director of the state lab, Victor Waddell, said he had been instructed by Homeland Security officials not to discuss the test results. “That’s considered national security,” he said.

The dreaded call

In the months before the 2008 Democratic National Convention, local, state and federal officials planned for a worst-case event in Denver, including a biological attack.

Shortly before 9 a.m. on Aug. 28, the convention’s final day, that frightening scenario seemed to have come true. That’s when Chris Lindley, of the Colorado health department, got the phone call from a colleague, saying BioWatch had detected the tularemia pathogen at the convention site.

Lindley, an epidemiologist who had led a team of Army preventive-medicine specialists in Iraq, had faced crises, but nothing like a bioterrorism attack. Within minutes, chief medical officer Ned Calonge arrived.

Calonge had little faith in BioWatch. A couple of years earlier, the health department had been turned upside down responding to what turned out to be a false alarm for Brucella, a bacterium that primarily affects cattle, on Denver’s western outskirts.

“The idea behind BioWatch — that you could put out these ambient air filters and they would provide you with the information to save people exposed to a biological attack — it’s a concept that you could only put together in theory,” Calonge said in an interview. “It’s a poorly conceived strategy for doing early detection that is inherently going to pick up false positives.”

Lindley and his team arranged a conference call with scores of officials, including representatives from Homeland Security, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Health and Human Services, the Secret Service and the White House.

None of the BioWatch samplers operated by the state had registered a positive, and no unusual cases of infection appeared to have been diagnosed at area hospitals, Lindley said.

The alert had come from a Secret Service-installed sampler on the grounds of the arena where the convention was taking place. The unit was next to an area filled with satellite trucks broadcasting live news reports on the Democratic gathering. Soon, thousands of conventioneers would be walking from Pepsi Center to nearby Invesco Field to hear Obama’s acceptance speech.

Had Lindley and Calonge been asked, they said in interviews, they wouldn’t have put the BioWatch unit at this spot, where foot and vehicle traffic could stir up dust and contaminants that might set off a false alarm. As it turned out, a shade tree 12 yards from the sampler had attracted squirrels, potential carriers of tularemia.

The location near the media trailers posed another problem: how to conduct additional tests without setting off a panic.

EPA officials “said on the phone, ‘We have a team standing by, ready to go,'” Lindley recalled. But the technicians would have to wear elaborate protective gear.

The sight of emergency responders in moon suits “would have derailed the convention,” Calonge said.

…

Find this story at 7 July 2012

By David Willman, Los Angeles Times

July 7, 2012Advertisement

david.willman@latimes.com

Copyright © 2012, Los Angeles Times

New report examines the composition of DG Enterprise and Industry expert groups. Among its findings, the shocking conclusion that there are 482 corporate lobbyists versus only 11 union representatives.

Industry experts and corporate lobbyists have effectively captured key areas of policy advice within the European Commission, according to new research carried out by the Alliance for Lobbying Transparency and Ethics Regulation (ALTER-EU) launched today at a joint event with the Austrian Trade Union Federation (ÖGB) and the Austrian Federal Chamber of Labour [1].

The study finds that two thirds of all of DG Enterprise’s non-governmental advisory groups are dominated by big business interests [2] with some 482 corporate advisors influencing key areas of policy, such as international trade, consumer protection, food and aspects of environmental protection.

In contrast, the interests of small and medium-sized enterprises have little opportunity to influence policy decisions through advisory groups, accounting for just 5% of the total non-governmental representatives. Representatives from NGOs (non-governmental organisations) account for just 8%, and unions for 1%.

The Commission’s advisory groups provide specialist advice on policy issues and their work can form the backbone of new legislation. The European Parliament has previously criticised the Commission for engaging more with big business than with any other social group through these advisory groups.

ALTER-EU argues that allowing big companies’ interests to dominate risks that the interests of these companies are given greater priority than the public interest. It also criticises the Commission’s own rules on expert groups which stress that “Commission services shall, as far as possible, ensure a balanced representation”.

One of the report authors, Yiorgos Vassalos from ALTER-EU, said:

“DG Enterprise seems to have become the champion of big business in the Commission. Their dominance in expert groups is providing business with privileged access to influence the policy agenda, while other interests do not have a similar voice. As a result there is a very real risk that industry lobbyists may capture whole areas of policy making at the European level, to the detriment of wider society.”

Oliver Roepke from the Austrian Trade Union Federation said:

“DG Enterprise seems to have forgotten that employees and workers are at the heart of the European economy. Their expertise and experience should also lie at the heart of policy making. Far too often we see DG Enterprise working with transnational corporations which have no interest in protecting jobs and decent living standards in Europe. This one-sided policy-making must be reformed.” [suggestion only – to be amended]

ALTER-EU is calling on the Commission to make major changes in the composition of its advisory groups to ensure that the public interest is properly served. It also calls on the Commission to implement the European Parliament’s demands and introduce safeguards against corporate capture of expert groups.

Contacts:

Yiorgos Vassalos, ALTER-EU, phone: 32-484675162 and email: yiorgos@corporateeurope.org

Paul de Clerck, ALTER-EU, phone: 32-494380959 and email: paul@milieudefensie.nl

Notes:

[1] Who’s driving the agenda at DG Enterprise and Industry? ALTER-EU, July 2012, see: http://www.alter-eu.org/sites/default/files/documents/DGENTR-driving.pdf

[2] The report authors defined that a group is dominated by a certain interest if that interest has more than half of the non-government seats.

The Alliance for Lobbying Transparency and Ethics Regulation (ALTER-EU) is a coalition of over 200 civil society groups, trade unions, academics and public affairs firms concerned with the increasing influence exerted by corporate lobbyists on the political agenda in Europe, the resulting loss of democracy in EU decision-making and the postponement, weakening, or blockage even, of urgently needed progress on social, environmental and consumer-protection reforms.
DGENTR-driving.pdf
Campaign:
Balanced expert groups

Publication date:
Tuesday, July 10, 2012

Press release issued by:
The Alliance for Lobbying Transparency and Ethics Regulation (ALTER-EU)

Find the report at

Recently, the head of the UK branch of G4S, the largest private security firm in the world, predicted that within the next few years an increasing amount police work will be allocated and outsourced to private security companies – like G4S.

The comments were made by the director of the UK led private security firm, off the back of G4S having secured lucrative contracts to carry out policing duties on behalf of West Midlands and Surrey police – and ultimately the taxpayer.

One of the immediate criticisms raised at this prospect was of the need for all individuals contracted to carry out police duties to be held equally accountable to the IPCC (Independent police complaints commission) – at present this will not the case.

G4S are also set to have a massive presence at this year’s Olympic Games, with around 13,000 staff allocated for the games which are set to begin in a couple of weeks time. Mainstream news reports have described the makeup of east London as looking increasingly more like an occupied military zone rather than the sight for one of the greatest spectacles on Earth. Coincidentally, we are talking about the same G4S that carries out duties for the Israeli government and the Israeli Defense Force (IDF).

Despite concerns raised over the last couple of days regarding the ability of G4S to deliver, the Home Secretary Theresa May today maintained that the Olympic games were safe to go ahead and that london is prepared.

Indeed, the security giant looks likely to secure lucrative contracts to undergo outsourced work on behalf of the NHS, and the police, and post Olympics, and does not look likely to be struggling for work, to put it politely.

Police forces across the country, as well as suffering from acute levels of public skepticism, and diminishing resources, will be headed by a company, driven by profit margins at the behest of our government.

Although according to government this is of course done in the name of efficiency and cost effectiveness, one might say that there is a direct conflict of interest. If we were to make any predictions as to how this were to translate into reality, looking at how the police, immigration officials, and prisons which have been privatised are operating in the US, and the resulting criticisms that have been leveled at them, we ought to surely be concerned.

Incidentally, here in the UK, we have already emulated the private prison system, with several currently outsourced to private companies.

In addition to the news that the police along with our other institutions, will now be further privatised and sold off, we have also had to digest the added revelation that we are likely to see an even greater drop in police numbers in the years leading up to 2015.

If alarm bells were not already ringing as a result of the fragility of the relationship between the police and the public, then they should be now.

There is no reason to believe that this will have a beneficial effect on the level of service provided. Or put another way, there is no evidence to suggest that in the long run this will benefit society. On the contrary many are voicing concerns saying the opposite; A climate under which it becomes more profitable to imprison people than to educate them, is not something we want. We only have to look across the pond to realise that.

Equally, the likes of G4S, securing the Olympics and carrying out increasingly more and more police duties holds just as many legitimate concerns.

As was revealed in a recent report, the extent to which some of the private companies awarded contracts to kickstart the coalition governments ‘work programme’ sought to actually cut the number of claimants claiming benefits- including G4S – was shockingly high. Many are concerned that they are more focused on cutting the number of benefit claimants, rather than actually getting people back to work.

Many groups and activists concerned about G4S have been trying to raise awareness and scrutinize G4S for many years, but in recent months and especially in the aftermath of the death of Jimmy Mubenga, which for many after a long list of incidents which brought into sharp focus the prospect of criminal charges being sought for possible criminal behaviour by G4S, that scrutiny has increased – and with good reason. Whether the staff that held Mubenga in their custody will now face criminal charges remains to be seen. It also remains to be seen whether the company itself will face criminal charges of manslaughter.

Just like the last New Labour government, which designated the contract for our census data to be gathered to Lockheed Martin, the arms manufacturer, with many other impressive titles to its name to boot, this coalition hasn’t flinched from its predictable ideological course, in shipping the important work of our already stretched institutions, over to private companies, and the reality is that we are poised to see more of the same. The fact that one of the big beneficiaries of this, has massive question marks hanging over it says much about our government’s willingness to ship out anything to the highest bidder, irrespective of the spin, which justifies such decision making in the name of cost effectiveness and efficiency. The question really, is what’s coming next.

Meanwhile the Olympics are awaited with bated breath from many and for many reasons. For sports lovers it’s the chance to enjoy the games the chance to inspire young people. For many police officers, the circumstances surrounding the Olympics, are just inviting the kind of scenes and trouble that we saw last year, possibly further rioting. Private companies, just like the big multinationals that go in to rebuild a destroyed infrastructure after a war, are poised to get rich either way.

Find this story at 13 July 2012

By Richard Sudan
Notebook – A selection of Independent views -, Opinion
Friday, 13 July 2012 at 12:00 am

Army called upon to fill Games security shortfall
Fears G4S may even fail to meet reduced target
MP accuses firm – who were paid £284m – of letting the country down

The security firm G4S was reportedly paid a staggering £284million to provide up to 17,500 personnel for the 2012 Games.

But yesterday, in a major humiliation for company bosses and Olympic organisers, it admitted it would fall well short of the target, forcing ministers to pull in thousands of military personnel.

The company was contracted to provide a minimum of 15,400 security staff, with a target of 17,500.

Yesterday, as the Government confirmed the call-up of 3,500 extra troops, G4S claimed it would be able to bring in 13,800.

However, with 14 days to go to the Games, question marks remained whether it would meet even that target, as just a small fraction of that total is available for deployment. Only 4,000 are ‘boots on the ground’, working as ticket checkers and bag searchers at the Olympic Park in Stratford, east London.

Another 9,000 are still in the training and vetting process – raising fears even the more reduced target might not be achievable.

The Armed Forces now make up the overwhelming majority of the security staff likely to be deployed during the Games.

The original plan for 7,500 military is bolstered by a special contingent of 5,000, plus the 3,500 announced on Tuesday, making a total of 16,000. In addition, there will be 3,000 unpaid volunteers.

The number of staff needed to guard the Olympic venues more than doubled last December after the organising committee Locog wildly underestimated the total required. Originally Locog contracted G4S to provide 2,000 security guards, but in December the firm agreed to increase that number massively.

Yesterday Downing Street insisted there would be financial penalties for the firm for failing to meet the contract. But Locog refused to comment on the nature of any fines, claiming it would breach commercial confidentiality. That is despite taxpayers coughing up at least £9billion for the cost of the Games.

Insiders said the company had repeatedly claimed until last week that it would meet its obligations.

A Whitehall source accused the firm of ‘abysmal’ failure and said it had delayed completing training and vetting processes to save money by not having too many staff on the books before the start of the Games.

The source said: ‘Until yesterday officials from G4S were turning up and assuring us that the figures were getting better and going to be OK.

‘Then we learn there’s not as many as we need. They didn’t want to be throwing money at the problem six months ago because their staff would be sitting around doing nothing.’

Home Secretary Theresa May was hauled to the House of Commons to try to explain the shortfall.

She insisted: ‘There is no question of Olympic security being compromised.’

But Labour MP Keith Vaz, who called for the emergency statement, said: ‘G4S has let the country down and we have literally had to send in the troops.’

Mr Vaz, chairman of the Commons Home Affairs Committee, has written to Nick Buckles, chief executive of G4S, demanding he give evidence before MPs next week.

The debacle is the latest blow to the reputation of G4S which, while relatively unknown to the public, is one of the world’s biggest security companies.

In recent years its tentacles have extended into swathes of British life which used to be the preserve of the public sector, including running prisons and police custody suites.

From headquarters in Crawley, Sussex, company bosses run a sprawling multinational company with interests in more than 125 countries.

They provide security at Heathrow and other major airports, and for vans transporting cash on behalf of banks and other financial institutions.

Under its previous name Group4Security it had a contract for transporting prisoners, but in 2004 the company ‘lost’ two prisoners, sparking a major investigation.

It runs six jails in the UK including Birmingham, where an inspection report in October 2011 said drugs were regularly being thrown over the prison walls.

Three G4S guards are on police bail over the death in October 2010 of Angolan national Jimmy Mubenga, who was restrained while being deported from the country.

…

Find this story at 13 July 2012

By Jack Doyle

PUBLISHED: 22:39 GMT, 12 July 2012 | UPDATED: 10:30 GMT, 13 July 2012

Published by Associated Newspapers Ltd

Part of the Daily Mail, The Mail on Sunday & Metro Media Group
© Associated Newspapers Ltd

The depth of the crisis over G4S’s Olympic security preparations became increasingly clear on Thursday as recruits revealed details of a “totally chaotic” selection process and police joined the military in bracing themselves to fill the void left by the private security contractor.

Guards told how, with 14 days to go until the Olympics opening ceremony, they had received no schedules, uniforms or training on x-ray machines. Others said they had been allocated to venues hundreds of miles from where they lived, been sent rotas intended for other employees, and offered shifts after they had failed G4S’s own vetting.

The West Midlands Police Federation reported that its officers were being prepared to guard the Ricoh Arena in Coventry, which will host the football tournament, amid concerns G4S would not be able to cover the security requirements.

“We have to find officers until the army arrives and we don’t know where we are going to find them from,” said Chris Jones, secretary of the federation.

G4S has got a £284m contract to provide 13,700 guards, but only has 4,000 in place. It says a further 9,000 are in the pipeline.

G4S sent an urgent request on Thursday to retired police asking them to help. A memo to the National Association of Retired Police Officers said: “G4S Policing Solutions are currently and urgently recruiting for extra support for the Olympics. These are immediate starts with this Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday available. We require ex-police officers ideally with some level of security clearance and with a Security Industry Association [accreditation], however neither is compulsory.”

Robert Brown, a former police sergeant, told the Guardian that he pulled out of the recruitment process for the Games after seeing it close at hand.

He said: “They were trying to process hundreds of people and we had to fill out endless forms. It was totally chaotic and it was obvious to me that this was being done too quickly and too late.”

Another G4S trainee, an ex-policeman, described the process as “an utter farce”.

He added: “There were people who couldn’t spell their own name. The staff were having to help them. Most people hadn’t filled in their application forms correctly. Some didn’t know what references were and others said they didn’t have anyone who could act as a referee. The G4S people were having to prompt them, saying things like “what about your uncle?”

Tim Steward, a former prison officer, said he was recruited by G4S in March as a team leader but said he would not be working at the Games because of a series of blunders.

Steward said he provided documentation for vetting but G4S had said it did not have the information on record and so closed his file. The security firm then offered him a training session at short notice, which he could not attend, but it did not offer an alternative.

A recruit who was interviewed in March and completed training last month, said: “There are people like me that are vetted and trained in security and would be happy to work, but can’t. Some of the classes were of around 200 in size with only two trainers accommodating the training for a class of this size.

“I am yet to hear from G4S regarding my screening, accreditation, uniform or even a rough start date. I know many people also who will be commencing work on 27 July who have had absolutely no scheduled on-site training. They are simply being chucked into their role on x-ray machines, public screening areas and even athlete screening areas.”

Another guard who has been trained as an x-ray operator, complained that he was unable to get through to G4S to find out when and where he was meant to be working, and was once left on hold on the phone for 38 minutes.

One student applicant said he had already spent £650 on travel and hotel bills to attend training and was now worried that, because he had not received any accreditation or rota from G4S, he might not be given the shifts that would enable him to cover those costs. He said he had expected to earn about £2,000 over the period of the Games.

G4S’s own Facebook page for new recruits is littered with similar complaints.

“They’ve placed me in Manchester and I want to work in London,” wrote Glenn Roseman. “Some idiot has changed my location, I’m never going to get any work now.”

Christian Smith complained: “I did the training course, passed, and got my own security industry association licence, only to fail G4S vetting. Two days after I got their letter, they rang me, and asked me what days I could work.”

…

Find this story at 13 July 2012 

Recruits tell of chaos over schedules, uniforms and training while ex-police officers asked to help out
Robert Booth and Nick Hopkins
The Guardian, Friday 13 July 2012

© 2012 Guardian News and Media Limited or its affiliated companies. All rights reserved.

Im Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV) sind nicht nur am 11.11.2011 V-Mann Akten mit Bezug zur rechtsextremen Szene vernichtet worden, sondern auch noch einige Tage danach. Das geht nach MONITOR-Informationen aus einem aktualisierten Schreiben des Bundesamts für Verfassungsschutz an das Bundesministerium des Inneren hervor. Deshalb wurde das Disziplinarverfahren gegen den zuständigen Referatsleiter ausgedehnt mit dem so wörtlich „Vorwurf, eine zweite rechtswidrige Aktenvernichtung ( ohne vorherige Prüfung der Akten) vorsätzlich veranlasst zu haben (..)“ Dazu erklärt das Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz gegenüber „Monitor“: Es seien 7 Operativakten in zwei zeitlich voneinander getrennten Schritten vernichtet worden.“

Dass es eine zweite Aktenvernichtung gegeben hat, hatte dem Schreiben zufolge ein BfV Mitarbeiter ausgesagt: Danach habe er „einige Tage nach dem 11.11. einen weiteren Aktenordner zufällig in der Aktenverwaltung gefunden.“ Der damit konfrontierte vorgesetzte Beamte habe „nach kurzem Durchblättern“, so der Zeuge, „sogleich dessen Vernichtung angeordnet.“

Über die anstehende Vernichtung von Akten waren offensichtlich viele Mitarbeiter im Verfassungsschutz informiert. Der zuständige Referatsleiter hatte per E-Mail nicht nur alle Mitarbeiter des Referats 2B unterrichtet, sondern auch seinen vorgesetzten Gruppenleiter, heißt es in dem Bericht. Der inzwischen zurückgetretene Verfassungsschutzpräsident Fromm hatte am 8.11. 2011 angeordnet, alle Unterlagen auf einen Zusammenhang mit den mutmaßlichen NSU–Terroristen Bönhardt, Zschäpe und Mundlos zu untersuchen.

Find this story at 12 July 2012

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Secret documents reveal British intelligence concerns and raise damaging questions about UK’s targeting of Gaddafi opponents
Britain already faces legal action over its involvement in the plot to seize Abdul Hakim Belhaj, who is now the military commander in Tripoli. Photograph: Francois Mori/AP

British intelligence believes the capture and rendition of two top Libyan rebel commanders, carried out with the involvement of MI6, strengthened al-Qaida and helped groups attacking British forces in Iraq, secret documents reveal.

The papers, discovered in the British ambassador’s abandoned residence in Tripoli, raise new and damaging questions over Britain’s role in the seizure and torture of key opponents of Muammar Gaddafi’s regime.

Britain is already facing legal actions over its involvement in the plot to seize Abdul Hakim Belhaj, leader of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) who is now the military commander in Tripoli, and his deputy, Sami al-Saadi. Both men say they were tortured and jailed after being handed over to Gaddafi.

The documents reveal that British intelligence believe the pair’s rendition boosted al-Qaida by removing more moderate elements from the insurgency’s leadership. This allowed extremists to push “a relatively close-knit group” focused on overthrowing Gaddafi into joining the pan-Islamist terror network.

One document, headed “UK/Libya eyes only – Secret”, showed the security services had monitored LIFG members since their arrival in Britain following a failed attempt to kill Gaddafi in 1996, and understood their aim was the replacement of his regime with an Islamic state.

The briefing paper, prepared by the security service for a four-day MI5 visit in February 2005, said that following the seizure of its two key leaders the year before the group had been cast into a state of disarray.

“The extremists are now in the ascendancy,” the paper said, and they were “pushing the group towards a more pan-Islamic agenda inspired by AQ [al-Qaida]”.

Their “broadened” goals, it continued, were now also the destabilisation of Arab governments that were not following sharia law and the liberation of Muslim territories occupied by the west.

The 58-page document, which included names, photographs and detailed biographies of a dozen alleged LIFG members in the UK, went on to highlight “conclusions of concern” in the light of these changes.

These included the sending of money and false documents to a contact in Iran to help smuggle fighters into Iraq, where British and US forces were coming under fierce attack. “UK members have long enjoyed a reputation as the best suppliers of false documents in the worldwide extremist community,” said the report. It added that British LIFG members were becoming “increasingly ambitious” at fundraising through fast-food restaurants, fraud, property and car dealing, and raised nearly all the money for the group outside of Libya.British security also asked Gaddafi’s security forces for access to detainees and their debriefs.

Asked about the document, a Foreign Office spokesman said: “It is the government’s longstanding policy not to comment on intelligence matters.”

The LIFG eventually merged with al-Qaida in 2007. However, a second document, a secret update on Libyan extremist networks in the UK from August 2008, says the response of British members was “subdued and mixed”.

It concluded that those already supporting the wider aims of al-Qaida continued to do so, but “those with reservations retain their focus on Libya”. It added, however, that some money raised by members in Manchester may have gone to “assist operational activity”.

The cache of confidential documents – which included private letters to Gaddafi from Tony Blair, Gordon Brown and key Downing Street aides – was abandoned when the three-story residence was attacked by Gaddafi loyalists in April. .

There was also a dossier prepared by British intelligence with suggested questions for the captured men. The 39-page document, entitled Briefs for Detainees and labelled “UK Secret” on each page, was written in three sections in March, June and October 2004.

The first section is dated the month of Belhaj’s arrest, and sought answers on everything from his private life to his military training, activities in Afghanistan and links to al-Qaida. There were also personalised questions for Saadi.

The LIFG, founded by veterans of the mujahideen’s war against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, was for many years the most serious internal threat to Gaddafi, coming close to blowing up the dictator with a car bomb in his home town of Sirte in 1996. The government denied claims by David Shayler, the renegade British spy, that this assassination attempt was funded by British intelligence.

After Gaddafi’s clampdown on the group, dozens of dissidents were allowed to settle in Britain. London only designated the LIFG a terrorist organisation after Libya said it was abandoning its weapons of mass destruction programme in 2003. The move is understood to have been agreed as part of the negotiations with Gaddafi’s regime that paved the way to the controversial Blair deal.

Belhaj, now a key figure in liberated Libya, is preparing to sue Britain after other documents discovered in the wake of Gaddafi’s fall indicated that MI6 assisted in his rendition to torture and brutal treatment from the CIA and Gaddafi’s regime.

MI6 informed the CIA of his whereabouts after his associates told British diplomats in Malaysia he wanted to claim asylum in Britain.

He was allowed to board a flight to London, then abducted when his aircraft landed at Bangkok.

…

Find this story at 24 October 2011 

Ian Birrell
guardian.co.uk, Monday 24 October 2011 20.28 BST

© 2012 Guardian News and Media Limited or its affiliated companies. All rights reserved.

Committee says there are questions about whether agencies should have been able to anticipate how events might unfold
Britain’s intelligence agencies were surprised by the Arab spring, and their failure to realise unrest would spread so rapidly may reveal a lack of understanding of the region, according to the parliamentary body set up to scrutinise their activities.

A particularly sharp passage of the intelligence and security committee’s (ISC) report describes as “ill-considered” an attempt by MI6 to smuggle into Libya two officers who were promptly seized by rebels.

The report says that at the time the Arab spring erupted, both MI6 and GCHQ, the government’s electronic eavesdropping centre, were cutting resources devoted to Arab countries.

The criticism of MI6’s attitude is all the more significant given the agency’s traditional close ties with the Arab world.

The ISC, chaired by the former Conservative foreign secretary Sir Malcolm Rifkind, said it was understandable that the intelligence agencies were taken by surprise, “as indeed were the governments in the countries affected”.

However, it said there were questions about whether the agencies “should have been able to anticipate how events might subsequently unfold, and whether the fact that they did not realise that the unrest would spread so rapidly across the Arab world demonstrates a lack of understanding about the region”.

SAS troops escorted MI6 officers to Libya in a Chinook helicopter and dropped them off at a desert location south of Benghazi in the middle of the night in March 2011. The mission was an embarrassment to the British government and the anti-Gaddafi rebels alike. MI6 “misjudged the nature and level of risk involved”, the ISC said.

It noted that the lessons had been taken seriously by MI6, and added: “We would have expected nothing less.” The incident “demonstrates a lack of operational planning that we would not have expected from [MI6]and other participants”, it said.

Cuts being made in Whitehall’s defence intelligence staff mean greater risks would have to be taken “when reacting to the next crisis than was the case with the Libya campaign”, the ISC warned. It said GCHQ’s difficulties in retaining internet and cyber specialists attracted by higher salaries in the private sector was a matter of grave concern.

The report said Jonathan Evans, head of MI5, had told the ISC there had been “very considerable erosion of al-Qaida’s senior leadership capability in Pakistan, and to some extent now in Yemen, as a result of drone strikes”.

Al-Qaida had to spend a lot of its time trying to protect itself, Evans was quoted as saying. “It is much more difficult to take action if you are permanently in fear that you are going to be attacked. I think that has had a strategic impact on al-Qaida’s senior leadership.”

The ISC said British intelligence agencies were now concerned that al-Qaida in Iraq “may gain a lasting foothold in Syria if there is a prolonged power vacuum, and also at the prospect of Syrian conventional and chemical weapons stockpiles falling into the hands of terrorist groups”.

…

Find this story at 12 july 2012

Richard Norton-Taylor
guardian.co.uk, Thursday 12 July 2012 17.26 BST

© 2012 Guardian News and Media Limited or its affiliated companies. All rights reserved.

Defence lawyer files motion that ‘aiding the enemy’ charge is stricter against US soldiers than it would be against terrorists
The lawyer defending Bradley Manning against charges that he “aided the enemy” by disclosing state secrets to the whistleblower website WikiLeaks, is arguing that US soldiers are being treated more harshly in application of the law than terrorists.

David Coombs, the civilian lawyer who has been representing the soldier for the past two years after he was arrested in Iraq on suspicion of being the WikiLeaks source, will be pressing his case in a military court next week. In a motion that he has lodged with the court as part of the lead up to a full court martial, he warns that unless the “aiding the enemy” charge is clarified it would leave Manning in a more onerous legal position than terrorists facing exactly the same count.

“It defies all logic to think that a terrorist would fare better in an American court for aiding the enemy than a US soldier would,” Coombs writes in the motion.

Aiding the enemy is the most serious of the 22 counts that Manning is facing. In the rank of military charges, it is rated very close to treason and technically carries the death penalty, though the prosecution in this case have indicated that they will not push for that.

The charge alleges that between November 2009 and 27 May 2010, when Manning was arrested at a military base outside Baghdad, he “knowingly gave intelligence to the enemy through indirect means”. In court deliberations, it has been further clarified that the charge refers to the transmitting of “classified documents to the enemy through the WikiLeaks website”.

The US government has added in later legal debate that the “enemy” to which it is referring is al-Qaida and al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, as well as a terrorist group whose identity has not been made public.

The allegations relate to the passing of hundreds of thousands of US state secrets, including embassy cables from around the world and war logs from Iraq and Afghanistan, that caused a worldwide sensation when they were published by WikiLeaks via several international news organisations led by the Guardian.

Next week the soldier and his defence team will be back in military court in Fort Meade, Maryland, in the latest of a succession of pre-trial hearings to hammer out the terms of the eventual court martial. Previous engagements have led to sparky interactions between Coombs and the army prosecutors seeking to condemn Manning possibly to spending the rest of his life in military custody.

The most significant discussion at next week’s proceedings will revolve around the precise legal definition of what “aiding the enemy” means – specifically its allegation that Manning “knowingly gave intelligence to the enemy”. The judge presiding over Manning’s trial, Colonel Denise Lind, has ruled that the soldier must have had “actual knowlege” that he was giving intelligence to enemy for the charge to be proven.

Coombs will next week attempt to gain further clarification that would raise the legal bar much higher. In his motion he argues that it is a truism in the age of the internet, any posted material is potentially accessible to anybody.

To accuse Manning of having aided the enemy by transmitting intelligence to WikiLeaks that could then be accessed by al-Qaida would remove any sense of him “knowingly” doing so. He writes that this would “render the ‘actual knowledge’ element utterly toothless in all internet-intelligence
cases.”

Coombs highlights an apparent absurdity in the way the law is being applied. In cases where terrorist suspects are brought before military commissions, such as those at Guantanamo, and accused of the very same charge as Manning, the military prosecutors have to prove that the defendant “knowingly and intentionally” aided the enemy. Yet in the case of a US soldier, intentionality is not mentioned.

…

Find this story at 12 July 2012

Ed Pilkington in New York
guardian.co.uk, Thursday 12 July 2012 17.36 BST

© 2012 Guardian News and Media Limited or its affiliated companies. All rights reserved.

Die Ermittler gingen zunächst davon aus, dass die Zwickauer Terrorzelle im Herbst 1999 mit ihrer Serie von Raubüberfällen begann. Doch laut einem Untersuchungsbericht des sächsischen Innenministeriums steht nun fest: Bereits 1998 erbeuteten Uwe Böhnhardt und Uwe Mundlos 30.000 Mark.

Dresden – Die Überfallserie der Neonazi-Terroristen Uwe Böhnhardt und Uwe Mundlos hat noch im Jahr ihres Untertauchens 1998 begonnen. Das sächsische Innenministerium bestätigte in seinem am Mittwoch bekannt gewordenen Abschlussbericht an den Innenausschuss des Landtags erstmals, dass auch ein Raubüberfall am 18. Dezember 1998 auf einen Edeka-Markt in Chemnitz auf das Konto der Rechtsterroristen geht. Dies habe ein Spurenabgleich ergeben. Über die Vermutung, der Raub gehe auf das Konto von Böhnhardt und Mundlos, hatte der SPIEGEL bereits Ende April berichtet.

Zuvor waren die Ermittler davon ausgegangen, dass Böhnhardt und Mundlos erst im Oktober 1999 den ersten mehrerer Raubüberfälle begingen, um mit der Beute ihr Leben im Untergrund zu finanzieren. Nach Angaben von LKA-Präsident Jörg Michaelis betrug die Beute seinerzeit rund 30.000 D-Mark. Es seien zwei Schüsse abgefeuert worden, dem “Nationalsozialistischen Untergrund” (NSU) habe die Tat durch später gefundene Patronenhülsen zugeordnet werden können.

Böhnhardt und Mundlos sind inzwischen tot. Gemeinsam mit ihrer Komplizin Beate Zschäpe – alle stammen aus Jena – sollen sie die Terrorgruppe NSU gebildet haben, die für zehn Morde verantwortlich gemacht wird. Opfer waren neun Menschen mit ausländischen Wurzeln und eine Polizistin. Gut 13 Jahre lang konnten die Rechtsterroristen unerkannt in Deutschland leben – vor allem in Sachsen.

Sachsen sieht keine eigenen Versäumnisse bei NSU-Ermittlungen

Die Schuld dafür sieht der Freistaat aber nicht bei sich. Nach heutigem Wissen seien “keine Versäumnisse innerhalb des polizeilichen Handelns zu erkennen”, heißt es in dem Bericht des Innenministeriums. Dem Verfassungsschutz wird darin attestiert, dass er von den Thüringer Behörden “nur unvollständig informiert” wurde. Es sei “nicht ersichtlich”, dass er “erfolgversprechende Maßnahmen” unterlassen habe.

…

Find this story at 27. Juni 2012, 17:36 Uhr

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Der italienische Geheimdienst hat den deutschen Verfassungsschutz laut einem Zeitungsbericht schon 2003 auf ein Netzwerk rechter Terrorzellen hingewiesen. Demnach pflegten deutsche Nazis intensive Kontakte ins Ausland.

Hamburg – Das Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV) soll laut “Berliner Zeitung” bereits vor Jahren konkrete Hinweise auf ein Netz rechter Terrorzellen in Deutschland erhalten haben. Das gehe aus einem Schreiben des italienischen Staatsschutzes AISI an das BfV vom 14. Dezember 2011 hervor.

In dem Schreiben verweise der italienische Dienst auf eine Information, die dem Kölner Bundesamt am 21. März 2003 übermittelt worden sein soll. Darin sei es um ein Treffen europäischer Neonazis im belgischen Waasmunster im November 2002 gegangen, bei dem italienische Rechtsextremisten “bei vertraulichen Gesprächen von der Existenz eines Netzwerks militanter europäischer Neonazis erfahren” hätten.

Aus dem AISI-Schreiben geht dem Bericht zufolge auch hervor, dass deutsche Neonazis insbesondere aus Bayern und Thüringen seit Jahren enge Beziehungen nach Italien pflegen. So habe etwa Ralf Wohlleben, der als mutmaßlicher Unterstützer der Zwickauer Terrorzelle in U-Haft sitzt, mehrfach an Treffen mit Gruppen wie “Skinhead Tirol – Sektion Meran” und “Veneto Fronte Skinheads” in Italien teilgenommen und Geld übergeben “für die Unterstützung von Kameraden, die sich in Schwierigkeiten befinden”.

2008 hätten zudem Südtiroler Skinhead-Gruppen dem AISI-Bericht zufolge bei einem Treffen mit deutschen Neonazis aus Bayern und Franken “über die Möglichkeit der Durchführung fremdenfeindlicher ‘exemplarischer Aktionen’ diskutiert und eine detaillierte Kartenauswertung vorgenommen, um Geschäfte ausfindig zu machen, die von außereuropäischen Staatsangehörigen geführt werden”.

…

hut/Reuters
NSU-Affäre: Verfassungsschützer manipulierten Dateien (01.07.2012)
NSU-Akten: Im Reißwolf des Verfassungsschutzes (28.06.2012)
Kampf gegen Rechts: Bundestag beschließt zentrale Neonazi-Datei (28.06.2012)
Zwickauer Zelle: Bundesanwalt übernahm – Verfassungsschutz löschte Akten (28.06.2012)
Untersuchungsbericht: NSU-Terroristen überfielen schon 1998 Supermarkt (27.06.2012)
Rechtsextremismus: Verfassungsschützer hatten zwölf Spitzel beim “Thüringer Heimatschutz” (23.06.2012)

Find this story at 2 July 2012

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Die vom Verfassungsschutz geschredderten V-Mann-Akten waren brisanter als zugeben. Einer der Spitzel war in die Suche nach dem NSU-Trio eingebunden.

BERLIN taz | Manchmal können Verfassungsschützer richtig kreativ sein. Eine groß angelegte Geheimdienstaktion tauften sie nach einem der schönsten Wanderwege Deutschlands im Thüringer Wald, dem 170 Kilometer langen Rennsteig.

Noch kreativer waren die Geheimdienstler aber bei der Wahl der Namen ihrer bezahlten Spitzel, die sie im Rahmen jener „Operation Rennsteig“ in der rechtsextremen Szene anwarben. Die Vorgabe war offenbar, dass die Decknamen all dieser V-Leute mit einem T beginnen müssen. Und deshalb bekamen sie Namen wie diese: „VM Treppe“, „VM Tonfarbe“, „VM Tinte“ oder „VM Tobago“.

Doch Kreativität bei der Namensfindung ist nicht das, was man von Behörden zuallererst erwartet, sondern vielmehr das, womit das Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz in Köln selbst auf seiner Internetseite wirbt: „Mit Vertrauen, Sicherheit.“

Das Vertrauen in die Sicherheitsbehörde aber war nach einer in den vergangenen Tagen bekannt gewordenen Vernichtung brisanter Akten auf einen Tiefstand gesunken. Weshalb Verfassungsschutzchef Heinz Fromm am Montag keine andere Wahl blieb als zurückzutreten.
Verbindung zum abgetauchten Terror-Trio

Den Verdacht, dass ausgerechnet am Tag des Auffliegens des Nationalsozialistischen Untergrunds (NSU) in seinem Amt potenziell relevante Informationen zu der rechten Terrorzelle vernichtet wurden, konnte Fromm nicht entkräften.

Informationen der taz belegen vielmehr, dass mindestens in einem Fall Akten zu einem V-Mann vernichtet wurden, der in die Suche nach dem 1998 abgetauchten Trio Uwe Mundlos, Uwe Böhnhardt und Beate Zschäpe eingebunden war – denjenigen also, die zehn Morde auf dem Gewissen haben.

Ein Referatsleiter des Bundesamts für Verfassungsschutz hatte im November 2011 sieben Akten zur „Operation Rennsteig“ vernichten lassen. Deren Inhalt betraf eine am 17. Juli 1996 gestartete konzertierte Aktion des Bundesamts für Verfassungsschutz, des Thüringer Landesamts und des Bundeswehrgeheimdiensts MAD.

Ziel der bis 2003 andauernden Operation war es, V-Leute in der Anti-Antifa-Ostthüringen und deren braunen Nachfolgetruppe „Thüringer Heimatschutz“ anzuwerben – in jenem Kameradschaftszusammenschluss also, dem die späteren NSU-Terroristen bis zu ihrem Untertauchen angehörten.

Acht V-Leute konnte das Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz anwerben, allesamt bekamen sie einen Tarnnamen, der mit einem T beginnt. Wichtige Teile dieser Akten wurden, wie nun bekannt geworden ist, am 11. November 2011 geschreddert – ausgerechnet an dem Tag, an dem der Generalbundesanwalt öffentlich bekannt gab, dass er die Ermittlungen gegen die Terrorzelle übernommen hat.
Geknickt und aufklärungsbereit

Gegenüber Verfassungsschutzchef Fromm soll der zuständige Referatsleiter die Aktenvernichtung, die er mit angeblich abgelaufenen Aufbewahrungsfristen begründete, aber erst vergangenen Mittwoch eingeräumt haben – fast acht Monate später.

Fromm wusste um die Brisanz des Vorgangs, leitete ein Disziplinarverfahren gegen den Mitarbeiter ein und versetzte ihn intern. Nach außen hin versuchte er die Wogen zu glätten, gab sich geknickt und aufklärungsbereit. „Nach meinem derzeitigen Kenntnisstand handelt es sich um einen Vorgang, wie es ihn in meiner Amtszeit bisher nicht gegeben hat“, ließ er sich am Wochenende zitieren. „Hierdurch ist ein erheblicher Vertrauensverlust und eine gravierende Beschädigung des Ansehens des Amtes eingetreten.“

Gleichzeitig versuchte Fromm aber die Bedeutung des Vorfalls hinter den Kulissen herunterzuspielen. „Keiner dieser V-Leute hatte eine Führungsfunktion im ’Thüringer Heimatschutz‘, die Quellen waren ausschließlich Randpersonen oder Mitläufer“, schrieb er dem Staatssekretär im Bundesinnenministerium, Klaus-Dieter Fritsche. Zugänge zu den drei späteren NSU-Mitgliedern seien „nicht erlangt“ worden.

Man wolle nun versuchen, aus anderen Akten den Inhalt der geschredderten Dokumente nachzuvollziehen, hieß es. Gleichwohl musste Fromm aber in seinem Schreiben eingestehen: „Die vernichteten Akten können voraussichtlich nicht mehr in vollem Umfang rekonstruiert werden.“
Mehr Brisanz als zunächst angenommen

Zunächst schien es noch, als wolle Verfassungsschutzchef Fromm im Amt bleiben. Doch am Wochenende wurde die Kritik immer lauter. Von einem „unglaublichen Vorgang“ sprach die FDP, von einem „Skandal“ redeten SPD und Linke. Die CSU forderte indirekt Fromms Rücktritt, und Grünen-Chef Cem Özdemir sagte: „Der Fisch stinkt vom Kopf her.“ Die Affäre einfach auf den Referatsleiter abzuwälzen war nicht mehr möglich. Am Montag schmiss der bald 64-jährige Heinz Fromm, der nächstes Jahr ohnehin in den Ruhestand gehen sollte, vorzeitig hin.

Sein Rücktritt erfolgte womöglich auch, weil in der Affäre noch viel mehr Brisanz steckt. Nach Informationen der taz spielte mindestens einer der V-Leute, dessen Akten nun geschreddert wurden, entgegen den Behauptungen Fromms durchaus eine Rolle bei der Suche nach dem mordenden Neonazi-Trio Mundlos, Böhnhardt und Zschäpe: Es handelt sich um den V-Mann, den das Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz unter dem Namen „Tarif“ führte.

Wer sich hinter dem Decknamen verbirgt, ist unbekannt. Doch wie aus streng geheimen Verfassungsschutzakten hervorgeht, war V-Mann „Tarif“ im Jahr 1999 in die Suche nach der NSU-Truppe eingebunden. Damals war den Diensten das Gerücht zu Ohren gekommen, dass die drei Gesuchten bei einem Neonazi in Niedersachsen unterkommen könnten oder dass dieser Mann den dreien die Flucht ins Ausland ermöglichen könnte.

…

 Find this story at 2 July 2012

von Wolf Schmidt

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In pre-dawn darkness, a Toyota Land Cruiser skidded off a bridge in North Africa in the spring, plunging into the Niger River. When rescuers arrived, they found the bodies of three U.S. Army commandos — alongside three dead women.

What the men were doing in the impoverished country of Mali, and why they were still there a month after the United States suspended military relations with its government, is at the crux of a mystery that officials have not fully explained even 10 weeks later.

At the very least, the April 20 accident exposed a team of Special Operations forces that had been working for months in Mali, a Saharan country racked by civil war and a rising Islamist insurgency. More broadly, the crash has provided a rare glimpse of elite U.S. commando units in North Africa, where they have been secretly engaged in counterterrorism actions against al-Qaeda affiliates.

The Obama administration has not publicly acknowledged the existence of the missions, although it has spoken in general about plans to rely on Special Operations forces as a cornerstone of its global counterterrorism strategy. In recent years, the Pentagon has swelled the ranks and resources of the Special Operations Command, which includes such units as the Navy SEALs and the Army’s Delta Force, even as the overall number of U.S. troops is shrinking.

At the same time, the crash in Mali has revealed some details of the commandos’ clandestine activities that apparently had little to do with counterterrorism. The women killed in the wreck were identified as Moroccan prostitutes who had been riding with the soldiers, according to a senior Army official and a U.S. counterterrorism consultant briefed on the incident, both of whom spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the matter.

The Army’s Criminal Investigation Command, which is conducting a probe of the fatal plunge off the Martyrs Bridge in Bamako, the capital of Mali, said it does not suspect foul play but has “not completely ruled it out.” Other Army officials cited poor road conditions and excessive speed as the likely cause of the 5 a.m. crash.

U.S. officials have revealed few details about the soldiers’ mission or their backgrounds, beyond a brief news release announcing their deaths hours after the accident.

In many countries, including most in Africa, Special Operations forces work openly to distribute humanitarian aid and train local militaries. At times, the civil-affairs assignments can provide credible cover for clandestine counterterrorism units.

But in Mali, U.S. military personnel had ceased all training and civil-affairs work by the end of March, about a week after the country’s democratically elected president was overthrown in a military coup.

The military’s Africa Command, which oversees operations on the continent, said the three service members killed were among “a small number of personnel” who had been aiding the Malian military before the coup and had remained in the country to “provide assistance to the U.S. Embassy” and “maintain situational awareness on the unfolding events.”

Megan Larson-Kone, a public affairs officer for the U.S. Embassy in Mali, said the soldiers had stayed in Bamako because they were “winding down” civil-
affairs programs in the aftermath of the coup while holding out hope “that things would turn around quickly” so they could resume their work.

Two of the soldiers, Capt. Daniel H. Utley, 33, and Sgt. 1st Class Marciano E. Myrthil, 39, were members of the 91st Civil Affairs Battalion, 95th Civil Affairs Brigade, which is based at Fort Bragg, N.C.

For two months after the crash, the U.S. military withheld the identity of the third soldier killed. In response to inquiries from The Washington Post, the Army named him as Master Sgt. Trevor J. Bast, 39, a communications technician with the Intelligence and Security Command at Fort Belvoir.

The Intelligence and Security Command is a little-known and secretive branch of the Army that specializes in communications intercepts. Its personnel often work closely with the military’s Joint Special Operations Command, which oversees missions to capture or kill terrorism suspects overseas.

During his two decades of service, Bast revealed little about the nature of his work to his family. “He did not tell us a lot about his life, and we respected that for security purposes,” his mother, Thelma Bast of Gaylord, Mich., said in a brief interview. “We never asked questions, and that’s the honest truth.”

Haven for Islamist militants

U.S. counterterrorism officials have long worried about Mali, a weakly governed country of 14.5 million people that has served as a refuge for Islamist militants allied with al-Qaeda.

With only 6,000 poorly equipped troops, the Malian armed forces have always struggled to maintain control of their territory, about twice the size of Texas. Repeated famines and rebellions by Tuareg nomads only exacerbated the instability.

About six years ago, the Pentagon began bolstering its overt aid and training programs in Mali, as well as its clandestine operations.

Under a classified program code-named Creek Sand, dozens of U.S. personnel and contractors were deployed to West Africa to conduct surveillance missions over the country with single-
engine aircraft designed to look like civilian passenger planes.

In addition, the military flew spy flights over Mali and other countries in the region with longer-range P-3 Orion aircraft based in the Mediterranean, according to classified U.S. diplomatic cables obtained by the anti-secrecy group WikiLeaks.

In what would have represented a significant escalation of U.S. military involvement in Mali, the Pentagon also considered a secret plan in 2009 to embed American commandos with Malian ground troops, diplomatic cables show.

Under that program, code-named Oasis Enabler, U.S. military advisers would conduct anti-terrorism operations alongside elite, American-trained Malian units. But the idea was rejected by Gillian A. Milovanovic, the ambassador to Mali at the time.

In an October 2009 meeting in Bamako with Vice Adm. Robert T. Moeller, deputy chief of the Africa Command, the ambassador called the plan “extremely problematic,” adding that it could create a popular backlash and “risk infuriating” neighbors such as Algeria.

Furthermore, Milovanovic warned that the U.S. advisers “would likely serve as lightning rods, exposing themselves and the Malian contingents to specific risk,” according to a State Department cable summarizing the meeting.

Moeller replied that he “regretted” that the ambassador had not been kept better informed and said Oasis Enabler was “a work in progress.” It is unclear whether the plan was carried out.

Since then, however, security in Mali has deteriorated sharply. After the coup in March, extremist Muslim guerrillas in northern Mali declared an independent Islamist state. They have imposed sharia law and have begun enforcing strict social codes that include compulsory beards for men and a ban on television.

In the fabled desert city of Timbuktu, al-Qaeda sympathizers have destroyed ancient mausoleums and attacked other shrines as part of a religious cleansing campaign. Western aid workers have abandoned the northern half of the country after a string of kidnappings.

Thousands of Malians have fled to refugee camps in neighboring countries.

A fatal plunge

The three soldiers riding through Bamako in April had rented their 2010 Toyota Land Cruiser from a local agency, according to written statements provided to The Post by the Special Operations Command at Fort Bragg.

Bast was in the driver’s seat and was headed south across the Martyrs Bridge. Preliminary investigative results determined that he lost control of the Land Cruiser, which broke through the bridge’s guard rail and landed in the river below.

Also in the vehicle were three Moroccan women, according to the Army’s statement. Contributing factors in the accident, the Army said, were limited visibility and “a probable evasive maneuver on the part of the vehicle’s driver to avoid impacting with slower moving traffic.”

The soldiers died of “blunt force trauma” when the vehicle landed upside down in the shallow river, crushing the roof, the Army said.

The Special Operations Command said it could not answer questions about where the soldiers were going, nor why they were traveling with the unidentified Moroccan women, saying the matter is under investigation.

Larson-Kone, the embassy spokeswoman, said the soldiers were on “personal, not business-related travel” at the time, but she declined to provide details. Officials from the Africa Command also said that they did not know who the women were, but they added in a statement: “From what we know now, we have no reason to believe these women were engaged in acts of prostitution.”

Coincidentally, the incident occurred less than a week after President Obama’s visit to a summit in Cartagena, Colombia, where U.S. military personnel and Secret Service agents became embroiled in a scandal involving prostitutes.

Little details not adding up

At least two of the soldiers in Mali had been trained as communications or intelligence specialists.

Bast, the master sergeant, was a ham radio hobbyist who originally joined the Navy before switching to the Army several years ago. An Army spokesman described him as a “communications expert” and said he was posthumously given the Meritorious Service Medal but declined to say why.

Myrthil was a native of Haiti who joined the Army two decades ago. Military officials released virtually no details about his service record.

Utley, the captain, was a Kentucky native who joined the Army in 2002 to work as a signals and communications officer but later transferred to the Special Forces.

Friends said he had expected to deploy to Afghanistan last summer but received last-minute orders to go to Africa instead. His Mali assignment was scheduled to end this spring but was extended, they said.

Three weeks after the coup, on April 11, Utley sent a brief e-mail to a friend from college, Chris Atzinger, to report that he was all right and that he would write more later.

…

Find this story at 9 July 2012

By Craig Whitlock, Monday, July 9, 3:04 AM

Dana Priest and Julie Tate contributed to this report.

© The Washington Post Company

A German intelligence agent was suspected of being involved in one of the immigrant murders attributed to the neo-Nazi terrorist group, a newspaper has claimed. All attempts to figure out his story have failed.

File shredding scandal leads to security reform – National (4 Jul 12)
Intelligence chief resigns over mistakes – National (2 Jul 12)
Intel ‘destroyed as Nazi terror group exposed’ – National (28 Jun 12)

The agent, named only as Andreas T., was in the internet cafe when the last victim of the National Socialist Underground (NSU) was shot – yet investigators have been unable to work out if he was involved.

Weekly paper Die Zeit says police suspected at the time he was involved in the murder of Halit Yozgat, a Kassel internet café worker, on April 6, 2006, but that the investigation was obstructed by the Hesse Office for the Protection of the Constitution – the state’s intelligence agency.

Andreas T. was in the café at the time of the murder and police later found three guns, shotgun shells, and a copy of Adolf Hitler’s Mein Kampf in his various homes.

Die Zeit reports that one Hesse investigator believed at the time that “a Hessian intelligence agent could have shot the young Yozgat.” Andreas T. was subsequently “intensively interrogated” and was “constantly caught contradicting himself.”

It was previously known that Andreas T. was in the internet café at the time of the murder. He claimed that Yozgat was shot behind his counter while he was in the back room, and that had he left the café without noticing anything untoward.

Investigators were reportedly puzzled by how Andreas T., who is over 6 feet 2 inches tall, could have overlooked the body and the blood on the counter.

Die Zeit also said that on the day of the killing Andreas T. held several phone calls with a far-right informant who had contact with the NSU’s network of sympathizers and helpers.

Andreas T.’s employer, the Hesse state intelligence agency, also reportedly obstructed the police investigation by failing to provide any information. He now works at the headquarters of the state government in Kassel, the paper said.

The latest revelations come after German Interior Minister Hans-Peter Friedrich promised a wholesale reform of Germany’s security services following the botched investigations into the NSU murders.

These led on Monday to the resignation of Heinz Fromm, president of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV), after 12 years in charge.

The Die Zeit article was written by Stefan Aust, former editor-in-chief of Der Spiegel, best known for “The Baader Meinhof Complex,” his history of the left-wing terrorist organization the RAF.

Find this story at 5 July 2012

The Local/bk

Published: 5 Jul 12 10:44 CET
Updated: 5 Jul 12 12:20 CET
Online: http://www.thelocal.de/national/20120705-43575.html

WASHINGTON — Spurred by complaints from women working for the CIA in war zones, the spy service is stepping up efforts to enforce what it calls a zero-tolerance policy on sexual harassment by supervisors and co-workers.

David Petraeus, the CIA director, sent a message to agency staff members last month to emphasize the initiative. He ordered a team of managers to meet with senior officers at stations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and possibly in Yemen, Somalia and other countries where the CIA has launched drone missile strikes against militants.

Petraeus also appointed a “counselor and investigator” to field sexual harassment complaints at those posts, CIA spokesman Preston Golson said.

The effort follows surveys of CIA officers in war zones in 2009 and 2011 by the agency’s office of medical services. The surveys, which sought “to capture perceptions” on a wide range of workplace issues, showed no improvement in alleged sexual harassment, Golson said in an email.

Numerous women, who were not identified in the surveys, reported having been harassed, often by supervisors, said two former CIA officials, who requested that they not be identified in discussing an internal matter. They did not know the numbers, and the CIA declined to provide them.

“This has been going on for years, but it seems to have become more serious,” one of the former officials said. “The agency has not come up with an effective tool to stop it.”

The majority of alleged incidents in the surveys “consisted of remarks or jokes of a sexual nature,” Golson said. “Survey results suggested that harassment of a more physical nature may also have occurred, but was not reported.”

Some CIA officials have been punished for sexual harassment in recent years, Golson said. He declined to disclose information about those cases, citing CIA policy of keeping personnel data secret.

A few have come to light, however. In 2010, for example, a senior manager in the National Clandestine Service, which conducts CIA operations, was forced to retire after he had an affair with a female subordinate and her husband complained toLeon E. Panetta, then the CIA director, the two former officials said.

Stories of sexual improprieties are infamous at some CIA stations, especially in high-stress areas. It is a civilian agency, and employees in war zones tend to work long hours, live in close quarters and let off steam by drinking alcohol after work.

Partly as a result of that, former CIA officers said, what would be considered workplace sexual impropriety at corporations and other government agencies has been tolerated at the CIA, and trysts between supervisors and employees are not unusual.

Ilana Sara Greenstein, who served as a CIA case officer in Iraq in 2004-05, said a senior manager who was responsible for her promotions “hit on me” when she worked at CIA headquarters.

“He was married, quite aggressive and wouldn’t take no for an answer,” Greenstein said. “I said no, and it put me in a really awkward position.”

Greenstein, who quit the CIA and is now a lawyer, didn’t file a complaint at the time “because you know that’s the end of your career,” she said. “It sounds cliche, but it’s an old boys’ network, and that kind of comes with the territory.”

…

Find this story at 4 July 2012

By Ken Dilanian, Los Angeles Times

3:04 PM PDT, July 4, 2012Advertisement

ken.dilanian@latimes.com

Times staff writer Brian Bennett contributed to this report.

Copyright © 2012, Los Angeles Times

Einem Medienbericht zufolge hat der italienische Geheimdienst den Bundesverfassungsschutz bereits 2003 auf ein Netz rechtsextremer Terrorzellen hingewiesen. Wegen der Vernichtung von Akten im Zusammenhang mit der „NSU“-Mordserie steht Verfassungsschutz-Präsident Fromm weiter in der Kritik.

Erklärungsbedarf: Der Präsident des Bundesamtes für Verfassungsschutz, Heinz Fromm (r.), und Thüringens Verfassungsschutzpräsident Thomas Sippel

Der Bundesverfassungsschutz hat einem Medienbericht zufolge offenbar im März 2003 Hinweise auf ein Netz rechtsextremer Terrorzellen in Deutschland erhalten. Die „Berliner Zeitung“ berichtete am Montag über ein Schreiben des italienischen Inlandsgeheimdienstes AISI an den Verfassungsschutz vom Dezember 2011, in dem auf ein Schreiben von März 2003 verwiesen werde.

Darin sei über ein Treffen europäischer Neonazis berichtet worden, auf dem italienische Rechtsextremisten „bei vertraulichen Gesprächen von der Existenz eines Netzwerks militanter europäischer Neonazis erfahren“ hätten. Dieses Netzwerk bilde eine „halb im Untergrund befindliche autonome Basis“ und sei in der Lage, „mittels spontan gebildeter Zellen kriminellen Aktivitäten nachzugehen“, zitierte die Zeitung aus dem Schreiben. In einem vertraulichen Zusammenhang seien in diesem Zusammenhang die Namen mehrerer ranghoher deutscher Rechtsextremisten genannt worden.

Aus dem Schreiben geht der „Berliner Zeitung“ zufolge außerdem hervor, dass deutsche Neonazis insbesondere aus Bayern und Thüringen seit Jahren enge Beziehungen nach Italien pflegen. Der rechtsextremen Zelle „Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund“ (NSU) werden in Deutschland neun Morde an Migranten sowie an einer Polizistin vorgeworfen.
Fromm weiter in der Kritik

Wegen der Aktenvernichtung im Zusammenhang mit der Mordserie durch die NSU haben Politiker nicht nur der Opposition unterdessen weitere Aufklärung sowie teils Konsequenzen an der Spitze des Verfassungsschutzes gefordert. Bundestagsvizepräsidentin Pau, für die Linkspartei Mitglied im NSU-Untersuchungsausschuss, äußerte am Sonntag in einer Mitteilung die Fragen: „Galt die Aktenschredderei im Verfassungsschutz als das kleinere Übel? Wenn ja, was wäre dann das größere?“ Dies sei offenbar der Inhalt der Akten gewesen.

Frau Pau sagte: „Möglicherweise waren Verfassungsschützer näher und länger am NSU-Mord-Trio dran, als bislang eingestanden wird. Das wäre ein Skandal sondergleichen.“ Auch der Parteivorsitzende der Grünen Cem Özdemir sagte: „Da kommen viele Fragezeichen auf, die dringend aufgearbeitet werden müssen.“ Özdemir befand, es reiche nicht aus, nur Beamte zu versetzen. „Der Fisch stinkt vom Kopf her.“

Der Zwickauer Neonazi-Zelle werden zehn Morde in ganz Deutschland angelastet

Der CDU-Innenpolitiker Clemens Binninger verlangte eine Offenlegung der Klarnamen von V-Leuten des Verfassungsschutzes. „Neben einer Rekonstruktion der Inhalte über andere Akten und einer Befragung von Zeugen muss der Untersuchungsausschuss in geeigneter Form Einblick in die Klarnamendatei der V-Leute ermöglicht werden“, erklärte der Unions-Obmann im NSU-Untersuchungsausschuss des Bundestages: „Wir müssen unbedingt eine Vorstellung bekommen, wer die V-Leute tatsächlich waren, die in den Akten beschrieben wurden.“

Der CSU-Innenpolitiker Stephan Mayer griff direkt den Präsidenten des Bundesamts für Verfassungsschutz, Heinz Fromm, an. Er sagte in der „Bild“-Zeitung: „Die Affäre wirft die Frage auf, ob Fromm den Verfassungsschutz noch im Griff hat. Das muss Konsequenzen haben.“ Der FDP-Obmann im NSU-Untersuchungsausschuss des Bundestags, Hartfrid Wolff, nannte den Vorgang im Südwestrundfunk (SWR) „sehr, sehr gravierend“.
Fromme: „Erheblicher Vertrauensverlust“

Fromm sagte der Zeitschrift „Der Spiegel“: „Nach meinem derzeitigen Erkenntnisstand handelt es sich um einen Vorgang, wie es ihn in meiner Amtszeit bisher nicht gegeben hat. Hierdurch ist ein erheblicher Vertrauensverlust und eine gravierende Beschädigung des Ansehens des Amtes eingetreten.“

…

Find this story at 01 July 2012  

Quelle: FAZ.NET mit AFP/dpa/löw.

© Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung GmbH 2012
Alle Rechte vorbehalten.

Der Thüringer Verfassungsschutz gerät immer stärker in die Kritik. Das Landesamt für Verfassungsschutz räumte nun ein, eine Geldzahlung an die Zwickauer Terroristen eingeleitet zu haben. Wie die Behörde unter Berufung auf einen ehemaligen Mitarbeiter mitteilte, habe ein V-Mann in den Jahren 1998 oder 1999 dem Trio über einen Mittelsmann 2000 D-Mark übergeben sollen, um Erkenntnisse über deren Tarnidentitäten zu erlangen.

Ziel sei es gewesen, die untergetauchten Jenaer Neonazis Uwe Böhnhardt, Uwe Mundlos und Beate Zschäpe verhaften zu können. Das Vorhaben sei jedoch gescheitert, weil der Mittelsmann das Geld selbst eingesteckt habe.

Geld für neue Pässe

Damit bestätigt sich ein Bericht der “Bild am Sonntag”, wonach ein Mitarbeiter des Verfassungsschutzes diese Information am 6. Dezember 2011 vor der geheim tagenden Kontrollkommission des Thüringer Landtages berichtet habe. Nach Aussagen dieses Verfassungsschützers wusste seine Behörde demnach aus abgehörten Telefonaten, dass die Neonazi-Gruppe damals dringend Geld für neue Pässe brauchte, berichtete das Blatt weiter.

Daher habe der Verfassungsschutz dem V-Mann “Otto” das Geld übergeben, es handelte sich demnach um den damaligen NPD-Funktionär Tino Brandt.

Die Neonazis besorgten sich daraufhin laut “BamS” tatsächlich neue Pässe. Da der Thüringer Verfassungsschutz aber die Meldeämter in Sachsen nicht eingeweiht gehabt hätte, flogen Zschäpe, Mundlos und Böhnhardt nicht auf.
Verfassungsschutz kaufte angeblich Hetzspiel

Der Thüringer Verfassungsschutz finanzierte dem Bericht zufolge das Neonazi-Trio indirekt auch durch den Ankauf des antisemitischen Brettspiels “Pogromly” für jeweils 100 Mark. Mindestens drei Exemplare des Hetz-Spiels, dessen Verkaufserlös an die Nazi-Zelle floss, wurde dem Zeitungsbericht zufolge an Mitarbeiter des Verfassungsschutzes verkauft.

Die Grünen reagierten schockiert auf die Erkenntnisse. Dies sei ein “Skandal erschreckenden Ausmaßes”, sagte Grünen-Chefin Claudia Roth. “Aufgabe des Verfassungsschutzes ist es, die Demokratie gegen Rechtsterrorismus und Rechtsextremismus wirkungsvoll zu schützen und bestimmt nicht, diesen auch noch finanziell zu fördern.”
Verfassungsschutz kannte Aufenthaltsort angeblich

Laut “Focus”-Informationen war den Verfassungsschützern zumindest Mitte 2000 das Versteck der Neonazis in Chemnitz bekannt. Das belege ein Observationsfoto des Trios vom 15. Mai 2000, das in die Akten des Thüringer Landeskriminalamtes gelangte und ursprünglich von den Thüringer Verfassungsschützern stammen soll.

Im Herbst wurden DVDs verschickt, in denen sich der “Nationalsozialistische Untergrund” (NSU) zu Morden und Anschlägen bekennt.
Die Staatsanwaltschaft Erfurt führt derzeit nach eigenen Angaben Ermittlungsverfahren wegen des Verdachts der Strafvereitelung im Amt “gegen mehrere Personen”. Doch könnten die Vorwürfe verjährt sein.
CDU prüft Ausschluss von umstrittenen Anwalt

Unterdessen gerät in Baden-Württemberg ein CDU-Mitglied zunehmend unter Druck. Klaus Harsch von der Anwaltskanzlei Harsch & Kollegen wurde schon seit Jahren immer wieder vorgeworfen, keine klare Abgrenzung zu Rechtsradikalen vorzunehmen. In der Kanzlei von Harsch arbeitet auch Nicole Schneiders, die aus Thüringen kommt, Mitglied der NPD war und nun den mutmaßlichen NSU-Unterstützer Ralf Wohlleben verteidigt. Die Anwälte aus der Kanzlei verteidigten bereits zahlreiche Neonazis vor Gericht. Zudem arbeitet der Sänger der mittlerweile aufgelösten Rechtsrock-Band “Noie Werte”, der auch Anwalt ist, mit einem Kollegen aus der Kanzlei Harsch zusammen. Auf den rekonstruierten Bekennervideos des NSU wurde Musik von der Band aus Baden-Württemberg benutzt.

Nach SWR-Angaben prüft die CDU nun ein Ausschlussverfahren gegen Harsch. Es gehe dabei um mögliche Verbindungen in die rechtsextreme Szene, hieß es aus der Partei. Allerdings brauche die Partei handfeste Beweise, dass es bei Harsch rechtsextreme Tendenzen gebe. Presseberichten zufolge soll sich Harsch inzwischen von Kollegen mit rechtsextremer Vergangenheit distanziert haben. Demzufolge soll er eine Bürogemeinschaft mit ihnen in Stuttgart gekündigt haben.

Find this story at 18 december 2011

Geheimdienstexperte Rolf Gössner findet den Verfassungsschutz „demokratieunverträglich“. Stattdessen sollten offen arbeitende Stellen die Neonaziszene durchleuchten.

taz: Herr Gössner, was ging Ihnen durch den Kopf, als Sie erfahren haben, dass der Bundesverfassungsschutz wichtige Akten geschreddert hat?

Rolf Gössner: Ich habe erwartet, dass wir es bei der Aufarbeitung rund um die Taten der NSU-Zelle auch mit Beweismittelunterdrückung zu tun haben würden. Andererseits hat es mich jetzt doch schockiert, dass ein geheimes Sicherheitsorgan in einem Fall von zehnfachem Mord Akten vernichtet. Es geht dabei schließlich um V-Leute und verdeckte Operationen im Umfeld des Thüringer Heimatschutzes, jener Neonazi-Truppe, aus der der NSU entstanden ist.

Der schreddernde Beamte argumentierte offenbar mit Datenschutz. Die Löschungsfrist sei bei den betreffenden Akten überschritten gewesen.

Das halte ich für sehr unglaubwürdig. Auch wenn tatsächlich die Löschungsfristen nicht eingehalten worden sind: Wenn die Akten noch existieren zu einem Zeitpunkt, in dem die Bundesanwaltschaft die Ermittlungen übernimmt, ist eine Vernichtung ungeheuerlich und meines Erachtens auch illegal.

Wurde hier versucht, etwas zu vertuschen?

Der Zeitpunkt deutet darauf hin. Ich kenne die Akten nicht, aber was man daraus weiß, ist so wichtig und gravierend, weil es einen unmittelbaren Bezug zu den mutmaßlichen Tätern des NSU hat.

ROLF GÖSSNER

64, Vizepräsident der Internationalen Liga für Menschenrechte. Von 1970 bis 2008 wurde er selbst vom Bundesverfassungsschutz beobachtet – rechtswidrig.
Foto: Heide Schneider-Sonnemann

Ein Referatsleiter soll die Aktenvernichtung eigenmächtig angeordnet haben. Halten Sie das für möglich?

Fachlich und politisch verantwortlich sind der Verfassungsschutzpräsident Heinz Fromm und letztlich auch der Bundesinnenminister Hans-Peter Friedrich (CSU). Von Fromms Auftritt vor dem Untersuchungsausschuss kommende Woche erwarte ich mir aber nicht viel. Eine lückenlose Aufklärung wäre von einem Verfassungsschutzpräsidenten auch zu viel verlangt. Da etwa der Schutz von V-Leuten auch von Fromm selbst als so überragend eingeschätzt wird, ist eine rücksichtslose Aufklärung gar nicht möglich.

Sollte Fromm zurücktreten?

Ich halte hier nicht viel von personellen Konsequenzen, denn das Geheimdienstsystem würde uns erhalten bleiben. Der Skandal ist systembedingt, an den Strukturen muss angesetzt werden. Denn die Geheimdienststrukturen führen zwangsläufig zu amtlichen Verdunkelungsstrategien. Der Inlandsgeheimdienst mit dem euphemistischen Tarnnamen Verfassungsschutz ist demokratieunverträglich, weil er den demokratischen Prinzipien der Transparenz und Kontrollierbarkeit widerspricht. Und mit seinen kriminellen V-Leute-System ist er Teil des Nazi-Problems geworden.

In der Politik ist die Empörung jetzt groß. Meinen Sie, dass das Ihrer Forderung nach Abschaffung des Verfassungsschutzes Rückenwind gibt?

…

Find this story at 29 June 2012

Interview: Sebastian Erb

29.06.20128 Kommentare

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38 jaar getapt door de Duitse inlichtingendienst

Nut en noodzaak van inlichtingendiensten wordt alleen zichtbaar als feiten over het werk van die diensten aan het licht komen. Succes verhalen over operaties worden beschreven door loyale onderzoekers en ‘deskundigen.’ Rob de Wijk stelde het boek ‘Doelwit Europa’ samen om te laten zien hoeveel aanslagen voorkomen waren door veiligheidsdiensten. Bij die succesverhalen zijn kanttekeningen te zetten. Er is bijvoorbeeld de voorkennis over aanslagen van de inlichtingendiensten waar niets is mee gedaan. De gevolgen van dat inadequate optreden is duidelijk geworden op 11 maart 2004 in Madrid en de 5 juli 2005 in London. Ook de betrokkenheid van informanten en infiltranten van inlichtingendiensten bij ernstige strafbare feiten roept vragen op over nut en noodzaak.
Rolf Gössner schreef over die strafbare feiten van informanten het boek “Geheime Informanten, V-Leute des Verfassungsschützes: Kriminelle im Dienst des Staates.” Het boek beschrijft de infiltratie van de Duitse extreem rechtse partij de NPD (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands) door de Duitse geheime dienst in het begin van de eenentwintigste eeuw. De Duitse regering overwoog de partij te verbieden, maar als de verhalen over de infiltratie van de partij opduiken is het mis. De verspreiding en vermenigvuldiging van fascistisch propaganda materiaal door betaalde informanten van de dienst is de eerste smet. Vervolgens volgen getuigenissen over mishandelingen en pogingen tot doodslag. Het verbod van de NPD is van de baan. Even is de betrokkenheid van NPD informanten bij strafbare feiten een groot schandaal. Gössner documenteert de feiten in “Geheime Informanten.” De consequenties voor de Verfassungsschütz zijn echter minimaal.
Voor Gössner zelf is het echter niet afgelopen. De inlichtingendienst zal hem tot 18 november 2008 in de gaten blijven houden. Op die dag heeft de staat de vice-president van de internationale liga voor de rechten van de mens, publicist en advocaat ruim 38 jaar in de gaten gehouden. Het Bundesamt für Verfassungsschütz deelt de rechtbank dan mee dat zij de observatie van Gössner stopzetten, “ … daß die Beobachtung des Klägers – nach aktuell erfolgter Prüfung durch das Bundesministerium des Innern und das Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz – eingestellt worden ist.” De dienst is net op tijd omdat op 20 november 2009 de rechtzaak van Gössner tegen de staat begint. Een zaak die de dienst naar alle waarschijnlijkheid verloren had, gezien recente uitspraken over de observatie van fractievoorzitter van de politieke partij Die Linke, Bodo Ramelow.

Gössner had een rechtzaak tegen de staat aangespannen met betrekking tot die observatie en de mogelijke vernietiging van de verzamelde gegevens over hem door de inlichtingendienst. Deze procedure loopt al sinds februari 2006. De geheime dienst merkt op dat zij de gegevens die over Gössner verzameld zijn in afwachting van een gerechtelijke uitspraak bewaren. “Die hier zum Kläger erfaßten Daten werden ab sofort gesperrt. Von der Löschung der Daten wird – trotz ihrer Löschungsreife – insbesondere wegen der anhängigen Auskunftsklageverfahren bis zum rechtskräftigen Abschluß der Verfahren abgesehen.”

Rolf Gössner werd in de gaten gehouden omdat hij contacten had met mensen en organisaties die door het Bundesamt für Verfassungsschütz worden bestempeld als links extremistisch of beïnvloed door het links extremisme. De observatie vindt plaats op grond van het feit dat hij zou samenwerken met deze groepen. “Zusammenarbeit mit linksextremistischen bzw. linksextremistisch beeinflussten Personenzusammenschlüssen,” wordt hem eind jaren negentig door de inlichtingendienst meegedeeld. Onder de groepen, bevindt zich ook de Vereinigung der Verfolgten des Naziregimes“ (VVN), de vereniging van slachtoffers van het nazi regime. De inlichtingendienst beschuldigt Rolf Gössner zelf niet van staatsgevaarlijke activiteiten. Hij wordt “nicht vorgeworfen, selbst verfassungsfeindliche Ziele zu verfolgen oder sich entsprechend geäußert zu haben.” Hij is slachtoffer geworden van de stelselmatige observatie door de inlichtingendienst omdat hij de ‘verkeerde’ contacten zou hebben als publicist en advocaat, zegt hij in de media. “Eine Art Kontaktschuld ist mir zur Last gelegt, nicht etwa eigene verfassungswidrige Beiträge oder Bestrebungen,” vertelt Gössner aan de Stuttgarter Zeitung.

In1996 deed het tijdschrift ‘Geheim” een inzage verzoek bij de Verfassungsschütz. Uit de stukken die naar aanleiding van dat verzoek werden geopenbaard werd duidelijk dat het blad al sinds 1970 in de gaten werd gehouden. De inlichtingendienst bestempelde het blad als links extremistisch. Gössner schreef regelmatig voor het blad en kwam ook in de stukken voor. Daarnaast heeft hij in de 38 jaar dat hij is geobserveerd, gewerkt als advocaat voor verschillende instellingen en individuen. Ook was hij actief als burgerrechten en mensenrechten activist. In de jaren negentig werkte hij als een adviseur voor de politieke partij de Grünen in Hannover. De inlichtingendienst heeft al die contacten van Gössner geobserveerd en afgeluisterd.

Een bron binnen het Bundesamt für Verfassungsschütz vertelde het tijdschrift Stern dat het aantal artikelen, recensies van Gössners boeken, voordrachten, interviews en andere informatie die over Gössner verzameld zijn niet meer te overzien is. Onder de documenten bevinden zich interviews van de advocaat in de Weserkurier en de Frankfurter Rundschau. De Bundesdatenschutzbeauftragten, het Duitse College Bescherming Persoonsgegevens, vond het niet te bevatten wat er over Gössner verzameld was. De Bundesdatenschutzbeauftragten mochten de documenten echter niet inzien. Zij werden door ambtenaren van de inlichtingendienst voorgelezen omdat volgens de dienst bronnen moeten worden beschermd.

Geheime bronnen doet vermoeden dat er informanten tegen Gössner zijn ingezet ook bijvoorbeeld in zijn tijd dat hij voor de Grünen werkte. De inlichtingendienst beweert echter dat er geen agenten zijn ingezet om specifiek de mensenrechtenactivist te observeren, maar Gössner kan dat zelf niet controleren. Hij heeft in eerste instantie een deel, ongeveer 500 pagina’s, van zijn persoonsdossier gekregen. Grote delen zijn zwart gemaakt. Zijn dossier over alleen de periode 2000 tot 2008 telt ruim 2000 pagina’s. Uit de gekregen stukken kan Gössner opmaken dat een deel van de zwart gemaakte teksten commentaren van de inlichtingendienst zijn op de lezingen en teksten van de publicist.
Over de geheimhouding verklaart de dienst dat deze in het belang is van informanten, ter bescherming van de bronnen van de dienst. Gössner moet de dienst op het woord geloven dat er geen informanten tegen hem persoonlijk zijn ingezet, maar dat is onmogelijk nadat je 38 jaar bent afgeluisterd door diezelfde dienst. Hij gaat er vanuit dat de dienst al zijn gesprekken met de klanten van zijn advocatenpraktijk en zijn mensenrechten werk heeft afgeluisterd.
De rechtbank heeft de dienst opgedragen het dossier van Gössner van 1970 tot 2000 en de niet vrijgegeven stukken van 2000 tot 2008 ter inzage aan de rechtbank over te dragen. Deze gaat dan beoordelen wat geheim mag blijven en wat niet.

Het niet vrijgeven van bepaalde documenten valt onder een verordening van de minister van Binnenlandse Zaken. Gössner vecht echter ook deze akte van geheimhouding aan. In een vraaggesprek met het blad de Neue Kriminalpolitik draait de advocaat de bescherming van de informanten van de overheid om. Als werknemers of betrokkenen uit de gelederen van de politie of de inlichtingendienst zich bij Gössner melden om misstanden openbaar te maken of te bespreken wordt de geheimhouding van die gesprekken geschonden. In zijn boek “Geheime Informanten” komen verhalen over zulke misstanden voor. Als de inlichtingendienst de advocaat/publicist in de gaten hield dan liepen de klokkenluiders gevaar. Door zich op haar bronbescherming te beroepen, maar tegelijkertijd de geheimhouding van de advocaat te schenden, erkent de inlichtingendienst dat het haar slechts om het eigen lijfbehoud gaat. Niet het behoud van de rechtstaat, maar dat van de dienst is haar doel. “Meine bereits über 30 Jahre währende Langzeitüberwachung kann gravierende Folgen in allen drei Berufen zeitigen. In meinem publizistischen Tätigkeitsbereich müssen Informanten etwa aus dem Polizei- oder Geheimdienst-Apparat, die sich wegen Mißständen an mich wenden, damit rechnen, daß ihr Kontakt zu mir überwacht wird. Insofern ist der eigentlich gesetzlich garantierte Informantenschutz nicht mehr gewährleistet. Genau so wenig wie das Mandatsgeheimnis bei meiner Tätigkeit als Rechtsanwalt. Kein Mandant kann mehr sicher sein, daß das, was er mir vertraulich mitteilt, tatsächlich auch vertraulich bleibt – es sei denn, die Unterredung erfolgt in Wald und Flur. Wenn ich meiner Tätigkeit als parlamentarischer Berater nachgehe, dann ist der Schutz jener gewählten Abgeordneten vor geheimdienstlicher Ausforschung nicht mehr gewährleistet, die ich persönlich berate. Ein wirklich unhaltbarer Zustand.”

Gössner was kritisch over het veiligheidsapparaat en over het werk van inlichtingendiensten. Het boek ‘Geheime Informanten’ is daarvan een voorbeeld. Dit kan een motief van de inlichtingendienst zijn geweest om hem veertig jaar in de gaten te houden ondanks protesten van vooraanstaande journalisten, schrijvers, juristen, maar ook de Duitse Bundestag (parlement) en de Duitse regering. Zelfs een regering van SPD en de Grünen weerhield de inlichtingendienst er niet van om Gössner te observeren.

Critici hun leven lang in de gaten houden is iets dat alleen de Stasi deed, lijkt de algemene stelling. De archieven van de Stasi zijn daar het levende bewijs van. De observatie van de mensenrechten activist door de Duitse inlichtingendienst en de duizenden pagina’s die over zijn leven zijn verzameld maken duidelijk dat dit niet alleen in het Oost Duitsland van Erich Honecker gebeurde.

Find this story at 1 June 2012

Rolf Gössner kritisiert in »Geheime Informanten« Symbiose zwischen Neonazis und Verfassungsschutz

Nicht erst seit den Enthüllungen über das Zusammenspiel der bundesdeutschen Inlandsgeheimdienste mit dem militanten Neonazinetzwerk, welches sich rund um die Terroristen des »Nationalsozialistischen Untergrundes« (NSU) gruppiert hat, wurde deutlich, welche Gefahr von den Schlapphutbehörden tatsächlich ausgeht. Schließlich sind die fälschlicherweise als »Verfassungsschutz« bezeichneten Dienste weder durch die kritische Öffentlichkeit noch durch geheim tagende parlamentarische Kontrollgremien kontrollierbar.

Einer, der bereits seit Jahrzehnten vor dem gefährlichen Treiben der Inlandsgeheimdienste warnt, ist der Rechtsanwalt und Publizist Dr. Rolf Gössner, der zugleich Vizepräsident der Internationalen Liga für Menschenrechte und stellvertretender Richter am Staatsgerichtshof in Bremen ist. Im Gegensatz zu manchen selbsternannten Geheimdienstexperten weiß Gössner sehr genau, wovon er spricht. Schließlich wurde der Bürgerrechtler selbst satte 38 Jahre überwacht und bespitzelt. Nun hat Gössner sein bereits 2003 erschienenes Buch »Geheime Informanten« aktualisiert und als E-Book zum Herunterladen im Internet neu aufgelegt. Der Band dokumentiert die langjährige Symbiose zwischen Verfassungsfeinden und »Verfassungsschützern« und legt ein brisantes Dossier der kriminellen Karrieren zahlreicher V-Männer vor. Über sein unkontrollierbares Netz bezahlter und krimineller V-Leute hat sich der Verfassungsschutz Gössner zufolge fast zwangsläufig in kriminelle Machenschaften verstrickt, wobei Straftaten geduldet bzw. indirekt gefördert wurden. Brandstiftung, Totschlag, Mordaufrufe und Waffenhandel, das sind nur einige der kriminellen Machenschaften, denen sich V-Leute in der Vergangenheit schuldig gemacht haben, so der Rechtsanwalt.

»Das vielleicht Erschreckendste, was ich bei den Recherchen zu meinem Buch erfahren mußte, ist, daß der ›Verfassungsschutz‹ seine kriminell gewordenen V-Leute oft genug deckt, systematisch gegen polizeiliche Ermittlungen abschirmt, um sie weiter abschöpfen zu können – anstatt sie unverzüglich abzuschalten«, konstatiert Gössner.

Seine Kritik an den staatlichen Spitzelbehörden äußert der engagierte Bürgerrechtler indes nicht nur auf theoretischer Ebene. Vielmehr untermalt er diese durch Enthüllungen über das kriminelle Treiben mancher V-Leute. Ebenso rechnet der Rechtsanwalt mit der Extremismusdoktrin ab, mittels derer Antifaschisten mit Neonazis gleichgesetzt werden.

Gössners Buch ist indes auch als Mahnung vor einem weiteren Abbau von Grund- und Freiheitsrechten zu verstehen. »Es besteht die Gefahr, daß der Rechtsruck, den wir in Deutschland nicht erst seit gestern zu verzeichnen haben, auf staatlicher Ebene mit weiteren autoritären ›Lösungen‹ verstärkt und gefestigt wird«, warnt er.

Trotz der offenkundigen Verstrickung der Geheimdienste in die militante Naziszene kommt es in der Bundesrepublik erstaunlicher Weise zu keiner dauerhaften und breiten gesellschaftlichen Debatte. Gössner hingegen nimmt deutlich Stellung und votiert für eine Abschaffung der Schlapphutbehörden.

Am Dienstag wird dem Autor für seine »Bücher und Vorträge, aktuell aber auch als Anerkennung für seinen Doppelsieg über die NRW-Verfassungsschutzbehörde und das Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, das ihn seit 1970 ununterbrochen – so das Urteil des Verwaltungsgerichts Köln–‚unverhältnismäßig und grundrechtswidrig‘ überwachen ließ«, von der Neuen Rheinischen Zeitung (NRhZ) der »Kölner Karls-Preis für engagierte Literatur und Publizistik« verliehen.

Rolf Gössner: Geheime Informanten. V-Leute des Verfassungsschutzes: Neonazis im Dienst des Staates. Knaur eBook, München 2012, 320 Seiten; Link zum Download für 6,99 Euro: bit.ly/J8XWNC

Find this story at14 Mai 2012

Provocateurs and criminals in the employ of the Brandenburg intelligence service

German undercover agents known as “V-men” have been regularly recruited or infiltrated by the intelligence services on a state and national level into groups and organisations the secret services regard as politically dubious. The official function of such agents is to acquire firsthand information about the groups.

In practice, however, they have not limited their activities to merely passively gathering information. On occasion they have carried out major illegal and violent acts, and often play a leading role in the organisations under observation. They are, according to author Rolf Gössner’s apt description in his recently published book Geheime Informanten (Secret Informants), “criminals in the service of the state” [1].

In the few brief years of its activity, since its foundation after the collapse of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), the Brandenburg intelligence service has gained notoriety for its use of provocateurs and criminals.

Particular public attention was aroused by the cases of Carsten Szczepanski and Toni Stadler—two neo-Nazis who worked as undercover agents for the Brandenburg intelligence service in the milieu of extreme right-wing and neo-fascist organisations. Both men were active in building up the groups they were associated with and took part in illegal activities, which the intelligence services are ostensibly supposed to prevent.

Carsten Szczepanski had already gained a reputation as a neo-Nazi at the beginning of the 1990s. He was part of the right-wing extremist skinhead milieu and had contact with the leadership of the National Front. He was also instrumental in establishing an offshoot of the Ku Klux Klan in Germany.

In 1992, police raided an apartment rented by Szczepanski and found four pipe bombs, explosive material and detonators. The police then undertook a preliminary inquiry on the suspicion that he was involved in founding a terrorist organisation. However, Szczepanski was never charged or sentenced for these crimes—indicating that he was at this point already being employed and receiving cover from the intelligence service.

According to the Brandenburg intelligence service, it first began to work with Szczepanski in 1994, after he had begun a long prison sentence for attempting to murder a Nigerian, Steve Erenhi. Despite the gravity of his crime, Szczepanski was already a free man in 1997, and renewed his activities in the neo-fascist milieu as V-man “Piato.”

After his release from jail, Szczepanski/Piato opened a shop in a small east German town, Königs Wusterhausen, where he sold books and music with neo-fascist text and lyrics. He was the publisher of an extreme right magazine, United Skins, and played a leading role in building up the neo-fascist milieu that he was supposed to spy on for the intelligence service. He became chairman of the local branch of the NPD (German National Party), a member of the regional leadership of the NPD in Spreewald, and the organisational head and committee member of the NPD for the state of Brandenburg-Berlin.

V-man “Piato” took over a leading role in the party he was sent to spy on for the Brandenburg intelligence service—and his is not the only case. Over the past three years, the German government has been attempting to ban the NPD, but in the spring of this year the German constitutional court threw out the entire case after it became clear during investigations that the party has been heavily infiltrated by the intelligence service. Because every seventh member of the NPD was an operative of the intelligence service, the court was forced to confront the fact that agents working for the intelligence services inside the NPD had possibly been responsible for acts and behaviour that the state had sought to use as evidence to ban the party.

In the case of Toni Stadler, the responsibility of the Brandenburg intelligence service for crimes carried out by neo-Nazis, including the dissemination of extreme right-wing material, is much more directly evident.

Stadler ran a neo-fascist shop with specialist music and literature. He took part in the production and distribution of the CD “Notes of Hatred,” which featured lyrics by the “White Aryan Rebels” calling for the abuse of children and the rape and murder of foreigners, Jews and anti-Nazis.

Shortly after Stadler received the commission for the production of the liner notes and cover for the CD, the Brandenburg intelligence service recruited him as an undercover agent. Stadler’s acquaintance, Mirko Hesse, who established contact with a foreign-based CD publishing company, was in the meantime working for the national intelligence agency. With the knowledge and backing of both intelligence authorities, the two neo-Nazis distributed the CDs, including lyrics calling for murder, with a circulation of 3,000 copies. Following the sell-out of the CD, the couple organised a further printing—entirely under the eyes of the intelligence services.

The undercover agents were finally exposed when the Berlin police, who knew nothing about the undercover activities of Stadler and Hesse, took action against their neo-Nazi music distribution. Previously, the intelligence services had done everything imaginable to protect Stadler from the police: his intelligence service handler warned him of imminent house searches, provided him with a “clean” computer, and advised him to establish a “bunker” for the illegal goods stored in Stadler’s shop.

In the trial against Stadler, Berlin state attorney Jürgen Heinke concluded: “Without the help of the Brandenburg intelligence service, the production of the CD by the neo-Nazi band White Aryan Rebels would not have been possible.” The presiding judge, Hans-Jürgen Brüning, declared in his judgment that the crimes of the accused were carried out “under the eyes and with the knowledge of state authorities” and that the intelligence service had been in a position “to nip the crime in the bud.” He concluded his judgement with the unusual demand by a judge for a parliamentary inquiry.

Both cases from Brandenburg cast light on the methods and characters of those who collaborate with the intelligence service. In Brandenburg, there are no regulations governing the activities of undercover agents. State interior minister, former general Jörg Schönbohm (Christian Democratic Union—CDU), has openly defended these practices and argued that his agents have to be allowed room to manoeuvre to avoid exposure.

Following criticisms of Schönbohm, the prime minister for the state of Brandenburg, Matthias Platzeck (German Social Democratic Party—SPD), demonstratively backed his controversial interior minister in the case of Stadler. He declared that Brandenburg required an “effective” rather than a “transparent” intelligence service. In similar manner, the state parliament commission overseeing the activities of the intelligence service backed the authority’s work in the cases of Szczepanski und Stadler. In fact, it emerged that the parliamentary commission had been regularly informed of the collaboration with agent “Piato.” This amounted to a de facto legitimisation of the intelligence service’s relations with Stadler. The commission went on to criticise the Berlin police for taking action against distribution of the racist CD without informing the commission or the intelligence service.

There has been little exposure in past years of the work of the Brandenburg intelligence service in the so-called milieu of “left-wing extremism.” Bearing in mind that Interior Minister Schönbohm never misses an opportunity to emphasise the potential threat from left-wing extremism, it is entirely plausible that the intelligence service has employed provocateurs in such circles. Attempts by the intelligence service to recruit spies in left-wing circles have regularly come to light when those approached have turned down an offer and publicised what had transpired.

In March of this year, a local Brandenburg newspaper, the Märkischen Allgemeinen Zeitung, featured an advertisement by the “Working Group—Knowledge and Progress” offering part-time employment for “politically interested young people—18 years and older.” A student who followed up the advertisement and met with a contact person reported that, in exchange for cash, he had been asked to provide information about the “left-wing milieu… for example, the peace movement.” Additional research revealed that the “Working Group—Knowledge and Progress” was a fiction. Just a few months before this incident, the Berlin intelligence service had also sought to recruit students for espionage purposes in left-wing groups under the cover name “Team Base Research.”

The results of these attempts at recruitment are not known. It would be the height of naiveté, however, to discount the use of agents and provocations in the milieu of “left-wing extremism” in a manner similar to that employed by the intelligence services in neo-Nazi groups.

[1] Rolf Gössner, Geheime Informanten, ISBN 3-4267-7684-7, 315 Seiten, € 12,90.

 Find this story at 17 november 2003

By Lena Sokoll
17 November 2003

Im Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz sollen wichtige Ermittlungsakten zur Zwickauer Terrorzelle vernichtet worden sein. Nach Informationen aus Sicherheitskreisen wurden die Unterlagen erst nach Auffliegen des Thüringer Neonazi-Trios gelöscht – nachdem sie zuvor jahrelang gelagert worden waren.

Der Verfassungsschutz hat zwischen 1997 und 2003 großen Aufwand betrieben, um die Neonazi-Szene in Thüringen zu unterwandern. Mit acht Spitzeln versuchte er Informationen aus dem “Thüringer Heimatschutz” (THS) zu gewinnen, aus dem auch das Trio stammte, das später die Zwickauer Terrorzelle bildete und jahrelang unentdeckt raubend und mordend durchs Land zog.

Das Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz soll sechs Spitzel im rechtsradikalen “Thüringer Heimatschutz” eingesetzt haben (im Bild: das Haus eines mutmaßlichen Terror-Helfers im sächsischen Johanngeorgenstadt). (© dpa)

Das Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz koordinierte die Operation “Rennsteig”. Es soll selbst sechs Quellen im THS geführt haben, zusätzlich zu V-Leuten des Thüringer Landesamts. Doch von der Operation, die den Verfassungsschutz dicht heranführte an die rechte Terrorzelle, fehlen nun wichtige Akten: Sie wurden im Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz gelöscht – nach Auffliegen der Terrorzelle Ende vorigen Jahres. Das erfuhr die Süddeutsche Zeitung am Mittwochabend aus Sicherheitskreisen.

Am 11. November 2011 sind demnach vier Akten der Operation “Rennsteig” vernichtet worden. Begründung: Es sei aufgefallen, dass die Löschfrist bereits abgelaufen war. Personenbezogene Daten darf der Verfassungsschutz nicht unbegrenzt speichern.

In Berlin kursiert die Frage, warum die Akten dann überhaupt so lange aufbewahrt wurden – und sie ausgerechnet dann gelöscht wurden, als Politik und Öffentlichkeit erfahren wollten, was eigentlich der Verfassungsschutz über das Neonazi-Trio wusste.

Andere sagen, das Löschen sei nun einmal aus datenschutzrechtlichen Gründen unumgänglich gewesen. Dass es Spitzel im THS gab, ist zwar schon länger bekannt. Der Thüringer Verfassungsschutz führte den Neonazi Tino Brandt, der den THS maßgeblich prägte, als V-Mann.

Kontakte der Neonazis nach Bayern

…

 Find this story at 27 June 2012 

27.06.2012, 22:20
Von Tanjev Schultz

Copyright: Süddeutsche Zeitung Digitale Medien GmbH / Süddeutsche Zeitung GmbH
Quelle: (Süddeutsche.de/kat)

Jegliche Veröffentlichung und nicht-private Nutzung exklusiv über Süddeutsche Zeitung Content. Bitte senden Sie Ihre Nutzungsanfrage an syndication@sueddeutsche.de.

Der Film zeichnet Leben und Taten der Terroristen nach und belegt Versagen von Verfassungsschutz und Polizei.

Find this story at 26 June 2012

Das Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz hat nach Angaben aus dem Bundestagsuntersuchungsausschuss bei den Ermittlungen zur Neonazi-Mordserie Akten vernichtet, nachdem das Trio aus Zwickau bereits aufgeflogen war. “Sie sind aufgefordert worden, Akten zu suchen, sie haben Akten gefunden und sie haben die Akten vernichtet”, sagte der Ausschussvorsitzende Sebastian Edathy (SPD) in Berlin.

Die Ermittler sollten demnach am 11. November 2011 Akten zur sogenannten “Operation Rennsteig” für die Arbeit der Bundesanwaltschaft zusammenstellen, stattdessen seien am selben Tag Akten vernichtet worden. Bei der “Operation Rennsteig” handelte es sich um eine Zusammenarbeit des Verfassungsschutzes mit der rechtsextremen Gruppe “Thüringer Heimatschutz”, aus der die NSU hervorgegangen sein soll. Die Aktenvernichtung habe Verfassungsschutzpräsident Heinz Fromm am Mittwoch dem Bundesinnenministerium mitgeteilt. Ein Vertreter des Bundesinnenministeriums bestätigte das.

Das Trio Beate Zschäpe, Uwe Böhnhardt und Uwe Mundlos (v.l.) soll für mindestens zehn Morde verantwortlich sein.
Im Untersuchungsausschuss sorgte die Information für Empörung – und zwar quer durch die Parteien. “Das ist erklärungsbedürftig”, sagte der Ausschussvorsitzende Edathy der “Mitteldeutschen Zeitung”. “Solche Vorkommnisse machen es schwierig, Verschwörungstheorien überzeugend entgegenzutreten.” Die Obfrau der SPD im Ausschuss, Eva Högl, nannte dies einen “Skandal”. Der Bundesinnenminister müsse aufklären, ob damit Fehler der Sicherheitsbehörden vertuscht werden sollten. Auch Linkspartei-Obfrau Petra Pau zeigte sich entsetzt über den Vorgang.
Porträt

Sebastian Edathy – ein kantiger Aufklärer
Er ist eigenwillig, manchmal etwas ruppig, aber immer “sehr parteilich gegen Rechtsextremisten”. Mit dem Vorsitz des Untersuchungsausschusses übernimmt Edathy die bislang größte Aufgabe seiner Karriere. [mehr]

Der CDU/CSU-Obmann Clemens Binninger hielt die Begründung des Verfassungsschutzes für die Aktenvernichtung für nicht glaubwürdig. Die Behörde habe erklärt, bei der Suche nach Beweismitteln zu den NSU-Terroristen sei aufgefallen, dass die Speicherfristen für die fraglichen Dokumente abgelaufen seien. Binninger betonte: “Ich halte diese Begründung für wenig überzeugend, für wenig plausibel, weil man in so einem Fall natürlich die Amtsleitung fragen müsste”. Er warnte zudem davor, dass derartige Vorfälle weitere Spekulationen über fragliche Aktionen von Sicherheitsbehörden befeuere.
Minister fordert Aufklärung

Bundesinnenminister Hans-Peter Friedrich (CSU) wies inzwischen Verfassungsschutzpräsident Heinz Fromm an, den Vorgang lückenlos aufzuklären. Dem Vernehmen nach ist der Täter inzwischen bekannt. Ihm droht ein Disziplinarverfahren. Der Verfassungsschutz will unterdessen die gelöschten Akten offenbar wieder rekonstruieren. Ein BfV-Vertreter soll dies den Mitgliedern des Untersuchungsausschusses des Bundestages angeboten haben.
BKA-Chef Ziercke räumt Fehler ein

BKA-Chef Ziercke vor dem NSU-Untersuchungsausschuss des Bundestags
Zuvor hatte der Untersuchungsausschuss den Chef des Bundeskriminalamtes, Jörg Ziercke, vernommen. Der Polizeichef sagte während der Befragung, er bedauere, dass die deutschen Sicherheitsbehörden ihrem Schutzauftrag nicht nachgekommen seien. Im Grundsatz verteidigte er das Vorgehen der Ermittler bei der Neonazi-Mordserie. Er räumte zwar Fehler ein, ließ aber offen, wo diese geschehen seien. “Das Versagen hat viele Facetten”, sagte er.

Der Ausschuss will unter anderem klären, welche Rolle Ziercke bei den Ermittlungspannen gespielt hat. Die Terroristen sollen von 1998 bis zu ihrem Auffliegen 2011 nahezu unbehelligt von den Sicherheitsbehörden im Untergrund gelebt und ihre Morde begangen haben. Ziercke ist seit 2004 Präsident des BKA.

Find this story at 28 June 2012

Germany’s domestic intelligence service destroyed files on neo-Nazis linked to the terror gang which claimed the murders of ten people – on the day the killings were traced to them, it has emerged. The interior minister has demanded an explanation.

Hans-Peter Friedrich said on Thursday he had personally called the president of the Federal Office for Protection of the Constitution and told him to tell him what had happened.

The office destroyed at least four files on its informants within a neo-Nazi group which had strong links to the terror group.

Operation Rennsteig used eight informers to infiltrate the Thuringia neo-Nazi group the Thüringer Heimatschutz – from which the neo-Nazi terrorists emerged. The informant operation ran from 1997 until 2003.

The gang, which called itself the National Socialist Underground, killed nine immigrant shop owners, eight Turkish and one Greek, and a policewoman in a murder spree over nearly 13 years.

Uwe Mundlos and Uwe Böhnhardt botched a bank robbery and died in a murder-suicide, leaving their friend Beate Zschäpe to allegedly blow up their flat and then hand herself in to the police.

The emergence of the neo-Nazi terror cell as responsible for the until then seemingly unconnected murders shocked Germany – particularly as it emerged at the end of last year that the trio were known to police and intelligence services.

The Süddeutsche Zeitung newspaper reported on Thursday that crucial files from Operation Rennsteig were missing – destroyed by the Office for Protection of the Constitution, Germany’s internal intelligence agency.

Four files were destroyed on November 11, 2011, the paper said – after it was realised that the time limit for keeping personal data had been breached.

This was also the same day as the connection between the neo-Nazi group and the string of murders was made.

The question now arises as to why the files were kept for so long – and why they were destroyed at exactly the time when it became important to see what had been known about the neo-Nazi trio, the paper said.

The fact that there were paid informants inside the notorious Thüringer Heimatschutz has been known for a long time, particularly with the outing of Tino Brandt, a neo-Nazi leader, as an informant.

But now that a parliamentary investigative committee is looking at who knew what and when – and how come nothing was done to stop the National Socialist Underground, details become crucial.

Jörg Zierke, head of the federal police BKA, admitted to the committee the police had failed in the case.

Find this story at 28 June 2012

Published: 28 Jun 12 10:48 CET
Updated: 28 Jun 12 14:30 CET

In a motion ahead of Monday’s pre-trial hearing, civilian lawyer says prosecutors are still denying defence access to documents
Bradley Manning’s lawyers say the prosecution team is keeping important documents from them. Photograph: Cliff Owen/AP

The US government is deliberately attempting to prevent Bradley Manning, the alleged source of the massive WikiLeaks trove of state secrets, from receiving a fair trial, the soldier’s lawyer alleges in new court documents.

David Coombs, Manning’s civilian lawyer, has made his strongest accusations yet about the conduct of the military prosecutors. In motions filed with the military court ahead of a pre-trial hearing at Fort Meade, Maryland, on Monday, he goes so far as to accuse the government in essence of lying to the court.

Coombs charges the prosecutors with making “an outright misrepresentation” to the court over evidence the defence has been trying for months to gain access to through disclosure.

The dispute relates to an investigation by the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, Oncix, into the damage caused by the WikiLeaks disclosures of hundreds of thousands of confidential documents.

Reports by the Associated Press, Reuters and other news outlets have suggested that official inquiries into the impact of WikiLeaks concluded that the leaks caused some “pockets” of short-term damage around the world, but that generally its impact had been embarrassing rather than harmful.

Such a finding could prove invaluable to the defence in fighting some of the charges facing Manning or, should he be found guilty, reducing his sentence.

Yet Coombs says the army prosecutors have consistently kept him, and the court, in the dark, thwarting his legal rights to see the evidence.

“It was abundantly clear that Oncix had some form of inquiry into the harm from the leaks – but the government switched definitions around arbitrarily so as to avoid disclosing this discovery to the defence.”

On 21 March, the prosecutors told the court that “Oncix has not produced any interim or final damage assessment” into WikiLeaks.

Coombs alleges that this statement was inaccurate – and the government knew it to be inaccurate at the time it made it.

“The defense submits [this] was an outright misrepresentation,” he writes.

On 20 April, the government told the court that “Oncix does not have any forensic results or investigative files”. Yet a week before that, the prosecutors had handed to the defence documents that clearly showed Oncix had begun to investigate WikiLeaks almost 18 months previously.

“Oncix was collecting information from various agencies in late 2010 to assess what damage, if any, was occasioned by the leaks. So how could it be that Oncix neither had an investigation nor a damage assessment?” Coombs writes.

The alleged efforts by the US government to avoid fulfilling its obligations to hand over evidence, Coombs says, has had the effect of rendering it impossible for the defence to prepare for the trial which is scheduled to begin in September.

Without access to the information, they cannot identify witnesses, develop questions for those witnesses, prepare a cross-examination strategy and so on.

…

Find this story at 24 June 2012 

Ed Pilkington in New York
guardian.co.uk, Sunday 24 June 2012 14.19 BST
© 2012 Guardian News and Media Limited or its affiliated companies. All rights reserved.

WASHINGTON — The Pentagon is beefing up its spy service to send several hundred undercover intelligence officers to overseas hot spots to steal secrets on national security threats after a decade of focusing chiefly on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The move comes amid concerns that the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Pentagon’s spy service, needs to expand operations beyond the war zones and to work more closely with the CIA, according to a senior Defense official who spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to speak publicly about the classified program.

The new Defense Clandestine Service will comprise about 15% of the DIA’s workforce. They will focus on gathering intelligence on terrorist networks, nuclear proliferators and other highly sensitive threats around the world, rather than just gleaning tactical information to assist military commanders on the battlefield, the official said.

“You have to do global coverage,” the official said.

Some of the new spies thus are likely to be assigned to targets that now are intelligence priorities, including parts of Africa and the Middle East where Al Qaeda and its affiliates are active, the nuclear and missile programs in North Korea and Iran, and China’s expanding military.

The initiative, which Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta approved last Friday, aims to boost the Pentagon’s role in human intelligence collection, and to assign more case officers and analysts around the globe. The CIA has dominated that mission for decades, and the two agencies have long squabbled over their respective roles.

An internal study by the director of National Intelligence last year concluded that the DIA needed to expand its traditional role and should gather and disseminate more information on global issues. It also found that the DIA did not promote or reward successful case officers, and that many often left for the CIA as a result.

Find this story at 23 April 2012

By David S. Cloud

April 23, 2012, 10:37 a.m.

Former police spy provides ‘investigative services, risk and threat assessments’ for Densus Group
Mark Kennedy posed as Mark Stone, a long-haired, tattooed campaigner, and took part in many demonstrations between 2003 and 2010. Photograph: Guardian

A former police spy who infiltrated the environmental movement for seven years has been hired by a private security firm in the US to give advice on how to deal with political activists.

Mark Kennedy has become a consultant to the Densus Group, providing “investigative services, risk and threat assessments”, according to an entry on his LinkedIn profile.

He says he has given lectures to firms and government bodies drawing on his experiences “as a covert operative working within extreme left political and animal rights groups throughout the UK, Europe and the US”.

Kennedy, 42, went to live in Cleveland, Ohio, after he was unmasked by activists in late 2010. He has claimed to have developed sympathies for the activists while undercover, although many campaigners have scorned this claim.

The disclosure of his clandestine deployment has led to a series of revelations over the past 18 months about the 40-year police operation to penetrate and disrupt political groups. The convictions of one group of protesters were quashed after it was revealed that prosecutors and police had withheld key evidence – Kennedy’s covert recording of campaigners – from their trial. A second trial of activists collapsed after it emerged that Kennedy had infiltrated them.

Kennedy was one of a long line of undercover officers since 1968 sent to spy on political activists under a fake identity. He posed as Mark Stone, a long-haired, tattooed campaigner, and took part in many demonstrations between 2003 and 2010. He has admitted sleeping with activists he was spying on, even though police chiefs say this is strictly forbidden.

Even after the police ended his deployment, he continued to pretend he was a campaigner and to fraternise with activists he had known while undercover. In particular, Kennedy developed a sudden interest in animal rights campaigns, according to activists.

After he was exposed, he sold his story to the Mail on Sunday which reported that soon after he left the police he worked for Global Open, a security firm that advises corporations on how to thwart campaigners promoting animal rights and other causes. He denied this in a later interview.

A month before he left the police he set up the first of three commercial firms whose work has not been described. For the past four months he has been working for the Texas-based Densus Group, which advises firms on “countering current and developing threats” from protesters.

…

Find this story at 21 June 2012

Rob Evans and Paul Lewis
guardian.co.uk, Thursday 21 June 2012 17.29 BST
© 2012 Guardian News and Media Limited or its affiliated companies. All rights reserved.

The first and only time I met Jose A. Rodriguez Jr., he was still undercover and in charge of the Central Intelligence Agency’s all-powerful operations directorate. The agency had summoned me to its Langley headquarters and his mission was to talk me out of running an article I had just finished reporting about CIA secret prisons — the “black sites” abroad where the agency put al-Qaeda terrorists so they could be interrogated in isolation, beyond the reach and protections of U.S. law.

The scene I walked into in November 2005 struck me as incongruous. The man sitting in the middle of the navy blue colonial-style sofa looked like a big-city police detective stuffed uncomfortably into a tailored suit. His face was pockmarked, his dark mustache too big to be stylish. He was not one of the polished career bureaucrats who populate the halls of power in Washington.

In fact, he fit perfectly the description given by my sources: hardworking but not smooth, loyal to the institution and now, probably, beyond his depth. He was as surprised as anyone that he had risen so quickly to the senior ranks after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, according to the account of his decades-long spy career in “Hard Measures: How Aggressive CIA Actions After 9/11 Saved American Lives.” The book is due out Monday, after an exclusive interview Sunday night on CBS’s “60 Minutes.” The Washington Post obtained a copy this week.

Shortly after the 2001 attacks, the CIA set up the secret prisons in Afghanistan, Thailand and several Eastern European countries for the explicit purpose of keeping detainees picked up on the battlefield or in other countries away from the U.S. justice system, which would grant them some protections against, among other things, torture or otherwise harsh treatment. In an effort to force these detainees to give their handlers information about terrorist plots, CIA interrogators subjected some of them to sleep and food deprivation, incessant loud noise and waterboarding.

By the time we met, those techniques were no longer in use. Rodriguez had not dealt with American reporters, he writes, but then-CIA Director Porter J. Goss had asked him to meet with me “to see if I could convince her that such a story would harm U.S. national security, put some of our allies around the world in a very difficult position, and potentially disrupt a program that was providing intelligence that was producing real results and helping to keep the country safe.”

What Rodriguez remembers from our conversation, according to his book, is that I brought him a copy of a book I had written about the U.S. military in an effort to butter him up. “That failed to soften my stance on the lack of wisdom of her proceeding with her article as planned,” he wrote, and “I could see I was not winning her over.” I remember bringing the book because I figured he didn’t know one reporter from the next, and I wanted him to know that I did in-depth work and didn’t want to just hear the talking points.

A blunt explanation

It became clear immediately that Rodriguez never even got the talking points, which was refreshing and surprising. Right away he began divulging awkward truths that other senior officers had tried to obfuscate in our conversations about the secret prisons: “In many cases they are violating their own laws by helping us,” he offered, according to notes I took at the time.

Why not bring the detainees to trial?

“Because they would get lawyered up, and our job, first and foremost, is to obtain information.”

(Shortly after our conversation, The Post’s senior editors were called to the White House to discuss the article with President George W. Bush and his national security team. Days later, the newspaper published the story, without naming the countries where the prisons were located.)

Rodriguez may have never felt the need to even reveal himself publicly or to write a book, complete with family photos, giving his version of many of the unconventional — and eventually repudiated — practices that the CIA engaged in after Sept. 11 had it not been for what happened shortly after our conversation.

Concerned that the location of one of the prisons was about to be revealed, Rodriguez writes that he ordered the facility closed immediately and the detainees moved to a new site. While dismantling the site, the base chief asked Rodriguez if she could throw a pile of old videotapes, made during the early days of terrorist Abu Zubaida’s interrogation and waterboarding, and now a couple of years old, onto a nearby bonfire that was set to destroy papers and other evidence of the agency’s presence.

Just at that moment, according to his account, a cable from headquarters came in saying: “Hold up on the tapes. We think they should be retained for a little while longer.”

“Had that message been delayed by even a few minutes,” Rodriguez writes, “my life in the years following would have been considerably easier.”

Those actions led to a lengthy and still ongoing investigation of the agency that produced no charges. Rodriguez retired in January 2008 and now works in the private sector.

A tough CIA veteran

Rodriguez was born in Puerto Rico, the son of two teachers. He was educated at the University of Florida, where he also received a law degree before being recruited by the CIA. He once gained the confidence of a dictator in a Latin American country because of his gutsy horseback riding skills. He worked as the chief of station in several countries he does not name, and was sent to El Salvador during its bloody civil war (which he glosses over completely) and to Panama, where he pitched the idea of recruiting Panamanian strongman Manuel Noriega’s witch doctor and putting him on the CIA payroll to persuade the dictator to retire to Spain. The CIA director at the time wasn’t impressed and instead, in 1989, “the United States followed a more traditional path: a military invasion.”

On Sept. 11, 2001, he did what legions of CIA officers not at work that day did: He rushed into headquarters, even as people were being evacuated, and pitched in. Rodriguez ended up in the Counterterrorism Center, which quickly went from a backwater posting to the center of the universe at the agency.

As CIA operations officers and analysts scrambled to figure out more about al-Qaeda and to plan a counterattack, Rodriguez was in the eye of the storm. “Hard Measures” takes readers through a highly sanitized — censored by the CIA, actually — version of events.

Although many details are left out and most of the outlines of what Rodriguez writes will not come as news to close readers of newspapers, he does not shy away from addressing the most controversial parts of what became the largest covert action program in U.S. history: the secret decisions to capture suspected terrorists on the battlefield or on the streets and make them disappear from the face of the Earth. Using a fleet of airplanes, the CIA bundled its captives into a netherworld no one else had access to, flew them around the world, deposited them in secret underground prisons where it could control their every move and use especially harsh interrogation methods on some of the most senior prisoners.

Many CIA officers had misgivings about these practices and what they might mean for America’s reputation around the world. Not Rodriguez. He is unabashedly confident that he and the agency did the right thing and saved lives in the process.

“I am certain, beyond any doubt, that these techniques, approved at the highest levels of the U.S. government, certified by the Department of Justice, and briefed to and supported by bipartisan leadership of congressional intelligence oversight committees, shielded the people of the United States from harm and led to the capture of killing of Usama bin Ladin.”

Of course, it is impossible to know this for certain, and many people inside and outside government — some of them involved in interrogations — have argued that with better-trained interrogators and more patience, the same information could have been obtained without such harsh methods.

The most newsworthy part of the book is a chapter in which Rodriguez explains how he came to order the destruction of 92 videotapes of the interrogation of Abu Zubaida.

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has nearly completed a four-year-long review of the CIA’s post-Sept. 11 detention and interrogation practices.

Shredding the tapes

Rodriguez writes that he ordered the tapes’ destruction because he got tired of waiting for his superiors to make a decision. They had at least twice given him the go-ahead, then backed off. In the meantime, a senior agency attorney cited “grave national security reasons” for destroying the material and said the tapes presented ‘“grave risk” to the personal safety of our officers” whose identities could be seen on the recordings.

In late April 2004, another event forced his hand, he writes. Photos of the abuse of prisoners by Army soldiers at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq ignited the Arab world and risked being confused with the CIA’s program, which was run very differently.

“We knew that if the photos of CIA officers conducting authorized EIT [enhanced interrogation techniques] ever got out, the difference between a legal, authorized, necessary, and safe program and the mindless actions of some MPs [military police] would be buried by the impact of the images.

“The propaganda damage to the image of America would be immense. But the main concern then, and always, was for the safety of my officers.”

Readers may disagree with much of what Rodriguez writes and with the importance of some of the facts he omits from his book, but the above sentence speaks volumes about why this book is important. In this case, a loyal civil servant — and the decision-makers above him who blessed these programs — were not thinking about the larger, longer-lasting damage to the core values of the United States that disclosure of these secrets might cause. They were thinking about the near term. About efficiency. About the safety of friends and colleagues. In their minds, they were thinking, too, about the safety of the country.

…

Find this story at 25 April 2012

By Dana Priest, Published: April 25

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