Researcher: CIA, NSA may have infiltrated Microsoft to write malware

Did spies posing as Microsofties write malware in Redmond? How do you spell ‘phooey’ in C#?

June 18, 2012, 2:46 PM — A leading security researcher has suggested Microsoft’s core Windows and application development programming teams have been infiltrated by covert programmer/operatives from U.S. intelligence agencies.

If it were true it would be another exciting twist to the stories of international espionage, sabotage and murder that surround Stuxnet, Duqu and Flame, the most successful cyberwar weapons deployed so far, with the possible exception of Windows itself.

Nevertheless, according to Mikko Hypponen, chief research officer of antivirus and security software vendor F-Secure, the scenario that would make it simplest for programmers employed by U.S. intelligence agencies to create the Stuxnet, Duqu and Flame viruses and compromise Microsoft protocols to the extent they could disguise downloads to Flame as patches through Windows Update is that Microsoft has been infiltrated by members of the U.S. intelligence community.

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Having programmers, spies and spy-supervisors from the NSA, CIA or other secret government agencies infiltrate Microsoft in order to turn its technology to their own evil uses (rather than Microsoft’s) is the kind of premise that would get any writer thrown out of a movie producer’s office for pitching an idea that would put the audience to sleep halfway through the first act.

Not only is it unlikely, the “action” most likely to take place on the Microsoft campus would be the kind with lots of tense, acronymically dense debates in beige conference rooms and bland corporate offices.

The three remarkable bits of malware that attacked Iranian nuclear-fuel development facilities and stole data from its top-secret computer systems – Flame Duqu and Stuxnet – show clear signs of having been built by the same teams of developers, over a long period of time, Hypponen told PC Pro in the U.K.

Flame used a counterfeit Microsoft security certificates to verify its trustworthiness to Iranian users, primarily because Microsoft is among the most widely recognized and trusted computer companies in the world, Hypponen said.

Faking credentials from Microsoft would give the malware far more credibility than using certificates from other vendors, as would hiding updates in Windows Update, Hypponen said.

The damage to Microsoft’s reputation and suspicion from international customers that it is a puppet of the CIA would be enough to keep Microsoft itself from participating in the operation, even if it were asked.

That doesn’t mean it didn’t happen.

“It’s plausible that if there is an operation under way and being run by a US intelligence agency it would make perfect sense for them to plant moles inside Microsoft to assist in pulling it off, just as they would in any other undercover operation,” Hypponen told PC Pro. “It’s not certain, but it would be common sense to expect they would do that.”

The suggestion piqued the imaginations of conspiracy theorists, but doesn’t have a shred of evidence to support it.

It does have a common-sense appeal, however. Planting operatives inside Microsoft would probably be illegal, would certainly be unethical and could have a long-range disadvantage by making Microsofties look like tools of the CIA rather than simply tools.

“No-one has broken into Microsoft, but by repurposing the certificate and modifying it with unknown hash collision technologies, and with the power of a supercomputer, they were able to start signing any program they wanted as if it was from Microsoft,” Hypponen said. “If you combine that with the mechanism they were using to spoof MS Update server they had the crown jewels.”

Hypponen is one of a number of security experts who have said Stuxnet and Duqu have the hallmarks of software written by traditionally minded software engineers accustomed to working in large, well-coordinated teams.

After studying the code for Duqu, security researchers at Kaspersky Labs said the malware was most similar to the kind of work done by old-school programmers able to write code for more than one platform at a time, do good quality control to make sure the modules were able to install themselves and update in real time, and that the command-and-control components ahd been re-used from previous editions.

“All the conclusions indicate a rather professional team of developers, which appear to be reusing older code written by top “old school” developers,” according to Kaspersky’s analysis. “Such techniques are normally seen in professional software and almost never in today’s malware. Once again, these indicate that Duqu, just like Stuxnet, is a ‘one of a kind’ piece of malware which stands out like a gem from the large mass of “dumb” malicious program we normally see.”

Earlier this month the NYT ran a story detailing two years worth of investigations during which a range of U.S. officials, including, eventually, President Obama, confirmed the U.S. had been involved in writing the Stuxnet and Flame malware and siccing them on Iran.

That’s far from conclusive proof that the NSA has moved its nonexistent offices to Redmond, Wash. It doesn’t rule it out either, however.

Very few malware writers are able to write such clean code that can install on a variety of hardware systems, assess their new environments and download the modules they need to successfully compromise a new network, Kaspersky researchers said.

Stuxnet and Flame are able to do all these things and to get their own updates through Windows Update using a faked Windows Update security certificate.

No other malware writer, hacker or end user has been able to do that before. Knowing it happened this time makes it more apparent that the malware writers know what they are doing and know Microsoft code inside and out.

That’s still no evidence that Microsoft could be or has been infiltrated by spies from the U.S. or from other countries.

It does make sense, but so do a lot of conspiracy theories.

Until there’s some solid indication Flame came from inside Microsoft, not outside, it’s probably safer to write off this string of associative evidence.

Even in his own blog, Hypponen makes fun of those who make fun of Flame as ineffective and unremarkable, but doesn’t actually suggest moles at Microsoft are to blame.

…

Find this story at 18 June 2012

By Kevin Fogarty

© 1994 – 2012 ITworld. All rights reserved.

CIA agreement touted as evidence in ‘black sites’ investigation

A partially signed agreement between Poland’s intelligence service and CIA provides central evidence in the ongoing investigation into alleged ‘black sites’ in Poland.

According to a source at the Krakow Prosecutor’s Office that is handling the investigation, the document was prepared in late 2001, early 2002, in the wake of the September 11 attacks on the US.

The Americans “did not want to leave traces [of evidence]” the source told Polish daily Gazeta Wyborcza, commenting on the fact that the document was only signed by former head of Poland’s Intelligence Agency (ABW), Zbigniew Siemiatkowski.

When queried about the document, Siemiatkowski stated that if his signature is present, it means that the document is classified, and that he is unable to talk about it. He did not confirm the existence of such an agreement.

Meanwhile, Adam Bodnar of the Helsinki Foundation – a human rights body that is monitoring the case – told that the paper that lack of an American signature does not invalidate the document as key evidence.

“The simple fact that the document was prepared attests to the fact that it there was a will [to create the CIA prisons], and that people who were aware of it, also knew about its contents.”

Accusations and denials

In 2011, the Council of Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights, Thomas Hammarberg, made an unequivocal statement on the matter.

“It is clear that Poland hosted secret CIA prisons between December 2002 and September 2003. We know who was held there and what interrogation methods were used. They can be described as torture.”

Leszek Miller was prime minister of Poland at that time, at the head of the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) government.

He has repeatedly denied knowledge of such a site, which is alleged to have been located in a villa near the Stare Kiejkuty military base in north east Poland.

…

 

Find this story at 19 June 2012 

19.06.2012 10:58

Copyright © Polskie Radio S.A

Criminele drugsinfiltrant VS jarenlang actief in Nederland

’Inzet burgerinfiltranten in Nederland strikt verboden’

 

De Amerikaanse drugsbestrijdingsorganisatie DEA heeft een criminele burgerinfiltrant ingezet in Nederland. Het AD heeft de hand weten te leggen op geheime rapporten van de DEA.

 

De burgerinfiltrant speelde een hoofdrol bij de gecontroleerde doorvoer van een grote hoeveelheid drugs in Europa. Doel was het in de val lokken van drugscriminelen. Op de partij kwamen meerdere Nederlanders af. Infiltrant ‘Mono’ werkte maandenlang vanuit Amsterdam.

 

De rol van de DEA-infiltrant ligt gevoelig, omdat het een bom kan leggen onder het proces tegen de potentiële kopers die momenteel in Haarlem terechtstaan. De verdachten vermoeden dat de DEA in Nederland buiten haar boekje is gegaan en eisen inzage in de operatie. De Amerikanen weigeren dat.

 

Justitie claimt dat ze eind 2009 voor het eerst hoorde dat Mono voor de DEA werkte. Een artikel uit de Poolse krant Gazeta Wyborcza zet vraagtekens bij die verklaring. Nederland zou namelijk al op 11 februari 2009 een bemiddelende rol hebben gespeeld tussen de DEA en de Poolse geheime dienst ABW.

 

…

Vindt dit verhaal op 16 juni 2012

 

Bewerkt door: Leonie Francien Sellies

16-6-12 – 08:23  bron: ANP

De infiltrant was maandenlang actief in Amsterdam. © ANP.

 

De Persgroep Digital. Alle rechten voorbehouden.

Top Secret CIA Documents on Osama bin Laden Declassified

Washington, D.C., June 19, 2012 – The National Security Archive today is posting over 100 recently released CIA documents relating to September 11, Osama bin Laden, and U.S. counterterrorism operations. The newly-declassified records, which the Archive obtained under the Freedom of Information Act, are referred to in footnotes to the 9/11 Commission Report and present an unprecedented public resource for information about September 11.

The collection includes rarely released CIA emails, raw intelligence cables, analytical summaries, high-level briefing materials, and comprehensive counterterrorism reports that are usually withheld from the public because of their sensitivity. Today’s posting covers a variety of topics of major public interest, including background to al-Qaeda’s planning for the attacks; the origins of the Predator program now in heavy use over Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran; al-Qaeda’s relationship with Pakistan; CIA attempts to warn about the impending threat; and the impact of budget constraints on the U.S. government’s hunt for bin Laden.

Today’s posting is the result of a series of FOIA requests by National Security Archive staff based on a painstaking review of references in the 9/11 Commission Report.
DOCUMENT HIGHLIGHTS

The documents released by CIA detail the meticulousness of al-Qaeda’s plot against the United States and CIA attempts to counter the rising terrorist threat. A previously undisclosed raw intelligence report that became the basis for the December 4, 1998, President’s Daily Brief notes that five years before the actual attack, al-Qaeda operatives had successfully evaded security at a New York airport in a test-run for bin Laden’s plan to hijack a U.S. airplane. [1998-12-03]. CIA analytical reports also provide interesting insights into al-Qaeda’s evolving political strategies. “In our view, the hijackers were carefully selected with an eye to their operational and political value. For instance, the large number of Saudi nationals was most likely chosen not only because of the ease with which Saudi nationals could get US visas but also because Bin Ladin could send a message to the Saudi Royal family.” [2003-06-01]

Reports on early attempts to apprehend bin Laden detail the beginning of the U.S. Predator drone program in Afghanistan and Pakistan. “First Predator mission over Afghanistan [excised] September 7, 2000.” [1] “Twice in the fall of 2000, the Predator observed an individual most likely to be Bin Ladin; however we had no way at the time to react to this information.” [2004-03-19] American UAVs did not have sufficient weapons capabilities at the time the CIA likely spotted bin Laden in 2000 to fire on the suspect using the UAV.

Al-Qaeda’s ties to Pakistan before September 11 are also noted in several documents. “Usama ((Bin Ladin))’s Islamic Army considered the Pakistan/Afghanistan area one region. Both Pakistan and Afghanistan serve as a regional base and training center for Islamic Army activities supporting Islamic insurgencies in Tajikistan, the Kashmir region and Chechnya. [Excised] The Islamic Army had a camp in Pakistan [Excised] purpose of the camp was to train and recruit new members, mostly from Pakistan.” [1997-07-14] While, “UBL elements in Pakistan reportedly plan to attack POTUS [U.S. President Clinton’s] plane with [excised] missiles if he visits Pakistan.” [2000-02-18]

Similar to the 9/11 Commission Report, the document collection details repeated CIA warnings of the bin Laden terrorist threat prior to September 11. According to a January 2000 Top Secret briefing to the Director of Central Intelligence, disruption operations against the Millennium plot “bought time… weeks… months… but no more than one year” before al-Qaeda would strike. [2000-01-07] “A UBL attack against U.S. interests could occur at any time or any place. It is unlikely that the CIA will have prior warning about the time or place.” [1999-08-03] By September 2001, CIA counterterrorism officials knew a plot was developing but couldn’t provide policymakers with details. “As of Late August 2001, there were indications that an individual associated with al-Qa’ida was considering mounting terrorist operations in the United States, [Excised]. No further information is currently available in the timing of possible attacks or on the alleged targets in the United States.” [2001-08-24]

Despite mounting warnings about al-Qaeda, the documents released today illustrate how prior to September 11, CIA counterterrorism units were lacking the funds to aggressively pursue bin Laden. “Budget concerns… CT [counterterrorism] supplemental still at NSC-OMB [National Security Council – Office of Management and Budget] level. Need forward movement on supplemental soonest due to expected early recess due to conventions, campaigning and elections. Due to budgetary constraints… CTC/UBL [Counterterrorism Center/Osama bin Laden Unit] will move from offensive to defensive posture.” [2000-04-05]

Although the collection is part of a laudable effort by the CIA to provide documents on events related to September 11, many of these materials are heavily redacted, and still only represent one-quarter of the CIA materials cited in the 9/11 Commission Report. Hundreds of cited reports and cables remain classified, including all interrogation materials such as the 47 reports from CIA interrogations of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed from March 24, 2003 – June 15, 2004, which are referenced in detail in the 9/11 Report.

Highlights of the CIA September 11 Document Collection Include:
The 1998 Raw Intelligence Report on UBL’s Plans to Hijack an Airplane that Became an Item in the December 4, 1998 President’s Daily Brief [1998-12-03].
The report details how bin Laden was planning “new operations against the United States (U.S.) targets in the near future. Plans to hijack a U.S. aircraft were proceeding well. Two individuals from the relevant operational team in the U.S. had successfully evaded security checks during a trial run at “New York airport [excised].”
Internal CIA E-mails on Osama bin Laden
1998-05-05 – “[Title Excised]” “Planning for the UBL Rendition is Going Very Well,” To: Michael F. Scheuer, From: [Excised], Central Intelligence Agency Email. Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as “Capture Op,” “[Gary] Schroen to Mike.” [Chapter 4, Endnote 22 9/11 Commission Report]
1998-12-20 – “Re: urgent re ubl,” Note For: Michael F. Scheuer, From: [Excised], Central Intelligence Agency Email. Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as “[Gary] Schroen to Mike” [Chapter 4, Endnotes 117, 119 9/11 Commission Report]
1998-12-21 – “your note,” Note For: [Excised], From: Michael F. Scheuer, Central Intelligence Agency Email. Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as “Mike to [Gary] Schroen,” [Chapter 4, Endnote 119 9/11 Commission Report]
1999-05-17 – “your note,” From Michael F. Scheuer, To [Excised], Central Intelligence Agency Email. Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as “Mike to [Gary] Schroen” [Chapter 4, Endnote 174 9/11 Commission Report]
2001-05-15 – “[Excised] Query [Excised].” Central Intelligence Agency Email. Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as “Dave to John.” [Chapter 8, Endnote 72 9/11 Commission Report]
2001-05-24 – [Title Excised] “Agee (sic) we need to compare notes,” Central Intelligence Agency Email. Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as “Dave to John.” [Chapter 8, Endnote 64 9/11 Commission Report]
2001-07-13 – “[Excised] Khalad [Excised],” Central Intelligence Agency Email. Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as “Richard to Alan” [Chapter 8, Endnote 64 9/11 Commission Report]
2001-08-21 – “Re: Khalid Al-Mihdhar,” Memorandum, Central Intelligence Agency Email. Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as “Mary to John.” [Chapter 8, Endnote 106 9/11 Commission Report]
Two Definitive CIA Reports on the September 11, 2001 Attacks
2003-06-01 – “11 September: The Plot and the Plotters,” CTC 2003-40044HC, Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.
[Chapter 5, Endnotes 42, 60, 61, 64, 70, 105, Chapter 7, Endnotes 45, 52, 60, 83, 86, 92, 94, 95, 96, 97, 105 9/11 Commission Report]
This document is a comprehensive CIA history of the 9/11 attack. Analysis includes notes on al-Qaeda, the evolution of the plot, terrorist techniques, timelines and detailed hijacker profiles.
2004-03-19 – “DCI Report: The Rise of UBL and Al-Qa’ida and the Intelligence Community Response,” Draft, Central Intelligence Agency Analytic Report. [Chapter 2, Endnote 67]
This document is a detailed summary of CIA efforts to apprehend Osama bin Laden from 1989-2004. Highlights include:
Agency notes on bin Laden’s evolution from “terrorist financier” in the early 1990s to a significant threat to U.S. interests by mid-1990.
Discussions and debates regarding the use of Predator drones as early as 2000. [2]
Critiques of FBI information systems as impediments to counterterrorism efforts – “A major, ongoing concern is FBI’s own internal dissemination system. CIA officers still often find it necessary to hand-deliver messages to the intended recipient within the FBI. In additional FBI has not perfected its FI reporting system and headquarters-field communications so dissemination of intelligence outside of FBI is still spotty.” And the report confirms suggestions by the 9/11 Commission Report that “the different organizational culture and goals of the FBI and CIA sometimes get in the way of desired results.” (p. 22)
A group of Afghan trial leaders worked with the CIA on the UBL issue, but “[Excised] judged to be unlikely to successfully attack a heavily guarded Bin Ladin.” “Masood has to be engaged to help in the attempt to capture Bin Ladin, but with the understanding that he would be his own man, never an agent of surrogate of the US government… Even if he agreed to do so, his chances of success against the Taliban were judged to be less than five percent.” (p. 58)

Note “DIF” written on multiple pages stands for “Denied in Full”
A Series of CIA Senior Executive Intelligence Briefs (SEIBS) from June-September 2001 Warning of “Imminent” Al-Qaeda Attacks:
2001-06-23 – “International: Bin Ladin Attacks May Be Imminent [Excised]” Senior Executive Intelligence Brief. [Chapter 8, Endnote 14, See also p. 257 9/11 Commission Report]
2001-06-25 – “Terrorism: Bin Ladin and Associates Making Near-Term Threats,” Senior Executive Intelligence Brief. [Chapter 8, Endnotes 12, 14]
2001-06-30 – “Terrorism: Bin Laden Planning High Profile Attacks [Excised],” Senior Executive Intelligence Brief. [Chapter 8, Endnote 12]
2001-07-02 – “Terrorism: Planning for Bin Ladin Attacks Continues, Despite Delay [Excised],” Senior Executive Intelligence Brief. [Chapter 8, Endnote 18]
2001-07-13 – “Terrorism: Bin Ladin Plans Delayed but Not Abandoned [Excised],” Senior Executive Intelligence Brief. [Chapter 8, Endnote 28]
2001-07-25 – “Terrorism: One Bin Ladin Operation Delayed, Others Ongoing [Excised],” Senior Executive Intelligence Brief. [Chapter 8, Endnote 28]
2001-08-07 – “Terrorism: Bin Ladin Determined to Strike in the US,” Senior Executive Intelligence Brief. [Chapter 8, Endnote 38. Chapter 11, Endnote 5. Page 342]
Detailed Reports on Al-Qaeda Organization
“The spike in the network’s activity stems in part from changes in Bin Ladin’s practices. To avoid implicating himself and his Taliban hosts, Bin Ladin over the past two years has allowed cells in his network, al-Qa’ida, to plan attacks more independently of the central leadership and has tried to gain support for his agenda outside the group. – The network also has benefited from a sharp increase in mujahidin recruitment since the resumption of the conflict in Chechnya in 1999, which exposed a new generation of militants to terrorist techniques and extremist ideology through training at al-Qai’da-run camps in Afghanistan. – Violence between Israelis and the Palestinians, moreover is making Sunni extremists more willing to participate in attacks against US or Israeli interests.” 2001-02-06 – “Sunni Terrorist Threat Growing,” Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, The Central Intelligence Agency. [Chapter 8, Endnote 4 9/11 Commission Report]
Bin Laden’s Attempts to Acquire Weapons of Mass Destruction
“Bin Ladin and his associates have experimented by crude means to make and deploy biological agents… Bin Ladin has sought to acquire military-grade biological agents or weapons.” 2001-02-14 –”Afghanistan: Bin Ladin’s Interest in Biological and Radiological Weapons,” Central Intelligence Agency Analytical Report [Chapter 11, Endnote 5. 9/11 Commission Report Page 342]
A Positive CIA Assessment of CIA Counterterrorism Capabilities in August 2001
In contrast to the findings of the 9/11 Commission Report and a 2004 CIA Office of Inspector General’s review of its pre-9/11 counterterrorism practices, a report completed in August 2001 by the CIA Inspector General gives very positively reviews to CIA counterterrorism practices, the management of information and interagency cooperation. “CTC fulfills inter-agency responsibilities for the DCI by coordinating national intelligence, providing warning, and promoting the effective use of Intelligence Community resources on terrorism issues. The Center has made progress on problems identified at the time of the last inspection in 1994 – specifically its professional relationship with the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Find this story at 19 June 2012

The Central Intelligence Agency’s 9/11 File

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 381

Posted – June 19, 2012

Edited by Barbara Elias-Sanborn with Thanks to Archive Senior Fellow Jeffrey T. Richelson

For more information contact:
Barbara Elias-Sanborn – 202/994-7000
belias@gwu.edu

Exclusive: Senate probe finds little evidence of effective “torture”

(Reuters) – A nearly three-year-long investigation by Senate Intelligence Committee Democrats is expected to find there is little evidence the harsh “enhanced interrogation techniques” the CIA used on high-value prisoners produced counter-terrorism breakthroughs.

 

People familiar with the inquiry said committee investigators, who have been poring over records from the administration of President George W. Bush, believe they do not substantiate claims by some Bush supporters that the harsh interrogations led to counter-terrorism coups.

 

The backers of such techniques, which include “water-boarding,” sleep deprivation and other practices critics call torture, maintain they have led to the disruption of major terror plots and the capture of al Qaeda leaders.

 

One official said investigators found “no evidence” such enhanced interrogations played “any significant role” in the years-long intelligence operations which led to the discovery and killing of Osama bin Laden last May by U.S. Navy SEALs.

 

President Barack Obama and his aides have largely sought to avoid revisiting Bush administration controversies. But the debate over the effectiveness of enhanced interrogations, which human rights advocates condemn as torture, is resurfacing, in part thanks to a new book by a former top CIA official.

 

In the book, “Hard Measures,” due to be published on Monday, April 30, the former chief of CIA clandestine operations Jose Rodriguez defends the use of interrogation practices including water-boarding, which involves pouring water on a subject’s face, which is covered with a cloth, to simulate drowning.

 

“We made some al-Qaeda terrorists with American blood on their hands uncomfortable for a few days,” Rodriguez says in an interview with CBS News’ “60 Minutes” that will air on Sunday, April 29. “I am very secure in what we did and am very confident that what we did saved American lives.”

 

For nearly three years, the Senate intelligence committee’s majority Democrats have been conducting what is described as the first systematic investigation of the effectiveness of such extreme interrogation techniques.

 

NO SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT

 

The CIA gave the committee access to millions of pages of written records charting daily operations of the interrogation program, including graphic descriptions of how and when controversial techniques were employed.

 

Sources agreed to discuss the matter on condition of anonymity because the report has not been finalized.

 

The committee members’ objective is to conduct a methodical assessment of whether enhanced interrogation techniques led to genuine intelligence breakthroughs or whether they produced more false leads than good ones.

 

U.S.intelligence officials have acknowledged that while the harshest elements of the interrogation program, including water-boarding and other tactics which cause severe physical stress, were in use, the CIA never carried out a scientific assessment of the program’s effectiveness.

 

The Bush Administration only used water-boarding on three captured suspects. One of them was Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the mastermind of the September 11, 2001 attacks.

 

Other coercive techniques included sleep deprivation, making people crouch or stretch in stressful positions and slamming detainees against a flexible wall.

 

The CIA started backing away from such techniques in 2004. Obama banned them shortly after taking office.

 

One source cautioned there could still be lengthy delays before any information or conclusions from the Senate committee’s report are made public.

 

One reason the inquiry has taken so long is that in 2009, committee Republicans withdrew their participation, saying the panel would be unable to interview witnesses to ensure documentary material was reported in appropriate context due to ongoing criminal investigations.

 

People familiar with the inquiry said it consisted of as much as 2,000 pages in narrative accounts of how the CIA interrogation program worked, including specific case histories in which enhanced interrogation tactics were used.

 

‘PROCEDURES’ UNJUSTIFIED: FEINSTEIN

 

The Intelligence committee has not issued any official statements about what its inquiry has found or when it expects to wrap up. But committee chair Sen. Dianne Feinstein has made relatively strong statements about the lack of evidence that enhanced interrogations played any material role in generating information leading to bin Laden’s killing.

 

Only days after the commando raid in which bin Laden was killed, Feinstein told journalists: “I happen to know a good deal about how those interrogations were conducted, and, in my view, nothing justifies the kind of procedures that were used.”

 

Current and formerU.S.officials have said one key source for information about the existence of the al Qaeda “courier” who ultimately ledU.S.intelligence to bin Laden was Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.

 

KSM, as he was known toU.S.officials, was subjected to water-boarding 183 times, theU.S.government has acknowledged.

 

Officials said, however, that it was not until sometime after he was water-boarded that KSM told interrogators about the courier’s existence. Therefore a direct link between the physically coercive techniques and critical information is unproven, Bush administration critics say.

 

Supporters of the CIA program, including former Vice President Dick Cheney, have portrayed it as a necessary, if distasteful, step that may have stopped extremist plots and saved lives.

 

…

 

 

Find this story at 27 April 2012

 

Fri, Apr 27 2012

By Mark Hosenball

(Editing by Todd Eastham)

 

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De inzet van de afluisterbevoegdheid en van de bevoegdheid tot de selectie van Sigint door de AIVD

Bij het toezichtsrapport inzake de inzet van de afluisterbevoegdheid
en de bevoegdheid tot de selectie van Sigint door de AIVD
Het onderzoek van de Commissie heeft zich gericht op de rechtmatigheid van de inzet van
de afluisterbevoegdheid en de bevoegdheid tot de selectie van Sigint door de AIVD in de
periode van september 2010 tot en met augustus 2011. Deze bevoegdheden zijn neergelegd
in de artikelen 25 en 27 van de Wiv 2002 en mogen enkel worden ingezet indien dit
noodzakelijk is in het kader van de veiligheidstaak of de inlichtingentaak buitenland van de
AIVD. Ook is wettelijk vereist dat de inzet van deze bevoegdheden proportioneel en
subsidiair is en voldoet aan in de Wiv 2002 neergelegde zorgvuldigheidsvereisten.
De Commissie constateert dat de AIVD bij de inzet van de afluisterbevoegdheid doordacht
te werk gaat. Zij heeft in de door haar onderzochte operaties geen onrechtmatigheden
geconstateerd. Dit is gezien het grote aantal onderzochte operaties een compliment waard.
Op enkele punten constateert de Commissie evenwel dat er sprake is van
onzorgvuldigheden, vooral ten aanzien van de motivering van operaties.
Voor een deugdelijke motivering is van belang dat de AIVD hierin alle beschikbare relevante
informatie betrekt. Alleen dan kan zorgvuldig worden afgewogen of de privacyinbreuk die
gepaard gaat met de inzet van de afluisterbevoegdheid inderdaad noodzakelijk,
proportioneel en subsidiair is. De Commissie heeft in één geval geconstateerd dat contraindicaties
inzake de dreiging die van een target uitging, niet waren opgenomen in de
motivering. De Commissie signaleert ook dat de AIVD incidenteel omwille van de efficiëntie
van het inlichtingenwerk parallelle, verschillend gerubriceerde motiveringen aanwendt.
Naar het oordeel van de Commissie staat dit op gespannen voet met het belang van een
zorgvuldige en eenduidige motivering.

De Commissie constateert dat het in het onderzoek van de AIVD naar
radicaliseringstendensen niet altijd evident is dat de personen of organisaties jegens wie de
afluisterbevoegdheid wordt ingezet, ook daadwerkelijk aanleiding geven tot het ernstige
vermoeden een gevaar te zijn voor de nationale veiligheid. De Commissie onderkent het
belang van dit onderzoek maar benadrukt dat dan wel voortdurend de inzet van bijzondere
bevoegdheden jegens deze personen of organisaties kritisch geëvalueerd dient te worden. Zij
heeft in één geval geconstateerd dat de AIVD gedurende enkele jaren bijzondere
bevoegdheden heeft ingezet zonder duidelijkheid te hebben verkregen over de dreiging die
van de betrokken personen uitging. De Commissie is van oordeel dat de inzet van de
afluisterbevoegdheid met name in de laatste periode van dit onderzoek zich op het
grensgebied bevond van wat wettelijk is toegestaan. In één geval zijn door de AIVD
bijzondere bevoegdheden ingezet tegen een persoon die een bepaalde boodschap wilde
publiceren waarvan volgens de AIVD niet uit te sluiten was dat deze opgevat kon worden
als een oproep tot activisme of geweld. De Commissie vindt deze formulering te ruim. Voor
ii
de inzet van een bijzondere bevoegdheid moet immers gemotiveerd worden dat er een
ernstig vermoeden van een gevaar is.
In één geval constateert de Commissie dat de AIVD de afluisterbevoegdheid heeft ingezet
terwijl er belangrijke redenen waren om voorafgaande hieraan de MIVD de consulteren.
Hierdoor had de AIVD niet alleen mogelijk operationeel relevante informatie kunnen
verkrijgen, ook kan zo voorkomen worden dat beide diensten zich los van elkaar met
dezelfde operationele aangelegenheden bezighouden.
De Commissie onthoudt zich, net als in twee eerdere rapporten waarin dit onderwerp ter
sprake kwam, van een oordeel over de rechtmatigheid van de selectie van Sigint door de
AIVD. Bij de inzet van deze bevoegdheid licht de AIVD vaak niet toe aan wie de nummers
en technische kenmerken toebehoren en waarom deze telecommunicatie dient te worden
geselecteerd. Deze problematiek lijkt eigen aan de selectie van Sigint, de Commissie heeft dit
onlangs ook ten aanzien van de MIVD geconstateerd. De motiveringsvereisten van de Wiv
2002 zijn evenwel strikt, aangezien bij de selectie van Sigint kennis wordt genomen van de
inhoud van communicatie van personen en organisaties. In het eind 2011 uitgebrachte
toezichtsrapport 28 inzake de inzet van Sigint door de MIVD heeft de Commissie het
juridisch kader voor het gehele proces van de inzet van Sigint uiteengezet en
aanknopingspunten gegeven voor een betere motivering. De Commissie zal dan ook in het
volgende diepteonderzoek naar de inzet van de afluisterbevoegdheid en de bevoegdheid tot
de selectie van Sigint door de AIVD nagaan in hoeverre de motivering van de selectie van
Sigint is verbeterd.

Het rapport is te vinden bij CTIVD

Reactie van de minister

Persbericht

G4S chief predicts mass police privatisation

Private companies will be running large parts of the police service within five years, according to security firm head

David Taylor-Smith, the head of G4S for the UK and Africa, said he expected most UK police forces to sign up to privatisation deals. Photograph: Guardian

Private companies will be running large parts of the UK’s police service within five years, according to the world’s biggest security firm.

David Taylor-Smith, the head of G4S for the UK and Africa, said he expected police forces across the country to sign up to similar deals to those on the table in the West Midlands and Surrey, which could result in private companies taking responsibility for duties ranging from investigating crimes to transporting suspects and managing intelligence.

The prediction comes as it emerged that 10 more police forces were considering outsourcing deals that would see services, such as running police cells and operating IT, run by private firms.

Taylor-Smith, whose company is in the running for the £1.5bn contract with West Midlands and Surrey police, said he expected forces across the country to have taken similar steps within five years . “For most members of the public what they will see is the same or better policing and they really don’t care who is running the fleet, the payroll or the firearms licensing – they don’t really care,” he said.

G4S, which is providing security for the Olympics, has 657,000 staff operating in more than 125 countries and is one of the world’s biggest private employers. It already runs six prisons in the UK and in April started work on a £200m police contract in Lincolnshire, where it will design, build and run a police station. Under the terms of the deal, 575 public sector police staff transferred to the company.

Taylor-Smith said core policing would remain a public-sector preserve but added: “We have been long-term optimistic about the police and short-to-medium-term pessimistic about the police for many years. Our view was, look, we would never try to take away core policing functions from the police but for a number of years it has been absolutely clear as day to us – and to others – that the configuration of the police in the UK is just simply not as effective and as efficient as it could be.”

Concern has grown about the involvement of private firms in policing. In May more than 20,000 officers took to the streets to outline their fears about pay, conditions and police privatisation. The Police Federation has warned that the service is being undermined by creeping privatisation.

Unite, the union that represents many police staff, said the potential scale of private-sector involvement in policing was “a frightening prospect”. Peter Allenson, national officer, said: “This is not the back office – we are talking about the privatisation of core parts of the police service right across the country, including crime investigation, forensics, 999 call-handling, custody and detention and a wide range of police services.”

Taylor-Smith said “budgetary pressure and political will” were driving the private-sector involvement in policing but insisted that the “public sector ethos” had not been lost.

“I have always found it somewhere between patronising and insulting the notion that the public sector has an exclusive franchise on some ethos, spirit, morality – it is just nonsense,” he said. “The thought that everyone in the private sector is primarily motivated by profit and that is why they come to work is just simply not accurate … we employ 675,000 people and they are primarily motivated by pretty much the same as would motivate someone in the public sector.”

In the £1.5bn deal being discussed by West Midlands and Surrey police, the list of policing activities up for grabs includes investigating crimes, detaining suspects, developing cases, responding to and investigating incidents, supporting victims and witnesses, managing high-risk individuals, managing intelligence, managing engagement with the public, as well as more traditional back-office functions such as managing forensics, providing legal services, managing the vehicle fleet, finance and human resources.

Chris Sims, West Midlands chief constable, has said his force is a good testing ground for fundamental change as he battled to find £126m of savings. He said the armed forces had embraced a greater role for the private sector more fully than the police without sparking uproar.

But a home affairs select committee report said many of the policing contracts being put up for tender amounted to a “fishing expedition”. MPs added that they were not convinced the forces understood what they were doing. The committee chair, Keith Vaz, said: “The Home Office must ensure it knows what services local forces wish to contract out before agreeing to allow expenditure of £5m on what is little more than a fishing expedition.”

Cambridgeshire, Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire police announced this month that they were considering privatising some services in an attempt to tackle a £73m funding shortfall created by government cuts. Police authority members in the three counties will be asked to consider how services including HR, finance and IT could be outsourced in line with the G4S contract in Lincolnshire as part of a joint recommendation made by the three chief constables.

…

Find this story at 20 June 2012

Matthew Taylor and Alan Travis
guardian.co.uk, Wednesday 20 June 2012 19.31 BST

• This article was amended on 21 June to add a quote from a Home Office spokesperson.
© 2012 Guardian News and Media Limited or its affiliated companies. All rights reserved.

Ian Tomlinson’s last moments shown at trial of Simon Harwood

Jury sees footage tracing newspaper vendor’s movements through City of London during G20 protests in 2009
Simon Harwood, charged with the manslaughter of Ian Tomlinson, arrives at Southwark crown court with his wife, Helen. Photograph: Rex Features

A court has seen video footage of the minutes leading to the death of Ian Tomlinson, the man prosecutors allege was killed on the fringes of the G20 protests in London by a riot police officer who struck him with a baton before shoving him to the ground.

The jury at Southwark crown court also heard from friends of Tomlinson, who said he had been calm and happy on the evening of 1 April 2009, although clearly under the influence of drink. The court was shown another compilation of images, tracking the movements of the police constable involved, Simon Harwood, before his encounter with Tomlinson.

Tomlinson’s family looked on grim-faced as the prosecution showed dozens of video clips giving a chronological rundown of Tomlinson’s movements as he tried to return home, having spent time with a newspaper vendor friend by Monument station in the City.

They also saw several video angles of the moment when Harwood, a member of the Metropolitan police’s Territorial Support Group unit, struck Tomlinson on the leg with a baton as the 47-year-old walked away from police lines, his hands in his pockets. Harwood then shoved Tomlinson to the ground causing, the prosecution alleges, internal bleeding which killed him within little more than half an hour.

In his attempt to reach the hostel where he lived when not with his family at weekends, Tomlinson, a long-term alcoholic, headed towards Bank tube station, where he was turned back at a police cordon set up following clashes involving protesters marking the G20 meeting of world leaders. He then wandered through alleyways towards the pedestrian passageway by the Royal Exchange building, where he encountered Harwood.

This slow progress was followed by dozens of cameras, mainly CCTV but also shaky, handheld amateur video, and footage from TV crews. The montage, some of it only brief glimpses as Tomlinson walked past internal cameras in shops, was compiled by investigators from the Independent Police Complaints Commission, which initially investigated his death.

While there were still occasional skirmishes between police and protesters by this time, throughout his walk Tomlinson appeared calm, walking mainly with his hands in the pockets of his tracksuit trousers. The final footage, chronologically, showed Tomlinson briefly walking away after he was pushed to the ground and then, after a cut in the filming, lying prone on the pavement, where a medical student was trying to assist him.

Harwood, 45, was first shown standing by the police van he had been designated to drive, then dragging away a man who wrote graffiti on the vehicle, only to lose him when the man slipped out of his jacket. Wearing a riot helmet and balaclava but easily identifiable by a waist-length fluorescent jacket, Harwood then joined a line of other riot officers who began clearing the passageway.

Amid initial chaos, Harwood shoved a man who blew a plastic vuvuzela in his face before pushing over a cameraman filming an arrest.

Another piece of footage showed Harwood pushing a third man, who had stopped seemingly to help someone sitting on the pavement. It is shortly after this that the line of police reaches Tomlinson.

The court later heard from several of Tomlinson’s friends, including Barry Smith, a newspaper vendor who had known him for more than 25 years. Smith said his friend had been very happy that day, having cashed his giro and used some of the money to travel to the Millwall FC club shop in south-east London to buy a replica shirt and other clothes.

Tomlinson had left the stall only because the papers sold out early, Smith said: “If I’d phoned up and got some more papers he might have been alive. I’m gutted.”

…

Find this story at 19 June 2012

Peter Walker
guardian.co.uk, Tuesday 19 June 2012 18.08 BST

© 2012 Guardian News and Media Limited or its affiliated companies. All rights reserved.

Rechercheprocessen bij de bestrijding van georganiseerde criminaliteit

Bij de sturing van op georganiseerde criminaliteit gerichte opsporingsonderzoeken, ontbreekt het aan voldoende inzichten: – in het opsporingsproces, – in de factoren die hierop van invloed zijn en – in de resultaten die ermee worden bereikt. Dit rapport gaat over de wijze waarop het concept ‘intelligence’-gestuurde opsporing in de praktijk uitwerkt bij de aanpak van georganiseerde misdaad. Hiertoe is ondermeer onderzocht hoe de voorbereiding van een opsporingsonderzoek naar georganiseerde misdaad in de praktijk verloopt, in hoeverre voorstellen voor onderzoeken daadwerkelijk tot opsporingsonderzoeken hebben geleid en wat daarvan de resultaten zijn geweeest. De eerste voorlopige resultaten werden reeds in 2007 in hoofdstuk 5 van het rapport “Georganiseerde criminaliteit in Nederland” (Onderzoek en Beleid, nr. 252) gepubliceerd (zie link bij: Meer informatie).

Inhoudsopgave:
Voorwoord
Samenvatting
Inleiding
Het selectieproces van zaken
Weegdocumenten van de Nationale Recherche
Van preweegdocumenten tot tactisch onderzoek
Conclusies
Summary
Literatuur
Bijlagen

Auteur(s): Bokhorst, R.J., Steeg, M. van der, Poot, C.J. de
Organisatie: WODC
Plaats uitgave: Den Haag
Uitgever: WODC
Jaar van uitgave: 2011
Reeks: Cahiers 2011-11
Type rapport: Eindrapport

Document te vinden bij

Samenvatting te vinden bij

Summary at

 

Große Schwester Europol

Die EU-Polizeiagentur Europol soll mehr Kompetenzen für eigene Ermittlungen erhalten. Im November will die EU-Kommission einen Vorschlag über die zukünftige Aufgaben, Struktur und Arbeitsweise vorlegen

Früher galt die EU-Grenzschutzagentur Frontex als die “Kleine Schwester” Europols: Die Polizeiagentur wurde offiziell 1999 gegründet, während die EU-Migrationsabwehr erst seit 2004 am Start ist. Doch was die Kompetenzen angeht, ist Frontex längst vorgeprescht. Jetzt soll Europol aufholen: Zur Debatte steht der Ausbau von Datensammlungen, das Einleiten von Ermittlungen und ein stärkeres Vorgehen auch gegen unerwünschte Migration. Die gleichzeitig anvisierte Ausweitung der parlamentarischen Kontrolle bleibt wohl marginal.

Bis zum Lissabon-Vertrag galt Europol als zwischenstaatliche Einrichtung der sogenannten “Dritten Säule” zur polizeilichen und justiziellen Zusammenarbeit in Strafsachen, in der die EU keine eigenen Beschlüsse fassen konnte. Mit dem seit 1. Januar 2010 gültigen neuen Europol-Beschluss[1] ist die Behörde in den Rechtsrahmen der EU überführt worden und wird aus dem Gesamtbudget der EU finanziert (Europol in der dritten Generation[2]). Die Aufgabenbereiche wurden im Vertrag von Lissabon als Bekämpfung der “schweren Kriminalität, des Terrorismus und der Kriminalitätsformen, die ein gemeinsames Interesse verletzen” sehr weitgehend definiert[3]. Voraussetzung ist immer, dass zwei oder mehr Mitgliedstaaten betroffen sind. Jedoch dürfen polizeiliche Zwangsmaßnahmen ausschließlich von den Behörden der Mitgliedstaaten vorgenommen werden.

Derzeit arbeitet Europol mit 17 Nicht-EU-Staaten, neun EU-Organen und -Agenturen sowie drei weiteren internationalen Organisationen, darunter Interpol, zusammen. Rechtlich problematisch sind die unterschiedlichen Datenschutzstandards der beteiligten Länder. Europol verhandelt beispielsweise auch mit Israel, Albanien, Bosnien, Kolumbien und Russland über eine Partnerschaft (Europol will mehr Datentausch mit Israel[4]). Im Falle Israels würde beim Abschluss eines Abkommens formal auch die Siedlungspolitik der Regierung in Tel Aviv anerkannt[5] – und damit die bislang vertretene, ablehnende Position des Rates der Europäischen Union untergraben.

Unterstützung bei der Aufrechterhaltung der “öffentlichen Sicherheit und Ordnung”?

Im Arbeitsprogramm für 2012[6] werden ehrgeizige Pläne artikuliert: Europol will “polizeilicher Hauptansprechpartner” für Strafverfolgungsbehörden der EU und “Drehscheibe für polizeiliche Informationen” werden. Dennoch ist die Behörde vergleichsweise klein: Vor zwei Jahren waren dort 662 Mitarbeiter angestellt. Die Bundesregierung erläutert[7], dass sich die Zahl nicht nur auf das Vertragspersonal der Agentur bezieht. Einbezogen seien demnach auch Personen in den Verbindungsbüros der EU-Mitgliedstaaten bei Europol (ca. 125) sowie aus den EU-Mitgliedstaaten entsandte Sachverständige. Deutschland stellt 39 Mitarbeiter, darunter 13 aus dem Bundeskriminalamt. Im deutschen Verbindungsbüro bei Europol arbeiten weitere acht Mitarbeiter und vier Sachverständige.

Laut dem Jahresabschluss von 2010[8] hat Europol die zuständigen Behörden in den Mitgliedstaaten in 11.738 grenzüberschreitenden Fällen unterstützt. Dies entspräche gegenüber 2009 einer Steigerung von 12%. In über 150 “bedeutenden grenzüberschreitenden Ermittlungen” habe das Amt “analytische und operative Unterstützung” geleistet. 35% der Operationen betrafen “Drogenvergehen”.

Doch die Polizeiagentur hat weitaus Größeres vor: Zukünftig könnte Europol den Mitgliedstaaten sogar bei der Aufrechterhaltung der “öffentlichen Sicherheit und Ordnung” assistieren. So jedenfalls ist es in einem Debattenbeitrag der derzeitigen dänischen Ratspräsidentschaft[9] niedergelegt. Gleichzeitig soll die Zusammenarbeit mit den anderen zehn EU-Agenturen im Bereich Justiz und Inneres intensiviert[10] werden: Die Grenzschutzagentur wünscht, dass Europol beim Erstellen der sogenannten “Risikoanalysen” zu unerwünschter Migration aushilft.

Auch mit der Agentur zur Betrugsbekämpfung (OLAF), der Europäischen Polizeiakademie (CEPOL), der Grundrechteagentur (FRA) und dem EU-Geheimdienst (SitCen) soll Europol stärker kooperieren. Das Gleiche gilt für die Europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik (ESDP): Die Mitgliedstaaten sollen erörtern, inwieweit “Synergien” erzielt werden können. Hierbei hilft die inzwischen institutionalisierte Zusammenarbeit der Leiter der Agenturen[11]: 2010 hatte Europol den Vorsitz dieser informellen Vereinigung inne.

Europol gegen “Migrationsdruck”

Was unter “Synergien” verstanden wird, macht eine weitere Initiative der dänischen Ratspräsidentschaft deutlich: Die Regierung in Kopenhagen überraschte Ende letzten Monats mit einer “EU-Aktion gegen Migrationsdruck”[12]. Gefordert werden als “strategische Antwort” mehr Anstrengungen auch von Europol bei der Bekämpfung unerwünschter Einwanderung. Sofern es das Mandat erlaubt, könnte die EU-Kriminalisten sogar gegen Scheinehen vorgehen, die laut der dänischen Ratspräsidentschaft durch “organisierte kriminelle Gruppierungen” inszeniert würden.

Die Polizeiagentur soll in die Zusammenarbeit mit Herkunfts- und Transitländern eingebunden werden, um unentdeckte Einwanderungsrouten aufzuspüren. Auch im Rahmen des zur Zeit verhandelten Rückübernahmeabkommens zwischen der EU und der Türkei soll Europol demnach eine besondere Rolle spielen. Angestrebt wird der Ausbau der Zusammenarbeit mit türkischen Polizeikräften und der Abschluss einer hierzu notwendigen Arbeitsvereinbarung.

Laut dem Papier der dänischen Regierung könnte die Migrationsabwehr im Dreiländereck von Griechenland, Bulgarien und der Türkei in der Einrichtung eines “trilateralen gemeinsamen Kontaktzentrums für Polizei-, Grenzschutz- und Zollzusammenarbeit” münden. 38 solcher Kooperationsprojekte entstehen zur Zeit in zahlreichen EU-Mitgliedstaaten. Ihr Vorbild sind die “Zentren für Zusammenarbeit von Polizei und Zoll” (PCCC), die als Pilotprojekte an den Grenzen Deutschlands mit Frankreich (Kehl), Polen (Swiecko) und Luxemburg aufgebaut wurden. Europol ist gehalten, sich verstärkt in die Kooperation mit diesen Zentren von Polizei und Zoll einzubringen. 2010 hatte die Agentur ein entsprechendes Seminar organisiert.

Bereits jetzt ist Europol verstärkt in den Balkanstaaten[13] aktiv. Nach Vorbild Europols errichten 13 Länder unter dem Namen Southeast European Law Enforcement Center[14] (SELEC) eine neue Polizeibehörde, in der Europol eine “Schlüsselrolle” spielen soll. . Das Vorhaben wird von der EU-Kommission gefördert[15] (Wer kontrolliert Europol?[16]).

“Poweruser” Deutschland

Zu den offenen Fragen einer neuen Europol-Rechtsgrundlage gehört vor allem die Erleichterung des Informationsaustausches mit der Agentur. Dabei geht es um das Europol-Informationssystem (EIS) und die Nutzung der sogenannten “Dataloader” durch die EU-Mitgliedstaaten. Diese automatisierte Übermittlung von Informationen über Personen, Sachen oder Vorgänge wird bereits für 81% aller Einspeisungen in das EIS in Anspruch genommen.

Die Mitgliedstaaten nehmen jährlich rund 10.000 Suchabfragen vor. Laut Europol verkraftet das Informationssystem ohne Probleme die doppelte Menge. Schon jetzt gehört Deutschland zu den vier Hauptlieferanten und Datenstaubsaugern bei Europol: Rund ein Drittel aller Daten im EIS stammen vom Bundeskriminalamt, etwa die gleiche Zahl an Abfragen kam über Wiesbaden. Zur “Spitzengruppe” gehören außerdem Frankreich, Belgien und Spanien. 70% der per “Dataloader” gelieferten Datensätze werden von den vier Ländern herangeschafft.

Einige Mitgliedstaaten begründen ihre Zurückhaltung bei der automatisierten Befüllung mittels “Dataloader” damit, dass dadurch qualitativ schlechte und damit für die anderen Mitgliedstaaten unbrauchbare Daten generiert würden. Trotzdem will der Rat der Europäischen Union Schlussfolgerungen verabschieden, um auch die weniger aktiven Mitgliedstaaten unter Druck zu setzen: Die nationalen Europol-Kontaktstellen sollen dann eine feste Quote an übermitteln Datensätzen erfüllen. In der Diskussion sind zudem “finanzielle Anreize”. Der Vorschlag wird unter anderem von Polen und den Niederlanden unterstützt.

Doch der Datenhunger Europols ist damit längst nicht gestillt: Erörtert wird beispielsweise, inwiefern die Nutzung von “Daten aus dem Privatsektor” intensiviert werden könnte. Fraglich ist aber, auf welche Art und Weise diese Informationen überhaupt verwertet werden dürfen. Auch ist unbestimmt, wie Provider, Firmen oder Institute auf entsprechende Anfragen zur Herausgabe von Daten reagieren müssen. Da Europol bislang über keine operativen Kompetenzen in den Mitgliedstaaten verfügt, können entsprechende Anfragen zunächst getrost ignoriert werden. Weitaus delikater ist aber die Frage, inwiefern die privaten Stellen mit Daten von Europol beliefert werden dürfen.

Einleitung von “Ermittlungsinitiativen” anvisiert

Im Rahmen der Kompetenzerweiterung wird darüber diskutiert, ob Europol zukünftig selbst Ermittlungen anstoßen darf (sogenannte “Ermittlungsinitiativen”). Die wesentlich jüngere Agentur Frontex ist dazu im Rahmen ihrer “Gemeinsamen Operationen”[17] bereits ermächtigt. Mit derartigen “Ermittlungsinitiativen” würde Europol aber tief in die Souveränität der Mitgliedstaaten eingreifen. Im Gespräch ist deshalb eine “Subsidiaritätsprüfung”, also die Festlegung einer Schwelle, bis zu der die nationalen Polizeibehörden zuständig bleiben sollen. Gleichzeitig sollen die Zurückweisungsgründe für die Maßnahmen eingeschränkt werden: Wenn die Mitgliedstaaten also eine entsprechende Forderung ablehnen, muss dies gut begründet werden.

Die neuen Ambitionen Europols werden jetzt im “Ständigen Ausschuss für die operative Zusammenarbeit im Bereich der inneren Sicherheit” debattiert. Im November sollen die Verhandlungen in einen Verordnungsvorschlag der EU-Kommission münden, der sowohl zukünftige Aufgaben, Aufbau, Arbeitsweise und den Tätigkeitsbereich definiert.

Parallel zum Upgrade der Polizeiagentur wird auch über eine erweiterte parlamentarische Kontrolle verhandelt. Hierzu hatte die Kommission im April Vertreter nationaler Parlamente und des Europäischen Parlaments eingeladen. Doch das zweistündige Treffen kann kaum als ernsthafte Debatte gelten: Auch der neue Rechtsrahmen von Europol wurde in der kurzen Zeit behandelt.

Die Kommission bietet den Abgeordneten an, sich zukünftig durch jährliche Rechenschaftsberichte und interparlamentarische Aussprachen mit dem Direktor von Europol zu informieren. Dies beträfe aber nur die Strategie von Europol, die Beratungen über Mehrjahresprogramme oder die “Sicherheitslage in der EU”. Es soll sich dabei aber lediglich um einen Gedankenaustausch handeln. Jegliche “Ko-Administration” wird von Europol abgelehnt.

…

Anhang

Links
[1]

http://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/council_decision.pdf
[2]

http://www.heise.de/tp/artikel/31/31792/1.html
[3]

http://dejure.org/gesetze/AEUV/88.html
[4]

http://www.heise.de/tp/artikel/36/36540/1.html
[5]

http://www.heise.de/tp/artikel/36/36540/1.html
[6]

http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/11/st13/st13516.en11.pdf
[7]

http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/17/031/1703143.pdf
[8]

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2011:366:0179:01:DE:HTML
[9]

http://euro-police.noblogs.org/files/2012/04/Debate_on_possible_future_user_requirements_for_Europol.pdf
[10]

http://www.statewatch.org/news/2012/feb/eu-council-cosi-jha-agency-heads-24-11-11-18075-11.pdf
[11]

http://www.statewatch.org/news/2010/feb/eu-cooperation-between-agencies-5816-10.pdf
[12]

http://euro-police.noblogs.org/files/2012/05/eu-aktion-gegen-migrationsdruck.pdf
[13]

http://www.andrej-hunko.de/register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/10/st18/st18148.en10.pdf
[14]

http://www.secicenter.org/m485/SELEC
[15]

http://www.statewatch.org/news/2011/mar/eu-council-draft-conclusions-seci-6504-rev1-11.pdf
[16]

http://www.heise.de/tp/artikel/34/34337/1.html
[17]

http://www.frontex.eu.int/structure/operations_division/joint_operations
[18]

http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/17/082/1708277.pdf

Find this story at & Mai 2012

Matthias Monroy 07.05.2012

Copyright © Telepolis, Heise Zeitschriften Verlag

Police demand the right to snoop on everyone’s emails: Scotland Yard chief is accused of playing politics

Met Police Commissioner slammed for his public support of the Government’s Communications Data Bill
Tory MP Dominic Raab accuses him of being ‘deeply unprofessional’ and jeopardising principle of ‘innocent until proven guilty’
Bill would force communications companies to store data on every website visit, email, text message and social network use for 12 months

Britain’s most senior police officer was accused of playing politics yesterday after he gave his full backing to Government plans to monitor the public’s every internet click.

Metropolitan Police Commissioner Bernard Hogan-Howe endorsed a draft law that critics claim amounts to a snoopers’ charter, saying that in some cases it could be a matter of ‘life or death’.

His actions were branded ‘deeply unprofessional’ and prompted calls for official censure.

Mr Hogan-Howe’s intervention in the Communications Data Bill was compared to that of former Met commissioner Sir Ian Blair, who was accused of lobbying for a Labour plan to allow terrorism suspects to be detained for up to 90 days and also backed controversial ID cards.

Tory MP Dominic Raab said: ‘Just as it was wrong for Sir Ian Blair to lobby for the flawed ID card scheme, it is deeply unprofessional for Commissioner Hogan-Howe to lobby for Big Brother surveillance.

‘It politicises our police and undermines public trust. It’s also shocking that he wants more surveillance powers to “eliminate innocent people from an investigation”.

‘In this country, we’re innocent until proven guilty – not the other way round.’

Former shadow home secretary David Davis, one of the most outspoken critics of the proposed law, said: ‘He will have done his reputation no end of harm by getting involved in this process.’

He said that after Sir Ian spoke out on 90 days detention he was seen as a Government spokesman and, if not careful, the same would be said of Mr Hogan-Howe.

He added: ‘The truth of the matter is this is a highly political issue and the police should stay out of it.’

Mr Hogan-Howe made the comments yesterday in an article for The Times, in which he brought the 2005 Soham murder investigation into his argument, saying police were able to disprove Ian Huntley’s alibi that he did not kill schoolgirls Jessica Chapman and Holly Wells by looking at his phone and text records.

He also appeared alongside Home Secretary Theresa May at a press conference to promote the draft Communications Data Bill.

If made law, it will give ministers powers to demand that internet companies store data on every website visit, email, text message and visit to social networking sites for a minimum of 12 months.

Police and security services would not have access to the content of messages, but would know who was contacted, when and by what method.

The Bill is expected to face fierce criticism from Lib Dem and Tory backbenchers when it is scrutinised by Parliament.

Currently, police can access information that is stored automatically by internet companies, but they say that 25 per cent of the data is not logged, leaving a loophole for determined criminals.

Mrs May said that without the new powers, offenders would go free. ‘We will see people walking the streets who should be behind bars,’ she said.

Sitting alongside her, Mr Hogan-Howe claimed the proposals were no more intrusive than current laws.

But in facing repeated questions over whether he was right to intervene so publicly, the Commissioner accepted there was a risk of the police becoming politicised over the issue.

‘You could say there is a risk [of politicisation], but the thing I’m passionate about is making sure criminals can’t get away with crime,’ he said.

‘If that’s regarded as political, it’s a sorry state of affairs.’

…

Find this story at 14 June 2012

By Jack Doyle

PUBLISHED: 23:14 GMT, 14 June 2012 | UPDATED: 23:14 GMT, 14 June 2012

Published by Associated Newspapers Ltd

Part of the Daily Mail, The Mail on Sunday & Metro Media Group
© Associated Newspapers Ltd

U.S. Security Expands Presence at Foreign Airports

SHANNON, Ireland — An ocean away from the United States, travelers flying out of the international airport here on the west coast of Ireland are confronting one of the newest lines of defense in the war on terrorism: the United States border.

In a section of this airport carved out for the Department of Homeland Security, passengers are screened for explosives and cleared to enter the United States by American Customs and Border Protection officers before boarding. When they land, the passengers walk straight off the plane into the terminal without going through border checks.

At other foreign airports, including those in Madrid, Panama City and Tokyo, American officers advise the local authorities. American programs in other cities expedite travel for passengers regarded as low-risk.

The programs reflect the Obama administration’s ambitious effort to tighten security in the face of repeated attempts by Al Qaeda and other terrorists to blow up planes headed to the United States from foreign airports.

The thinking is simple: By placing officers in foreign countries and effectively pushing the United States border thousands of miles beyond the country’s shores, Americans have more control over screening and security. And it is far better to sort out who is on a flight before it takes off than after a catastrophe occurs.

“It’s a really big deal — it would be like us saying you can have foreign law enforcement operating in a U.S. facility with all the privileges given to law enforcement, but we are going to do it on your territory and on our rules,” the secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, Janet Napolitano, said on a flight back to the United States from the Middle East, where she negotiated with leaders in Israel and Jordan about joint airport security programs. “So you flip it around, and you realize it is a big deal for a country to agree to that. It is also an expensive proposition.”

Airports in 14 countries are participating in the programs, which have been expanded over the last several years and have required substantial concessions from foreign leaders. In many cases they have agreed to allow American officers to be placed in the heart of their airports and to give them the authority to carry weapons, detain passengers and pull them off flights.

Last December, the government of Abu Dhabi signed a letter of intent to build a terminal where American officers will clear passengers to enter the United States, the most ambitious agreement the United States has struck so far with an Arab country. On her recent trip to Jordan, Ms. Napolitano began negotiations with the ruling family there about similar efforts.

Representative Peter T. King, the New York Republican who is chairman of the House Committee on Homeland Security, endorsed the overseas security efforts and said he hoped the department would expand them. “A lot of these attempts are coming from the Middle East,” he said, referring to terrorism plots, “and that drives home that we have an immediate problem and that we need to push for these programs there as hard as we can.”

The Obama administration sped up expansion of the programs, which cost about $115 million a year, after a Qaeda operative tried to detonate explosives hidden in his underwear on a flight from Amsterdam to Detroit on Dec. 25, 2009. The security at foreign airports drew more public attention last month after new reports that intelligence agencies had thwarted another plot by Al Qaeda to detonate an underwear bomb on an American-bound airliner. After that news emerged, Ms. Napolitano said the new measures being put in place in foreign airports for flights to the United States would have stopped a terrorist from boarding a plane with such a bomb.

But critics of the department on Capitol Hill — particularly two Republican committee chairmen in the House, Darrell Issa of California and John L. Mica of Florida — questioned her claims and said that security in foreign airports is not robust enough.

Ms. Napolitano and other Obama administration officials praise the programs as essential to help protect the 80 million passengers a year who fly to the United States from 300 foreign airports, and as a boon for travelers, who save time after landing,

Still, as with many other counterterrorism measures, it is hard to gauge the programs’ success or their impact on Al Qaeda and other terrorists. They have not foiled any major plots so far, and it is hard to imagine terrorists unaware of which airports had a robust American security presence and which were more vulnerable.

Homeland Security officials acknowledge that the United States cannot control security in every airport in the world. The focus, they said, was on expanding an American presence at airports with a significant number of United States-bound flights.

The officials said that of the roughly 30 million travelers who passed through foreign airports with American Customs and Border Protection officers over the past two years, about 500 were deemed national security risks and were turned away or pulled aside for further questioning. Over the same period, about 18,000 air travelers were denied admission to the United States for reasons like having a criminal record or lacking a proper visa.

At Shannon, where American officers have checked passports since 1986, passengers bound for the United States first pass through the Irish government’s airport security and then through three levels of American security: one to check for explosives in shoes and carry-on luggage, then to get clearance to enter the United States, and finally to ensure that checked baggage does not contain contraband.

The biggest problem for the United States is that it cannot compel foreign governments to strengthen security at their airports. But the United States limits flights from foreign airports that do not meet minimum security standards and screen passengers using procedures modeled after those of the Transportation Security Administration.

American officers at foreign airports constitute the next level of security, and the “gold standard” is an arrangement like the one at Shannon, with comprehensive preboarding clearance.

…

Find this story at 13 June 2012

June 13, 2012

By MICHAEL S. SCHMIDT

© 2012 The New York Times Company

Criminele Inlichtingeneenheden waarborgen intern toezicht onvoldoende

CBP-onderzoek naar periodieke controle politiegegevens omtrent zware criminaliteit

Persbericht, 12 juni 2012
Het College bescherming persoonsgegevens (CBP) heeft na onderzoek geconcludeerd dat de Criminele Inlichtingeneenheden (CIE’s) bij twee regionale politiekorpsen, de Koninklijke Marechaussee en een bijzondere opsporingsdienst onvoldoende maatregelen hebben getroffen om de wettelijke eisen omtrent bewaartermijnen van politiegegevens na te leven. Daarmee handelen zij in strijd met de wet. Het CBP deed onderzoek bij de twee regionale politiekorpsen Flevoland en Brabant Zuid-Oost, de Koninklijke Marechaussee en de Inlichtingen en -Opsporingsdienst van de Inspectie Leefomgeving en Transport. De CIE’s verwerken politiegegevens om inzicht te krijgen in de betrokkenheid van personen bij ernstige en georganiseerde misdrijven. Voor de verwerking van deze gevoelige (politie)gegevens omtrent zware criminaliteit gelden strenge wettelijke eisen, mede omdat de informatie niet altijd betrouwbaar is terwijl de risico’s en gevolgen van de verwerking groot kunnen zijn voor de personen die het betreft. De Wet politiegegevens (Wpg) bepaalt dan ook dat dergelijke politiegegevens moeten worden verwijderd zodra zij niet langer noodzakelijk zijn. Daarbij geldt dat uiterlijk vijf jaar nadat voor het laatst gegevens zijn toegevoegd, de gegevens moeten worden verwijderd. De wet eist bovendien een periodieke (jaarlijkse) toets om vast te stellen in hoeverre de gegevens nog noodzakelijk zijn voor het doel waarvoor ze werden verwerkt. Uit het onderzoek blijkt dat geen van de vier onderzochte partijen deze bij wet verplichte periodieke toets uitvoert dan wel niet concreet genoeg toetst of de opgenomen politiegegevens nog noodzakelijk zijn. Ook constateert het CBP dat het verplichte interne toezicht door de privacyfunctionarissen op de naleving van de bewaartermijnen van de gegevens inclusief het toezicht op de periodieke controle van de noodzaak om ze te bewaren, tekort is geschoten.

Lees het rapport van definitieve bevindingen Regionaal politiekorps BZO (528 KB)

Lees het rapport van definitieve bevindingen Regionaal politiekorps Flevoland (528 KB)

Lees het rapport van definitieve bevindingen Koninklijke Marechaussee (502 KB)

Lees het rapport van definitieve bevindingen Inspectie Leefomgeving en Transport – Inlichtingen en Opsporingsdienst (492 KB)
Periodieke controle
De wetgever verplicht tot een periodieke, jaarlijks uit te voeren, interne controle waarna gegevens die niet langer noodzakelijk zijn moeten worden verwijderd. De politie moet daarbij het belang van de registratie van de gegevens voor de uitvoering van de politietaak afwegen tegen de belangen van de betrokkene bij verwijdering. Deze belangenafweging kan leiden tot verwijdering van de gegevens voordat de uiterste bewaartermijn van vijf jaar is verlopen.

Controle door de privacyfunctionaris
De Wpg verplicht de politiekorpsen om een privacyfunctionaris aan te stellen die als taak heeft gegevensverwerkingen intern te controleren, onder meer op de naleving van de bewaartermijnen. Het CBP constateert dat geen van de privacyfunctionarissen de afgelopen jaren een onderzoek heeft uitgevoerd naar (de naleving van de bewaartermijnen van) gegevensverwerkingen door de CIE. Daarmee schiet de verplichte interne controle om de grenzen van de Wpg te bewaken, tekort.

Contractors run U.S. spying missions in Africa

ENTEBBE, Uganda — Four small, white passenger planes sit outside a hangar here under a blazing sun, with no exterior markings save for U.S. registration numbers painted on the tails. A few burly men wearing aviator sunglasses and short haircuts poke silently around the wing flaps and landing gear.

The aircraft are Pilatus PC-12s, turboprops favored by the U.S. Special Operations forces for stealth missions precisely because of their nondescript appearance. There is no hint that they are carrying high-tech sensors and cameras that can film man-size targets from 10 miles away.

To further disguise the mission, the U.S. military has taken another unusual step: It has largely outsourced the spying operation to private contractors. The contractors supply the aircraft as well as the pilots, mechanics and other personnel to help process electronic intelligence collected from the airspace over Uganda, Congo, South Sudan and the Central African Republic.

In October, President Obama sent about 100 elite U.S. troops to central Africa to scour the terrain for Joseph Kony, the messianic and brutal leader of a Ugandan rebel group. But American contractors have been secretly searching for Kony from the skies long before that, at least since 2009, under a project code-named Tusker Sand, according to documents and people familiar with the operation.

The previously unreported practice of hiring private companies to spy on huge expanses of African territory — in this region and in North Africa, where a similar surveillance program is aimed at an al-Qaeda affiliate — has been a cornerstone of the U.S. military’s secret activities on the continent. Unlike uniformed troops, plainclothes contractors are less likely to draw attention.

But because the arms-length arrangement exists outside traditional channels, there is virtually no public scrutiny or oversight. And if something goes wrong, the U.S. government and its partners acknowledge that the contractors are largely on their own.

U.S. Africa Command, which oversees military operations on the continent, declined to discuss specific missions or its reasons for outsourcing the gathering of intelligence.

In response to written questions from The Washington Post, the command stated that contractors would not get special treatment in case of a mishap. Instead, they “would be provided the same assistance that any U.S. citizen would be provided by the U.S. Government should they be in danger.”

Perils of the job

There is precedent for the use of contractors in spying operations. The military hired private firms to conduct airborne surveillance in Latin America in the 1990s and early 2000s, with sometimes-disastrous results.

In 2003, for instance, one American was killed and three others were taken hostage by Colombian insurgents after their plane crashed in the jungle. The contractors, who were working for Northrop Grumman on a Defense Department counter-narcotics program, endured five years of captivity before they were freed in a raid by Colombian police.

Peter W. Singer, a Brookings Institution senior fellow and an expert on military contracting, said the Pentagon typically turns to the private sector for “deniability,” but he added that “it rarely turns out that way.”

“When things go bad, you can have two scenarios,” he said. “Either the contractors are left holding the bag, complaining about abandonment, or else some kind of abuse happens and they’re not held accountable because of a mix of unclear legal accountability and a lack of political will to do something about it.”

Indeed, contractors knowledgeable about the central Africa mission appear to be aware that the downing of one of their planes could have far-reaching implications.

“From a purely political standpoint it is obvious the fallout of such an incident would be immense, especially if hostile forces reached the crash site first,” Commuter Air Technology, an Oklahoma defense firm, wrote in May 2010 in response to a U.S. Africa Command solicitation to expand operations. “This could turn into a prisoner/hostage situation at worst, or at the least a serious foreign relations incident highly damaging to both AFRICOM and the U.S.”

The warning was prescient. That summer, a PC-12 surveillance aircraft operated by a New Jersey contractor as part of Tusker Sand was forced to make an emergency landing in Obo, an isolated town in the Central African Republic where Kony’s forces had terrorized the population.

On board were a handful of Americans working for the firm R-4 Inc., as well as a Ugandan military officer and a Congolese officer.

The unexpected appearance of two foreign soldiers and some Americans aroused the suspicions of tribal leaders, who had been kept in the dark about Tusker Sand by their national government. They detained the crew for several hours as they debated what to do.

“We felt like we were going to prison,” said one of the American contractors involved, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss a sensitive operation.

The contractor said that his group contacted State Department and United Nations officials but that they declined to intervene. It was even harder to track down Africa Command officials, whose headquarters are in Stuttgart, Germany.

“Eventually, we were able to talk our way out of it,” the contractor said. “That’s all we did over there, pay people off and talk our way out of situations.”

Dwight Turner, vice president of overseas operations for R-4, said he was not personally familiar with the incident. He confirmed that his company had been involved in Tusker Sand but declined to comment further.

A growing appetite

When Tusker Sand began in late 2009, it consisted of a single PC-12, operating out of a Ugandan military hangar at Entebbe airport. The hangar also housed a Gulfstream aircraft for the country’s president, Yoweri Museveni.

According to the contractor who worked for R-4, the presidential palace was so protective of Museveni’s plane that the Americans were required to push their PC-12 out of the hangar by hand, instead of with a tractor, to avoid inadvertent scrapes.

The U.S. military’s appetite for surveillance quickly grew. On June 11, 2010, the Africa Command participated in an “Industry Day” to drum up interest. More than 50 private contractors were invited to develop proposals to expand Tusker Sand and Creek Sand, the program aimed at al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, which operates mainly in Mali.

Unclassified documents prepared for the event show that the military wanted contractors to provide at least a combined 44 personnel for the programs, with double that number if the Africa Command decided to “surge” either one of them. At a minimum, contractors were told that they would have to keep planes flying for 150 hours a month.

Among the jobs to be outsourced: pilots, sensor operators, intelligence analysts, mechanics and linguists. The expectation was that the personnel would be veterans; most needed to certify that they had passed the military’s survival, resistance and escape training course, because of the possibility of aircrews being downed behind enemy lines.

Contractors would have to supply the surveillance gear, including electro-optical and infrared sensors that work in the dark, and a laser-emitting sensor that can peer under the jungle canopy. All had to be concealed within the body of the plane with retractable mounting to avoid attracting suspicion.

Another document stipulated that prospective firms fly “innocuous” aircraft that would “blend into the local operating area.” In a PowerPoint presentation posted on a federal government Web site for contractors, the Africa Command warned firms bidding for the work that African countries would be “uncomfortable” with activities that might look suspicious, adding: “Don’t want covert aircraft, just friendly looking aircraft.”

In addition to expanding Tusker Sand and Creek Sand, the Africa Command said it wanted to start a drone-based program, dubbed Tusker Wing, to search for members of Kony’s militia, the Lord’s Resistance Army.

That plan envisioned contractors using blimps equipped with cameras as well as ScanEagles, small and unmanned aircraft that can be launched with a catapult but stay aloft for 22 hours at a time, according to Gene Healey, a contractor who helped prepare a study for the Africa Command.

Healey said the Africa Command was initially enthusiastic about Tusker Wing but canceled the program, without explanation, before it got off the ground. Africa Command officials declined to comment.

Nonetheless, the number of manned surveillance flights for Tusker Sand has gradually increased. A new contractor, Sierra Nevada Corp., began operating PC-12 flights out of Entebbe in August.

Michelle Erlach, a spokeswoman for Sierra Nevada Corp., based in Sparks, Nev., declined to answer questions about Tusker Sand or the firm’s activities in Africa. “I cannot give any details on that,” she said.

The Africa Command declined to answer questions about the contract for Tusker Sand, saying it was “proprietary in nature.”

Allies on the Hill

Tusker Sand could soon receive another boost.

In March, Sen. James M. Inhofe (R-Okla.), one of Congress’s leading voices on Africa, issued a statement expressing concern that the U.S. military was being hindered in its efforts to track the Lord’s Resistance Army.

He called on the Obama administration to give the Africa Command “the full availability” of surveillance aircraft and equipment necessary to catch Kony and conduct other counterterrorism missions.

In an interview a month later, however, Inhofe said Africa Command officials told him that things had improved and that they were no longer being shortchanged. “I have been reassured,” he said. “I think they right now have the assets they need.”

Asked whether he had any qualms about private contractors operating spy missions on behalf of the U.S. military, Inhofe said he’d “rather not get into that.”

“They are working with contractors on these things, and I know there are a lot of people involved,” he added. “I’m just not going to elaborate on where they are or what they’re doing.”

Late last month, however, the Senate Armed Services Committee passed a measure authorizing $50 million for the Defense Department to “enhance and expand” surveillance operations to help Ugandan and other regional militaries search for Kony.

A congressional staff member said the legislators’ priority was to increase and improve the surveillance operations as quickly as possible, adding that Congress was not necessarily opposed to using private companies for the Kony manhunt.

“It’s a concern, but when you’re short on resources, it’s what you have to do,” said the staffer, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive operations. “It’s a permissive environment. Nobody’s getting shot at, and we’re just collecting intelligence.”

…

Find this story at 15 June 2012

Staff researcher Julie Tate in Washington contributed to this report.

By Craig Whitlock, Published: June 15

© The Washington Post Company

Prostitutes, drunken behaviour and illegal wiretaps: US reveals accusations against Secret Service

The US government has revealed details of serious allegations since 2004 against Secret Service agents and officers, including claims of involvement with prostitutes, leaking sensitive information, publishing pornography, sexual assault, illegal wiretaps, improper use of weapons and drunken behavior. It was not immediately clear how many of the accusations were confirmed to be true.

The heavily censored list — which runs 229 pages — was quietly released today under the US Freedom of Information Act to The Associated Press and other news organizations following the Secret Service prostitution scandal in Colombia. It describes accusations filed against Secret Service employees with the Homeland Security Department’s inspector general. The service protects the president and those close to him.

In many cases, the government noted that some of the claims were resolved administratively, and others were being formally investigated.

Basic details of the dozens of complaints were first revealed last month during a Senate hearing about the Colombia scandal, as senators questioned whether the Colombia incident was a sign of a broader culture problem at the storied agency tasked with protecting the president.

Secret Service Direct Mark Sullivan apologized for the incident during the May hearing, but insisted that it was an isolated case.

The list of complaints, however, suggested otherwise senators said at the time.

Secret Service officials did not immediately comment today.

…

AP

Find this story at 15 June 2012

Alicia A Caldwell
Friday, 15 June 2012

© independent.co.uk

Journalisten moesten Chinezen bespioneren

 

Van een onzer verslaggevers AMSTERDAM, vrijdag Personen die door de AIVD worden benaderd om als informant of agent voor de dienst te gaan werken, kunnen hiertoe niet gedwongen worden , zo benadrukt de inlichtingendienst. Net zomin kunnen zij gedwongen worden om bepaalde informatie te verstrekken. Zowel de medewerking als de informatieverstrekking aan de AIVD is dus geheel vrijwillig en betreft primair de verantwoordelijkheid van de betrokken persoon zelf.

 

Uit informatie die De Telegraaf heeft ontvangen, blijkt dat de Nederlandse journalisten is gevraagd verslagen over en foto s te maken van Chinese officials die contact zochten met Nederlandse officials en vertegenwoordigers van het bedrijfsleven en de overheid, die bijeenkwamen in het Holland Heineken House.

 

De AIVD wil niet ingaan op verdere vragen, bijvoorbeeld hoe de betrokken journalisten voor vertrek naar China werden geïnstrueerd en of Nederlandse journalisten vaker worden benaderd als bron voor de geheime dienst.

 

…

Find this Story at 15 juni 2012 

© 1996-2012 Telegraaf Media Nederland | Landelijke Media B.V., Amsterdam.

Intelligent kill: The dirty art of secret assassination

State-sponsored foreign assassinations of military, religious, ideological and political figures are an ugly reality of world history.

By means of sudden, irregular or secret attack, there is even a common euphemism in international law which bluntly describes the practice: targeted killing.

According to a UN special report on the subject, targeted killings are “premeditated acts of lethal force employed by states in times of peace or during armed conflict to eliminate specific individuals outside their custody”.

And it works something like this.

A state deems a certain individual wanted or a danger to its national security. After ruling out any feasible attempt to bring them to their own jurisdiction, usually because they are based in a third country, it deems itself responsible with silencing them by whatever means necessary.

The operational dynamics are then conducted under the auspices of one of two possible dimensions.

Either to eliminate the target under a fog of plausible deniability, in order for the state authorities to wash their hands clean of any discreditable action in a foreign land, and by extension any prosecution should its agents be captured; or to have blatant disregard to the norms of international law by reference to domestic constitutions that empower them to act under the guise of self-defence – in order to protect themselves from imminent threats of attack.

The use of targeted killing has become quite common in the aftermath of 9/11. U.S. Predator drones strikes against Al Qaeda targets in Pakistan and the Yemen, Israeli airstrikes against Palestinian leaders in the occupied territories and Russian targeting of Chechen separatists in the Caucasus — are just a few recent examples.

But the covert practice of this art has always been a lot murkier.

In 1942, formerly secret memos now reveal how the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) secretly trained Czechoslovakian volunteers to assassinate Reinhard Heydrich, one of the most feared men in Nazi Germany, in a daring ambush on his motorcade.

Alternatively, the main security services of the Third Reich, the RSHA, had in place its own clandestine unit which planned to target Allied soldiers with poisoned coffee, chocolate and cigarettes; as part of a ruthless terrorist campaign.

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union’s equivalent of the CIA, the KGB, poisoned two of its dissidents abroad, once by firing a tiny Ricin-infested pellet from a specially designed umbrella into the target’s leg; and on another occasion by a spray gun firing a jet of poison gas from a crushed cyanide ampoule.

But even when the intended targets happen to miraculously survive a surreptitiously planned death, the devil that’s in the detail can be just as intriguing.

The CIA attempted to kill Cuban dictator Fidel Castro on numerous occasions by utilizing everything from exploding cigars, mafia contractors and femmes fatales — albeit without success.

On another occasion, the CIA unsuccessfully attempted to kill the Republic of Congo’s first Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba, using a tube of doctored toothpaste which would have left him dead, apparently of Polio.

In 2004, Ukrainian opposition leader Victor Yushenko was poisoned with TCDD, the most toxic form of Polychlorinated Dibenzodioxins, otherwise known as Dioxins, by what is largely suspected were pro-Russian individuals within the state’s security apparatus.

Although many of the shrewd techniques that have been secretly used in the murder of dissidents and enemies abroad have long been acknowledged in the post-cold war era, many practices may still be eluding us by virtue of remaining shrouded in anonymity, even to this day.

But generally speaking, secret state-sponsored targeted killings are still synonymous with booby-trapped car bombs, sniper hits, exploding cell phones and even small arms fire.

In recent years, however, the art of these smart assassinations – designed in the most part to make a person’s death look somewhat natural – have now been refined by the most unthinkable of materials.

And you don’t have to look beyond what happened to Alexander Litvenenko, a former officer in Russia’s internal security force, FSB, and critic of Vladimir Putin’s rule, in London on November 2006.

After meeting what he ostensibly thought were two former KGB officers for tea in a hotel bar, within hours he was hospitalized with mysterious symptoms including progressively severe hair loss, vomiting and diarrhea for three weeks — before he ultimately succumbed to his horrible death.

His post-mortem finally furnished us with details. He was poisoned it turns out, with tiny a nuclear substance, the radioactive isotope, Polonium-210. Its acute radiation syndrome that he ingested virtually meant he had no chance of survival.

The UK authorities were able to piece together trails of the material as left by the culprits, incidentally right back to Russia itself, where almost all the world’s polonium is produced.

The logic of administering such toxic materials was in fact deliberate. Polonium-210 is something which is normally undetectable; as a rare radioactive isotope it emits alpha particles, not the common gamma radiation that standard radiological equipment would detect in hospitals.

The accused culprits may have underestimated the determination of the British authorities to uncover the whole plot, but simultaneously the incident also told us something; the Russians were not going to play by the old rules – they were going to rewrite them.

It would be wrong to assume, however, that biological poisons, chemical agents and nuclear materials are the only things used in smart killings. In fact, the use of materials designed for rudimentary medical procedures have also taken on a new course.

Israel’s Mossad, long considered the most effective intelligence agency in the world per magnitude, and no stranger to the world of targeted killing in foreign countries, has two shiny examples.

In September 1997, Mossad agents sprayed Hamas Leader Khaled Meshal with the poison Levofentanyl – a modified version of the widely-used painkiller Fentany – by using a small camera which served as a trajectory. Although the agents were later apprehended, and eventually exchanged the antidote (following lengthy behind-the-scenes negotiations before it was eventually given to the victim), the audacity of the materials they used spoke volumes: it was designed not to leave any visible or tell-tale signs of harm on the target’s body.

In January 2010, Hamas military commander Mohammad Al Mabhouh was found dead in his Dubai hotel room in what initially appeared to be death by natural causes.

However, upon thorough investigation, not only were 26 suspects (believed to have emanated from Israel) fingered, but the circumstances surrounding his death also soon transpired.

Al Mabhouh was injected in his leg with Succinylcholine, a quick-acting, depolarizing paralytic muscle relaxant. It causes almost instant loss of motor skills, but does not induce loss of consciousness or anesthesia. He was then apparently suffocated — ostensibly to quicken the pace of his death.

In his bestselling book, Gordon Thomas, author of Gideon Spies: The Secret History of the Mossad, gives a chilling and detailed account of how the Mossad uses Biochemists and genetic scientists in order to develop lethal cocktails as bottled agents of death.

This includes the development of nerve agents, choking agents, blood agents, and blister agents – including Tuban (virtually odorless and invisible when dispensed in aerosol or vapor form), Soman (the last of the Nazi nerve gasses to be discovered which also has a slightly fruity odour and is invincible in vapour format), blister agents (which include chlorine, phosgene and diphosgene, and smell of new-mown grass) and blood agents (including those with a cyanide base).

The point to extrapolate is clear. States that employ the practice of smart assassination techniques see them as effective strategies that are justified. They don’t need to admit to carrying them out, but we know they are happening.

An obvious concern raised here is that their almost pathological unwillingness to answer questions about the consequences of resorting to such assassinations – or covert targeted killings – will result in the practice becoming more widespread.

The arbitrary stretching of legal justifications for such assassinations, premised on what an individual country recognizes as self-defence, indirectly renders them to be bound by no limits — and by extension may serve as encouragement for other nations to follow suit, if they interpret their national security considerations being failed by international treaty and cooperation.

Just last month, British Police warned two outspoken Rwandan dissidents of threats to their lives by the Rwandan government, which could come in ‘any form’ or by ‘unconventional means’.

…

Find this story at 19 June 2012

By Mohammad I. Aslam
Tuesday, 19 June 2012 at 3:00 am

©independent.co.uk

 

Netpol 2012 breaks new revelations of private sector snooping on protest

New evidence of the disturbing practices of private sector companies seeking ‘intelligence’ on protest organisations was revealed by documentary photographer and investigative journalist Marc Vallée at Sundays Netpol conference.

Speaking on the subject of Olympic policing, Marc Vallée told how he had been personally approached for information on protest groups by a private sector company specialising in risk analysis. The company, Exclusive Analysis, asked him to provide any information he had about direct action and protest groups, particularly the groups No Tar Sands, Rising Tide UK, Climate Camp and UKuncut.

Exclusive Analysis promotes themselves as “a specialist intelligence company that forecasts commercially relevant political and violent risks.” Their website claimed they work with a range of private sector and government clients, including intelligence and national security agencies.

Marc Vallée was approached by a Richard Bond, who stated he was an employee of Exclusive Analysis. He told Mr Vallée that Exclusive Analysis had a number of clients that ‘had interests in’ the Olympic games. Asked whether there was an Olympic context to the information they were after, Richard Bond replied, “We have followed these groups for a long time. Yes we are looking at them for the Olympics.”

Exclusive Analysis are one of a growing number of private sector organisations providing intelligence or vetting information to private sector companies on protest activity. One of the roles of Exclusive Analysis appears to be the provision of intelligence and information that enables private companies to better manage or control the ‘risks’ from political action.
The company website claimed that as well as dealing with global terrorism threats, “Our regional teams analyse data and risk indicators on other groups (from violent single-issue groups focused on animal rights, the environment and pro-life activism to politically motivated groups such as anarchists and the extreme right and extreme left.”

Find this story at 22 May 2012

 

Hits en hints: De mogelijke meerwaarde van ANPR voor de opsporing

Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) is een techniek waarmee kentekens met behulp van camera’s automatisch worden gelezen en vervolgens worden vergeleken met één of meer referentiebestanden. Deze bestanden bevatten kentekens waarmee iets aan de hand is, bijvoorbeeld een openstaande boete, een gestolen voertuig of een rijontzegging. Er zijn op dit moment 90 mobiele en 120 vaste ANPR-camera’s in gebruik bij de Nederlandse politie.
Dit onderzoek maakt duidelijk of, en zo ja hoe, ANPR kan bijdragen aan (verbeterde) opsporing, vervolging en berechting van delictplegers.
De probleemstelling van dit onderzoek is als volgt geformuleerd:
Hoe wordt binnen de Nederlandse strafrechtspleging gebruik gemaakt van ANPR?
Op welke elementen van de strafrechtsketen is ANPR van invloed?
Draagt de inzet van ANPR bij aan een effectiever werkende strafrechtsketen en zo ja, hoe dan?

Inhoudsopgave:
Managementsamenvatting
English summary
Inleiding
ANPR in Nederland
Wetgeving en bewaartermijn
Beoordelingskader ANPR
Stap 1: Scannen
Stap 2: Referentielijsten en hits
Stap 3: Reactie
Neveneffecten, knelpunten en kosten/baten
Slotbeschouwing
Bijlagen
Auteur(s): Flight, S., Egmond, P. van
Organisatie: DSP-groep, WODC
Plaats uitgave: Amsterdam

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Undercover policeman planted bomb in 1987 Debenhams blast that caused millions of pounds worth of damage to ‘prove worth’ to animal rights group he was infiltrating, claims Green Party MP

News revealed as minister said undercover officers CAN have sex with environmental activists to maintain their cover

Bob Lambert planted a bomb in Debenhams inHarrowin 1987, MP says using parliamentary privilege

Three bombs planted during the coordinated attacks

Two bombers were caught and jailed, but the third one was never traced

An undercover policeman planted a bomb in a department store to prove his commitment to animal rights extremists, an MP claimed yesterday.

Bob Lambert is accused of leaving an incendiary device in a Debenhams inLondon– one of three set off in a coordinated attack in 1987.

Caroline Lucas, leader of the Green Party, used parliamentary privilege to claim that Mr Lambert – who went under the alias Bob Robinson – carried out the attack after infiltrating the Animal Liberation Front.

The group planted the devices in protest at the store’s decision to sell fur products.

The attacks caused £8million of damage and led Debenhams to stop selling fur.

The claims were strongly denied by Mr Lambert, who is now a leading academic and expert in terrorism and Islamophobia at St Andrew’s University.

Following the July 1987 attacks on Debenhams, two activists – Geoff Sheppard and Andrew Clarke – were jailed for planting devices in theLutonand Romford stores.

Sheppard received a sentence of four years and four months, while Clarke was jailed for more than three years. The third activist involved was never caught.

Miss Lucas yesterday said she had seen a witness statement from Sheppard claiming the third man was Mr Lambert and that he targeted a store inHarrow.

She told MPs that Sheppard was not there when the bomb was planted. She read from his statement, which said: ‘I straightaway knew that Bob had carried out his part of the plan.

‘There’s absolutely no doubt in my mind whatsoever that Bob Lambert placed the incendiary device at the Debenhams store inHarrow.

‘I specifically remember him giving an explanation to me about how he had been able to place one of the devices in that store, but how he had not been able to place the second device.’

Miss Lucas alleged that when Sheppard’s flat was raided two months later while he was making four more fire-bombs, the intelligence was so accurate it ‘came from Bob Lambert’.

Calling for an inquiry into the activities of undercover officers, Miss Lucas told MPs: ‘It would seem that planting the third incendiary device was perhaps a move designed to bolster Lambert’s credibility and reinforce the impression of a genuine and dedicated activist.

 

‘There is no doubt in my mind that anyone planting an incendiary device in a department store is guilty of a very serious crime and should have charges brought against them.’

 

Mr Lambert said: ‘It was necessary to create the false impression that I was a committed animal rights extremist to gain intelligence so as to disrupt serious criminal conspiracies.

 

‘However, I did not commit serious crime such as planting an incendiary device at the Debenhams Harrow store.’

 

Mr Lambert infiltrated the Animal Liberation Front in the late 1980s and his evidence was used to convict Sheppard and Clarke.

 

He went on to become a police spymaster who led a network of undercover officers who infiltrated radical groups.

…

 

Find this story at 13 june 2012

By Kirsty Walker and Chris Greenwood

PUBLISHED: 14:27 GMT, 13 June 2012  | UPDATED: 00:45 GMT, 14 June 2012

Published by Associated Newspapers Ltd

Part of the Daily Mail, The Mail on Sunday & Metro Media Group

© Associated Newspapers Ltd

Tappen en infiltreren

De telefoontap is een veelvuldig ingezet opsporingsmiddel. Nu de inzet van telefoontap steeds minder effectief blijkt en de internettap nog in de kinderschoenen staat, lijkt het voor de hand te liggen dat er in de opsporing meer aandacht zal komen voor andere bijzondere opsporingsmethoden, zoals observatie (stelselmatig volgen), infiltratie, pseudokoop en -dienstverlening, undercover stelselmatig informatie inwinnen, inkijken, direct afluisteren en bijstand en opsporing door burgers (informanten en infiltranten). In dit themanummer wordt daarnaast aandacht besteed aan het fenomeen exfiltratie, ofwel meewerkende criminele getuige.

Inhoudsopgave:
Voorwoord
Wie belt er nou nog? De veranderende opbrengst van de telefoontap – G. Odinot en D. de Jong
Mogelijkheden en beperkingen van de internettap – J.J. Oerlemans
Opsporingsbevoegdheden en privacy; een internationale vergelijking – J.B.J. van der Leij
Undercoveroperaties: een noodzaakelijk kwaad? Heden, verleden en toekomst van een omstreden opsporingsmiddel – E.W. Kruisbergen en D. de Jong
De exfiltratie van verdachte en veroordeelde criminelen; over de onmisbaarheid van een effectieve regeling voor coöperatieve criminele getuigen – C. Fijnaut
Summaries

Organisatie: WODC
Plaats uitgave: Den Haag

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Het gebruik van de telefoon- en internettap in de opsporing

De minister van Justitie heeft tijdens een Algemeen Overleg over tapstatistieken toegezegd een onderzoek te laten verrichten naar de effectiviteit van telefoon- en internettaps (TK 2009-2010, 30 517, nr. 16).
Dit rapport heeft als doel inzicht te bieden in het feitelijk gebruik van de telefoon- en internettap bij opsporing van strafbare feiten. In het onderzoek wordt uitgegaan van een getrapte vraagstelling:
Hoe wordt in Nederland gebruikgemaakt van de telefoon- en internettap tijdens het opsporingsproces?
Hoe wordt in enkele andere West-Europese landen (Engeland en Wales, Duitsland en Zweden) met dit opsporingsmiddel omgegaan?
Kunnen (grote) verschillen tussen deze landen in het gebruik van dit opsporingsmiddel worden verklaard?
Deze vraagstelling is uitgewerkt in verschillende onderzoeksvragen, die zich samen laten vatten als: hoe vaak, waarom en wanneer wordt de telefoon- en internettap ingezet, voor hoe lang wordt een tap aangesloten en wat voor een informatie levert het dan op?

Inhoudsopgave:
Voorwoord
Afkortingen
Samenvatting
Inleiding
De telefoon- en internetmarkt
Regulering van tappen in Nederland
Wat is een tap en hoe komt deze tot stand?
De tapstatistieken in Nederland
De telefoontap in de praktijk
De internettap in de praktijk
Alternatieven voor de tap
Het gebruik van de tap in Engeland en Wales
Het gebruik van de tap in Zweden
Het gebruik van de tap in Duitsland
Slotbeschouwing

Auteur(s): Odinot, G., Jong, D. de, Leij, J.B.J. van der, Poot, C.J. de, Straalen, E.K. van
Organisatie: WODC
Plaats uitgave: Den Haag

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U.S. expands secret intelligence operations in Africa

OUAGADOUGOU, Burkina Faso — The U.S. military is expanding its secret intelligence operations across Africa, establishing a network of small air bases to spy on terrorist hideouts from the fringes of the Sahara to jungle terrain along the equator, according to documents and people involved in the project. At the heart of the surveillance operations are small, unarmed turboprop aircraft disguised as private planes. Equipped with hidden sensors that can record full-motion video, track infrared heat patterns, and vacuum up radio and cellphone signals, the planes refuel on isolated airstrips favored by African bush pilots, extending their effective flight range by thousands of miles. About a dozen air bases have been established in Africa since 2007, according to a former senior U.S. commander involved in setting up the network. Most are small operations run out of secluded hangars at African military bases or civilian airports. The nature and extent of the missions, as well as many of the bases being used, have not been previously reported but are partially documented in public Defense Department contracts. The operations have intensified in recent months, part of a growing shadow war against al-Qaeda affiliates and other militant groups. The surveillance is overseen by U.S. Special Operations forces but relies heavily on private military contractors and support from African troops. The surveillance underscores how Special Operations forces, which have played an outsize role in the Obama administration’s national security strategy, are working clandestinely all over the globe, not just in war zones. The lightly equipped commando units train foreign security forces and perform aid missions, but they also include teams dedicated to tracking and killing terrorism suspects. The establishment of the Africa missions also highlights the ways in which Special Operations forces are blurring the lines that govern the secret world of intelligence, moving aggressively into spheres once reserved for the CIA. The CIA has expanded its counterterrorism and intelligence-gathering operations in Africa, but its manpower and resources pale in comparison with those of the military. U.S. officials said the African surveillance operations are necessary to track terrorist groups that have taken root in failed states on the continent and threaten to destabilize neighboring countries. A hub for secret network A key hub of the U.S. spying network can be found in Ouagadougou (WAH-gah-DOO-goo), the flat, sunbaked capital of Burkina Faso, one of the most impoverished countries in Africa. Under a classified surveillance program code-named Creek Sand, dozens of U.S. personnel and contractors have come to Ouagadougou in recent years to establish a small air base on the military side of the international airport. The unarmed U.S. spy planes fly hundreds of miles north to Mali, Mauritania and the Sahara, where they search for fighters from al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, a regional network that kidnaps Westerners for ransom. The surveillance flights have taken on added importance in the turbulent aftermath of a March coup in Mali, which has enabled al-Qaeda sympathizers to declare an independent Islamist state in the northern half of the country. Elsewhere, commanders have said they are increasingly worried about the spread of Boko Haram, an Islamist group in Nigeria blamed for a rash of bombings there. U.S. forces are orchestrating a regional intervention in Somalia to target al-Shabab, another al-Qaeda affiliate. In Central Africa, about 100 American Special Operations troops are helping to coordinate the hunt for Joseph Kony, the Ugandan leader of a brutal guerrilla group known as the Lord’s Resistance Army. The results of the American surveillance missions are shrouded in secrecy. Although the U.S. military has launched airstrikes and raids in Somalia, commanders said that in other places, they generally limit their involvement to sharing intelligence with allied African forces so they can attack terrorist camps on their own territory. The creeping U.S. military involvement in long-simmering African conflicts, however, carries risks. Some State Department officials have expressed reservations about the militarization of U.S. foreign policy on the continent. They have argued that most terrorist cells in Africa are pursuing local aims, not global ones, and do not present a direct threat to the United States. The potential for creating a popular backlash can be seen across the Red Sea, where an escalating campaign of U.S. drone strikes in Yemen is angering tribesmen and generating sympathy for an al-Qaeda franchise there. In a response to written questions from The Washington Post, the U.S. Africa Command said that it would not comment on “specific operational details.” “We do, however, work closely with our African partners to facilitate access, when required, to conduct missions or operations that support and further our mutual security goals,” the command said. Surveillance and intelligence-gathering operations, it added, are “simply a tool we employ to enable host nation militaries to better understand the threat picture.” Uncovering the details The U.S. military has largely kept details of its spy flights in Africa secret. The Post pieced together descriptions of the surveillance network by examining references to it in unclassified military reports, U.S. government contracting documents and diplomatic cables released by WikiLeaks, the anti-secrecy group. Further details were provided by interviews with American and African officials, as well as military contractors. In addition to Burkina Faso, U.S. surveillance planes have operated periodically out of nearby Mauritania. In Central Africa, the main hub is in Uganda, though there are plans to open a base in South Sudan. In East Africa, U.S. aircraft fly out of bases in Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya and the Indian Ocean archipelago of the Seychelles. Army Gen. Carter F. Ham, the head of U.S. Africa Command, which is responsible for military operations on the continent, hinted at the importance and extent of the air bases while testifying before Congress in March. Without divulging locations, he made clear that, in Africa, he wanted to expand “ISR,” the military’s acronym for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. “Without operating locations on the continent, ISR capabilities would be curtailed, potentially endangering U.S. security,” Ham said in a statement submitted to the House Armed Services Committee. “Given the vast geographic space and diversity in threats, the command requires increased ISR assets to adequately address the security challenges on the continent.” Some of the U.S. air bases, including ones in Djibouti, Ethiopia and the Seychelles, fly Predator and Reaper drones, the original and upgraded models, respectively, of the remotely piloted aircraft that the Obama administration has used to kill al-Qaeda leaders in Pakistan and Yemen. “We don’t have remotely piloted aircraft in many places other than East Africa, but we could,” said a senior U.S. military official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss intelligence matters. “If there was a need to do so and those assets were available, I’m certain we could get the access and the overflight [permission] that is necessary to do that.” Common aircraft Most of the spy flights in Africa, however, take off the old-fashioned way — with pilots in the cockpit. The conventional aircraft hold two big advantages over drones: They are cheaper to operate and far less likely to draw attention because they are so similar to the planes used throughout Africa. The bulk of the U.S. surveillance fleet is composed of single-engine Pilatus PC-12s, small passenger and cargo utility planes manufactured in Switzerland. The aircraft are not equipped with weapons. They often do not bear military markings or government insignia. The Pentagon began acquiring the planes in 2005 to fly commandos into territory where the military wanted to maintain a clandestine presence. The Air Force variant of the aircraft is known as the U-28A. The Air Force Special Operations Command has about 21 of the planes in its inventory. In February, a U-28A crashed as it was returning to Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, the only permanent U.S. military base in Africa. Four airmen from the Air Force Special Operations Command were killed. It was the first reported fatal incident involving a U-28A since the military began deploying the aircraft six years ago. Air Force officials said that the crash was an accident and that they are investigating the cause. Military officials declined to answer questions about the flight’s mission. Because of its strategic location on the Horn of Africa, Camp Lemonnier is a hub for spy flights in the region. It is about 500 miles from southern Somalia, an area largely controlled by the al-Shabab militia. Lemonnier is even closer — less than 100 miles — to Yemen, where another al-Qaeda franchise has expanded its influence and plotted attacks against the United States. Elsewhere in Africa, the U.S. military is relying on private contractors to provide and operate PC-12 spy planes in the search for Kony, the fugitive leader of the Lord’s Resistance Army, a group known for mutilating victims, committing mass rape and enslaving children as soldiers. Ham, the Africa Command chief, said in his testimony to Congress in March that he was seeking to establish a base for surveillance flights in Nzara, South Sudan. Although that would bolster the hunt for Kony, who is wanted by the International Criminal Court, it would also enable the U.S. military to keep an eye on the worsening conflict between Sudan and South Sudan. The two countries fought a civil war for more than two decades and are on the verge of war again, in part over potentially rich oil deposits valued by foreign investors. Other aviation projects are in the offing. An engineering battalion of Navy Seabees has been assigned to complete a $10 million runway upgrade this summer at the Manda Bay Naval Base, a Kenyan military installation on the Indian Ocean. An Africa Command spokeswoman said the runway extension is necessary so American C-130 troop transport flights can land at night and during bad weather. About 120 U.S. military personnel and contractors are stationed at Manda Bay, which Navy SEALs and other commandos have used as a base from which to conduct raids against Somali pirates and al-Shabab fighters. About 6,000 miles to the west, the Pentagon is spending $8.1 million to upgrade a forward operating base and airstrip in Mauritania, on the western edge of the Sahara. The base is near the border with strife-torn Mali. The Defense Department also set aside $22.6 million in July to buy a Pilatus PC-6 aircraft and another turboprop plane so U.S.-trained Mauritanian security forces can conduct rudimentary surveillance operations, according to documents submitted to Congress. Crowding the embassy The U.S. military began building its presence in Burkina Faso in 2007, when it signed a deal that enabled the Pentagon to establish a Joint Special Operations Air Detachment in Ouagadougou. At the time, the U.S. military said the arrangement would support “medical evacuation and logistics requirements” but provided no other details. By the end of 2009, about 65 U.S. military personnel and contractors were working in Burkina Faso, more than in all but three other African countries, according to a U.S. Embassy cable from Ouagadougou. In the cable, diplomats complained to the State Department that the onslaught of U.S. troops and support staff had “completely overwhelmed” the embassy. In addition to Pilatus PC-12 flights for Creek Sand, the U.S. military personnel in Ouagadougou ran a regional intelligence “fusion cell” code-named Aztec Archer, according to the cable. Burkina Faso, a predominantly Muslim country whose name means “the land of upright men,” does not have a history of radicalism. U.S. military officials saw it as an attractive base because of its strategic location bordering the Sahel, the arid region south of the Sahara where al-Qaeda’s North African affiliate is active. Unlike many other governments in the region, the one in Burkina Faso was relatively stable. The U.S. military operated Creek Sand spy flights from Nouakchott, Mauritania, until 2008, when a military coup forced Washington to suspend relations and end the surveillance, according to former U.S. officials and diplomatic cables. In Ouagadougou, both sides have worked hard to keep the partnership quiet. In a July 2009 meeting, Yero Boly, the defense minister of Burkina Faso, told a U.S. Embassy official that he was pleased with the results. But he confessed he was nervous that the unmarked American planes might draw “undue attention” at the airport in the heart of the capital and suggested that they move to a more secluded hangar. “According to Boly, the present location of the aircraft was in retrospect not an ideal choice in that it put the U.S. aircraft in a section of the airfield that already had too much traffic,” according to a diplomatic cable summarizing the meeting. “He also commented that U.S. personnel were extremely discreet.” U.S. officials raised the possibility of basing the planes about 220 miles to the west, in the city of Bobo Dioulasso, according to the cable. Boly said that the Americans could use that airport on a “short term or emergency basis” but that a U.S. presence there “would likely draw greater attention.” In an interview with The Post, Djibril Bassole, the foreign minister of Burkina Faso, praised security relations between his country and the United States, saying they were crucial to containing al-Qaeda forces in the region. “We need to fight and protect our borders,” he said. “Once they infiltrate your country, it’s very, very difficult to get them out.” Bassole declined, however, to answer questions about the activities of U.S. Special Operations forces in his country. “I cannot provide details, but it has been very, very helpful,” he said. “This cooperation should be very, very discreet. We should not show to al-Qaeda that we are now working with the Americans.” Discretion is not always strictly observed. In interviews last month, residents of Ouagadougou said American service members and contractors stand out, even in plainclothes, and are appreciated for the steady business they bring to bars and a pizzeria in the city center. … Find this story at 14 June 2012 By Craig Whitlock, Thursday, June 14, 4:02 AM © The Washington Post Company

Undercover Policing

Caroline Lucas (Brighton, Pavilion, Green)

It is a pleasure to hold this debate under your chairmanship, Mr Davies. I am very grateful for the opportunity to raise the issue of the rules governing undercover police infiltrators and informers.

I am sure the House will agree that when it comes to the deployment of undercover police officers, transparency and accountability are of the utmost importance. In recent months, however, a number of cases have come to light that seem to expose serious abuses of any guidelines that we might reasonably assume inform what police officers working undercover can and cannot do. The cases raise important questions about whether such guidelines are ever enforced, whether individuals who breach them are properly held to account, and the extent to which infiltration of campaign groups is a legitimate, or even effective, tactic. Also, I have details of new allegations relating to the behaviour of one undercover officer that I believe require immediate investigation and raise questions about the convictions of two individuals.

Since at least the 1968 protests against the Vietnam war, police chiefs, backed by successive Governments, have used the tactic of infiltration to secure more reliable intelligence about political demonstrations than could be provided by informants. Undercover police officers pose as political activists over several years, to gather reliable intelligence and perhaps disrupt campaigners’ activities. In the early days, such officers were part of a super-secret unit within special branch, called the special demonstration squad; more recently they have been under a second unit, the national public order intelligence unit.

Up to nine undercover officers have been unmasked following the exposure of Mark Kennedy in late 2010. I will say a bit more about his case later, but the officers include Bob Lambert, know by the alias Bob Robinson. That officer pretended to be a committed environmental and animal rights campaigner between 1984 and 1988. By the summer of 1987, he had successfully infiltrated the Animal Liberation Front, a group that operated through a tightly organised underground network of small cells of activists, making it difficult to penetrate. In October 2011, after he was exposed as an undercover officer, Bob Lambert admitted:

“In the 1980s I was deployed as an undercover Met special branch officer to identify and prosecute members of Animal Liberation Front who were then engaged in incendiary device and explosive device campaigns against targets in the vivisection, meat and fur trades.”

Lambert has also admitted that part of his mission was to identify and prosecute specific ALF activists:

“I succeeded in my task and that success included the arrest and imprisonment of Geoff Sheppard and Andrew Clarke.”

The men Lambert referred to were ALF activists who were found guilty of planting incendiary devices in two Debenhams stores. Allegations about exactly what kind of role Lambert might have played in their convictions have come to light only recently.

In July 1987, three branches of Debenhams, in Luton, Romford and Harrow, were targeted by the ALF in co-ordinated, simultaneous incendiary attacks, because

the shops sold fur products. Sheppard and Clarke were tried and found guilty, but the culprit who planted the incendiary device in the Harrow store was never caught. Bob Lambert’s exposure as an undercover police officer has prompted Geoff Sheppard to speak out about the Harrow attack. He alleges that Lambert was the one who planted the third device and that he was involved in the ALF’s co-ordinated campaign. Sheppard has made a statement, which I have seen, in which he says:

“Obviously I was not there when he targeted that store because we all headed off in our separate directions but I was lying in bed that night, and the news came over on the World Service that three Debenhams stores had had arson attacks on them and that included the Harrow store as well. So obviously I straightaway knew that Bob had carried out his part of the plan. There’s absolutely no doubt in my mind whatsoever that Bob Lambert placed the incendiary device at the Debenhams store in Harrow. I specifically remember him giving an explanation to me about how he had been able to place one of the devices in that store, but how he had not been able to place the second device.”

In the same interview, Sheppard says that two months after the three Debenhams store were set on fire, he and another person were in his flat making four more fire bombs when they were raided by police. Sheppard alleges that the intelligence for the raid was so precise that it is now obvious that it “came from Bob Lambert”. Lambert knew that the pair were going to be there making another set of incendiary devices.

Sheppard was jailed for four years and four months, and Clarke for more than three years. For Lambert, it was a case of job done—in fact, so well had he manipulated the situation that he even visited Sheppard in prison, to give him support before disappearing abroad. Until recently Sheppard had no reason whatsoever to suspect the man he knew as Bob Robinson—he assumed that Robinson had got away with it, fled the country and built a new life.

It seems that planting the third incendiary device might have been a move designed to bolster Lambert’s credibility and reinforce the impression of a genuine and dedicated activist. He successfully went on to gain the precise intelligence that led to the arrest of Sheppard and Clarke, without anyone suspecting that the tip-off came from him, but is that really the way we want our police officers to behave?

The case raises new questions about the rules governing undercover police infiltrators and informers, particularly when it comes to those officers committing a crime—an area in which the law is especially grey. Police chiefs can authorise undercover officers to participate in criminal acts to gain the trust of the groups they are trying to infiltrate and, in theory, to detect or prevent a more serious crime, but usually they are not allowed to be involved in planning or instigating the crime. As I understand it, the specific law on that is the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, and that before its enactment, at the time of the Debenhams attacks, the rules were vague. They have not so far been made public.

If Sheppard’s allegations are true, someone must have authorised Lambert to plant incendiary devices at the Harrow store, and presumably that same person may also have given the officer guidance on just how far he needed to go to establish his credibility with the ALF. We simply do not know, and in the absence of any

proper framework or rules, the task of holding Lambert to account is very difficult. Even if strict protocols are in place to try to control the actions of undercover officers, who decides what the protocols say, and how can we hold those people to account, given the secrecy that surrounds such activities?
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Mark Reckless (Rochester and Strood, Conservative)

Will the hon. Lady give way?
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Caroline Lucas (Brighton, Pavilion, Green)

Yes, but very briefly, as I am short of time.
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Mark Reckless (Rochester and Strood, Conservative)

Is not an alternative explanation that there were no protocols in place and that decisions were taken at the discretion of this officer, who was not properly controlled? To the extent that there were protocols, is it not clear that the guidance for undercover officers was coming from the Association of Chief Police Officers, which is an entirely unaccountable organisation?
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Caroline Lucas (Brighton, Pavilion, Green)

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention. The truth is that we simply do not know, and that is the problem. We need clarity, which is what I hope the Minister for Policing and Criminal Justice can help us with later.

There is no doubt in my mind that anyone planting an incendiary device in a department store is guilty of a very serious crime and should have charges brought against them. That means absolutely anyone, including, if the evidence is there, Bob Lambert or, indeed, the people who were supervising him.

Ironically, as we have seen, the use of undercover police infiltrators can make it much more difficult to secure successful convictions. Three Court of Appeal judges have overturned the convictions of 20 environmental protestors, ruling that crucial evidence recorded by an undercover officer, Mark Kennedy, operating under the false name of Mark Stone, was withheld from the original trial. The judges said that they had seen evidence that appeared to show that Kennedy was

“involved in activities that went further than the authorisation he was given”,

and that he was “arguably, an agent provocateur.” The latest allegations concerning Bob Lambert and the planting of incendiary devices prompt us to ask: has another undercover police officer crossed the line into acting as an agent provocateur, and how many other police spies have been encouraging protestors to commit crimes?

Mark Kennedy’s exposure in 2010 has shone a light on how officers behave when they go undercover, and especially on the rules governing whether they are permitted to form intimate relationships with those on whom they are spying. Jon Murphy, Chief Constable of Merseyside and the police chiefs’ spokesman on the issue, claims that that is “grossly unprofessional” and “never acceptable”, yet one undercover police officer, Pete Black, claims that superiors knew officers had developed sexual relationships with protestors to give credibility to their cover stories and help gather evidence.

Eight women who say that they were duped into forming long-term loving relationships with undercover policemen have started a legal action against the police. They have a copy of a letter from a Metropolitan police solicitor that asserts that the forming of personal and other relationships by a “covert human intelligence

source” to obtain information is permitted and lawful under RIPA; so either rogue undercover officers have been breaking the rules set by senior officers, or senior officers have misled the public by saying that such relationships are forbidden. We need to know what the truth is, and we need any rules of engagement to be published and open to public and parliamentary scrutiny or challenge.

The eight women allege that the men’s actions constitute a breach of articles 3 and 8 of the European convention on human rights. Article 3 asserts that no one shall be subject to inhuman or degrading treatment, and article 8 grants respect for private and family life, including the right to form relationships without unjustified interference by the state. The women go on to allege that the actions amount to common law tortious acts of deceit, misfeasance in public office and assault.

Bob Lambert is one of the five men named in the legal action, as is Mark Kennedy. The Guardian has also reported that Bob Lambert secretly fathered a child with a political campaigner whom he had been sent to spy on, and later disappeared completely from the life of the child, concealing his true identity from the child’s mother for many years. Lambert has admitted having had a long-term relationship with a second woman to bolster his credibility as a committed campaigner, and he subsequently went on to head the special demonstration squad and mentor other undercover officers who formed deceitful relationships with women.

The police authorities have made virtually no attempt to hold those or other men to account, or to examine whether they have broken any rules on relationships when undercover. The solicitors instructed by the Metropolitan police have taken a totally obstructive approach to the litigation, threatening to strike out the claims as having no foundation. Furthermore, police solicitors argue that cases can be heard only by the investigatory powers tribunal, in secret—a move that would prevent the women, whose privacy was invaded in the most intrusive manner imaginable, from hearing the evidence, such as the extent to which intimate moments were reported back to police chiefs. It seems that the police do not want anyone to be able to challenge their version of events or to scrutinise their actions. To paraphrase one of the women involved, it is incredible that in most circumstances the police need permission to search someone’s house, but if they want to send in an agent who may sleep and live with activists in their homes, that can happen without any apparent oversight.

The rules governing undercover police infiltrators and informers are also remarkably deficient when it comes to giving false evidence in court to protect a secret identity. For example, Jim Boyling, who was exposed last year for infiltrating groups such as Reclaim the Streets using the pseudonym Jim Sutton, concealed his true identity from a court when he was prosecuted alongside a group of protestors for occupying a Government building during a demonstration. It is alleged that from the moment Boyling was arrested, he gave a false name and occupation, maintaining this fiction throughout the entire prosecution, even when he gave evidence to barristers under oath.

Boyling was reported to have been present at sensitive discussions between other activists and their lawyers to decide how they would defend themselves in court, undermining the fundamental right of the activists to

hold legally protected consultations with a lawyer and illicitly obtaining details of private discussions. A lawyer representing activists who were charged alongside Jim Boyling has noted:

“This case raises the most fundamental constitutional issues about the limits of acceptable policing, the sanctity of lawyer-client confidentiality, and the integrity of the criminal justice system. At first sight, it seems that the police have wildly overstepped all recognised boundaries.”

Yet Boyling’s actions may well have been authorised. Pete Black, who worked with Boyling in the same covert unit penetrating political campaigns, said that the case was not unique and that, from time to time, prosecutions were allowed to go ahead in order to build up credibility with the activists being infiltrated.

The Metropolitan commissioner, Bernard Hogan-Howe, has defended undercover officers’ use of fake identities in court, claiming that there is no specific law that forbids it. However, I echo the concerns of Lord Macdonald, the former Director of Public Prosecutions, who said that Hogan-Howe’s defence was “stunning and worrying”. He commented that

“at the very least, the senior officers who are sending these undercover PCs into court to give evidence in this way are putting them at serious risk of straying into perjury.”

Bob Lambert, Mark Kennedy and Jim Boyling, as well as two other officers named in current legal actions against the police, John Barker and Mark Cassidy, have all crossed a line. Similarly, other undercover police officers may well have crossed such a line. The assumption is that they have been authorised and instructed to do so or at least, if that is not specifically the case, that a blind eye has been turned to some of their actions.

Activists who have been infiltrated have called for one overarching, full public inquiry to examine what has gone on. Lord Macdonald has also called for such an inquiry to consider how we should control undercover operations, but the Government have ignored calls to set one up. Instead, the authorities have set up 12 different inquiries since January 2011, each held in secret and looking at only one small aspect of an undercover operation. Those inquiries have not been particularly thorough and have not resulted in follow-up action. For example, the Director of Public Prosecutions, Keir Starmer QC, ordered an investigation and report into allegations that the Crown Prosecution Service suppressed vital evidence in the case of the Ratcliffe-on-Soar environmental protestors. A key criticism of the CPS in that report is of the

“failures, over many months and at more than one level, by the police and the CPS.”

Nick Paul, the senior CPS lawyer who specialises in cases involving police misconduct, was not even interviewed as part of the investigation, and senior CPS staff have evaded disciplinary action. The CPS shows an ongoing reluctance to investigate past possible miscarriages of justice, and Keir Starmer is among those resisting calls for a more far-reaching inquiry.

The new allegations that I have raised today make the case for a public inquiry even more compelling. So many questions remain unanswered, including whether Bob Lambert planted the third incendiary device and, if he did, who authorised him to do so and why. More widely, the public have a right to know why money is being spent on infiltrating campaign groups, with no apparent external oversight of the decision to infiltrate

or of whether the methods used are necessary or proportionate. Why are the rules on such practices open to such abuse? Why are high-ranking police officers and, presumably, politicians sanctioning operations that put police officers at risk and undermine basic human rights?

We need to have faith that police officers are beyond reproach, that robust procedures are in place to deal with any transgressions and that those making decisions about the deployment of police officers are accountable and subject to proper scrutiny. I hope the Minister will take this opportunity to review the various concerns I have raised, and that he can tell us that the Government will agree to set up a far-reaching public inquiry into undercover police infiltrators and informers, which will look back over past practices as well as look forward.
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11:16 am

Nick Herbert (Minister of State, Justice; Arundel and South Downs, Conservative)

May I say what a surprise, but nevertheless what a great pleasure, it is to see you in the Chair, Mr Davies? I congratulate Caroline Lucas on securing the debate. I am grateful to her for raising some of these issues, because it gives me an opportunity to set out the Government’s response. I recognise that the issues she has raised are serious.

Undercover operations are sometimes necessary to protect the public and to prevent or detect crime. We should commend the difficult and often dangerous job performed by undercover officers. However, in the light of recent cases and concerns, including those raised by the hon. Lady, it is right to ask two principal questions that we must be able to answer with confidence. First, is there a system for ensuring that the use of police undercover deployment is consistent with human rights legislation, particularly the right to privacy and the right to a fair trial? Secondly, is the system working sufficiently well for the particular type of undercover deployment that has led to concerns, or do we need to take action to improve it and ensure that it provides the required assurance?

Before I consider those two fundamental questions, it is important to point out that the deployment of Bob Lambert, a case raised by the hon. Lady, took place in the 1990s, before the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000—or RIPA, as it is known—was implemented. RIPA is the legislative framework that enables police and other public authorities using covert human intelligence sources, such as undercover officers, to ensure that they act in compliance with their duties under the Human Rights Act. A “covert human intelligence source” is the label used by the legislation to describe anyone who establishes or maintains a relationship for a covert purpose. That applies to a member of the public who comes forward to volunteer information about someone and who is asked by a public authority to find out more. It applies to a public authority test purchaser who engages the confidence of a supplier to buy illicit goods. It also applies to a member of a law enforcement agency who goes undercover to infiltrate and to pass intelligence back to that agency about an organisation planning disruption or criminal acts.
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Mark Reckless (Rochester and Strood, Conservative)

Could the Minister clarify whether RIPA also applies to ACPO’s responsibility for an undercover officer and its status as a private company? Moreover, did ACPO have any involvement in the Lambert case, or did it become involved only in later operations?
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Nick Herbert (Minister of State, Justice; Arundel and South Downs, Conservative)

I will clarify that point later, but my understanding is that the accountability lies with chief constables, not ACPO. I am aware of and share my hon. Friend’s concern about ACPO and its status. I hope and believe that it will be addressed, but if there is anything further to say about the matter, I will write to him.
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Mark Reckless (Rochester and Strood, Conservative)

I am thinking in particular of the environmental protests at Ratcliffe-on-Soar, where it emerged that ACPO was responsible for the management of undercover officers. I am delighted that since then, Ministers have ensured the transfer of the powers involved to the Metropolitan police.
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Nick Herbert (Minister of State, Justice; Arundel and South Downs, Conservative)

My hon. Friend is correct about the responsible unit, and that important change has enhanced accountability.

RIPA applies to each of the instances that I have mentioned, because the true nature of the relationship, which involves reporting back covertly to a public authority what has been said or done, is hidden from the other person or people being talked to. In every case, RIPA requires that authorisation is only given if it is necessary and proportionate. RIPA sets out who can make a decision to deploy a covert source and for what purpose the deployment might be made. RIPA codes of practice provide practical guidance on how best to apply the regulatory framework and how to observe the human rights principles behind authorisations. External oversight and inspection is provided by the chief surveillance commissioner, and independent right of redress is provided by an investigatory tribunal for anyone who believes that they have been treated unlawfully.

That is the current system, which was not in place when Lambert was deployed, but does it work? The published annual reports of the chief surveillance commissioner indicate that, in the main, it does, but that has not always been the case. That was shown graphically by the independent report produced by Her Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary earlier this year on the deployment of undercover police officer Mark Kennedy. It showed that there had been failings in the application of the existing system and safeguards, but it went further by making a number of recommendations for ACPO to strengthen both internal review and external quality assurance of undercover officers deployed against domestic extremism. It also invited the Home Secretary to consider the arrangements for authorising the undercover police operations that present the most significant risks of intrusion. In particular, it proposed raising the internal level of police authorisations for the long-term deployments of undercover police officers under RIPA, and establishing independent, external prior approval by the chief surveillance commissioner for long-term deployments of undercover police officers.

The Home Secretary welcomed the HMIC report, and since its publication the Home Office has been working with the inspectorate, ACPO, the chief surveillance commissioner and others on how best to implement its recommendations.
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Caroline Lucas (Brighton, Pavilion, Green)

I am grateful to the Minister for setting out the situation as he sees it, but does RIPA allow undercover police to have sexual relationships with those they are trying to infiltrate? That is one of the points at issue: some say that it does and some say that it does not.
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Nick Herbert (Minister of State, Justice; Arundel and South Downs, Conservative)

I will try to respond to the hon. Lady’s question before the end of my speech.

One factor is how we target the type of deployment that causes concern, without imposing an unnecessary or burdensome bureaucracy across a much wider field where the current regime may be said to be working as Parliament intended. We need to ensure that we do not deter members of the public from coming forward to help the police in what can be difficult work. We also need to make sure that officers charged with sensitive, intrusive and dangerous policing in the community are given the support and protection they require. Above all, we need to avoid the mistakes identified in the HMIC report being made again. Our response, when we make it, will have that uppermost in mind.

On the hon. Lady’s call for a public inquiry, the independent HMIC review looked at the broad issues raised by the Kennedy case, and made clear recommendations as to how the current system should be strengthened—a system that was not, in any case, in place when Lambert was deployed. We are considering our precise response to those recommendations. I do not think that it is necessary to conduct a public inquiry.

The hon. Lady raised a number of specific issues, one of which was whether RIPA can be used to authorise a covert human intelligence source to break the law. In a very limited range of circumstances, an authorisation under RIPA part II may render lawful conduct that would otherwise be criminal, if it is incidental to any conduct falling within the Act that the source is authorised to undertake. That depends, however, on the circumstances of each individual case, and consideration should always be given to seeking advice from the legal adviser of the relevant public authority when such activity is contemplated. A covert human intelligence source who acts beyond the limits recognised by the law will be at risk of prosecution, and the need to protect the covert human intelligence source cannot alter that principle.

The RIPA statutory guidance does not explicitly cover the matter of sexual relationships, but it does make it clear that close management and control should

be exercised by the undercover officer’s management team. That will be a relevant factor. The absence of such management gave rise to concern in the Kennedy case.
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Caroline Lucas (Brighton, Pavilion, Green)

Does the Minister agree that that sort of fudged, grey area means that for women who have had such an experience, and for women and, indeed, men who might have such an experience in the future, this is incredibly unsatisfactory? We simply do not have clear guidelines on whether the action and going that far is legitimate, and that undermines confidence in the system. The Minister has referred to other inquiries that have been conducted, but what has not been conducted is a public, overarching inquiry to consider all the relevant areas.

Moreover, the Minister’s response to the case of Bob Lambert is extraordinarily complacent. Yes, RIPA was not in place at that point, so there can be no criticism that its guidance was not followed, but what is the Minister going to do now, given that the issue is in the public domain and that there could have been serious miscarriages of justice? How will the Minister follow up on that case in particular?
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Nick Herbert (Minister of State, Justice; Arundel and South Downs, Conservative)

I would be happy to pursue the matter further with the hon. Lady, if she likes, but I am not persuaded that it would be appropriate to issue specific statutory guidance under RIPA about sexual relationships. What matters is that there is a general structure and system of proper oversight and control, rather than specific directions on behaviour that may or may not be permitted. Moreover, to ban such actions would provide a ready-made test for the targeted criminal group to find out whether an undercover officer was deployed among them. Specifically forbidding the action would put the issue in the public domain and such groups would know that it could be tested.

The Government are certainly not complacent about the Lambert case. We were keen for an independent, wider review of the deployment of undercover officers by HMIC, which is now independent of the Government and reports to Parliament. We are satisfied that its recommendations will further strengthen the proper system of safeguards for the deployment of undercover officers that did not operate when Lambert was deployed.

Sitting s uspended.

Find this story at 13 June 2012

Questions remain over animal rights activists’ case

An undercover operation 25 years ago that led to the jailing of two animal rights activists now appears shrouded in mystery

It seemed like – and may well have been – a heroic police triumph that thwarted a campaign to firebomb department stores. When anti-terrorist officers caught two animal rights activists red-handed as they assembled incendiary devices to set fire to branches of Debenhams, it appeared their timing could not have been better.

As police burst in, the Old Bailey was later to hear, the activists were sitting at a table using a soldering iron that was still hot.

But on Wednesday, 25 years after an audacious police investigation led to the jailing of two activists for inflicting damage totalling £9m on three Debenhams stores, new questions have been raised in parliament about the ethics of the operation and the conduct of one particular police spy.

The MP who raised the case – Caroline Lucas of the Green party – conceded that much of the infiltration of a cell of the Animal Liberation Front in 1987 remains shrouded in mystery.

What is unlikely to be disputed is that an undercover police officer, Bob Lambert, adopted a fake identity to live deep undercover among hardcore activists – gaining crucial intelligence about their campaign against the fur trade.

The question raised on Wednesday was whether Lambert went further, potentially acting as agent provocateur. According to the accusation levelled by one convicted activist – and aired by Lucas in parliament – Lambert is suspected of planting one of three incendiary devices in branches of Debenhams. Lambert has strongly denied the allegations.

A long-standing investigation by the Guardian has brought to light various aspects of Lambert’s clandestine surveillance unit, set up in 1968 to gather intelligence about anti-Vietnam war protesters.

Police continue to maintain an army of spies living long-term in activist groups – the most infamous example being Mark Kennedy, who was last year exposed as a police officer after a seven-year deployment among green activists. Kennedy’s double life as ‘Mark Stone’ ended in ignominy last year after it emerged he had developed sexual relations with women while undercover.

Since Kennedy was unmasked, a further eight undercover police officers have been identified, most of whom stand accused of developing sexual relations with activists – behaviour police chiefs insist is banned. They include Lambert, who has apologised for deceiving “law-abiding members of London Greenpeace” during his deployment and admitted he tricked an innocent woman into having a long-term relationship with him, to lend credibility to his alter ego. Lambert also fathered a child with a woman activist he had been sent to spy on.

Responding to Lucas during the parliamentary debate, the policing minister, Nick Herbert, said police officers can start sexual relationships with suspected criminals if it means they are more plausible. He said that the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (Ripa), the law that has governed their activities since 2000, does not explicity prohibit sexual relations, but requires the operations to be strictly managed.

Herbert said it was important police were allowed to have sex with activists because otherwise it could be used as a test for outing suspected undercover officers.

In his almost total adoption of a new identity, and his willingness to develop close personal relations with women activists, Lambert followed a similar path to that of Kennedy. His journey into the core of the animal rights movement started around 1984.

Like other members of the covert unit, then known as the Special Demonstration Squad, Lambert radically changed his appearance, growing his hair long to reinvent himself as the militant animal rights activist ‘Bob Robinson’.

Insiders from the covert police unit confirm Lambert’s work inside the ALF burnished his reputation as one of their most successful spies. He went on to become a spymaster in the unit before leaving the police for a career as a lecturer at St Andrews University.

However, his respected record was placed in doubt on Wednesday when Lucas raised questions about the extent of his involvement in a campaign to target Debenhams stores with incendiary devices. Lucas admitted “we just don’t know” exactly how far Lambert may have taken his operation.

By 1987, Lambert had infiltrated the small ALF cell co-ordinating arson attacks on stores in protest against their sale of fur. The relatively simple devices – the size of cigarette boxes – were placed under inflammable objects in the stores and were designed to set off the sprinkler systems, causing extensive flooding. They were set to go off at night so that people were not harmed, according to the activists. In July that year, the incendiary devices were simultaneously planted and ignited at three Debenhams stores in Luton, Romford and Harrow. But only two activists – Geoff Sheppard and Andrew Clarke – were caught and convicted. It appeared that the perpetrator who planted the third device had got away.

Lucas told MPs: “Sheppard and Clarke were tried and found guilty but the culprit who planted the incendiary device in the Harrow store was never caught. Bob Lambert’s exposure as an undercover police officer has prompted Geoff Sheppard to speak out about that Harrow attack. Sheppard alleges that Lambert was the one who planted the third device and was involved in the ALF’s co-ordinated campaign.”

She added: “Sheppard says that two months after the three Debenhams stores were set on fire, he and another person were in his flat, making four more firebombs, when they were raided by police. Sheppard alleges that the intelligence for the raid was so precise that it is now obvious that, and I quote, it ‘came from Bob Lambert’ who knew that the pair were going to be there making another set of incendiary devices.”

The suggestion that intelligence gathered by Lambert thwarted two activists planning a firebombing campaign is likely to be uncontroversial. On 9 September, police burst into Sheppard’s bedsit in Hillside Road, Tottenham and caught the pair red-handed surrounded by paraphernalia for making the devices – alarm clocks, copper wire, bulbs and batteries.

Victor Temple, for the prosecution, said at the time: “They were in the process of what was clearly a well-practised method of constructing incendiary devices similar in every significant respect to those used at Harrow, Luton and Romford.”

Previously, Lambert has spoken about his role in the police operation against the ALF, and his specific involvement in the investigation into Sheppard and Clarke, saying: “I succeeded in my task and that success included the arrest and imprisonment of Geoff Sheppard and Andrew Clarke.”

What is likely to prove more controversial is the suggestion, relayed by the MP, that Lambert may have gone further than a mere observer, and planted the third incendiary device in order to bolster his credibility and “reinforce the impression of a genuine and dedicated activist”.

That is an allegation that Lambert has firmly denied. He told the Guardian: “It was necessary to create the false impression that I was a committed animal rights extremist to gain intelligence so as to disrupt serious criminal conspiracies. However, I did not commit serious crime such as ‘planting an incendiary device at the [Debenhams] Harrow store’.”

One possibility is that police chiefs authorised some kind of controlled explosion at the Harrow store – which the court heard suffered £340,000-worth of damage – to maintain Lambert’s cover story. That, however, would raise further questions.

If Lambert did not let off the incendiary device, who did? And if police knew about the plan to start fires in three branches of Debenhams, why did they let them go ahead, causing £9m in damages and lost trade?

Both are likely to be questions explored by an internal Metropolitan police inquiry into the activities of undercover officers in protest groups between 1968 and 2008 – a review that has been continuing for several months.

The Met said in a statement: “Any matters arising from the review will be assessed and where appropriate will be referred to the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC).”

Whatever the precise nature – if any – of Lambert’s involvement in the firebombing campaign, his success in duping hardened animal rights activists into believing he was a fellow campaigner is beyond doubt.

In 1988 – a year after the Debenhams fire attacks – Lambert later went abroad, telling friends he was escaping the attentions of Special Branch. They could not have known he was in fact one Special Branch’s finest operatives.

Following their arrests in 1987, Sheppard and Clarke were convicted for planting devices in the Debenhams branches. Sheppard was jailed for four years and four months, and Clarke for more than three years. Sheppard was jailed again in the 1990s but says he stopped doing illegal protests some years ago.

Sheppard said he did not doubt the motives of the man he knew as ‘Bob Robinson’ until his true identity was revealed in the Guardian. The convicted activist told the Guardian: “For 24 years I have believed that my friend … Bob Robinson was on the run and had most likely gone to a different country and probably made a new life for himself and I just thought – good for him, he was the lucky one that managed to get away.”

So instinctively did Sheppard trust Lambert, he said, that he was grateful to him when he visited him in jail. Sheppard said: “I remember thinking ‘Bob’s still there for me’. Actually, he was the guy who put me there.”

Clarke declined to talk about his role in the arson campaign but his lawyer, Mike Schwarz, said: “These allegations are very serious. If true, they cast doubt on the safety of my client’s convictions. Over a month ago I wrote to the director of public prosecutions asking about these issues. It is of great concern that the Crown Prosecution Service have still not replied to me.”

His letter to the DPP, Keir Starmer, states that Lambert played an “active, participating and crucial” role in the firebombing campaign, and the failure of prosecutors to diclose his information about his role would render Clarke’s conviction unsafe.

Herbert indicated on Wednesday that the Home Office was not inclined to investigate the Lambert case. It may therefore turn out to be in the courts where the latest allegations are resolved.

Last year the court of appeal quashed the convictions of 20 environmental activists infiltrated by Kennedy. The key issue was the failure by the Crown Prosecution Service to disclose details about Kennedy’s undercover operation to the defence team. On the face of it, the Lambert case presents another example in which police or prosecutors did not disclose all the evidence they had amassed.

In July last year, when overturning the convictions of green activists, the three senior judges said they had evidence indicating Kennedy “was involved in activities that went further than the authorisation he was given” and was “arguably, an agent provocateur”.

During her speech in parliament, Lucas suggested Kennedy may not be the police spy to have “crossed the line”.

“The latest allegations concerning Bob Lambert and the planting of incendiary devices would beg the question: has another undercover police officer crossed the line into acting as an agent provocateur?” she said. “And how many other police spies have been encouraging protesters to commit crimes?”

Find this story at 13 June 2012

Paul Lewis and Rob Evans
guardian.co.uk, Wednesday 13 June 2012 17.40 BST
© 2012 Guardian News and Media Limited or its affiliated companies. All rights reserved.

Call for police links to animal rights firebombing to be investigated

MP claims that undercover police officer may have ‘crossed the line’ during animal rights activists’ bombing of department store

Ministers have been asked to investigate the police infiltration of a cell of animal rights activists responsible for a firebombing campaign after questions were raised about the ethics of an operation that, it was alleged, may have involved an undercover spy planting an incendiary device in a department store.

The MP who raised the case, which dates back to the 1980s but surfaced only after recent disclosures about the clandestine unit of police spies, suggested it may constitute a case in which “a police officer crossed the line into acting as an agent provocateur”.

Caroline Lucas, parliament’s only Green MP, used a Westminster Hall debate on the rules governing undercover policing to raise the case under parliamentary privilege, and add to calls for a public inquiry into the use of police spies.

Only limited details are known about the mysterious police operation to infiltrate a group of hardcore anti-fur protesters, and Lucas admitted no one could be sure about the precise role played by the undercover police officer, Bob Lambert, who spent years living among the activists having adopted a new identity.

Lambert infiltrated a cell of activists from the Animal Liberation Front (ALF), who detonated three incendiary devices at three Debenhams branches in London in July 1987 as part of a campaign against the sale of fur.

Two activists, Geoff Sheppard and Andrew Clarke, were caught red-handed months later as they prepared for a second wave of arson attacks. They were convicted over the attacks on the stores.

“Sheppard and Clarke were tried and found guilty – but the culprit who planted the incendiary device in the Harrow store was never caught,” Lucas said. “Bob Lambert’s exposure as an undercover police officer has prompted Geoff Sheppard to speak out about that Harrow attack. Sheppard alleges that Lambert was the one who planted the third device and was involved in the ALF’s co-ordinated campaign.”

The MP relayed comments from Sheppard in which the convicted activist said: “Obviously I was not there when he targeted that store because we all headed off in our separate directions but I was lying in bed that night, and the news came over on the World Service that three Debenhams stores had had arson attacks on them and that included the Harrow store as well.

“So obviously I straight away knew that Bob had carried out his part of the plan. There’s absolutely no doubt in my mind whatsoever that Bob Lambert placed the incendiary device at the Debenhams store in Harrow. I specifically remember him giving an explanation to me about how he had been able to place one of the devices in that store, but how he had not been able to place the second device. So it would seem that planting the third incendiary device was perhaps a move designed to bolster Lambert’s credibility and reinforce the impression of a genuine and dedicated activist. He did go on to successfully gain the precise intelligence that led to the arrest of Sheppard and Clarke – and without anybody suspecting that the tipoff came from him. But is that really the way we want our police officers to behave?”

Lambert, who has admitted having sexual relations with women while operating undercover, has previously spoken about his role in the police investigation of the ALF and his specific role in the operation against Sheppard and Clarke.

However, he firmly denies planting the incendiary device. He told the Guardian: “It was necessary to create the false impression that I was a committed animal rights extremist to gain intelligence so as to disrupt serious criminal conspiracies. However, I did not commit serious crime such as ‘planting an incendiary device at the [Debenhams] Harrow store’.”

Lucas admitted “we just don’t know” exactly how far Lambert may have taken his operation, but said: “Yet, if Sheppard’s allegations are true, someone must have authorised Lambert to plant incendiary devices at the Harrow store. Presumably that same someone may also have given the officer guidance on just how far he needed to go to establish his credibility with the ALF.”

She added: “There is no doubt in my mind that anyone planting an incendiary device in a department store is guilty of a very serious crime and should have charges brought against them. That means absolutely anyone – including, if the evidence is there, Bob Lambert or indeed the people who were supervising him.”

Lucas raised the case of Mark Kennedy, who was revealed last year to have spent seven years living undercover among environmental activists. He also had sexual relations with female activists. Kennedy’s exposure led the court of appeal to quash the convictions of 20 environmental campaigners wrongly convicted of conspiring to break into a power station. The three judges said they had seen evidence that appeared to show Kennedy had been “arguably, a provocateur”.

Lucas said: “The latest allegations concerning Bob Lambert and the planting of incendiary devices would beg the question: has another undercover police officer crossed the line into acting as an agent provocateur? And how many other police spies have been encouraging protesters to commit crimes?”

The MP voiced concerns about other aspects of a longstanding operation to plant spies in protest groups, including the evidence that most of those unmasked in public are suspected of having engaged in sexual relationships with activists. She raised the case of eight women who say they were duped into forming relationships with undercover officers, and who have begun a legal case against police.

She said senior police chiefs had said it was “never acceptable” for their spies to have sexual relations with activists, but the Met had told the women’s lawyers that “forming of personal and other relationships” is permitted under Ripa, the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000.

“So either rogue undercover officers have been breaking the rules set by senior officers, or senior officers have misled the public by saying that such relationships are forbidden,” Lucas said.

The policing minister, Nick Herbert, acknowledged there were questions about the accountability of long-term spies and said the Home Office was considering how better to regulate the area.

He said ministers were considering proposals from a review of the Kennedy case by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary, which recommended that future deployments of undercover police officers should be “pre-authorised” by the Office of Surveillance Commissioners.

…

Find this story at  13 June 2012

Rob Evans and Paul Lewis
guardian.co.uk, Wednesday 13 June 2012 13.29 BST
© 2012 Guardian News and Media Limited or its affiliated companies. All rights reserved.

 

 

Claims that police spy ‘crossed the line’ during animal rights firebombing campaign

An MP has raised questions over the conduct of Bob Lambert, an undercover policeman who infiltrated the Animal Liberation Front in the 1980s, suggesting he may have acted as an ‘agent provocateur’. Here, one of two activists convicted over an ALF firebombing campaign explains how he was duped by the police spy.

Find this story at 13 june 2012

Rob Evans, Paul Lewis, Richard Sprenger, Guy Grandjean and Mustafa Khalili
guardian.co.uk, Wednesday 13 June 2012

© 2012 Guardian News and Media Limited or its affiliated companies. All rights reserved.

Undercover police spies given go-ahead for affairs if it makes their false identity more convincing

But operations must be strictly managed according to the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000

It’s a tough job: Home Office Minister Nick Herbert has given police the go-ahead to have sex with suspects

Undercover police officers can start sexual relationships with suspected criminals to make their false identity more convincing, a Home Office minister said yesterday.

Nick Herbert said officers were permitted to have sex as part of their job, under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, but the legislation meant the operations were strictly managed.

There had been confusion about whether undercover police were allowed to go that far following the collapse of a case against environmental activists in Nottinghamshire.

It emerged the group was infiltrated by an officer called Mark Kennedy, who had been in sexual relationships with two women in the campaign.

Mr Herbert said it was important police were allowed to have sex with activists because otherwise it could be used as a way of outing potential undercover officers.

Speaking in a debate in Westminster Hall, Mr Herbert said: ‘In very limited circumstances, authorisation under Ripa Part 2 may render unlawful conduct with the criminal if it is consentutory conduct falling within the Act that the source is authorised to undertake.

…

Find this story at 14 June 2012

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KRO Reporter International: Huurlingen

Nederlandse gewapende beveiligingsbedrijven moeten verplicht gescreend worden op justitiële antecedenten. Dat stellen defensiespecialisten naar aanleiding van de uitzending van Reporter International van vrijdag 3 februari.

In de uitzending wordt onthult dat de directeur van het Nederlandse beveiligingsbedrijf Specops Company een strafblad heeft. Hij heeft de Wet Wapens en Munitie overtreden, maakte zich schuldig aan drugsbezit en een woninginbraak. Het Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie was daarvan op de hoogte, maar zag geen reden actie te ondernemen.

Specops Company biedt in 15 landen, waaronder Zuid Afrika, Seychellen en de Verenigde Arabische Emiraten, gewapende diensten aan. Het gaat onder meer om beveiliging van schepen tegen piraten en persoonsbeveiliging . Omdat Specops alleen in het buitenland werkt, hoefde het bedrijf volgens de huidige regels geen vergunning aan te vragen. Het bedrijf is dus niet gescreend door het Ministerie van Justitie.

Hoogleraar Militair Recht Terry Gill van de UvA reageert geschrokken op deze zaak. Gill vindt dat gewapende beveiligingsbedrijven die in Nederland gevestigd zijn altijd gescreend moeten worden. ‘Je moet zorgen voor een deugdelijke screening en een vergunningstelsel van beveiligingbedrijven op eigen bodem’ aldus Gill in Reporter International.

Ook hoogleraar Internationale Betrekkingen Rob de Wijk en René Hiemstra van adviesbureau Acestes willen strengere eisen aan Nederlandse gewapende beveiligers. ‘Het begint met in kaart te brengen welke bedrijven er op dit gebied zijn en te inventariseren wat ze precies doen. Screening op antecedenten is er nu voor deze bedrijven niet, dat moet echt gaan veranderen’, aldus Hiemstra. Om problemen met de militaire beveiligers te voorkomen is zelfs een nieuwe, interdepartementale samenwerking van diverse ministeries nodig, zo stelt hij in Reporter International.

Hiemstra voorzag in 2007 de Adviesraad internationale vraagstukken, AIV van informatie over deze groeiende bedrijfstak. Hoeveel Nederlandse bedrijven momenteel gewapende beveiliging aanbieden in het buitenland is onbekend. Hoogleraar Rob de Wijk denkt dat het om zo’n 20 bedrijven gaat die vanuit Nederland opereren.

Bekijk hier de uitzending van 3 februarie 2012

KRO Reporter International: Politie dikt exportcijfers nederwiet aan

De exportcijfers van nederwiet die de Taskforce Aanpak Georganiseerde Hennepteelt veelvuldig in de media bracht, zijn sterk overdreven. Dit blijkt uit een vertrouwelijk rapport van het Korps Landelijke Politie Diensten dat openbaar wordt gemaakt door KRO Reporter International. Het rapport maakt duidelijk dat de export van nederwiet een “bescheiden omvang” heeft. “Het grootste deel van de productie is bedoeld voor de binnenlandse markt”, aldus het KLPD. Donderdag debatteert de Tweede Kamer over het drugsbeleid.

Volgens de politie is 80 procent van de totale Nederlandse cannabisproductie bestemd voor het buitenland. Jaarlijks zou 500.000 kilo worden uitgevoerd ter waarde van 2,4 miljard euro. In 2008 start de politie met het beleidsprogramma Versterking Aanpak Georganiseerde Hennepteelt. Een speciale Taskforce moet het maatschappelijk draagvlak vergroten om de teelt van nederwiet harder aan te pakken. Vertegenwoordigers van de politie verschijnen regelmatig in de media om te vertellen dat het gedoogbeleid volkomen uit de hand is gelopen.

Nederland zou zijn uitgegroeid tot “de grootste producent” van marihuana en jaarlijks 500.000 kilo naar het buitenland exporteren, zo’n 80 procent van de totale nederwietproductie. Deze opzienbarende cijfers zijn volgens de Taskforce gebaseerd op een onderzoek van het Korps Landelijke Politie Diensten. Het KLPD heeft het nooit openbaar willen maken, omdat het onderzoek “intern en vertrouwelijk” is. Het televisieprogramma KRO Reporter International wist er de hand op te leggen, zowel op een conceptversie als op de definitieve tekst. Het blijkt te gaan om De cannabismarkt in Nederland. Raming van aanvoer, productie, consumptie en uitvoer uit 2006.

Uit het onderzoek blijkt dat de politie eigenlijk geen idee heeft van de totale Nederlandse cannabisproductie. De schattingen lopen wijd uiteen, van 323 tot 766 ton per jaar. Ook ontbreekt elk zicht op de omvang van de export. “In hoeverre de hier geproduceerde cannabis wordt verkocht in coffeeshops en andere verkooppunten dan wel wordt geëxporteerd, is niet duidelijk”, aldus het KLPD. In het onderzoek wordt een enquête aangehaald van het Openbaar Ministerie onder regionale politiekorpsen “waaruit naar voren komt dat het grootste deel van de productie is bestemd voor de binnenlandse markt”.

Het veelvuldig door de Taskforce genoemde exportcijfer van 80 procent wordt in het onderzoek juist ongeloofwaardig genoemd. “Vooral gezien de betrekkelijk geringe hoeveelheden nederwiet die in buurlanden worden onderschept, is deze uitkomst niet erg aannemelijk.” Het KLPD houdt het er daarom op dat de uitvoer van nederwiet van “bescheiden omvang” is.

Volgens drugsonderzoeker Martin Jelsma van het Transnational Institute in Amsterdam heeft de Taskforce met het aanhalen van alleen de hoogste schattingen het KLPD-onderzoek misbruikt. “Die cijfers zijn voor een groot deel uit de lucht gegrepen. Die 80 procent mythe van de export, die blijft maar rondzingen in de media en in de Tweede Kamer. Het is absoluut een opgeklopt cijfer. Die 80 procent mythe heeft de politieke besluitvorming over de aanscherping van het hele gedoogbeleid absoluut mogelijk gemaakt,” zegt Jelsma in KRO Reporter International.

Bekijk de uitzending van 2 maart 2012

Berekening ministerie van Financiën belastingopbrengsten legalisering cannabis

De cannabismarkt in Nederland – Raming van aanvoer, productie, consumptie en uitvoer

De cannabismarkt in Nederland – Raming van aanvoer, productie, consumptie en uitvoer – CONCEPT

 

www.criminology.com/know-your-rights/

The Criminology.com project was created by Angelina Matson to be an online informational resource for individuals looking to pursue criminology-related education and careers. As a vast and interesting field, we delve into the meat of criminological thought and have also collected information like the job prospects for those with a degree in criminology to what an actual criminology education is composed of. As a fairly new project, those of us behind it are always trying to improve. With that said, please drop us a line on the contact page to give us suggestions for new articles or resources, or have questions answered.

http://www.criminology.com/know-your-rights/

Police up to 28 times more likely to stop and search black people – study

Human rights watchdog warns of ‘racial profiling’ as data reveals under 3% of stop and searches leads to an arrest
Vikram Dodd

A Metropolitan officer is allegedly about 30 times more likely to use section 60 to stop a black person than a colleague outside London. Photograph: Dominic Lipinski/PA

Police forces are up to 28 times more likely to use stop-and-search powers against black people than white people and may be breaking the law, new research from the official human rights body reveals.

The research from the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) looked at police stop powers where officers do not require suspicion of involvement in crime, known as section 60 stops.

The power is used most by the Metropolitan police, which carried out three-quarters of the stops between 2008-11, some 258,000 in total. The next heaviest user was Merseyside with 40,940 stops. Some forces barely use the power.

Thus what the Metropolitan police does can skew the national picture and the data shows a Met officer is about 30 times more likely to use section 60 to stop a black person than a colleague outside London.

The figures show how often black Britons experience stop and search through section 60 alone, never mind the more commonly used other stop-and-search powers. The EHRC found that in 2008-09, the Met stopped 68 out of every 1,000 black people in its area. This fell to 32.8 per 1,000 by 2010-11. In the rest of England, the figure was down to 1.2 stops per 1,000 black people by 2010-11.

Section 60 of the 1994 Public Order Act was introduced to target originally brought in to tackle people going to illegal raves. It gave police the power, if they feared violence or disorder, to stop and search suspects at a specific time and place.

Most stops in England and Wales require an officer to have “reasonable suspicion” that someone is involved in crime. Section 60 gives an officer maximum discretion and privately police fear its wide-ranging nature and the discretion it gives officers, plus the allegations it is being abused, may lead the courts to strike it down – as happened with section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000, which had to be reformed after the courts ruled its provision allowing stops without suspicion was too wide-ranging.

The EHRC notes that while the overall use of section 60 had fallen, excessive use of the power against ethnic minorities, known as racial disproportionality, had continued or even increased. The report found a rise in the percentage of ethnic minorities among those stopped under section 60 between 2008-11, from 51% to 64%.

The commission said the police may be breaching their legal responsibilities, known as the public-sector equality duty: “Any continuing and serious disproportionate use of these powers against ethnic minorities may indicate that the police and Home Office are not complying with their public-sector duties obligations.”

The worst rates of racial disproportionality were outside London, according to the EHRC. An officer in the West Midlands was 28 times more likely to stop and search a black person than a white person, in the Greater Manchester force the figure was 21 times, in the Met 11 times, and for British Transport police the figure was 31 times.

Nationally, the EHRC said black people were 37 times more likely to be stopped and searched under section 60 than white people in 2010-11. From 2008 to 2011, the racial disproportionality worsened for the Met and West Midlands forces, while Greater Manchester’s disproportionality rate in 2008-9 was 44.9 times greater, which had been halved three years later.

Racial disproportionality meant an officer was 10 times more likely to stop Asian Britons than a white person, with the worst offender being West Midlands police.

The EHRC said through section 60 alone ethnic minorities underwent more than 100,000 excessive searches over 2008-11.

Figures also show that section 60 may be ineffective in fighting crime. According to the report: “In England as a whole, only 2.8% of [section] 60 stops and searches resulted in an arrest in 2008-09 and this decreased to 2.3% in 2010-11. Of these, fewer than one in five arrests were for offensive weapons.”

The fact that arrest rates are similar for black and white Britons suggests problems in how police use the power, the EHRC said: “The lack of a significant difference does not prove that black people are not inappropriately targeted.”

Simon Woolley, a commissioner at the EHRC, said: “Our research shows black youths are still being disproportionately targeted, and without a clear explanation as to why, many in the community will see this as racial profiling.

“Moreover, police data itself questions the effectiveness of this practice. Some forces are using 200 or 300 stops before arresting an individual over a weapon.

“We are encouraged at least that the Met seek to review the practice with a clear objective that avoids the crude measure of racial profiling and focuses on intelligence-led policing.”

The Met is being threatened with a legal challenge over allegations that it discriminates in its use of section 60 stop and search. The commission has previously said it believes the Met’s use of section 60 is unlawful.

The Met said it was reforming its use of the power and would aim to make it more focused on tackling violence and reduce the number of stops carried out.

However, in a statement, the Met’s deputy commissioner, Craig Mackey, who speaks on stop-and-search issues for the Association of Chief Police Officers, said: “Chief officers support the use of stop and search as these powers are critical in our efforts to tackle knife, gun and gang crimes.

…

Find this story at 12 June 2012

The Guardian, Tuesday 12 June 2012

© 2012 Guardian News and Media Limited or its affiliated companies. All rights reserved.

 

 

Ex-police spy Mark Kennedy’s current business activities

Mark Kennedy, who was exposed as a police infiltrator of various movements
in the UK and beyond in October 2010, is still, after the collapse of his
police career, actively seeking to operate as a private consultant. He
appears to be based in the US, although this is not certain.

Kennedy is advertising himself on “LinkedIn”, and his profile can be viewed at
http://www.linkedin.com/pub/mark-kennedy/44/853/198

An extract from this profile is listed here….

“I have many years experience in covert operations and deployments,
intelligence gathering, analysis and dissemination, statement taking,
investigations and case preparation, evidential court apperances,
surveillance and counter-surveillance skills and the use of technical
covert, recording equipment.

I have lectured for law enforcement agencies and services regarding
infiltration tactics and covert deployments and have lectured for the
private sector regarding risk management, the threat from extremist and
protest groups and creating preventative protocols.

My exeperience is drawn from 20 years as a British Police officer, the
last ten of which were deployed as a covert operative working within
extreme left political and animal rights groups throughout the UK, Europe
and the US providing exacting intelligence upon which risk and threat
assessment analysis could be made.

That knowledge and experience is now drawn upon to provide expert
consultation to the public / private sectors to provide investigative
services, deliver informative lectures and training, provide risk and
threat assessments to companies, corporations and their staff from the
threat of direct action in all its forms. It is my intention to provide a
enhance a better understanding of protest, the reasons why protest takes
place and the subsequent appropriate management of protest and
to assist in employing the appropriate pre-emptive policing and security
considerations to mass mobilisations, protest and direct action as well as
real time analysis and responces and to provide post event debriefing to
staff effected by direct action.”

The profile indicates Kennedy is based in Cleveland, Ohio, USA.

The profile also reveals that in January 2010, shortly before leaving the
police, he set up a company called “Stanage Consulting”.

Stanage Consulting are registered at
SUITE 2029
6 SLINGTON HOUSE
RANKINE ROAD
BASINGSTOKE
ENGLAND
RG24 8PH

This address is simply a forwarding service -see
http://www.my-uk-mail.co.uk/frequentlyaskedquestions.htm

This forwarding service also hosted another company set up by Kennedy
called “Tokra”, linked to “Global Open”, which has since been dissolved –
for background on this see
http://www.indymedia.org.uk/en/2011/01/471916.html?c=on#c277723

The other company listed by Kennedy on his LinkedIn profile is US- based
“risk managers” Densus Group, for whom, since March 2012, he has acted as
a consultant – see http://www.densusgroup.com

To quote from the LinkedIn page again – “The Densus Group provides a range
of specialty consultancy and training, primarily on behalf of government
institutions and private firms in respect of risk analysis and threat
assessment from protest groups and domestic extremism.”

The Densus Group was very interested in the policing of the Pittsburgh G20
summit protests (see
http://www.bizjournals.com/pittsburgh/stories/2009/09/21/daily42.html?page=all)
and is generally trying to sell its services to corporate clients
concerned with combatting the US Occupy movement and similar groups (see
http://darwinbondgraham.wordpress.com/tag/densus-group/)

Thus, it seems that Kennedy is attempting to establish himself as a
private consultant for corporate agencies, presumably especially in the
US, where he seems to be based (despite a UK-based forwarding business
address). Activists in the US (and elsewhere) should be aware of this.

Find this story at 1 june 2012 

Advocate General’s Opinion in Joined Cases C-539/10 P and C-550/10 P Stichting Al-Aqsa v Council and Netherlands v Stichting Al-Aqsa

In Advocate General Trstenjak’s view, the Council may freeze funds in the fight against terrorism only while national prosecutions of the persons concerned are ongoing.
In view of the repeal of the Netherlands measures against Al-Aqsa, the General Court was therefore right to annul the legal acts by which the Council allowed Al-Aqsa’s funds to remain frozen.
The Netherlands Al-Aqsa foundation has been engaged since 2003 in judicial proceedings challenging its inclusion or its continued inclusion in the list drawn up by the Council of persons and entities whose assets are to be frozen in the fight against terrorism. An initial series of Council decisions by which the Council included or retained Al-Aqsa in that list was annulled by the General Court of the European Union on the ground of inadequate statement of reasons. A second series of such Council measures adopted between 2007 and 2009 was also annulled by the General Court, in that case because the Netherlands had repealed the ministerial regulation relating to Al-Aqsa which ultimately formed the basis of subsequent Council measures. Inclusion or retention in the list is conditional upon the active pursuit of a national investigation or prosecution of the relevant person on account of a terrorist act, or enforcement of a penalty previously imposed.

In an appeal brought by the Netherlands against the latter judgment of the General Court, the Court of Justice has been called upon to examine the conditions under which funds may be frozen.
In her Opinion announced today, Advocate General Verica Trstenjak proposes that the Court of Justice uphold the judgment of the General Court. She points out that EU measures to combat terrorism3 are not a matter for the Council’s discretion. Rather, the Council can freeze the funds of persons and entities on the basis of a suspicion that they are supporting terrorist activities only if a Member State has at least instigated investigations against such persons or entities following a decision by the authorities. Since it is ultimately those investigations alone which justify the freezing of funds, the Council must unfreeze those funds if, in accordance with its duty regularly to review the measures adopted, it determines that the national decision has ceased to apply or the investigations being conducted at a national level are no longer being pursued.

Against that background, there were no longer any grounds for keeping Al-Aqsa on the Council’s list. The Netherlands had, as long ago as August 2003, repealed the ministerial regulation relating to Al-Aqsa on which that foundation’s inclusion in the Council’s list was ultimately based, and the Council had not checked whether there was any other national investigation that might have constituted grounds for the Council’s freezing of Al-Aqsa’s funds. The fact that a Netherlands court had, in June 2003, dismissed an application by Al-Aqsa for the temporary suspension of the Netherlands ministerial regulation is not relevant in this context. To that extent, the General Court was right to find that that Netherlands judgment has no significance of its own following the repeal of the ministerial regulation.
Advocate General Trstenjak therefore proposes that the Court of Justice dismiss the appeal by the Netherlands. She further proposes that the appeal brought by Al-Aqsa also be dismissed, as that appeal is directed not against the outcome of the judgment of the General Court of the European Union but merely against the considerations contained within it, and is thus inadmissible.
NOTE: The Advocate General’s Opinion is not binding on the Court of Justice. It is the role of the Advocates General to propose to the Court, in complete independence, a legal solution to the cases for which they are responsible. The Judges of the Court are now beginning their deliberations in this case. Judgment will be given at a later date.
NOTE: An appeal, on a point or points of law only, may be brought before the Court of Justice against a judgment or order of the General Court. In principle, the appeal does not have suspensive effect. If the appeal is admissible and well founded, the Court of Justice sets aside the judgment of the General Court. Where the state of the proceedings so permits, the Court of Justice may itself give final judgment in the case. Otherwise, it refers the case back to the General Court, which is bound by the decision given by the Court of Justice on the appeal.

Unofficial document for media use, not binding on the Court of Justice.

Court of Justice of the European Union
PRESS RELEASE No 72/12
Luxembourg, 6 June 2012
Press and Information

The full text of the Opinion is published on the CURIA website on the day of delivery.

Press contact: Christopher Fretwell  (+352) 4303 3355
www.curia.europa.eu

Infiltrators & Informers – an activistsecurity.org project

Infiltrators & Informers is an off-shoot of the UK based ActivistSecurity.org project. Its purpose is twofold:
To provide an archive of individuals involved in protest movements who have been exposed as working for the police, security services and private security firms.
To provide advice and support to groups who are dealing with suspected infiltrators on what best practice is, from verifying their suspicions to exposing them.

Where possible the ActivistSecurity collective will attempt to verify the evidence and give supporting statements if necessary. If you have any questions, please get in touch at info{{at}}activistsecurity.org. We have pgp/gpg keys for secure communication. For a guide to this complicated issue see our pamphlet “Infiltrators, Informers & Grasses“.

See the website at

ACADEMI — ex-Blackwater — Boosts State Dept Business, Eyes Acquisitions: EXCLUSIVE

ARLINGTON, VA: How confident is the new management at private security contractor ACADEMI — formerly known as Xe and, also, infamously, as Blackwater — that they’ve turned the company around?

Last month, apparently without attracting any public attention (until now), they quietly bought another security firm, International Development Solutions, and took over its piece of the State Department’s $10 billion World Protective Services contract, which then-Blackwater got kicked out of years ago.

And ACADEMI plans on further acquisitions, CEO Ted Wright confirmed in an exclusive interview with AOL Defense.

The company has spent a year rebuilding and is set to grow again, said Wright, who took over in June 2011. (He was hired by a new ownership team that bought out Blackwater founder Erik Prince the previous December). “The things we said we were going to do a year ago, we’ve kind of done,” said Wright, just back from visiting employees in Afghanistan.

Since he started, the company has not only a new name but a new management team, a new board of directors — in fact it didn’t even have a board before — and a new corporate headquarters in Arlington, looking across the Potomac River straight at the headquarters of the State Department. Many of the employees doing security work in the field are new, Wright said, and the core of ACADEMI’s business, its training cadre, has turned over almost completely: Only about 10 instructors remain from the old days, compared to 30 new hires, with another 20 on the way.

“After a year, back office is good, governance is good, and now we’re beginning to grow,” Wright said. “Now we’re going to be acquisitive.”

Wright downplayed the acquisition of International Development Solutions as a first step, more consolidation than expansion. IDS was not a truly independent company but a joint venture that ACADEMI co-founded, subcontracted for, and already owned 49% percent of. Critics in Congress and the media even called IDS a “shell company” and a “front,” created as a cut-out so the ACADEMI / Xe / Blackwater name would not appear on State Department contracts, though Wright said ACADEMI always did some work directly for State. The main difference is that ACADEMI was a subcontractor on the World Protective Services program, but now it will be a prime contractor working directly for State. (The State Department did not return multiple calls and emails requesting comment; we will update this story when and if they do).

“The people in the field doing the work [for State], they’re employes of IDS and they’ll become employees of ACADEMI,” said Wright. “That was the reason I was just in Afghanistan, to go to talk to the employees. [For them] there’s no difference at all, zero….The only difference is the administrative functions that were split between us and the other company now are just all us.” In terms of both personnel and revenue, he said, absorbing IDS only grows ACADEMI by “10 or 15 percent.”

Wright has much bigger targets in mind. “[We’ll] maybe buy companies that give us new capabilities,” he said,” or spread us to a new location like maybe the Pacific or Latin America or Africa.” ACADEMI is already standing up a new training site in North Africa, he said, while its existing site in Afghanistan, called “Camp Integrity,” is “about to double in size,” from under 200 to 300 to 400 people, with an influx of new Special Operations customers Wright declined to talk about in any detail. Last month, the company started a new branch, ACADEMI Consulting Services, aimed at commercial clients — “oil and gas, multi-nationals, high net-worth individuals”: ACADEMI only does about $15 million a year for such non-governmental customers currently, Wright said, but he expects rapid growth. Some day, Wright even hopes to get back into business in Iraq, where the company is currently banned.

So while the US military is out of Iraq and drawing down, albeit slowly, in Afghanistan, Wright said, that doesn’t mean ACADEMI will shrink. To the contrary: Wright plans to grow. After all, the State Department, other civilian agencies, and the private sector are still in dangerous places, only with fewer US troops deployed to protect them. “We’ve got some very stable customers that have enduring requirements for security in Afghanistan,” said Wright. “Our business is not going going to shrink quickly.” While some private security contractors will ultimately go out of business, he predicted, ACADEMI will be trying to buy them up. “The industry will now consolidate,” he said. “The strong will survive: We intend to be one of those.”

The company once called Blackwater isn’t going away. But what about the culture that permitted its infamous abuses — mistreatment of Afghan and Iraqi civilians, misappropriation of weapons, drug use, drinking, and the killing of at least 14 innocent Iraqis in 2007 in Baghdad’s Nisour Square?

…

Find this story at 8 june 2012

By Sydney J. Freedberg Jr.

Published: June 8, 2012

© Copyright 2012 AOL Inc. All Rights Reserved.

G4S: securing whose world?

You are not imagining it. The G4S logo really is popping up all over the place — in your local supermarket, on your local street, on police uniforms if you happen live in the English county of Lincolnshire.

And it’s all over the London Olympics, where 25,000 security people will be working under G4S control. The company’s bill, £300 million. (That’s right: £300 million).

The world’s biggest security company, G4S operates in 125 countries. Slogan: Securing Your World.

It’s based in Britain, where it is fast taking over vital public services. . . in policing, running prisons and children’s homes, dominating “asylum markets”, training magistrates, assessing welfare claimants, building and running hospitals and schools. It’s a very big player in the Private Finance Initiative.

G4S is installing smart meters in our homes, guarding our supermarkets, supplying number-plate recognition technology to retailers, the police and the military, performing covert surveillance for insurance companies.

In so many ways G4S is watching us.

Since early 2010 OurKingdom has been watching G4S, shining a light on this company’s extraordinary progress and its cosy relations with government.

Growing from our reporting on the scandal of child immigration detention here in the UK, OurKingdom’s award-winning reporting and analysis has been followed by, among others, the BBC, The Times, The Guardian and the New York Times ↑ .

We have explored human rights abuses and child protection failings. And revisited the horrible death of Mr Ward, the Aboriginal Elder cooked to death in G4S’s care, whose case casts doubt upon often-unchallenged assumptions about the virtues of privatisation.

We welcome fresh submissions, intelligence from within G4S, and reports, like this one, on G4S around the world. Please, let us know how G4S is securing your world.

Find this story at 1 June 2012 

Achtergelaten om te sterven

Op 26 maart 2011 vertrok vanuit Tripoli een bootje met aan boord 72 Afrikaanse vluchtelingen. De mannen, vrouwen en 2 baby’s waren op weg naar een nieuwe toekomst in Europa. Onderweg raakte de benzine op, en vervolgens dobberde de boot 2 weken op volle zee. Gadegeslagen door een helikopter, vissersschepen en een marineschip. Maar omdat niemand wat deed, vonden uiteindelijk 61 opvarenden de dood, waaronder de twee baby’s. Wouter Kurpershoek bericht over de schandalige gebeurtenis op de Middellandse Zee.

 

Uitzending Brandpunt 08 april 2012 

Polderen bij de politie

De sterkte van de Nederlandse politie is sinds 1991 met bijna de helft (43,9%) toegenomen, maar er zijn amper meer agenten op straat gekomen. Bovendien wordt door dat veel grotere politieapparaat nauwelijks een boef extra gevangen.

Dat blijkt uit interne rapporten van de Politieacademie waar KRO Brandpunt de hand op heeft weten te leggen. Hoe de politie steeds meer veranderd is in een bureaucratische moloch. Aart Zeeman onderzoekt waar de roep om meer blauw op straat uiteindelijk toe heeft geleid.

Uitzending Brandpunt 06 mei 2012

Roel van Duijn eist bij AIVD films en geluidsopnames op van “journalist” Wieting

Ik heb van de AIVD nu ook  foto’s, film- en geluidsopnamen opgeëist. Die zijn omstreeks 1970 gemaakt door een geheim agent van de Groep IJzerman. En aan de BVD overgedragen.

Ik vraag het onder het voorwendsel van journalistiek  gemaakte materiaal met het oog op een verfilming van mijn boek “Diepvriesfiguur”. Dit is  onlangs bij uitgeverij van Praag verschenen. Het nu door mij gevraagde  materfoto- , film- en geluidsmateriaal is van historisch belang.

   De Groep IJzerman is een groep van de Amsterdamse politie  geweest, die zich in de periode 1967-1972 heeft bezig gehouden met het inwinnen van inlichtingen omtrent opstandige groeperingen, waartoe Provo en de Kabouterbeweging behoorden. 

De bronnen

De naam van deze geheim agent was Dolf Wieting. Dit is uit verschillende openbare bronnen bekend. Zijn spionage-activiteiten zijn niet alleen uitgebreid beschreven  in mijn bovengenoemde boek, maar ook in  “De Groep IJzerman” van de politiehistoricus dr. G.Meershoek (uitgeverij Boom, 2011). In deze studie wordt hij als “Agent Zomer” aangeduid. In het tijdschrift “Ons Amsterdam”, van maart 2011, wordt duidelijk wie er achter dit pseudoniem schuil gaat. Eerder, in 1996, waren enkele van zijn activiteiten al beschreven in het boek “Louter Kabouter” van Coen Tasman (uitgeverij Babylon/De Geus).

Wieting gaf zich bij zijn activiteiten uit als journalist. Enkele malen heeft hij tegenover ons  voorgegeven medewerker van de VPRO te zijn.

Dolf Wieting heeft ongeveer 4 jaar voor de Groep IJzerman gewerkt. Vanaf begin 1968 tot en met zomer 1971. De Groep IJzerman bespioneerde t.b.v. de Amsterdamse politie en de BVD verschillende linkse jongerengroepen, waaronder de Kabouterbeweging.

Foto’s, films en geluidsbanden

Concreet eis ik u tenminste het materiaal dat Wieting geproduceerd heeft bij de volgende gelegenheden:

1. Opnames in de periode  eind 1969 t/m maart 1970 gemaakt in de studentensociëteit Akhnaton bij vergaderingen van de door mij opgerichte “Volksuniversiteit voor Sabotoga en Pseudo-erotiek”, een voorloper van de Kabouterbeweging.

2. Film -, foto- en geluidsmateriaal door hem gemaakt op 11 maart 1970 tijdens een kabouteractie bij de Juliana van Stolbergkazerne in Amersfoort, waar Kabouters naartoe getrokken waren om pamfletten te verspreiden over geweldloze defensietechnieken. Volgens de bovenbeschreven bronnen is Wieting daar aanvakelijk gearresteerd, maar onmiddellijk vrijgelaten met teruggave van zijn camera en andere apparatuur.

3. Volgens een rapport van de BVD, afgedrukt in “Diepvriesfiguur” als

    Document 7-1 heeft Wieting in mei 1970 filmopnames gemaakt van acties

    van de Kabouterbeweging in het kader van de gemeenteraadsverkiezingen.

     Citaat uit dit rapport: “Zowel het filmapparaat als de geluidsopname-

      apparatuur waren van professionele kwaliteit. Opmerkelijk was, dat

       richtlijnen van deze filmer voetstoots- en zonder enig ommentaar

       uitgevoerd.” Grappig genoeg wist de BVD-er die dit rapport gemaakt heeft

       dat Wieting ook een geheim agent was.

   Het rapport is in kopie bijgevoegd (eerste attachment).

   Ik herinner mij dat Wieting bij deze campagne mij, als lijsttrekker, niet 

    alleen op straat, maar ook bij mij thuis. herhaaldelijk heeft geïnterviewd

    met zijn filmcamera en bandrecorder.

4.Op de achttiende foto in “Diepvriesfiguur” is te zien hoe Wieting bij het kraken van een langdurig leegstaand pand in de Damstraat door de Kabouterbeweging, op 28 mei 1970, opnamen maakt van een vergadering. Wat is het resultaat daarvan geweest?

De foto is bijgevoegd (tweede attachment, in zwart jasje + microfoon aan onderkant foto).

5. Op pg. 86 van “De Groep IJzerman” wordt beschreven dat Wieting veel

     foto’s gemaakt heeft in het politiek café “De Pieter” in de

     Pieterspoortsteeg,in Amsterdam, dat vanaf 1968 gediend heeft als een

     onderkomen voor linkse jongerenbewegingen zoals de Kabouters.

 6. Op pagina 94 van dit laatste boek beschrijft de auteur hoe deze geheim agent ontmaskerd werd door een van onze medestanders, Hans Hofman,  In 1969. op het moment dat deze met een pistool zwaaide in een café in de Peperstraat. Het was zijn dienstpistool. Wieting ontkende krachtig dat hij een geheim agent was en om Hofman te intimideren schoot hij met een kogel een urinoir van het café kapot. Aangezien Wieting steeds met zijn apparatuur gezien werd, heeft hij waarschijnlijk ook rond deze gebeurtenis opnames gemaakt.

Een verzoek met gelijke strekking is verzonden aan de politie Amsterdam-Amstelland en aan de MIVD.

roelvduijn@planet.nl

1 June 2012